

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW

VOL. XXII.—JANUARY, 1897.—No. 85.

CARDINAL LAVIGERIE.

LE CARDINAL LAVIGERIE. Par *Mgr. Baunard*. Two Volumes, with Portraits and Maps. Paris: Ch. Poussielgue. 1896.

MONTALEMBERT, speaking of the great influence of St. Wilfrid over the men of his times, says it was due, above all, to his noble, manly, firm spirit on fire with enthusiasm ; to an energy that never flagged ; to his knowing when to wait, when to act ; to his never losing heart nor feeling fear ; to his having a soul that soared to heights which attract the eyes of the multitude as well as the fury of the thunder-storm. Then, after speaking of St. Wilfrid's eloquence, his love for learning and for Christian architecture, the great historian of the "Monks of the West" goes on to say that the saint rose superior to all trials, that he was consumed with love of justice, and that it was these things that made him tower above his fellows and riveted their attention and admiration even when they did not share his convictions. "There was always something generous, warm-hearted, grand in him which commanded the sympathy of all true hearts ; then, when adverse fortune, violence and ingratitude triumphed over him and stamped him with the seal of sacrifice nobly and holily borne, sympathy redoubled, and all that was least loveable or explicable in his conduct was forgotten."¹ This description, written by Montalembert, of St. Wilfrid, seems quite applicable to the late Cardinal Lavigerie. There was much in common in the character and career of the early English saint of the seventh and of the great African cardinal of the nineteenth century ; and after reading *Mgr. Bau-*

¹ *Les Moines d'Occident*, t. iv., p. 388.

nard's intensely interesting life of the Apostle of Africa, nobody would hesitate to admit the fittingness of Montalembert's words.

But there was another thing which the saint and the cardinal had in common: it was their deep love for the See of Peter. Thrice did St. Wilfrid hasten across seas and mountains to seek help, comfort and counsel from the Holy Father. Thirty and more times did Lavigerie, living in times when steam has made travel easier, imitate the saint's example. During the twenty-nine years of his episcopal life not a year passed that he did not visit Rome. France his country, Africa the land of his adoption, were alike dear to his great heart, but Rome held there the first place; for to Rome, to the Holy See, he looked to save both Africa and France from discord and darkness.

Charles Martial Lavigerie was born at Bayonne, on October 31, 1825. His mother was daughter of the director of the mint at Bayonne before the Revolution; it was from her that Lavigerie inherited the hot blood of the south that sometimes showed itself in his character. His father was from Auvergne, and held a respectable position in the customs. His parents seem to have been good, honest folk, enjoying life in their provincial town, or in the little country-house they owned outside it, or during their short yearly summer sojourn at Biarritz—worldly people in the best sense, striving to advance themselves and their children in life. So when Charles, first in his childhood by his loving to play at being a priest, in his boyhood and early manhood by his expressed wishes, sought to become a priest, his parents, far from fostering, discouraged his desires. They even formed projects for settling him in the matrimonial state. The good seed was sown by other hands than those of his parents. There were two old maid-servants in the household; these taught the future cardinal his prayers, his catechism, and took him with them to church. He loved to acknowledge all he owed to these good souls, and, wearing the red robes of a prince of the Church, he spoke thus to an assembly of priests: "Brethren, if I am what I am to-day, I owe it to those two good women. See how important it is to place good Christians in charge of children."

There are, however, one or two anecdotes of his childhood to show that the seed had fallen on good soil. He, who was one day to preach the crusade against slavery in the great capitals of Europe, delighted as a child to preach sermons in the family circle; nor would he suffer his little audience to break up before his discourse was ended, even when the dinner was getting cold on the table! It is also related how the future apostle of Africa showed his early zeal by catching the children of Jews—of whom there

were many in Bayonne—and forcibly baptizing them at the nearest fountain, consoling them for their ducking with the gift of a *sou* or two! After he had made his first communion and been confirmed, his desire to study for the Church became so strong and serious that his father took him to the Bishop of Bayonne, where, in answer to the prelate's questions, the young Lavigerie insisted on his great wish to become one day a parish priest in the country. After studying humanities at the college of his own diocese, he went to Paris at the age of fifteen, and for two years continued his college course under the celebrated Abbé Dupanloup, afterwards Bishop of Orleans. In October, 1843, he entered the seminary of St. Sulpice. The class to which he belonged on beginning his theological studies is still remembered as "the class of bishops," for no less than thirty of its members became bishops; of these, several became cardinals. Lavigerie was remembered at school as being always first in class and on the playground—a high-spirited lad, a bit unruly and pugnacious. At Christmas, 1847, he became sub-deacon. Two months later a revolution replaced the monarchy of Louis Philippe by a republic. Two of the students went out in secular dress to see the revolutionists at work, and were compelled to help in destroying a sentry-box. These two students, of whom Lavigerie was one, were both destined to become cardinals.

Although he was ordained priest in 1848, his public life did not, as his biographer remarks, really begin then. The next thirteen years were, in some sort, still years of preparation. He completed his intellectual training by taking his degree of doctor of theology and in teaching as professor of the Sorbonne.

But a wider sphere of action than a lecture room afforded was soon offered to the young priest. After the Crimean war, a number of Frenchmen of light and leading, among whom may be named the learned Baron Cauchy, Montalembert, Bosquet, a hero of the Russian war, the artist Flandrin and the saintly Ozanam, had founded an association for starting and maintaining schools in the East. Illustrious as was the patronage under which the work began, it seemed likely to be still-born. The work depended for its life on the alms of the faithful, so it was felt that a priest should be asked to be its manager. Father de Ravignan, the great Jesuit, was asked to obtain the services of Lavigerie. "If you think it is the will of God," answered the latter, "that I should accept the post, I am ready." "I believe it is," replied the Jesuit, and the matter was settled. The first thing was to make the *Œuvre des Écoles d'Orient* known, and to find resources to carry on the work. During the next three years Lavigerie visited all the great towns of France, preaching in each on behalf of the schools of the East, with the result that while the money collected in 1857 was less

than sixteen thousand francs, in 1859 it already exceeded sixty thousand.

In the following year the massacres in the Lebanon and at Damascus, in which more than nineteen thousand Christians were slain, which destroyed the homes of some seventy thousand, and in which numberless schools, convents, charitable institutions and chapels perished, and a vast territory was devastated, called on the work of the *Écoles d'Orient* to make a supreme effort. Europe had charged the French government to restore order, to carry official aid to the distressed population of the Lebanon. But this still left a wide field for charity to exercise itself. An appeal was made, and was nobly responded to by France, England, Ireland, Germany and Italy. Nearly two millions and a half of *francs* were subscribed and sent to the East. With these alms went the Abbé Lavigerie to see to their distribution. His mission lasted three months. It was then that he first came in touch with infidels; it was then, as he himself declared, that he discovered his real vocation.

On his return from Syria, he was received in audience by Pius IX., who was so struck by the clear information the young priest gave his Holiness concerning Oriental affairs, that it led the Pope, shortly afterwards, to call Lavigerie to Rome to hold the high office of Auditor of the Rota. As such, Monsignor Lavigerie spent sixteen months in Rome and obtained that knowledge of Roman life that was of no small use to him afterwards. At Rome he continued to aid the work of the *Écoles d'Orient*. One day, preaching on its behalf, he mentioned a fact worth recalling, in these terms: "Do you know, brethren, how many Christians there were between Aleppo and Gaza at the time of the Mohammedan invasion? How many in the plains and mountains of Palestine and Syria? Eighteen millions. And now after ten centuries of persecution? Not half a million!"

The position of Auditor of the Rota, that of an ecclesiastical diplomatist, was little suited to the active, bold character of Monsignor Lavigerie, specially when he had to be the mouthpiece of the crafty, Judas-like policy of the third Napoleon in regard to the Holy See. "I have too much to suffer here, Holy Father," he said, in one of these intimate conversations he was allowed often to hold with Pius IX. "I was not born to be a diplomatist, but a priest." His desire, too, became known in France, and the government nominated him to the See of Nancy. Ill-health alone prevented the Pope from personally consecrating, on March 22, 1863, the youthful bishop—he was only thirty-seven years old—and the Cardinal Villecourt replaced the Holy Father at this sacred function, in which he was assisted by the late Cardinal

Hohenlohe and by the Pope's Sacristan, Mgr. Marinelli, in presence of the French ambassador and a large gathering of Roman prelates and princes.

The new Bishop of Nancy was the junior in years of all the French bishops. *Caritas* was the device he took for his armorial bearings. But the youthful energy with which he set to work to rule his diocese made it seem at times as if he forgot his motto. He made sweeping reforms with bold, soldierly hands, and as his biographer shows, he often made mistakes and unintentionally inflicted wounds through his hasty zeal. He reorganized ecclesiastical studies; he insisted that teachers in convent schools should obtain a certificate proving that they were as competent to teach as the mistresses of official schools; he adopted the Roman Cereimonial in his cathedral, beautified the edifice, and carried out the functions with great grandeur; these, and many other measures excellent in themselves, caused no small friction by the almost imperious manner in which they were carried out. An iron will, an exaggerated sense of his duty, an apparent carelessness for what others felt or thought, added to want of experience, led the bishop to commit many mistakes in the government of his first diocese: yet it is to him that Nancy owes its great reputation for the godliness and learning of its clergy. And at this epoch of his life there is one episode that takes us aback when we consider how, ever after, Mgr. Lavigerie lovingly heeded the slightest wish that came from the Holy See. He received with a cold reserve the Encyclical *Quanta curâ* and the Syllabus. But he had been the pupil of Mgr. Dupanloup, the friend of Mgr. Maret, and a professor of the Sorbonne; he was still deluded by Liberalism.

Monsignor Lavigerie had not yet found the true field for his labors. His ideal was to be a missionary bishop as was St. Martin whom the bishop had called in his pastoral on the Saint, "a model conqueror of souls." Now it fell out that shortly after this, the bishop, being at Tours, had a dream in which he saw himself carried into a far land, where there came to him a mighty multitude of dusky or dark black men speaking strange tongues. It chanced that four days later, Mgr. Pavy, Bishop of Algiers, died. Marshal MacMahon, then Governor of Algeria, offered to propose Lavigerie to the emperor for the vacant see: the bishop of Nancy accepted without a moment's hesitation what to many would have been a sacrifice. "I was only following," he said, "the attraction a missionary life had ever had for me and I obeyed God's call."

The readiness with which the bishop accepted the nomination puzzled the marshal, and it perplexed him greatly when he found that Lavigerie had accepted the post in order to work for the con-

version of Mahommedans. This was against the traditional policy of the French government in Africa, which favored the infidels and allowed the Church no freedom to carry out her mission among them. The marshal informed the emperor that he did not want the bishop in his province. The emperor sent for Lavigerie and offered him the right of succession to an archiepiscopal see in France if he would give up Algiers. "Sire, since I have been nominated to the see, I wish and I must go thither." And nothing would make the bishop yield. The Pope approved his transfer from Nancy to Algiers, which meanwhile had been made into an archiepiscopal see, the two dioceses of Constantine and Oran being detached from its territory. On April 8, 1867, he took leave of his old diocese amid the regret of all. Long after they continued to speak of him there as "le grand Charles."

The new archbishop set out for Algiers with a mind determined as to the work he meant to do there. He had explained to his friends what we can only call a plan of his African campaign. He proposed first, in the colony itself, to bring the influence of the Church and of civilization to bear on the natives whom official France had left to their barbarism and their Koran; this he deemed would be possible by means of works of charity and French schools. And secondly, since Algiers was a way into the dark continent peopled by two hundred millions of infidels and pagans, it was his duty and that of his clergy to carry the light of the Gospel to those who sat in darkness. The plan was noble; its execution was nobler still, and proved truly that what the great Napoleon was among the conquerors of men, that Lavigerie was among the conquerors of souls.

The story of Mgr. Lavigerie's life from the moment of his becoming Archbishop of Algiers to his death, fills over eleven hundred closely printed pages in the two volumes before us. Yet there is not a redundant word in any one of them. So vast were the works he undertook for the Church and for civilization that to give in detail an account of them and of their author, no less space was necessary. Even to give a mere outline of them will require all the space at our disposal. These works fall mainly under three heads. First, for the conversion of Africa; secondly, those for the regeneration of France; and thirdly, those for the abolition of African slavery. Any one of these three divisions required the zeal, energy and courage of a great Christian hero for its direction, yet he alone sufficed to give the impulsion to all, to guide them all, if not to entire success, at least on the high road thereto.

The diocese of Algiers was, in its archbishop's plan, to be the base of his operations for the conversion of Africa. He began by asserting his authority. To one of the Vicars-Capitular, who had

told him of some abuses among the Algerian clergy, he said: "Tell them they will find me severe." An incident, trifling in itself, showed that he would keep his word if necessary. As he was entering his archiepiscopal city, through crowded streets lined by all the troops of the garrison, amid the roar of artillery and the strains of military bands, and accompanied by his clergy and the civil and military authorities, when he came in sight of his episcopal palace, he beheld its windows filled with gaily-dressed dames and damsels—the wives and daughters of the authorities of the city. He halted the procession and would not enter his palace until the last of these ladies had left it. "If ever you bring a lady up the staircase of this palace," he said that evening to his hall-porter, "mind, you will be the first to go down it, never to return." This act showed the manner of man his clergy and laity had got for their pastor.

They soon learned that if he could be severe, he could also be self-sacrificing for their temporal and spiritual welfare. He who only a few weeks before had hired a special train to fly from Rome before the cholera, when the epidemic broke out in his diocese, hastened back there, visiting the stricken in its hospitals at a time when fifteen hundred natives were dying daily. Sixty thousand victims fell before the disease, and in the same year, 1867, the locusts and a drought brought on a terrible famine in the land. The archbishop in his letters describes with the pen of a De Foe all the horrors of the famine. But even out of such evil good comes. It gave him the occasion he sought of attracting the natives to him by the exercise of Christian charity. In his own country-house and in his seminary for junior church students, he gave shelter to some seventeen hundred starving orphans whose parents had died by cholera or from starvation. His entire wardrobe, even to his violet cassock, went to clothe the starvelings. His efforts were well seconded by the government of Algiers and by none more warmly than by the wife of Marshal MacMahon. But this was not enough, and the archbishop had to take the journey to Paris, to become a beggar—happily a successful beggar—for his sorely-trying flock. But he looked higher for their salvation: he established on a better basis the Association of Notre Dame d'Afrique and of St. Augustine, an association of prayer for the conversion of Africa.

The archbishop's crusade by charity and prayer was not to proceed without let or hindrance. A government that called itself Christian opposed it. It was hostile to the Church, and the enemies of the Church are alike all the world over, whether in Bandon or in Algeria. Turk, Jew, or anything, rather than Papist is their war-cry. In Algeria, they placed Islam and Christianity on the

same footing, and even went so far as to impose the Koran on the mountaineers of Kabylia, who, if they had lost, had never renounced the faith. The municipal authorities of Algiers objected to schools taught by Christian brothers or by nuns. "Suffer little children to come unto Me," is perhaps the precept God's enemies like least. Then the honest, brave old Marshal MacMahon, bred unfortunately in the worst bureaucratic traditions of the French colony, set himself in opposition to the archbishop. In his short-sightedness, he failed to see that in Christianizing and civilizing the Arab, France would be the gainer. The watchword the marshal had received was: "The Gospel for the colonists; the Koran for the natives." He did not see that with the Koran the natives could never be won over, that, as the archbishop said, now or a thousand years hence the Koran would always teach them that it was a holy and wholesome thing to cast us "dogs of Christians" into the sea. And, added the archbishop, France must preach or allow the Gospel to be preached to the Arabs or else drive them into the desert afar from all civilization.

Inspired by evil counsellors, egged on by irreligious journalists, the honest marshal penned a letter to the archbishop charging him with wishing to convert the Arabs by force, with putting himself in opposition to the government, in painting the situation of the colony in too sombre tints. It was the old cry, "Thou art not Cæsar's friend!" It was in this letter that MacMahon tried to palliate the acts of cannibalism done in Algeria during the famine, by alleging that in like circumstances similar acts had been committed in Catholic Ireland. This unfounded statement drew from Cardinal Cullen a severe and well-merited reprimand. The marshal should never have signed a letter containing such a false charge against the land of his forefathers. The letter too quickly received a very strong reply from the archbishop. The marshal had appealed to Cæsar; so did the archbishop; both wrote and both took the road to Paris. Lavigerie boldly demanded that, in the interest of the colony itself, the Church there should be free to fulfil its mission. Napoleon III. replied: "You have two hundred thousand Catholic colonists to evangelize; leave the Arabs to the marshal to discipline."

This reply did not defeat the valiant archbishop; he wrote again to the emperor and demanded for the Church in Algeria the freedom she enjoyed in Turkey. At the same time he sought to have audience of the emperor; twice he was foiled. The emperor having gone to Biarritz, Lavigerie followed him there and was admitted to see him alone. The emperor, more weak than wicked, was soon gained over, convinced by the archbishop's manly and apostolic words. The emperor ordered that the conflict between

his governor and the archbishop should cease; that his Minister of War should write him a public letter in which it was said: "The government never intended to restrict your rights as a bishop," and in which it was promised that the archbishop's works in the colony would be respected and might go on. After thirty years of conflict between the Church and the State in Algeria, the Church had secured freedom to carry out her divine mission. This was Lavigerie's first, perhaps his greatest, victory in his conquest of Africa, for it was a victory that made all others possible.

No conqueror can march without troops, and most march with a picked corps. Napoleon had his "Old Guard"; La Moricière, the conqueror of Abd-el-Kader, his African "Zouaves." Archbishop Lavigerie, for his spiritual conquests, had his "White Fathers." Some words of the aged Lazarist Father Girard, superior of the Seminary of Algiers, inspired three of his students to offer themselves for missionary work to their archbishop. The institute began. Its members were to lead a hardy, active life; they were to familiarize themselves with the ways and language of the Arabs; they were so to identify themselves with the people among whom they were to labor, as to adopt their white dress and red fez. The institute rapidly prospered, and soon from its novitiate at Maison-Carrée, went forth its first missionaries. Only twenty-seven years have passed since the institute was begun, and now? Unroll the map of Catholic missions in Africa. Throughout Algeria and Tunis, the missions of the White Fathers are scattered broadcast; away into the Sahara; along the Congo; round the great African lakes and even in Madagascar they are at work together, in many places, with the Missionary Sisters of Notre Dame d'Afrique. Uganda, no longer theirs, owes the introduction of Christianity to their zeal. They have now houses in Rome, Jerusalem, Paris, in Belgium, Holland and Tyrol. They have prospered with the blessing of the Holy See whose devoted sons they are; they have prospered because they have already been blessed with the blood of their martyrs. We read in history of how the monks civilized so much of Europe; we read of the coming of the friars with their holy poverty; we read of the rise of the Society of Jesus with its apostles carrying the Gospel around the world. We are apt to think that these things are of the past. No, they are of the present; they are realities; and the history of "the White Fathers" of Cardinal Lavigerie is a history of our own times—of the last quarter of this nineteenth century. The Church has lost none of its glorious life-giving powers.

Soon after the first steps had been taken to form a body of missionaries, their founder was called to Rome to take part in the Vatican Council. There he was, as he said he would be, "ever on

the side of Peter." Then came the war in France and the proclamation of the republic, which gave rise to troubles in Algiers in which the archbishop was so menaced that he had to seek refuge at Maison-Carrée. Rome too had been taken from Pius IX.; a short strong letter of protest was penned by the archbishop against the usurpation. Keenly did he feel the catastrophes that overwhelmed his country. He was at table with some civil and military authorities when news came of the fall of Metz. In sign of sorrow, he cut the dinner short and went on board the steamer that was to take him to Constantine. "Gentlemen," he said to the officers and crew that stood on deck to receive him, "Metz with its hundred thousand men has capitulated; France is lost—let us pray for her." And he fell on his knees, as did the others. It was a heartrending spectacle.

At this time he was called on to administer the diocese of Constantine—a difficult task, and that at a moment when his own diocese and its works were in dire distress, the war having put a stop to the alms coming from France. Insurrection, too, had broken out in Kabylia. Happily, this led the President of the French Republic, M. Thiers, to send Admiral Comte de Gueydon to rule Algeria. He was a man after the archbishop's own heart. A committee of revolutionists had made government in Algiers impossible. On his arrival the admiral, who was without troops, landed a party of thirty armed sailors to occupy government house. As soon as he himself came there, the delegates of the committee came to try to intimidate the new governor. He met them in the courtyard of the palace. "Gentlemen, you asked to see me. Here I am; what do you want? The state of siege? No. Then if it is not that, I don't know what else you can want. Begone." The delegates took the hint, backed, as it was, by the rifles and cutlasses of the sailors. The admiral saved Algeria, and with it the works of its archbishop, to whom he proved a staunch friend. Although the archbishop had many difficulties and trials still to face, such as the refusal of the home government to continue its grants to his diocese, the law against religious congregations, and that which compelled his church students, and even his younger priests, to serve in the army, his diocese and his missions grew and flourished. As early as 1877 the Holy See had been anxious to confer on him a signal mark of its favor, and to create the first African, as it had recently created the first American, cardinal. But Mgr. Lavigerie opposed the Holy Father's desire so long as Marshal MacMahon was President of the French Republic, to whom the question of the archbishop's entry into the Sacred College would have had to be submitted. Nevertheless, the downfall of the marshal did not make matters easier, for it brought into

office men hostile to the Church, before whom Mgr. Lavigerie would not bow his head, even to put on a cardinal's hat. Not that he did not covet the honor, not indeed for himself, but because it would better enable him to promote the interests of his missions. At Rome, his elevation to the cardinalate was anxiously desired by Leo. XIII. and many leading cardinals; at Paris, even the government wished it, though it was its suppression of the salaries its predecessors paid to the French cardinals that delayed the Pope in making any new cardinals in France. The difficulty, however, was got over, and on March 19, 1882, Mgr. Lavigerie received notice from the cardinal secretary of state of his having been chosen to enter the Sacred College.

It was in Tunis, at his residence of St. Louis, almost on the spot where the holy King of France had breathed his last, amid the ruins of Carthage, that the new prince of the Church received the noble guard who brought the pontifical letters instituting him Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church. A few days later, surrounded by his clergy, by the officers of the French Army in Tunis, and by the French resident and other consular authorities, he received from the same noble guard the scarlet skull-cap of cardinal. In replying to the papal envoy's speech, the cardinal said that, as the oldest of the French archbishops, he had been pointed out to the Holy Father for the high honor conferred on him; that very soon the purple must become his winding-sheet. But, he added, it was not my humble person, but Africa, hitherto the only quarter of the globe not represented in the Sacred College, which Leo XIII. desired to honor. There was a strange tinge of melancholy in the cardinal's speech, especially when he referred to the ruins around him of that ancient Carthage which told with such eloquent silence of human greatness and its hollowness. But the lone hills around were undyingly linked with much Christian glory; this was reviving. He bade the Pope's envoy tell Leo XIII. that the cross now crowned the summit of the citadel of Carthage, and that there rose a house of prayer in memory of France's royal saint. "And you will tell the Holy Father," he concluded, "that you have seen around me this day representatives of all the nations of Europe, and that in his name I preach to them charity, union and peace."

The cardinal was, as we have now seen, a great prelate; he was also a great patriot. There was in his patriotism none of that "chauvinism" of the *café-chantant*, none of that "jingoism" of the music-hall. His patriotism was enlightened. While he worked to place his own country in the van of Christian civilization, he could appreciate the merits of other countries, he could sympathize in their sorrows and in their joys. For instance, he had a *Te*

Deum sung in his cathedral for the escape of Queen Victoria from assassination. He could rejoice at the freedom the Maltese enjoyed under British rule. Even when British Protestantism was ruining his flourishing mission in Uganda, he did not rail at England; he only appealed through Cardinal Manning to the British premier to right his wrongs. His patriotism never led to his meddling in mere party politics. As Bishop of Nancy he kept himself and his priests aloof from such politics, bidding them do no more than use their electoral rights as citizens. Once, indeed, he sought, with the approval of Pius IX., parliamentary honors, and offered himself for a seat in the French Assembly after the war with Germany. He came forward "as a Frenchman who would save his country's honor from the hands of the enemy and from anarchy; as a bishop, to defend the rights of the Church and the truths of the Gospel; as an Algerian, to tell France what she might expect from her colony and her colony from her." He was not, however, elected.

If he was never a gladiator in party politics, he did not hesitate to intervene in political matters when he could, or thought he could, attain some great good thereby. He was the prime mover in the French occupation of Tunis, because he believed it was for the good of his country, of civilization and of the Church. The same motives made him desire, especially after two interviews he had with the Comte de Chambord at Carlsbad, to see that son of St. Louis mount the French throne. It was on the feast of St. Louis, in 1874, immediately after these interviews, that Mgr. Lavigerie wrote his famous letter to the count. It was a strong appeal to the count to come to France, and France would accept him as her king. It was nothing more nor less than a *coup d'etat* which the archbishop proposed. The plan was bold and perilous; it would have delighted a Henry of Navarre. At Frohsdorf, more timid counsels prevailed. Royalty forgot that

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."

Cardinal Lavigerie must have felt more and more that royalty had let slip its chance, and that when its Orleanist representative had stooped to seek the aid of a military charlatan its cause was lost. What was left for Catholics but to rally to the republic? A letter to his flock, dated February 3, 1890, recommended French Catholics to "accept the national form of government; to unite themselves for the more energetic defence, in parliament and in the press, of the cause and rights of religion; to hold aloof from party

quarrels, passions and schemes purely political; and, above all, to implore God's help for France and for the Church." This, too, he felt was what Leo XIII. desired.

Being on his way to Rome about this time, the cardinal had an interview with President Carnot at Fontainebleau. He never revealed fully what then passed between him and the president. It is almost certain that the chief question then discussed was that of rallying French Catholics to the republic. Already, at Rome, Leo XIII. was disposed to recommend this policy, as he had been deeply impressed by M. Grévy and M. Freycinet having attributed the persecution the Church in France suffered to "the belligerent attitude" of French Catholics towards the republic. It was at this psychological moment, to use a Bismarckian phrase, that Cardinal Lavigerie had audience of the Holy Father to give an account of his anti-slavery crusade. Leo XIII. suddenly changed the subject of conversation to ask about the political state of France and the desirability of Catholics uniting, on constitutional grounds, to fight for their rights. Finding the cardinal's views in agreement with his own, Leo XIII. asked the cardinal to be the exponent of his wishes that Catholics should rally to the republic in France. The cardinal, having consulted two of the superiors of his "White Fathers," then in Rome, consented. The act which the Pope asked from the cardinal was one that jeopardized the work of his "White Fathers," for their resources came largely from French monarchists of different shades. But it was the will of the Pope, so no matter the cost, said the cardinal and his advisers.

The cardinal returned to Africa. For some days he pondered how best he might perform the great act Leo XIII. required of him, speaking, however, to no man of what he was about to do. The French Mediterranean fleet was at anchor in Algiers roads; the cardinal resolved to invite its chief officers to meet at his table the civil and military authorities of Algiers; and there was more reason to do this, as, in the absence of the governor-general, the cardinal was the Frenchman of highest rank in the colony. It was on Thursday, November 12, 1890. "At the end of the banquet," wrote the cardinal afterwards, "the moment had come to do the most dreaded act of my life." He was excessively nervous about making a short speech which he had carefully made ready beforehand. He felt that every Frenchman was listening to words destined, perhaps, to begin a fresh chapter in the history of his country. He rose and drank to the health of the French Navy. He spoke of the union of soldiers, sailors and civilians around the table of an aged archbishop, all in the service of France, as typical of the union the Church and its pastors desired to see in France.

Then followed a brief and brilliant appeal to all to cease opposing and to support the form of government which the will of the nation had given France. "Unless we resign ourselves to this, unless we accept this patriotically, it is impossible to keep order and peace, to save the world from social dangers, to save even religion itself, of which we are the ministers."

The cardinal's auditors were stricken dumb by his speech; he had even to remind the admiral that he had not replied to the toast. Admiral Duperré, perhaps at heart a Royalist, rose and simply said: "I drink to the health of his Eminence and of the clergy of Algiers." As the guests departed, the band of music of the cardinal's students struck up, as it had done on similar occasions before, the *Marseillaise*. That evening when the newspapers brought to Leo XIII. the account of the toast, he said to those about him: "Why should not French Catholics imitate the Primate of Africa?" And when the *Marseillaise* incident was mentioned, the Pope added, with a smile: "Ah, I didn't ask his Eminence for that."

The speech was received in France with a howl of execration from all the Royalist, Imperialist, and Radical papers; with joy by the moderate Republican journals; with guarded courtesy by the Catholic organs. The latter, with the "Univers" at their head, have now loyally accepted the Republic. The storm, however, aroused by the cardinal's words had not died out at his death. He had, however, the consolation of having done his duty to his country and to the Holy Father, though at cost of mental suffering that undoubtedly hastened his end.

Sufficient time has not elapsed as yet to tell how far French Catholics have listened to the advice which Cardinal Lavigerie gave them in the toast that caused so much wild excitement. Since then Leo XIII. has publicly endorsed with dignified approval that advice, and it may be hoped that its adoption will bring forth good fruits. But of the fruits of his crusade against African slavery there can be no doubts. When England, in 1838, had given freedom to nearly a million slaves in her colonies; when the French Republic, in 1848, had done likewise to another quarter of million of slaves; when in 1863, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed free the four millions of slaves in the United States; when, lastly, Dom Pedro, in 1888, had determined that the two millions of slaves in his empire of Brazil should be set free, the world might believe that slavery had vanished from its surface. Cardinal Lavigerie soon undeceived the world. He only knew too well from the reports of his missionaries that what Livingstone and other explorers had reported was only too true; that in a quarter of a century ten millions of human beings perished on

their way from Central Africa to those slave-markets kept open to provide the followers of Mahomet with slaves to do their work or to fill their harems.

Cardinal Lavigerie who, ever since he had been in Africa, had in all his letters to his flock never ceased protesting against this traffic, now wrote to the Holy Father. He in turn in his Encyclical *in plurimis* embodied in it, almost word for word, what the cardinal had written to him about African slavery. Two days after the Pope's letter had been issued, Cardinal Lavigerie presented a large body of pilgrims from Lyons and from Africa to the Pope. Among these pilgrims were twelve negroes redeemed from slavery. Pointing them out to the Holy Father, and having spoken of what they had suffered and how they had been rescued, the cardinal added: "But, Holy Father, in the heart of our immense continent they have left behind them a whole people—their people, doomed to such a dire fate as they have escaped—a hundred million of men, women and children condemned to such a life or to such a death."

The Pope's reply to the cardinal's address was virtually an order to begin an anti-slavery crusade. The cardinal did not allow the grass to grow under his feet before fulfilling the Pope's order. He hurried to Paris, where the President and the leading members of the French government promised their support to the crusade. He began preaching it from the pulpit of Saint-Sulpice, on July 1, 1888, in the same church where, half a century earlier, he had begun his sacerdotal life. His sermon lasted an hour and a half; five thousand people crushed into the church to hear it. Next day the press scattered the cardinal's words all over France and they found an echo in every true heart. But he had resolved that his crusade should not be preached to France alone; wherever he could make his voice heard, thither would he go. On July 31, he spoke in Princess's Hall, London, supported by Cardinal Manning and Lord Granville, with the pick of London society for his audience. Those present that evening have not forgotten the deep impression the cardinal's words made on them. Fifteen days later, on the feast of the Assumption, he preached the crusade from the pulpit of Sainte-Gudule at Brussels with such success that the Belgian Anti-Slavery Society was forthwith founded and a thousand pounds there and then subscribed for its wants. A similar society had begun to operate in France; a kindred one in Spain. Thither, as well as to Germany, the cardinal would have gone had not the efforts already made over fatigued him. He could only write letters and send printed copies of his speeches to his friends in the two countries. The Germans had taken up the matter warmly and were happy enough to draw from Prince Bis-

marck the news that Germany and England were negotiating to bring all the nations interested in Africa to take action in common to stop the slave-trade. Before the year was out English and German ships were blockading the east coast of Africa to stop the Arab slave-trade. This was the first great result of the cardinal's crusade. The cardinal did not, encouraged by the Holy Father, cease his efforts. Rome—where the Masonic newspapers did their worst to ruin his work against slavery—Naples, and Milan heard his eloquent words, and Italy was united in the great anti-slavery movement which had spread itself, like some great tidal wave, over all western Europe. In the summer of 1889, it was proposed to hold an international congress at Lucerne of representatives of all the anti-slavery societies of the world. But on the very eve of the meeting, it was found that their electoral duties at home prevented most of the French delegates from coming to the congress, so the cardinal saw fit to prorogue it until the following spring. This was a bitter disappointment to many, to none more so than to the cardinal. Finally, the congress met in Paris on August 3, 1890, but it had lost much of its importance, for the powers had met in conference at Brussels and passed their famous act for the suppression of African slavery and slave-trade. The congress had but to approve that act; it had already largely won the approbation of Cardinal Lavigerie and the Holy Father Leo XIII., the two first promoters of the anti-slavery crusade which the powers interested in Africa had now solemnly bound themselves to carry out.

Such, in general outlines, was the life-work of Cardinal Lavigerie—work often done amid intense physical, and hardly less intense moral, sufferings. That tall, imposing, stalwart frame was weakened by the multitude of labors it had undergone; that flame of life, which the doctors said might have burned on beyond man's ordinary span of existence had it burned less fiercely, began to flicker. He had never ceased to labor except when illness compelled him to desist. Rising at five, and often even earlier, his Mass and devotions over, he would cast a quick glance through the newspapers, then busy himself and his hardworked secretaries with his correspondence, which was world-wide. He read only a few books and those chiefly that dealt in some way with Africa. His recreation in Africa was a walk to one or other of his religious establishments; in the afternoon he had business to transact with many visitors; to none did he seem hurried by his work. Nevertheless that work was constantly prolonged far into the night. In his habits he continued as simple as if he had been no more than the humble priest he had desired to be in his youth. He loved, indeed, for God's greater glory, to appear in

great splendor on occasion of any great ecclesiastical function, or when he had to represent the Church as its archbishop or as its cardinal. If he had to give a public entertainment, it was splendid; his own daily fare was of the simplest. He was of course a great traveller by land and sea, but on the latter he suffered severely, if the sea was rough. He never wore the purple on his journeys, so that he was constantly mistaken for a simple missionary. "Ah, you are from Algiers," one would ask. "Then you know Lavigerie?" It was thus that on one occasion a priest from Nancy criticised his late bishop to his face. Lavigerie listened calmly and replied, as they were parting: "All you have said about Lavigerie is quite true, M. l'Abbé, except what you said of his wish that you should become his vicar-general. This I certainly never dreamed of." He often wished to appear and even was severe, and would sometimes storm at others; but these moments of terrible excitement quickly passed; an occasionally rough exterior hid a grateful heart, full of the milk of human kindness.

And when that great heart ceased to throb on November 23, 1892, there died one whose name will go down with honor to posterity in the annals of France, of Africa, and of the Church. The cardinal's body was taken from Algiers to Carthage, of which see he had become the first archbishop. There, in the primatial Church he founded, the mortal remains of the great cardinal were laid to rest. He is dead; not so his works. They survive and are hastening that day he so desired when the dark continent shall become a land bright with Christian civilization.

WILFRID C. ROBINSON.

BRUGES, BELGIUM.

THE CHIPPEWAS AND OTTAWAS: FATHER BARAGA'S BOOKS IN THEIR LANGUAGE.¹

IN Colonial times, before the American Revolution, the domain of the Iroquoian Confederacy extended as far west as the Cuyahoga River, where the city of Cleveland now stands; but the Senecas, who were the guardians of the "Western Door" of the "Long House," claimed jurisdiction along the shore of Lake Erie as far up as Sandusky. The domain proper of the Chippewas and their allies, the Hurons, the Ottawas, and the Pottawotomis, commenced at the Cuyahoga River, and extended 60 miles inland, including portions of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and part of Wisconsin, the shores of Lake Michigan, and the littoral of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and the Georgian Bay. Here the joint control of the territory ended. Among the people of the Huron, the Ottawa, and the Pottawotomi nations the Chippewa dialect was spoken and understood, although the Huron language differed in its roots and gutturals from that of the Chippewas.

Without regard to the national boundaries subsequently outlined, the Chippewa domain extended from St. Mary's River around both shores of Lake Superior to its head-waters at Fond du Lac, and thence away around to the Mississippi and beyond to the shores of Hudson Bay and further westward. After the American Revolution the Federal Government found the nations mentioned more or less under the influence of the British Indian Department at Quebec. It became necessary to bring them under American control, and this was effected by the treaty of Fort McIntosh, in 1785, where a treaty of peace was concluded between the United States and the Ohio Delawares, the Chippewas, the Hurons, the Ottawas, and the Pottawotomis. The country bordering on Lake Erie, as far up as Toledo—60 miles back of the lake shore—was ceded to the United States, with certain reservations of lands occupied at the time by communities of the Indian Nations who were parties in the negotiation of this treaty. The post of Detroit, with 12 square miles in its surroundings, the island of Michilimacinac and its dependencies, and 12 miles square

¹ See "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, January, 1896; "The Chippewas of Lake Superior," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, April, 1896; "Father Baraga Among the Chippewas," *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, July, 1896.

on the mainland, were also ceded at this treaty. Here, then, commenced the American control of Chippewa, Ottawa, Huron, and Pottawotomi domain over the territory bordering on the shores of Lake Erie and the *Detroit*, and the river St. Clair.

In 1789 General St. Clair concluded a treaty with the same nations at Fort Harmer, when other important cessions were made.

In 1789 General Wayne negotiated at Greenville the most important Indian treaty hitherto made with the same Indian nations, as also the Miamis and several Illinois nations, at which was ceded much of the territory unceded in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, including the site of Chicago, and the littoral as well as the islands of Lakes St. Clair, Huron, and Michigan, with certain reservations which were acquired in part by subsequent treaties, held in 1805, 1807 and 1808. Then occurred the war of 1812. In 1815 General Harrison negotiated at Springwells, now Detroit, a treaty with the Chippewas, the Hurons, and Pottawotomis, at which peace was assured to those nations, who acknowledged on their part and ratified the treaty of Greenville, which effectually ceded control of the Northwest Territory to the United States.

This important treaty was followed by that of St. Louis, in 1816, when much of Illinois was ceded; and in 1817 by General Cass' treaty at the Miami Rapids, when reservations were ceded; and again by General Cass at Saginaw, Michigan, in 1819, between the Chippewas and the Government, in which important cessions of land were made on the littoral of Lake Michigan, subject to certain reservations. In 1820 General Cass negotiated a treaty with the Chippewas at Sault St. Marie, at which they ceded all the land on the Rivér St. Mary, reserving the right to camp on the shores and to fish in the rapids in perpetuity. This was the first cession by the Chippewas of territory in their home country proper. In 1821, at a treaty made at Chicago, the Chippewas, Ottawas and Pottawotomis made extensive cessions of territory on the south shore of Lake Michigan and on the St. Joseph River. In 1825 General Cass negotiated the famous treaty of Prairie du Chien, where the Sacs and Foxes, the Iowas, other nations of the Missouri and the Mississippi, the Sioux, and the Chippewas were represented. At this treaty the war between the Chippewas and the Sioux, which, according to General Cass, had existed for 200 years, was happily ended, and the territorial boundaries of each nation were permanently defined. Peace was also made between the Sioux and the other Indian nations represented. This treaty, by which the Indian wars between the Western and Southwestern Indian nations was ended, was probably the most important of the Indian treaties negotiated by General Cass.

In 1826 General Cass had this treaty ratified by the Chippewa chiefs of the head waters of Lake Superior and westward, who were not present at Prairie du Chien in 1825, at Fond du Lac.¹

This treaty was followed by that of Butte des Morts, negotiated by General Cass and Colonel McKenney, in 1827, when the southern boundary line of the Chippewa domain in Wisconsin was defined and established.

In 1828 General Cass and Louis Ménard negotiated a treaty with the Chippewas, the Ottawas, the Pottawotomis, the Sac and Fox, and the Winnebagos, defining the boundaries of the Chippewa domain in Illinois and Wisconsin, and in relation to the relinquishment of the titles of these nations to the lands in which were the lead mines in Illinois. This brings us down to the time when the Pottawotomis, the Ottawas, and the Chippewas ceded their lands on the western shore of Lake Michigan and in Wisconsin, and, besides money and other considerations, were assigned five million acres of land west of the Mississippi. This treaty was negotiated at Chicago, September 26, 1833, by Governor Porter, of Michigan, and two other commissioners. Its results were unfortunate for the Pottawottomis, nearly all of whom were Catholic, who were removed by force of arms from their reservations on the St. Joseph River and shore of Lake Michigan to the territory assigned them west of the Mississippi; and to the Ottawa tribes on the littoral of Lake Michigan, as well as those in the Grand River Valley, who had been evangelized by Father Baraga, who were obliged to follow the Pottawottomis to the unknown west. Such of the Chippewa tribes as had been domiciled in the lower peninsula of Michigan, in Illinois, and in part of Wisconsin, who had been parties to this treaty, shared the fate of their allies, the Ottawas and Pottawotomis, and were removed from their ancient homes. Henry R. Schoolcraft negotiated at Washington, March 28, 1836, an important treaty, by which extensive cessions of their reservations were made by the Chippewas, in consideration of a large sum of money and permanent reservations for the use of those of this nation living north of the Straits of Mackinac, at Point au Barbe and Mille Coquin River, where there were fisheries; the Beaver Islands, Round Island, near Michilimackinac; the Che-naux Islands, and a part of the adjacent north coast of Lake Huron; Sugar Island, with its islets in the River St. Mary; 640 acres at the Mission of the Little Rapids, a tract on the Lake Superior shore south of Point Iroquois, including islets and fishing grounds in the vicinity; 640 acres on Grand Island, and 2000 acres on the

¹ See "Frederick Baraga among the Ottawas," *AM. CATH. QUAR. REVIEW*, vol. xxi., No. 81, January, 1896, p. 109.

main land south of it; and two sections on the northern extremity of Green Bay. By a subsequent treaty, made by Mr. Schoolcraft at Washington, May 9, 1836, further cessions were made by the Chippewas of lands in the vicinity of River St. Clair near Lake Huron, Michigan, for which government was to pay to the residents on the land ceded a certain annuity during ten years, and to provide them with 8320 acres for new homes west of the Mississippi. At a treaty negotiated at Detroit by Mr. Schoolcraft, January 14, 1837, the Chippewas of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan ceded large tracts of land on the Au Sable, the Rifle River, the Kawkawling River, the Flint River, the Cass River, an island containing 1000 acres in the Saginaw Bay, 2000 acres on the Saginaw River, another tract of 1000 acres on the east side of the same river, 640 acres at Great Bend on Cass River, another tract of 1000 acres on the same river, 10,000 acres on the Shiawasse River, 6000 acres on the Titabewassing River, 6000 more acres at Birds Town on the same river, and one tract of 40,000 acres on the Saginaw River—in all, 102,400 acres. The Indians on certain of the tracts sold were allowed to remain in their homes five years before removing west of the Mississippi. By an agreement made at this treaty, the government was to sell the lands ceded, and to pay the net proceeds in annuities to the tribes ceding, the proceeds of sales, less expenses, to be funded, and to advance funds to enable the Indians to remove to their new homes when the same should be satisfactorily located. It is to be remarked, in connection with this treaty, that most of the tracts ceded were pine lands in demand; these the government proposed to sell for money at the established price; the number of Indians interested were not many, only twenty-seven chiefs and head men were parties to the treaty, while only three of the tracts were actually occupied by Indian families.

The treaty made in 1837, at St. Peter's, by Governor Dodge and the Chippewas of Leech Lake, Gull Lake, St. Croix River, Lake Court d'Oreille, Lac du Flambeau, La Pointe, Mille Lac, Sandy Lake, Snake River, Fond du Lac, Red Cedar Lake, Red Lake, all of whom were constituents of Father Baraga, who at the time was absent in Europe, was in regard to the cession of lands very important, taking into consideration the impoverished condition of the people of the respective localities at the time.

The territory ceded comprised about a fifth of the State of Minnesota, as at present constituted; a large part of Wisconsin, and extended from the head-waters of Lake Superior to the Mississippi. In consideration, the government was to pay in money and goods to the value of \$35,000 annually for twenty years—besides a sum of \$100,000 to the half-breeds in the tribes negotiating the

treaty, in one sum. A further sum of \$70,000 was to be paid in settlement of claims held against these Indians. The privilege of hunting, etc., on the lands ceded was granted during the pleasure of the President. A treaty made at Flint River, Michigan, by Mr. Schoolcraft, December 20, 1837, provides for the expenses of the removal of the Chippewas interested in the Saginaw treaty, and in the lower portions of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, to a reservation to be selected for them at the head-waters of the Osage River, west of the Mississippi.

On January 23, 1838, Mr. Schoolcraft negotiated another treaty with the Chippewas at Saginaw, Michigan, providing for their expatriation to the West. October 4, 1842, Robert Stuart negotiated at La Pointe a treaty with the Chippewas of Lake Superior and the Mississippi, at which all the valuable mineral lands in Minnesota, Wisconsin and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan remaining uncaded were ceded to the government. At the treaties of 1846, 1847, 1848, two in 1855, four in 1856, of 1860, 1863, 1864, 1865, two in 1866 and of 1867, important cessions of land were made in the Lower and Upper Peninsulas of Michigan, in Minnesota and Wisconsin. In some, provision was made for the expatriation of the Chippewas to the country west of the Mississippi; in others reservations were assigned by government to the tribes who did not emigrate, including those tributary to La Pointe, at L'Anse, Beaver Island, Cross Village, Arbre Croche, Grand River and Grand Traverse, as well as of the Swan Creek and Saginaw tribes.¹ All the evangelized communities within the lake circuit of Father Baraga's missionary work among the Chippewas of Lake Superior and those on the Lower Peninsula of Michigan were, by his influence, secured permanent reservations near their ancient homes.

At L'Anse, where fifty years ago Father Baraga built his missionary chapel and gathered around him a colony of his neophytes, there are at the present day over 700 Chippewas who lead Christian lives; there is a resident missionary, a church and school. Few full-blood Chippewas are to be found among the people of this locality; they dress like white men—most of the men speak English, but the Chippewa dialect is universally spoken in their homes. They are not under the care of the Government Indian Bureau at Washington. There are probably 1000 living in the territory tributary to Sault Ste Marie, and 2000 more around and south of the Straits of Mackinac. The religious welfare of the Chippewas of L'Anse and of the 3000 above mentioned is supervised by the Bishop of Marquette. In the Lower Peninsula of

¹ For the official copies of all the treaties mentioned above, see *United States Statutes at Large*, "Indian Treaties," by Richard Peters; Boston edition.

Michigan, according to the United States Census of 1890, there are probably 3000 Chippewas living on their respective reservations, whose populations vary from 50 to 200, who dress like white people, and among whom the Chippewa dialect is exclusively used; they mingle but little with their white neighbors. They are mostly Catholic; their religious welfare is in charge of the Bishop of Grand Rapids; during the past fifty years several eminent Catholic missionaries have labored among the Indian communities of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan.

It will be remembered that Father Baraga's missionary labors among the Chippewas commenced under adverse circumstances sixty-one years ago at La Pointe, an island in the head-waters of Lake Superior, which at the present time is within the boundaries of the State of Wisconsin.

It is the headquarters of the United States Indian Agency at La Pointe, which for some years has been in charge of Lieutenant W. A. Mercer, an army officer detailed for this special service.

The La Pointe Agency includes a series of reservations aggregating over half a million acres. Four of these reservations are in Wisconsin and three in Minnesota,¹ viz.:

	Acres.	Population.
Red Cliff, Bayfield County, Wis., ...	11,457	555
Bad River, Ashland County, Wis., ...	124,333	655
Lac Court d'Oreilles, Sawyer County, Wis., ...	66,136	1116
Lac du Flambeau, Oneida County, Wis., ...	69,824	794
Fond du Lac, Carleton County, Minn., ...	92,346	759
Vermillion Lake, St. Louis County, Minn., ...	131,629	760
Grand Portage, Cook County, Minn., ...	51,840	324

These are all familiar names of localities where Father Baraga starved and shivered during the first decade of his apostolate among the Chippewa Indians, 1835-1845.

The aggregate population is nearly 5000, and is probably greater at present than it was during Father Baraga's apostolate.

Most of the Chippewa families are living on allotted lands, which they cultivate; and they live fairly well. The timber industries in Lac du Flambeau and Bad River Reservations are worked to advantage on the contract system.

The religious welfare of the Chippewas of the La Pointe Agency, most of whom have preserved the faith, is under charge of the Bishop of La Crosse. It will be remembered that the Franciscan fathers succeeded Father Baraga in missionary work in this locality; they now have many churches and missionary stations, the former with resident pastors, who make regular visits to the latter.

¹ *Report of Lieut. W. A. Mercer to U. S. Com. Indian Affairs, 1894, pp. 331-335.*

The education of the children is in excellent hands; the Franciscan Sisters conduct the Catholic schools. Lieutenant Mercer reports that "the boarding and day schools under the charge of the Catholic Church are efficiently managed and doing much good."¹ It is evident that the seed of Christianity, sown with so much labor and personal privation by Father Baraga, upon the soil inhabited by the Chippewas of the littoral of the head-waters of Lake Superior, more than half a century ago, took such deep root that it yielded and continues to yield an abundant harvest of Christian souls. Congress, in 1889, appropriated \$165,000 for the Chippewas of this reservation, for the promotion of civilization generally; which included the cost of the erection of houses, the purchase of agricultural implements, stock and seeds, breaking and fencing of land, *for payment of expenses of delegations of Chippewa Indians to visit the White Earth Reservation* (west of the Mississippi), for educational purposes, surveys, etc.

This money was an advance made by Government, for the purposes stated, from the interest fund of these Chippewa Indians.²

West of the Mississippi, White Earth Indian Agency consists of three reservations: White Earth, Becker County, Minn.; Leech Lake, Cass County, Minn.; and Red Lake, Beltrami County, Minn.; having a total of nearly four and a half million acres. On these reservations are:

	Population.
White Earth Mississippi Chippewas, ...	1287
White Oak Mississippi Chippewas, ...	702
Gull Lake Mississippi Chippewas, ...	316
Mille Lac Mississippi Chippewas, ...	976
Red Lake Chippewas, ...	1276
Pembina Chippewas, ...	311
Leech Lake Pillager Chippewas, ...	1141
Cass and Winnebagoish Chippewas, ...	421
Otter Tail Pillager Chippewas, ...	702
Making a total population of, ...	7132

White Earth, the headquarters of the agency, is 22 miles distant from Detroit City, on the line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, which is the nearest railroad point. Leech Lake is 105 miles, and Red Lake 100 miles from headquarters. The former is 45 miles northeast of Park Rapids, on the Great Northern Railroad, and the latter 60 miles from Fosston, on the line of the same railroad.

The tribes comprising this population are descended from those represented by their chiefs at the treaty of Fond du Lac, at the

¹ *U. S. Com. Indian Affairs' Report*, 1894, p. 333.

² *Report of the Com. of Indian Affairs for 1894*, p. 439.

head-waters of Lake Superior, negotiated by General Cass and Colonel McKenney in 1826, seventy years ago.

In his report for 1894, Robert M. Allen, United States Indian Agent, says:

"They are composed of nine distinct bands, scattered over 200 miles of territory, and some of these bands have little or no communication or relation with each other. All now wear citizen dress and live in houses of some character. When free from whiskey they are generally peaceable and not hard to manage, but aside from living in houses and wearing clothes I cannot see wherein the *full-bloods* have made much advancement. They are constitutionally opposed to work and refuse to do it, and it is simply a question whether the Government will furnish them with supplies or allow them and their families to half starve.

It is evident, from Agent Allen's report, that the full-blood Chippewa of 1894 has not degenerated from that high standard and that supreme disgust of labor for which his father and grandfather were distinguished sixty or more years ago. The Agent continues:

"During the long years of residence of these tribes in this locality a great many whites have settled among them and married Indian women, and their offspring now comprise a large portion of the population, and especially is this true of the White Earth Reservation. These mixed-bloods are the prosperous Indians, who do most of the work and furnish the best examples of thrift, making the good showing upon this agency in gardening, farming and stock-raising now to be seen. Here and there a full-blood can be found who is educated, trying to live right, and prospering. But this is the exception, as most all of the pure-bloods remain in idleness and show little disposition to engage in labor of any kind, all the roseate and sentimental reports to the contrary notwithstanding."

From the further details of this report it is painfully evident that but little progress has been made in agriculture; this may be owing to the indifference of former Indian Agents, for Mr. Allen states that corn, the greatest economic factor of an Indian's household, can be raised, at least some varieties which grow quickly, but no attention has been paid to its cultivation, apparently, by his predecessors. He proposes to introduce and distribute among the Indians seed corn of the variety best adapted to the climate.

The production of corn will be followed by the raising of pork, and both will greatly conduce to the comfort of the Indian families. In such a large area of territory one would suppose game would be plenty. It was formerly, and was of great advantage to the Indians in its food and in the product of its furs; but the loud whistle of the locomotive and the rattle of the wheels of railroad trains on the steel rails of the great lines of railroads traversing the territory, and the cutting of timber, have long since alarmed the more valuable species of wild animals and they have fled far beyond the hunter's range.

Climatic effect or some other causes have operated adversely to the natural sources of support, which in former years were available to the Chippewa women and children of the White Earth Agency. Wild rice, blueberries, cranberries and snake root were gathered in considerable quantities in former years, and added materially to the means of support.

But these are now rarely to be found. Maple sugar was formerly made in considerable quantities, but the maple forests were cut down and the timber sold. "The lakes, where rice grew so abundantly in former years, have become almost barren, and this is largely true of the cranberry marshes, so that these small industries have gone."¹ As an evidence, both of the indifference of former Indian Agents to the Indian's welfare and of the shiftlessness of the Indian himself, it is stated there are thousands of acres of wild prairie grass on the White Earth Agency that makes the best of hay. So small a portion of this grass has been cut in former years that much of the stock of the Indians has starved during the long winters for want of food, an abundance of which might have been procured from the prolific source described.

Although the country is adapted to the raising of wheat, oats, roots and other vegetables, a mere fraction, less than 10,000 acres, of this vast area is under cultivation, but little more than an acre per capita. We are inclined to believe that, although the climate of the White Earth Agency may be severe, during the winters especially, its soil will richly repay agricultural labor, as appears from competent and reliable evidence. This agency furnishes a scandalous example of Government neglect of the Chippewa people who had been removed from their homes and colonized at this locality.

That this neglect has resulted from laziness, indifference, or cupidity, or from a combination of these vices, operating through Government Indian Agents, is but too evident from the condition of the people of this agency as described by Mr. Allen, the present Indian Agent in his report to the Indian Bureau at Washington.

The White Earth Agency offers a good example of what little progress a large colony composed exclusively of Chippewa people, will make, when given the opportunity to labor and become prosperous, when this people are permitted to be guided by the traditional instincts of their unfortunate race.

The religious welfare of the Chippewa Catholics of the White Earth Agency, of which there are probably 4000 souls, of whom 1200 are communicants, has of late years fallen under the direction of the Bishop of Duluth.

¹ *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, p. 150.

The headquarters of missionary work is at White Earth Agency, where the Benedictine father, Aloysius Hermannitz, has a church, boarding school and orphan asylum; the two latter institutions are conducted by Benedictine sisters.

There are churches at Cass Lake, Leech Lake and Red Lake, the latter in charge of the Benedictine father, Thomas Boryerding. The fathers of the same order make regular visits to missionary stations established elsewhere in this extensive Chippewa Agency.

In 1875, the government granted a tract of 171 acres to the Roman Catholic Mission of White Earth. In 1889 another grant of 160 acres was made for a Catholic school, and in 1894 a grant of 80 acres for mission and school in this agency. Special grants were made in 1889 for church, presbytery and school at Red Lake.¹

The Protestant Episcopal denomination directs the most active non-Catholic missionary work in the White Earth Agency; while they have 8 churches, 6 schools, 7 parsonages in the agency, and a hospital at White Earth, 1 white and 8 Indian missionaries, the total number of their members is given at only 300.²

Over 600 acres have been granted by Government to the respective missionary establishments of the Protestant Episcopal Church in this agency.

In North Dakota, at Turtle Mountain Agency, there are about 2000 Chippewa Indians, of whom nearly 300 are full blood. This agency is located in Rolette County, near the boundary line of the Dominion of Canada; it includes 46,000 acres of land, 15,000 being tillable.

Besides the enrolled Chippewas of the agency, 60 families of mixed blood aggregating 250 souls, reside on the reservation.

It is officially reported, that this reservation is not a proper place to locate Indians or mixed bloods with the expectation of building them up to the standard which the Government expects and civilization demands. It is too small and too near towns; moreover, it is not a country where farming can be made successful.³

Year after year, crops have been to a great extent destroyed by excessive cold or heat; while, what the elements may have spared, the gophers have destroyed.

The best disposed among those seeking support by agriculture, have become discouraged by repeated total or partial failure of

¹ *Report of the Com. of Indian Affairs for 1894*, p. 481.

² Report of Robert M. Allen, U. S. Indian Agent White Earth, in *Com. Rep.*, 1894, who also states that the Catholics have large and substantial brick buildings for school and church purposes, page 152.

³ *Report of the Com. of Indian Affairs*, "E. W. Brenner's Report to Indian Agent, 1894," page 219.

their crops and have turned their attention in other directions to provide the means of support.¹

The agent has this to say of the Chippewas of pure blood: "This report would be incomplete did I not call attention to the condition of our full blood Chippewa Indians—the Turtle Mountain Chippewas—287 individuals, out of the 2000 who make up the census."

They should receive the attention of the Government, but they have been overlooked.

They have gradually removed from the reservation, selling out what little improvements they had made, and two-thirds of them are now located outside its jurisdiction.

They cultivate on an average half-acre patches.²

They have gathered near the town of Dunseith, where they are exposed to many temptations; they are retrograding and have nearly reached the limit of worthlessness.

So far as the welfare and progressive improvement of the Chippewas of the Turtle Mountain Agency is considered, the operations of the Government in this direction have been a failure.³

It is well known that more than twenty years ago missionary work in North and South Dakota was begun and continued by the late Bishop Marty; this venerable prelate was the apostle of the Indians colonized in these states as at present constituted.

However unfortunate the temporal condition of the Indians may have been heretofore, and as at present described, their religious interests have been well cared for by Benedictine fathers, and the education of the children by Benedictine sisters. The result is, that to-day the great majority of the Chippewas of the Turtle Mountain Agency are Catholics. North Dakota now comprises the diocese of Jamestown, with Fargo as the residence of the bishop. The Sisters of Mercy and the Gray Nuns have been associated with the Benedictine Sisters in the education of Indian children.

In the Dominion of Canada, beginning at the river Thames, which flows into Lake St. Clair, there are settled on both banks of this stream 442 Chippewas who cultivate the soil to advantage; they are solidly Protestant. Not far distant, on Walpole Island, in the river St. Clair, there are 649, 10 of whom are Catholics and 6 pagan. These Indians are all farmers, they have good

¹ 3800 acres were cultivated in 1894, mostly by mixed bloods; wheat, oats, barley, roots and vegetables were sown, the seed for all of which was furnished by the Government.

² The labor required is most probably performed by the women.

³ Seed for each yearly planting has been furnished gratuitously. In 1894 30,000 pounds of beef, 100,000 pounds of flour, 20,000 pounds of pork, 1000 pounds of rice, 2000 pounds of sugar and 200 pounds of tea were given as rations.

houses, barns, stock, etc., and are prosperous; they are all of mixed blood, as also those on the Thames, and dress like white people, speaking exclusively the Chippewa dialect. In the vicinity of Sarnia, on the shore of Lake Huron, there are 479, nearly all Protestant; on Snake Island there are 124, not a Catholic among them; at Rama, further up the Lake Huron shore, there are 226, of whom 13 are Catholics; at Saugeen, 379, 21 of whom are Catholics; at Narvash, 396, of whom 124 are Catholics; at Beau-soleil, 357, of whom 142 are Catholics.¹ On the upper coast of Lake Huron, at Thessalon River, 172; at Maganetewan, 169; at Spanish River, 566; at White Fish Lake, 143; at Mississauga River, 153; at Oncwaiegos, 50; at Serpent River, 100; at French River, 94; at Tahgaiewenewe, 149; at White Fish River, 79; at Parry Island, 82; at Shawanaga, 119; at Henry's Inlet, 187; at Lake Nipissing, 163; at Temogamingue, 87; at Dokis, 61; at Garden River, 441; and at Batchewana Bay, 368, making an aggregate of Lake Huron coast Chippewa population of 3,183. The people of most of the places named in this aggregate are solidly Catholic, the total number of Protestants being 583, and pagans 112.² Round the head-waters of Lake Huron near the Georgian Bay, on the Manitoulin and Cockburn Islands, there are nine Indian villages, containing about 1000 Chippewas, solidly Catholic. These tribes were among those visited by Father Baraga, and their ancestors had occupied the soil for several centuries. They are prosperous and exceptional to the general characteristics of the people of this race, being industrious and thrifty.

On the north shore of Lake Superior there are 371 Chippewas at Fort William, 201 on Helen Island, 52 at Pays Plat, 520 at Lake Nepigon, 260 at Pic River, 328 at Long Lake, and 319 at Michipicoton; the aggregate in these villages is 2051—all solidly Catholic, except 53 at the last named village.

These localities are all in the province of Ontario.³ The social condition, dress, language, industry and thrift of the Chippewas included in the above details, according to the reports of the Dominion officials, correspond with what we have stated.⁴

¹ Jesuit Fathers look after the religious welfare of Catholic Indians in the villages named above.

² The Jesuit Fathers conduct the missions among the 3,183 Chippewas; their lay brothers teach the Indian boys, while Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary teach the Indian girls.

³ *Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Dominion of Canada for 1892*, pp. 308-9.

⁴ The religious welfare of the Indian Catholics in the Chippewa and Ottawa tribes on Cockburn and Manitoulin Islands is supervised by the Bishop of Peterborough.

The Jesuit Fathers have churches and mission stations, the number of fathers doing missionary work being 12. Lay brothers of this order conduct free schools, indus-

Nearly all the Chippewas we have mentioned above are classed as "treaty Indians;" all, with the exception of those living in the villages on the south side of Manitoulin Island, having ceded their lands to the Dominion Government, retaining reservations on which they are now living, and receiving in compensation annuities paid the heads of families in the respective tribes. We do not believe that the Chippewa communities in the Dominion, who are living on the shores of the Thames, on Walpole Island, at Sarnia and up the coast of Lake Huron as far as Beausoleil, are the descendants of the people of this nation who were evangelized by Father Baraga, fifty or more years ago. As a rule, the descendants of his converts, wherever they may be found at the present day, have remained, with few exceptions, steadfast in the Catholic faith. In the Province of Manitoba, on the northern borders of Minnesota and North Dakota are many communities of Chippewa Indians living more or less under the tribal system. These are grouped by the Dominion Government with the Cree Indians under the designation of Treaty Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5. These may be called "wild tribes."

Treaty No. 1 includes seven villages of Chippewas and Crees, having a population of 2605, of whom 1339 are stated to be Protestant; 682 Catholic, and 584 pagan. Treaty No. 2, having six villages, 694, of whom 351 are stated to be Protestant, 198 Catholic, and 145 pagan. Treaty No. 3 comprises thirty-one villages, with an aggregate population of 2871 Chippewas and Salteux, of whom 570 are stated to be Protestant, 296 Catholic, and 2005 pagan.

In twelve villages, forming part of Treaty No. 5, there is a population of Chippewas and Salteux of 2129, of whom 1564 are Protestant, 57 Catholic, and 508 pagan. How many Chippewas are included in the above census of these "wild tribes" of Manitoba Province we are unable to say; none of their ancestors were probably ever evangelized by Father Baraga. Nor are we able to determine whether the respective numbers of Catholics stated comprise Chippewas to any extent.

It may be interesting to know, that in the northwest territories of the Dominion of Canada, in the Athabaska and McKenzie River District, comprising nineteen villages, there is an aggregate population of 5589, all solidly Catholic, no Protestant or pagan statistics being given; while the Peace River District, comprising twelve villages, contains 1725, all solidly Catholic, no statistics of Protestant

trial schools, and boarding schools for Indian boys. The Sisters of St. Joseph and of the Immaculate Heart of Mary have similar schools for Indian girls.

The Jesuit Fathers have charge of missionary work on the main shore below and above Sault Ste. Marie, under the same supervision.

or pagan being given. In the Nelson and Churchill Rivers Districts there are in five villages 852, the entire population, all of whom are reported Catholic, no other statistics given. But we believe there are no Chippewas included in the thirty-six villages referred to in the northwest territories. "The Census Returns of Resident and Nomadic Indians," in all the Dominion of Canada, shows a total Indian population of 109,205.¹

The religious welfare of the Catholic Chippewas of Manitoba, and of the solidly Catholic Indian population in the northwest territory is supervised by the Archbishop of St. Boniface.

The missionary labor among the Indians inhabiting the extensive regions comprised within the limits of the Dominion Provinces of Manitoba and of the Northwest Territory, has for many years been performed by the Oblate Fathers, who are all of French or French-Canadian nationality.

Associated with the Oblates in the work of education are the Brothers of the Congregation of Mary, who teach Indian boys; the Gray Nuns, the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, and of other communities, conduct schools of different grades for Indian girls.

There are, in all, fourteen Indian schools. This is as far as we feel disposed to follow the wild Chippewas of the north-west in the Dominion of Canada.

What of the race of warriors whose castle, during the French régime, on the south shore of the beautiful bay which is at the head of the *Détroit*, dominated that romantic vicinity for nearly a century, until their greatest chief, Pontiac, baffled by British power in his attempt to establish Indian supremacy over the territory west of the Ohio River, retired, defeated and disheartened, with the tribes of the Ottawas to their ancient homes on the littoral of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and the Georgian Bay?

They were the grandchildren of the Ottawas of Pontiac's time, whom Frederick Baraga evangelized during the fourth decade of the present century, and for whose spiritual welfare he wrote and had published the religious books in the Ottawa language, which we shall endeavor to describe. It may interest our readers to know the destiny of the generations succeeding the Ottawa Christians of Arbre Croche, its vicinity, and the Grand River valley.

Pontiac had no successor. White civilization made necessary the removal of his race from their homes in Michigan to the territory assigned them west of the Mississippi. This ostracism was the coup de grace of the autonomy of the Ottawa nation; as such, it has been literally wiped out of existence.

¹ *Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for 1892*, pp. 308-309, 316, 317, and 322.

Although the territory assigned the exiles was all that a nomadic people could wish for, with mild and genial climate, and fine hunting ranges, they did not take kindly to their new homes. It was not the land wherein the bones and ashes of kindred generations reposed; the American Indian, of all others of the human race, has probably the greatest love for the soil in which his kindred have been buried. Very many of the exiles straggled back to Michigan soil so dear to them in filial associations.

One generation at least, although scattered, acquired homes and lived fairly well; other stragglers found their way to Canada and became mixed with other Indian nationalities. But the second generation, almost entirely denationalized, and at present living in Michigan, have, as a rule, become impoverished and are fading out of existence, victims of surrounding white demoralization.¹

In the northwest corner of the Indian Territory, with Kansas on the north, Missouri on the east, and the Cherokee nation on the south and west, is located the United States Government Indian Quapaw Agency. It has an area of about 213,000 acres. Under the management of its agent, the welfare of the remnants of eight American Indian nations, who were more or less prominent in American Indian history, is supervised under direct control of the Government at Washington. These nations are the Hurons or Wyandottes, the Miamis, the Modocs, the Ottawas, the Peorias, the Quapaws, the Senecas, and the eastern Shawnees.²

The total population of the eight nationalities is only 1334, the Hurons, Miamis and Senecas having the largest number, from two to three hundred each.

Among all these so-called Indians, tribal and national government as formerly existing is unknown. George S. Doane, U. S. Indian Agent,³ reports that this agency is favorably located; 800 feet above the level of the sea; the winters are short and mild, and the climate salubrious. Stock requires very little feeding; the country is well watered by rivers and streams. The soil and climate favor the most diversified culture; the two extremes of Northern and Southern products, corn and cotton can be grown to advantage; while wheat, oats, rye, flax, tobacco, hemp, tame grasses, castor beans, roots and vegetables of all kinds, and fruits of all varieties, are among the annual productions of this prolific region. Climatic diseases are unknown and sickness results only from hereditary maladies. The enterprising town of Seneca, Mo., is

¹ It is estimated there are 3000 Ottawas of mixed blood living in a semi-civilized state in the Lower Peninsula of Michigan.

² The Hurons, the Miamis, and the Ottawas are Michigan tribes.

³ *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, 1894, p. 134.

five miles from the agency, whose people stand high in the estimation of the merchants and traders of this town.

In this favored locality reside 160 Ottawas, officially known as such to the government, and this is all of the people of this once great nation to be found in the official records of the Indian Bureau at Washington at the present day! The Ottawa reservation comprises 14,860 acres, of which 8,000 acres are fenced.

Heads of families have been allotted land in severalty and 27 families are now living upon and cultivating such allotments. Very little of the Ottawa type remains; all dress in citizens' clothing; the once bright copper color of the race has given place to a yellow shaded white, while only a few aged men and women are of pure Ottawa blood.¹ It would appear from the report of Rev. W. H. Ketcham, Roman Catholic Missionary to the Cherokees and Creeks, who makes monthly visits to the Quapaw Agency, of whose Catholic missions he has temporary charge, that there are 400 Catholics in the agency, in which there are promising mission stations among the Senecas, the Hurons, the Miamis, the Ottawas, and the Quapaws, which are visited monthly, while religious services are held elsewhere.

The members of the Quapaw nation, which is affiliated with the Osage, are nearly all Catholics, and the same may be said of the Ottawas. The former people have built a church and presbytery and will soon have a resident priest, who will attend to all the Catholics in this agency. A large school-house and a residence for sisters who will conduct a school, are in process of completion.² This is all the more necessary not only for the spiritual welfare of all, but especially of the Ottawa Catholics. The Quakers have been very active and have 16 places of worship in this agency; the Methodists have 2 and the Baptists 2. Mr. Doane, however, remarks in this connection: "The Catholics are making great strides in Christianizing the Indians."³

The greatest number of Ottawa Indians in the Dominion of Canada are to be found on the Great Manitoulin and Cockburn Islands in Lake Huron near the Georgian Bay.⁴

On these Islands there are nearly 1900 Indians of the Chippewa and Ottawa nations, probably an equal number of each living in tribal relationship; intermarriages between the people of the two

¹ No government rations are issued to these Ottawas. Hunting and fishing are no factors in their means of support. They stand 100 in the ratio of self-support by labor. The Ottawa language is used exclusively in social life, and most of them can read and speak English.

² "Report of Rev. W. H. Ketchum, Church of the Assumption, Muscogee; Creek Nation, Ind. Ter., July 25, 1894," in *Report of Com. of Ind. Affairs*, 1894, p. 139.

³ "Report of U. S. Indian Agent, Quapaw, etc. for 1894," p. 136 in *Com. Rep.*

⁴ "Dominion of Canada," *Rep. Dep. of Indian Affairs*, 1892, pp. xiv and 308.

nations have been frequent, as also with Canadians; the lines of descent are however traced from the maternal side and the nationality remains distinct; while a child may have a Chippewa father, if his mother be an Ottawa, the child is known as of the nationality of his mother and *vice versa*. At Sucker Creek there are 110 of these Indians, of whom 94 are Protestant; at Sheguindah there are 153, all Protestant, the remaining 1653 are solidly Catholic. Besides these aggregates, the little village of Obidgewong has a population of 22 Chippewas, all of whom are Pagan.

The chief dependence of these Indians is agriculture and fishing. On the southern portion of Manitoulin Island, however, the land has not been ceded to the Dominion, and the sale and cutting of timber adds materially to the means of support.

Many of these Indians, the Dominion Chief Secretary states, derive profitable employment in the open season from acting as boatmen and guides for sportsmen; some of them likewise work in saw-mills and on steamers as deck-hands. Their situation as a rule is satisfactory; the Dominion Government provides missionaries and teachers and most rigidly enforces the laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicants. The population on these islands is gradually increasing.

Small bands of Ottawas are found farther north in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie; these are Catholic, who receive missionary care.

Whatever may ultimately become of the Ottawa race, whose people in time will probably lose their identity, the name can never disappear in the Dominion of Canada, whose capital is named Ottawa, from the noble river which flows past this city toward the St. Lawrence.

Although the Ottawa Indian tribes evangelized by Father Baraga during the first years of his missionary work on the littoral of the waters of Lake Michigan and in the Grand River valley have been removed from Michigan soil, the renown of this fine race of Indian warriors will remain in the history of the American Indian nations who were prominent in the great Algonquin confederation of the East, West and Northwest.

But the name of Frederick Baraga has become for all time indissolubly identified with the history and fate of the Ottawas of Michigan, and the perpetuation of their language by the printed works in the Ottawa vernacular, which he has contributed to the bibliographical collections of American Indian languages in the libraries of America and Europe.

While yet a young man, comparatively speaking, Father Baraga became interested in philological study; we have seen that at the time of his ordination to the priesthood, being then in his twenty-

sixth year, he could speak fluently his native Slavonic, the French, German, Italian, Latin and Greek languages; so it may be claimed for him that when he was admitted to the sacerdotal state he was to some extent a linguist. During the seven years of his young sacerdotal life, while pastor at Smartna, in his native province, literary work occupied the few leisure hours at his disposal, and became to some extent his solace and his recreation.

It was at this period that he undertook the difficult task of the reconstruction of his native Slavonic language, which had degenerated, and which he redeemed from the hybrid condition into which the dialect had fallen.

This was probably the first philological work accomplished by Father Baraga, but it was to him, perhaps, at the time, a labor of love.¹

We have no description, as heretofore stated, of the works he wrote and had printed during his pastorate at Smartna, but we recall the attention of our readers to the fact that those of a devotional character are still used by the people for whom they were written; while others have been republished in the original text, and extensively in translations.

It will be remembered that when Father Baraga arrived at Cincinnati, in January, 1831, he was welcomed by the amiable and pious Dominican, Dr. Edward Fenwick, first bishop of Cincinnati, whose episcopal control extended over the Territory of Michigan and the littoral of the Northwestern Lakes.

During the months he was detained at Cincinnati he acquired a knowledge of the English language. It happened that a young Ottawa was at the same time a member of the bishop's household; this young man had been selected as a candidate for the priesthood, and was pursuing a preparatory course before being sent to the Propaganda College at Rome.

Father Baraga's first knowledge of the Ottawa language was derived from this young Indian in the bishop's house at Cincinnati. He continued the study of the roots and gutturals, and soon acquired a practical knowledge of the Ottawa dialect.

When, finally, he was enabled to make the journey to Detroit, from which city he was to go, by way of Mackinac, to Arbre Croche, Bishop Fenwick, in order to facilitate the work of the young missionary, arranged with Father Richard to provide an interpreter who would repeat the words Father Baraga delivered to the Indians in the French language, in the Ottawa dialect. Father Richard selected for this purpose a Detroit lady, whom

See *Frederick Baraga among the Ottawas*, AM. CATH. QUAR. REVIEW, vol. xxi., January, 1896, p. 114.

he had educated, and who, with two other young ladies, in 1804, he had placed in charge of his seminary for the higher education of young ladies in her native city. This lady's name was Miss Angelique Campau. She spoke the Ottawa and other local Indian dialects fluently. She was probably at the time in her fiftieth year, while her zeal and great piety were remarkable.

But after a few weeks' experience, Father Baraga, who had zealously pursued the study of the Ottawa language, found he could preach and instruct in the local dialect sufficiently well to be understood.

Miss Campau was not required to interpret his words, but she was assigned by the missionary to the special work of instructing the children of his neophytes.

How she had lived while at Arbre Croche we do not know, but probably she had made her home with some Ottawa widow; her father, Barnabé Campau, was a wealthy merchant of Detroit, and she had ample means of her own. She had probably volunteered for the work, but when she had found Father Baraga proficient in the language of the Indians, she returned to Mackinac during the summer, and thence to her home in Detroit.

In our article, "Frederick Baraga Among the Ottawas,"¹ we attempted to outline the missionary work accomplished by Father Baraga among the tribes of this nation in the territory of Michigan; we have directed attention to the preliminary pages of this outline to illustrate the wonderful capacity of this devoted missionary for Indian philological work.

Thirteen months after his arrival at Arbre Croche he had written and prepared for the press his first work in the Ottawa language and the first of the series of Indian books destined to make his name celebrated as one of the greatest philologists of the Algonquian languages. He came to Detroit in August, 1832, at a time when the Ottawas of his mission had gone to Drummond's Island to receive their annuities from the British Indian Agent, and placed his manuscript in the hands of George L. Whitney, who at the time was the publisher of the "Detroit Daily Advertiser."² This was not the first Catholic prayer-book which this gentleman had printed. In 1830 he published for Father Augustine Dejean, a French missionary under Father Gabriel Richard, an Ottawa prayer-book and catechism combined, 108 pages 18mo.³

At the time Father Baraga came to Detroit, in 1832, to supervise the printing of his Ottawa prayer-book the Asiatic cholera was

¹ AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. xxi, 1896. No. 81, p. 106.

² This paper was the political organ of the "Whigs."

³ Anichanibek amisinahaniwa kichean ameachik, Catolic, Ottawak wakanakessi, Dejean Macate okonoye. Wyastenong: George L. Whitney, manda, etc., 1830.

epidemical in the city. Mr. Whitney's staff had been weakened to some extent by the scourge, but he was courageous and energetic. The office and typographical plant of the "Detroit Daily Advertiser" was on the fourth floor of a building on the corner of Jefferson and Woodward Avenues, about three squares from the pastoral residence of Father Richards, which was the home of Father Baraga while in Detroit. Few compositors would care to set up solid Ottawa copy; Mr. Whitney's probably did their best; but it is not unlikely that each square of proof contained Indian words unintelligible to Father Baraga or to anybody.

Whenever the missionary had to interview his publisher, and this was necessary for the ordeal of proof-reading many times each week, he had to climb three flights of steep stairs in dark halls, which to him, who, for more than a year, had been living in a cabin, was harder work than marching in the woods or on the ice. But the little book was in time printed and bound, and in such a shape as was highly creditable to its publisher. Although purely and simply Ottawa, it is printed in pica type, which was evidently new, on good, clear white paper, and with good ink. Compared with the prayer-books in the English, French and German languages in use during the "thirties" and "forties," Father Baraga's Ottawa prayer-book is superior to most in typographical work and in stock, while good taste is evident in the manner in which the headings, many of them long Indian words, are arranged:

A copy in the library of the Boston Athenæum is described as follows:

"OTTAWA
ANAMIE MISINAIGAN.
(Two lines quotation.)
WYASTENONG.¹
Nin Frederick Baraga.

George L. Whitney, Ogimisinakisan manda misiriaigan. 1832."

Text entirely Ottawa, pp. 205; index in Ottawa, pp. 206-207. Like ordinary prayer-books it contains devotional prayers, litanies, etc., 57 pages; hymns, 83 pages; with catechism, 58 pages. This book is 4½ inches square. This prayer-book was intended for the use as well as for the doctrinal instruction of Christian Ottawas, but more especially for those attending divine service in the respective mission chapels. To make it available, Father Baraga taught a certain number of his converts the rudimentary parts of their printed dialect, and when these were able to read and understand they in turn taught others. So that while the Holy Sacrifice was being offered these Ottawa Catholics, with prayer-book in hand, intelligently assisted, and when necessary joined in the

¹ The Ottawa name of Detroit.

responses. At vespers the congregation chanted the Gregorian strains adapted to the psalms appropriate to the evening service and benediction of the Blessed Sacrament.

It may be claimed that this was the perfection of Indian missionary work among the people of the Ottawa nation.

While in Europe in 1837, Father Baraga had printed a more extensive Indian prayer-book; a copy in the library of the Boston Athenæum is thus described:

"OTTAWA.
ANAMIE-MISINAIGAN,
gwaiaikossing anamiewin ejitwadjig,
mi sa Katolik-enamiadjig gewabandangig.
PARIS, (France, Europe.)
E. J. Bailly, sgimisinakisan manda misinaigan. 1837."

A brief literal translation would be: Ottawa praying book, that which is right religion they who profess, that is, Catholic praying ones, they shall read, etc.

The Ottawa preface is signed Nin Frederick Baraga, after which is given in English and French the approbation of † Frederick Résé, Bishop of Detroit.

This book contains 297 pages of Ottawa text, and an index of 3 pages; 300 in all. 16mo. Many of the hymns have French headings, which induces us to believe that this book was not intended, like the Detroit edition of 1832, for the particular use of Ottawa Indian Catholics, but more for the convenience of French missionaries in their initial work.

The binding of this book is somewhat superior to that of the Detroit edition, but in typographical work and stock, although printed in Paris, it is inferior.

By the same publisher, while in Europe in 1837, Father Baraga had printed a life of Jesus—in the Ottawa language. A copy of this work in the library of the Boston Athenæum is described as follows:

"JESUS.
OBIMADISIWIN AJONDAAKING,
guaiaikossing anamiewin
egitwadjig mi sa,
Katolik enamiadjig gewabandangig.
PARIS.
E. J. Bailly, ogimisinakisan manda misinaigan. 1837."

A picture of the crucifixion faces this work after the title page, which is followed by a short preface signed

NIN FREDERICK BARAGA.

The imprimatur of Frederick Résé, Bishop of Detroit, dated from his titular city October 20, 1836, is printed in English and French.

This is a work of 204 pages, 16mo., in the Ottawa language, with an index of 2 pages, also in Ottawa. It contains a folded map of the Holy Land.

Seven years later Father Baraga had printed another Ottawa prayer-book, a copy of which is in the library of the Boston Athenæum, and described as follows:

“OTTAWA.
ANAMIE MISINAIGAN, ETC.
DETROIT, 1842.

Eugene T. Smith, o gimisinakisan manda misiniagan. Text in the Ottawa language, 16mo.”

In the same library is a copy of an Ottawa prayer-book, evidently intended for the use of missionaries, by Father Baraga:

“KATOLIK ANAMIE-MISINAIGAN.
NIN FREDERICK BARAGA.
Wawiiatanong: Bagg & Harmon,¹ ogimissinakisanawa mandan misiniagan.
1846.”

The preface, in Ottawa, is followed by the imprimatur, in French, of Pierre Paul Lefevre, Evêque, etc.; 252 pages of the text is in Ottawa; 3 pages in double columns, Ottawa and French, contain litanies with French headings; 73 pages devotional prayers; 103 pages hymns, some with French headings; then follows JESUS odigitwawin katechim ejinikadeg, 74 pages, followed by 11 pages in French containing *Le chemin de la croix*, and *Le rosaire*. The typographical work is excellent, the stock equally good, and the binding creditable. 256 pp., 16mo.

Two years after Father Baraga had been promoted to the purple, he had published:

“KATOLIK OTTAWA.
ANAMIE-MISINAIGAN.”

From a copy in the library of Yale the following description is taken:

Following the title is a picture of two angels bowed before the cross, and then:

“FREDERICK BARAGA,
Kitchi-mekatewikwanaie.”

Preface in Ottawa, text also in the same language, with index. Pages 357. 16mo.

“CINCINNATI, 1855.
Joseph A. Hemann, o gi-misinakisan manda misinaigan.”

¹ Bagg & Harmon were proprietors of the *Detroit Free Press*, the political organ of the Michigan Democracy.

The typographical work, paper, etc., is inferior to the respective books above described. In 1858 the same party published :

"KATOLIK OTTAWA
Anamie-misinaigan wetawawissing.
CINCINNATI 1858.

Joseph A. Hemann o.g.misinakisan manda misinaigan. Devotional prayers."

This book has a frontispiece of a religious design, text entirely in the Ottawa language—pages 240, 16mo. In typographical execution it is about the same standard as the work last noticed.

This is the latest of the devotional works in the Ottawa language published under the direct supervision of their author. We shall not refer to later reprints, but attempt a description of his books in the Chippewa language, or as he always wrote, the Otchipwe, the earliest of which is :

"OTCHIPWE
ANAMIE-MASINAIGAU
Gwaiakossing anamfewin ejitwadjig, misa katolik-enamiadjig gewabamdangig.
NIN FREDERICK BARAGA

E. J. Bailly ogimasinakisan mandan masinaigan. PARIS 1837.

This description is from a copy of a Chippewa prayer-book in the library of Congress, text entirely in Chippewa, of 300 pages, 16mo. The work consists of prayers, litanies, hymns, and catechism, preceded by a preface signed by Father Baraga, and has the imprimatur of Frederick Résé, Bishop of Detroit. It is an enlarged edition of the Ottawa prayer-book printed the same year by the same house in Paris, which we have already described. This is the first of the series of Chippewa books published by Father Baraga. It will be remembered that he had been but two years starving and freezing among the Chippewas at La Pointe, when he went to Europe to procure funds.

He took with him the manuscripts of the Ottawa and Chippewa prayer-books as also of the Life of Christ in the same languages and had them printed.

When we consider the missionary work accomplished during his initial years among the Chippewas, we may perhaps be able to appreciate the hardships endured ; but when we consider the amount of labor required to write, first in the Ottawa language, the books printed at Paris by Bailly in 1837, and then to change the text from the Ottawa ending of words to the Chippewa, it is difficult to conceive how many hours out of each twenty-four, Father Baraga allowed himself for rest, during these two years. Here is the description of the copy in the Astor Library :

"JESUS
OBIMADISIWIN OMA AKING, ETC.
NIN FREDERICK BARAGA
PARIS 1837."

E. J. Bailly agimasinakisan mandan masinaigan. The same preface, imprimatur and division of the work as we have described in the Ottawa version. Text 211 pages, 16mo, with picture and map.

But this was not all the philological work accomplished during these same two years.

From a copy in the Boston Athenæum we have the following description of a Chippewa primer:

"ABINODJIIAG
OMASINAIGANIWAW.
BUFFALO 1837.
Press of Oliver G. Steele."

Primer lessons in the Chippewa language. Pour les maitres et maitresses d'école, the instructions to whom, also in French, advises that the children be shown all the proper names which are found in Baraga's "Jesus Obimadisiwin."

How much rest the brain of Father Baraga was allowed during the interval between 1837 and 1843 is easily answered. Not any! It was worked harder every available hour!

Father Verwyst, O.S.F., states that he usually rose at 3 A.M. in summer, and an hour later in winter. One summer morning his frail organization was nourished by "balmy sleep" until five o'clock; in his diary of that day he mentions the occurrence, and laments the loss of two precious hours by sleep.¹

He was probably constantly at work on his Chippewa grammar and his dictionary. In the meantime he had prepared for the press and had published at Laibach, in his native province, Bible stories in the Chippewa language; from a copy of this little book in the Astor Library the following description is taken:

"GETE
GAIE DACH NITAM
Mekatsokwanaieg ogagikwewinewara.
Frederick Baraga.
Laibach, 1843."

Joseph Blasnik, ogimasinisan mandan masinaigan. Text, with index, entirely in the Chippewa language. Preface in the same, signed by the author. 211 pages, 18mo. The frontispiece has an engraving of cherub and cross.

¹ *Manuscript Rev. C. Verwyst, O.S.F.*

From a copy in the library of the Boston Athenæum the following description is taken of a later Chippewa primer :

" ABINODJIIAG
OMASINAIGANIWAN.
Detroit, 1845.
Bagg and Harmon, printers."

In addition to the matter contained in the Buffalo edition of 1837, which is rearranged, there is a prayer and the Ten Commandments. 8 pages, 32mo.

A valuable aid to missionaries was the first volume of Father Baraga's sermons in the Chippewa language; from a copy in the library of Yale the following description is taken :

" KATOLIK
GAGIKWE-MASINAIGAN.
Nin Frederick Baraga,
Wawiiatanong,¹
1846."

M. Geiger, *ogi-masinakisan mandan masinaigan*. The work bears the imprimatur in French of Bishop Lefevre; otherwise it is entirely in the Chippewa language, consisting of sermons preached by Father Baraga, with a preface and index. 268 pages, 16mo.

In chronological order follows a Chippewa prayer book :

" KATOLIK
ANAMIE-MASINAIGAN.
Nin Frederick Baraga,
Mekatewikwanaie,
Wawiiatanong, 1848.
Munger & Pattison; *ogi-masinakisanawa*, etc., Detroit."

This work bears the imprimatur in French of Bishop Lefevre. James Constantine Pilling describes his own copy as follows :

Prayers, litanies, etc., pp. 5-76; the Lord's Prayer, a prayer to the Virgin, and the Creed in double columns, Chippewa and French, pp. 10-13; *le chemin de la croix*, pp. 76-99; hymns, many with the headings in French, pp. 100-106. Bound with this volume was a Chippewa catechism, the title of which Mr. Pilling gives :

" JESUS
OD IJITWAWIN
Katechim ejinikadeg.
Detroit, 1849."

Text entirely in the Chippewa language. 80 pages, 16mo.

During the following year the most extensive purely religious

¹ Wawiiatanong is the Chippewa name of Detroit.

work from the pen of Father Baraga, and in the Chippewa language, was published in Detroit. From a copy in the library of the Boston Athenæum the following description is taken :

"KATOLIK
ENAMIAD O NANAGATAWENDAMOWINAN,
Frederick Baraga.
Wawiiatanong, 1850.
Jabez Fox, ogi-masinakisan mandan masinaigan, Detroit."

The work has the imprimatur in French of Bishop Lefevere. The text, which is entirely in the Chippewa language, Catholic Christian meditations, is preceded by a preface and ends with an index. 712 pages, square 16mo.

The extent and importance of the book under notice, the number of whose pages is twice as large as any heretofore described, lead us to believe Father Baraga gave the labor and precious time required for its composition, to provide devotional reading for his own neophytes at L'Anse, as well as for his spiritual children in other parts of the Lake regions. Not only these Christians were to be benefited, but we believe he intended the book should have circulation in other Christian communities among the Ottawa and Pottawotomi tribes of Michigan, wherever these might be, as well as the Algonkin tribes of Canada, or wherever else the latter might be found leading Christian lives. Among the people of all these communities, who for all time had been included in the widespread Algonquian Confederacy, the Chippewa language was to a considerable extent understood, as the English language is at the present day among peoples of so many different nationalities in North America, in Europe and in other parts of the world; while some of the Algonkin nations referred to had been converted by Catholic missionaries more than two centuries ago.

The works of Father Baraga in the Ottawa and Chippewa languages thus far noticed were purely religious; while the great labor required in their preparation was given by the missionary for one prime object, and this was the salvation of souls.

Subordinate to this religious work was probably the preparation, no less laborious, of the scientific contributions to the general philological construction and development of the Chippewa language.

These were, perhaps, the most important contributions to Indian philology made hitherto.¹ The first of these works to be noticed, and in chronological order, we shall describe from the copy presented to us by its venerable author, which copy is now in the library of the Detroit (Jesuits') College :

¹ Appleton's *Cyclop. of Am. Biog.* quoted in Bibliography of the Algonquian Languages.

"A THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL¹
GRAMMAR
OF THE OTCHIPWE LANGUAGE.
Spoken by the Chippewa Indians, etc.
By Frederick Baraga,
Missionary at L'Anse, Lake Superior.
Detroit.
Jabez Fox, Printer.
1850."

The typographical work of this edition is first-class. The type new, the paper white, the ink clear and the leather binding strong and good. It is square 16mo, with preface and index, 576 pages.

Following the Chippewa Grammar, Father Baraga had printed in Cincinnati his famous Chippewa-English dictionary. From the copy presented to us by its venerable author, which copy is now in the library of the Detroit (Jesuits') College, we make the following description :

"A DICTIONARY
OF THE OTCHIPWE LANGUAGE.
Explained in English."

"This language is spoken by the Chippewa Indians, as also by the Ottawas, Pottawotomis and Algonkins, with little difference."

"For the use of Missionaries, etc.
by the
REV. FREDERICK BARAGA ;
Roman Catholic Missionary among the Otchipwe Indians,
Cincinnati,
1853.
Printed for Joseph A. Hemann, etc."

This is a book of 662 pages, square 16mo ; it is in 2 parts ; part 1, Otchipwe-English ; part 2, English-Otchipwe. With preface in English. Its typographical work and stock is more creditable to Mr. Hemann than the other Indian books he brought out for Father Baraga.

In the latter part of 1853, Father Baraga was elevated to episcopal rank. Upon assuming the mitre he announced the event to his spiritual constituents among the Indian tribes of the Lake Superior region, in a pastoral in the Chippewa language :

"KITCHI-MEKATEWIKWANAIE
FREDERICK BARAGA,
O masinaigan,
Ge-wabandamowad.
Kakina anashinabec enamiadjig.
Cincinnati. Catholic Telegraph,
Gashkadino-issis
1853."

¹ See the AM. CATH. QUAR. REVIEW, No. 83, July, 1896, page 606. Description reproduced to make the series of Indian works in the present article complete.

Printed cover above ; text entirely in the Chippewa language, 10 pages, 12mo.

At the top of the first page of text is the bishops's diocesan seal, under which is :

"Frederick Baraga,
Kitchi-mekatewik-wanie."

Probably the only copy of this pastoral extant among white people was in the possession of the late James Constantine Pilling, whose description we have given. It had been presented him by Father John Gafron, of Bayfield, Wisconsin.

After his elevation to the episcopacy, and while residing at Sault Ste Marie, Bishop Baraga, more than ever anxious for the spiritual welfare of Christian Indians, had prepared for the press and published at Cincinnati the last of his works in the Chippewa language of which we have knowledge.

The description is from a copy in the Congressional Library :

"KAGIE DEBWEWINAN
KAGINIG GE-TAKWENDANG
KATOLIK ENAMAID,
(Device.)
Cincinnati, 1855."

"Joseph A. Hemann o gi-masinikisan mandan masinaigan."

Eternal truths always to be remembred by a Catholic Christian. The text is entirely in the Chippewa language, with preface and index. Pages 367, square 16mo.

The most important reprints of Bishop Baraga's works, of which we have seen an authentic record, comprise a revision of the Paris edition of 1837 ; *Katolik anamie-Masinaigan*, etc., by Rev. John B. Weikamp, Tert. O.S.F., which was issued by Benziger Brothers, New York, 1874 ; Prayer-book in the Chippewa language, 322 pages, with an appendix of 16 pages, by Father Weikamp. 16mo.

A reprint of the Chippewa grammar and dictionary in three parts was undertaken by the Abbe Lacombe of the Oblate Fathers.

Each part has printed cover, as title to the grammar : A theoretical and practical grammar of the Otchipwe language for the use of missionaries, etc. By Rt. Rev. Bishop Baraga, etc.

Montreal 1878. Beauchemin & Valois, small octavo, 422 pages.

A dictionary of the Otchipwe language—Part I. Otchipwe-English, by Rt. Rev. Bishop Baraga, etc. Beauchemin & Valois, Montreal, 1878, small quarto, 321 pages.

A dictionary of the Otchipwe Language, etc.—Part II. English-Otchipwe. Beauchemin & Valois, Montreal, 1880. Small octavo, 422 pages.

In Rev. Chrysostom Verwyst's (O.S.F.) *Mikana gigigong enamog*, etc., some portions of Bishop Baraga's devotional works are included and duly acknowledged in this valuable work of 602 pages, which contain nine plates. Square 16mo., St. Louis 1880.¹

Father Verwyst, O.S.F., has been a missionary among the Indians in the Lake Superior country since 1878.

It is impossible to estimate the number of days and nights of weary labor given by Father Baraga during the years he was engaged in the preparation of his Ottawa and Chippewa works for publication; his master-pieces, the Chippewa Grammar and Dictionary, would require an ordinary life's work.

It will be remembered that the Very Rev. Father Jacker had completed a revision of Father Baraga's Chippewa Dictionary, which had occupied his leisure time for a period of twenty years; the result of this extended labor was lost by an accident in Lake Michigan. The Jesuit Missionary, Father Rasles, was at work completing his Abnaki-French Dictionary, which he had commenced thirty years before, when he was killed by New England soldiers at Norridge-wock, 1724. We think the Abnaki language has fewer gutturals than the Chippewa and requires less philological work in the compilation of a dictionary.

The great aim of Father Baraga's missionary life among the Indians of Michigan was the saving of their souls.

He knew perfectly well what would most aid him in his missionary work, an auxiliary in which was his Ottawa and Chippewa prayer-books and devotional manuals.

The value of these works was so appreciated by Catholic missionaries that thousands upon thousands of Father Baraga's books were procured by missionaries engaged in evangelical work among the numerous Indian tribes of the wide-spread Algonquian races. They are still in use among the Indian missionaries in the Dominion Provinces in that great range of territory extending from Nova Scotia on the Atlantic to Vancouver on the Pacific; while they are hand-books among the American missionaries laboring for the salvation of souls among the descendants of the expatriated Algonquians, who, fifty years ago, by the demands of American civilization, were removed from Michigan and transferred to the wild regions of Minnesota and the Dakotas, west of the Mississippi.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

¹ Nearly all the titles of Indian works given by us are from James Constantine Pilling's Bibliography of the Algonquian Languages. The copies described as being in the library of the Boston Athenæum were presented to this institution by Henry Rowe Schoolcraft.

A GLANCE AT THE REIGN OF ST. LOUIS.

THE reign of the holy grandson of Philip Augustus has been rightly styled the keystone of the arch of French history. Certainly much had been effected for the consolidation of the French monarchy when Philip Augustus defeated, at Bouvines (July 27, 1214), the trebly larger forces of the German Otho IV. and the English John Lackland. By that victory the standard of the Lilies, which for some years had waved only over the space which is covered by five of the modern departments of France,¹ again threw its protecting folds over all the ancient provinces excepting Aquitaine. But it was in the reign of St. Louis that the lineaments of the later French society were drawn; and it was in the person of that everlasting glory of the French monarchy that the world beheld an incarnation of all that was most honorable, most redolent of justice, in fine, most Christian, in the royalty of the Middle Age. This reign demonstrated that the great theologians of the Church had not formulated the vagaries of a dream when they conceived the idea of a Christian royalty legitimized, not only by sacerdotal consecration, but by justice in its exercise, and by a proper participation, on the part of the governed, in public affairs. The salient features of the career of St. Louis, the grandest of the nearly innumerable Christian heroes of France, are at the command of the student;² in these few pages we propose to treat of some points which, although essential to a proper appreciation of the character of the royal confessor, and to even a moderate understanding of the period in which he lived, are ignored by the authors whose works are consulted by the average reader. We shall touch upon the sanctity of Louis IX. only by implication; for nothing in the domain of history is more certain than the opinion of that sanctity, held by the contemporaries of the monarch, whether Frenchmen or foreigners, Christians or pagans. Neither shall we attempt to detail even the principal events of this charming and edifying life; but we may be permitted to preface the fulfilment of our main purpose by a brief summary of the results of a policy which, although less theatrically impressive

¹ Seine, Seine et Loire, Seine et Marne, Oise and Loiret; 120 by 90 miles in extent.

² Michelet: *Histoire de France*, ch. 8, Paris, 1830; Villeneuve: *Histoire de Saint Louis*, Paris, 1840; Mignet: *La Feudalité et les Institutions de Saint Louis*, Paris, 1850; Cantù: *San Luigi di Francia*, in the Collection of Biographies attached to that author's *Storia Universale*, 9th Turin edition, 1862; Lecoy de la Marche: *Saint Louis, Son Gouvernement, et Sa Politique*, Paris, 1891.

than that followed by certain of the crowned disposers of national destinies, was probably unique in an utter absence of reasons for blame. From the very beginning of his reign, Louis IX. resolved to restrain the abusive domination of the great vassals of the crown; but law and justice formed the invariable basis of his conduct. The same scrupulousness led him to doubt as to the entire legitimacy of certain conquests of some of his predecessors to the detriment of the kings of England, and he resolved to yield something for the sake of peace. By the treaty of Abbeville, in 1259, he voluntarily ceded to Henry III. of England part of the territories which that monarch reclaimed from the conquests of Philip Augustus; but in return he obtained the recognition, as inalienable from the French monarchy, of Anjou, Normandy, Maine, Touraine, Berri and Poitou. The English sovereign also engaged to do homage to the king of France, as to his liege and suzerain lord, for all his possessions in the kingdom of France. When the dissensions between Henry III. and his barons threatened to become interminable, the reputation of Louis for probity caused the contestants to appeal to him as arbitrator. In 1264 both parties argued their claims before the saint at Amiens, submitting to his judgment, although only for a time. In his conduct toward Frederick II. of Germany, that most virulent in a line of emperors, so many of whom were as so many running sores in the visible body of the Church, the saintly monarch demonstrated that if the Holy Roman Emperors of the German line had ignored the fact that their sole reason for existence was their obligation to be Defenders of the Holy See, that sublime privilege had devolved on the Eldest Sons of the Church. In his relations with the Orient the crowned hero showed himself a missionary, as well as an armed defender of the Christian faith; he spared no exertion, no expense, in aiding the missions which the sons of Sts. Dominic and Francis had established among the Photian and Nestorian schismatics, and among the Saraceus and Tartars. In the administration of the internal affairs of his kingdom, St. Louis was an energetic and prudent reformer; there was not, in all France, a bailiff, a seneschal, or a provost who was not made to feel that his office was a solemn charge for the benefit of the people. The reign of St. Louis was pre-eminently one of justice. The royal tribunals became sure refuges for oppressed innocence; and the king himself heard whatever case a subject desired to be considered by him. From one end of the kingdom to the other, the proudest lord hastened to undo a wrong when he heard the peasant murmur: "If the king only knew of that!" Students of financial questions know that anything like a well-regulated system of governmental finance is of very modern origin; but St. Louis

so regulated the reception of revenue, so accurately was every account verified, that never, during his reign, was there ordered an extraordinary tax. And let the statesmen of our day note that to our times must not be credited the invention of that famous panacea: "No taxation without representation." In 1256 this "cowed king" decreed in favor of the *bonnes villes* of his dominions that no tax should be levied on them without their consent. If the reader is curious to know how much St. Louis effected for the amelioration of the lot of the serfs, and how he emancipated those of his own royal domain; if it would interest the social economist to learn all that this crowned saint of the Middle Age effected for the encouragement of art, for the improvement of agriculture, etc., we refer him to the eloquent but judicial narrative of Lecoy de la Marche. When the beautiful picture has been examined, it may occur to the observer that it is strange that one is not oppressed by the sight of some disagreeable shadows, behind which some possible miseries may lurk. Nearly every other biography furnishes some occasion for adverse criticism of its subject; but that of St. Louis refuses to a critic the exercise of his choicest prerogative, and for the simple reason that Louis IX. was more than a worthy husband and father, a consummate statesman, a successful general, and an excellent sovereign. He was also a saint. Such a phenomenal combination has been witnessed in only three or four instances in the history of the world; for while it is true that, at least in the Middle Age, there were many royal saints—considering the comparative fewness of royal personages, more than from any other condition of life—very seldom have other saintly royalties filled all the positions which St. Louis occupied.¹

I.

It is impossible to attain to a correct conception of the character and influence of St. Louis, or to any accurate knowledge of the period in which he lived, if one does not appreciate properly the theory concerning the nature and origin of the royal power which was then in vogue. And among moderns, especially among those whose ideas of history have been derived from Protestant

¹ Speaking of the Venerable Mary Christina of Savoy, mother of King Francis II. of the two Sicilies, a writer in the *Civiltà Cattolica* (1859) says: "In the Ages of Faith sanctity shone on the thrones of kings, and in royal halls; and perhaps more than in the homes of the lowly and in the cells of religious. Then Italy, France, Spain, Germany, England, Scotland, Hungary and Denmark gave to the Church so many saints who were either kings or queens, or royal princes or princesses, that, considering the fact that the number is small of those persons who occupy so elevated a position, it may be seen that reigning families furnished more saints than were produced by any other condition of life."

and rationalistic sources, how many are there who understand the meaning of that phrase, the "divine right of kings," which, with some show of reason, they regard as indicative of that *toto cælo* difference which subsists between mediæval days and our own? Very few; and, nevertheless, there are some who have read, to say nothing about many minor struggles between royal autocracy and the protectress of the peoples, much concerning that perennial and soul-sickening struggle between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Emperors of the German line—a contest the sole object of which was, on the part of the Pontiffs, to force the emperors to avow that between them and God there was a divinely appointed power. If these pages come to the notice of any persons who believe, with the immense majority of Protestants, that the "divine right of kings," as they understand the formula, was the theory held by jurists in the Middle Age, and then taught by the Church, they must learn that the Church has never made any definition concerning either a mediate or an immediate communication of ruling power. The Church has simply presented the dogma revealed in the Pauline declaration that all power comes from God. But the most reliable and most authoritative doctors and theologians of the Church have taught that power has its source in the nation; that power comes from the nation; and that the nation gives, in some manner and in unison with God, that power to princes or other rulers of the peoples. Hear St. Chrysostom, as he comments on the Pauline text: "Is every ruler established by God? I do not say that he is; for I am not speaking of any particular rulers, but of the thing in itself. I say that it is an institution of Divine Wisdom that some command, and others obey; and that thus human affairs do not go on in haphazard fashion, the peoples being agitated like the waves of the sea. The Apostle does not say that there is no prince who does not come from God; but speaking of the thing itself, he says that there is no power, unless from God."¹ But hearken to the Angel of the Schools, who, to put the matter very mildly, is the best accredited of all the Catholic theologians, and upon whose judgments all other theologians rely, when they approach this matter *ex professo*. St. Thomas, who was a contemporary of St. Louis, tells us that the legislative power resides in the nation, in the people, or in him who has received it from the people.² He says the same in regard to the coercive power.³ He insists that in certain conditions of society, the ruler has power to make laws, only because he represents the nation—in *quantum gerit personam multi-*

¹ *Homilia XXIII. in Epist. ad Romanos.*

² *Summa Theol.*, I a., 2 æ., q. 90, a. 3, *in corp.*

³ *Ibid.*, q. 90, a. 3, ad 2 um.

tudinis.¹ A little further on he says that in a well-ordered state the governing power belongs to all—*principatus ad omnes pertinet*, inasmuch as all can vote and be elected.² After St. Thomas of Aquino, probably Suarez would dispute with Bellarmine the honor of leading the schools. The opinion of Suarez concerning the divine right of kings can be gathered from his "Treatise on Laws," and from an apposite work written in reply to King James I. of England, who, an earnest champion of that doctrine which is falsely supposed to be Catholic teaching, had taken up the pen in an attempted refutation of Bellarmine's defense of the really Catholic position. Listen to Suarez: "It must be admitted that the power to rule is not given by nature to any one person in particular; being, rather, resident in the community. This is the *common opinion*, and it is *certain*. It is the teaching of St. Thomas."³ And can anything be clearer than the following? "Whenever the civil power resides in any man, in any prince, it has emanated, by legitimate and ordinary right, from the people and the community, either immediately or mediately; and in no other way can it be a legitimate."⁴ Again: "When the civil power is found in this man, it is the result of a gift of the nation, as I have proved; and in that respect, the power is of human right. And if the government of this or that nation or province is monarchical, it is such because of human institution; and therefore the power also is of human origin. And what proves the matter more strongly, the power of the ruler is more or less great, according to the agreement between him and the nation."⁵ Now listen to the reply of Suarez to his Protestant Majesty: "Here the most serene king not only upholds a *new and singular opinion* (that of the *immediate and direct divine right of kings*), but he violently attacks Cardinal Bellarmine because his Eminence affirmed that monarchs, unlike the Sovereign Pontiffs, do not receive their authority immediately from God. His Majesty holds that a prince does not receive his power from the people, but immediately from God; and he tries to support his assertion with arguments and facts which I shall examine in the following chapter. Now, although this controversy does not turn directly on matters of faith, since neither Scripture nor patristic tradition determines anything concerning the subject, nevertheless the matter ought to be treated carefully, firstly, because it may furnish an occasion of error in others; secondly, because the king's opinion, such as he establishes it, and because of its object, is *new and singular*, and seems to have been expressly invented in order to enhance the temporal, and to diminish the

¹ *Ibid.*, q. 97, ad 3, ad 3 um.² *Ibid.*, q. 105, a. 1, in corp.³ *De Leg.*, lib. iii., cap. 2.⁴ *Ibid.*, lib. iii., cap. 3.⁵ *Ibid.*, cap. 4.

spiritual power; and, thirdly, because we contend that the opinion of the illustrious cardinal is *ancient, received, true, and necessarily to be admitted*.¹ When such was the opinion of theologians like the Angelic Doctor, Bellarmine, and Suarez, we are not surprised on hearing Beaumanoir, in the thirteenth century, and Marsilio of Padua in the early fourteenth, asserting that the people were the first sovereign, and that from the people the king derived his right to make laws.

Nevertheless, the sovereigns of the Middle Age, especially in France, were popularly regarded as, in some sort, images of the Deity; in those days men respected authority. In France, the holy unction which the monarch received at Rheims gave to him, in the popular imagination, an almost sacerdotal character; hence in the *Chanson de Roland* we see Charlemagne giving a solemn blessing to his army. It is very probable, remarks a judicious critic of our day,² that this idea of the quasi-divinity of royalty came from the principle of Aristotle—a philosopher then almost worshipped in the schools—that the monarchical form of government is the most conformable to the order of nature, since all nature is ruled by one God. So thought Gerson, repeating the words of Homer, “*Οὐχ ἀγαθὸν πολυκυρανία’ εἰς χοίρανος ἔστω*—It is not good to have many leaders; let us have but one.” As to hereditary monarchy, the principle was by no means absolute in mediæval France. Louis VIII. was the first monarch whose father had not procured his coronation during his own life; all the Capetians, down to Philip Augustus, had found it necessary to take this measure in order to secure the succession to their eldest sons. At that time, not only in France, but also in Italy, Hungary and Germany, there was always a menace in the ears of a reigning prince; he knew that misconduct or tyranny might cause the royal dignity to be transferred to some other family. However, with the advent of St. Louis, the hereditary principle was definitely accepted by the French; the Christian prestige of this prince was so communicated to his race that to be the heir of St. Louis was equivalent to being the future wearer of his crown. And now a word as to the measure of the royal authority during the Middle Age. Eliand, a Cistercian monk of the diocese of Beauvais, in the time of St. Louis, whose knowledge and prudence is lauded by all his literary contemporaries, and whose political ideas are regarded as having helped to form the policy of the holy monarch, thus speaks of the power of a Christian sovereign in his day: “The ancient code (the pagan Roman) utters a tremendous lie, when it pronounces that the mere will of the prince has the force of law.

¹ *Defensio Fidei Adversus Anglicanæ Sectæ Errores*, lib. iii., cap. 2.

² M. Chas. Jourdain, in his *La Royauté Française et Le Droit Populaire*.

. . . . It is not at all strange that, among us, the king is not allowed to have a private treasury; for the king does not belong to himself, but to his subjects."¹ And lest the reader may think that this theory of Elinand is a mere isolated opinion, we subjoin a remark of the most celebrated publicist of that day, Cardinal James de Vitry, bishop of Tusculum and dean of the Sacred College: "There is no security for a monarch, from the very moment when men find that they are not secure from him."² Then we hear St. Thomas proclaiming that the good of the community is the sole end of a government; that a monarch is not enthroned for his own satisfaction, but for the public weal; that a king must be the good shepherd of his people; that, in fine, no law should be considered as such, unless it be "a reasonable regulation, promulgated by him who has the care of the community, and directed to the public good—*quædam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habet promulgata*."³ One of the most ardent partisans of hereditary monarchy was the great Gerson; but he wrote: "He errs who thinks that a king can use the persons and goods of his subjects as his pleasure dictates; or that he can load his people with taxes, when the public weal does not call for such burdens. Such conduct is that of a tyrant, not that of a king."⁴ It is true that in the time of Philip the Fair, the hero of the sad and disgraceful episode of Anagni, certain jurists tried to flatter their royal master with the notion that his authority was unbounded; that it was even independent of the tiara.⁵ But we must remember that between the reigns of St. Louis and Philip the Fair there had intervened the reign of Philip III. (the Rash); that then had really begun the end of the Middle Age, and the disintegration of its vital and most characteristic elements. During the reign of St. Louis, and during many previous centuries, no Christian publicist would have dared to utter such sentiments as began to be current when the *populus Christianus* began to give way to the divided Christian peoples, and when other elements than the Christian faith began to sway the nations. In the palmy days of the Middle Age the governmental ideal was an absence of both despotism and demagoguery.

St. Louis was not twelve years of age when, by the premature death of his father, Louis VIII., he was called to the throne of France in 1226. The political condition of France was very dif-

¹ In a sermon by Elinand, recorded in the edition of the works of Vincent of Beauvais, published by the Dominicans of Douai, in 1624.

² Latin MS. No. 17,509, folio 103, in the National Library of France, cited by Le-coy de la Marche, *loc. cit.*

³ See Jourdain's *La Philosophie de Saint Thomas*, i., 407.

⁴ Jourdain, *Ibid.*

⁵ Goldast, *Monarchia Sancti Romani Imperii*, ii., 96.

ferent from that which the kingdom had presented in the time of Charlemagne. That king of the Franks, placed by Pope St. Leo III. at the head of a new empire which had nothing but the name in common with that of pagan Rome, had fulfilled his mission by combining the heterogeneous elements entrusted to his care, so that he left behind him neither Romans nor Franks, neither Gauls nor barbarians; but a *populus Christianus*, in a unity which required for its maintenance merely the moral leadership of the Roman Pontiff, and in that unity the political and social organization of the Middle Age was established.¹ In the year 962 Pope John XII. transferred the Holy Roman Empire from the French to the Germans; but thereafter the emperors were merely kings of the Germans and of whatever other peoples happened to be subject to the titular of the nonce, he enjoying over other sovereigns only the primacy of dignity. When the crown of France passed from the Carolingians to the Capetians, a radical change had been effected in the royal condition. Under both the Merovingians and the early Carolingians, the dukes and counts, in various parts of the kingdom, had been merely administrators for the king; but toward the end of the ninth century they bought up or appropriated the proprietorship of their territories. Thus arose feudalism in France, the new proprietors soon confounding, in good or in bad faith, the right of the land-owner with that of sovereignty. In this new state of affairs, in which the sovereignty was attached to the land instead of to the individual, the king was a person of small consideration; for even his residence, the Ile de France, belonged to the Count of Paris. Even when the will of the nation raised Hugh Capet, Count of Paris and Duke of France, to the royal throne in 986, his own services and those of his father, Hugh the Great, could not obtain for him better conditions than that he should be full sovereign in his own county of Paris, and have the commandment of all forces in war. Of course all the other princes swore homage to the new king as their "suzerain." From the date of Hugh Capet's accession down to the time of Louis XI., the main object of every king was to enlarge his own peculiar domain by purchase or alliance, and to augment the attributes of his suzerainty. The first successors of Hugh Capet, namely, Robert, Henry I., and Philip I., effected much in this really praiseworthy struggle; that great minister, the Benedictine abbot Suger, did still more in favor of Louis VI. and Louis VII.; but Philip Augustus struck two mortal blows against feudalism. The first was when he caused the king of England, his most redoubtable vassal, to answer, before the peers of France, for the crime of mur-

¹ Lecoy de la Marche, *loc. cit.*, p. 27.

dering his own nephew; confiscating thereafter to the benefit of the French crown, nearly all the fiefs which the English monarch had held in France, namely, Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, and Poitou. The second blow was when, by the victory of Bouvines, he destroyed forever the arrogant pretensions of the German emperors in regard to France. It is true that Philip Augustus feared for the permanency of his work; but God had decreed that his daughter-in-law, the saintly Blanche of Castile, should carry it on during her regency, and should so train her son, St. Louis, that he would perfect it by the exercise of an ability and an honesty which exceeded those of his grandfather. In the fulfilment of his task St. Louis relied little on the lasting effects of conquest; nay, he was so unworldly that he would not regard as legitimate any gain accruing to his kingdom, which had not been sealed by a perfect concord between the parties concerned. The work of consolidating the Capetian monarchy on the ruins of feudalism was indeed consummated only by Louis XI., the very antipode of St. Louis; but the latter monarch had contributed more to that end than all of his predecessors united. And how different was the policy of St. Louis from that of his foxy successor! Certainly Louis XI. was not the character which most modern historians describe for the worshipers of the nineteenth century; nor was he at all the one who crawls along the modern stage as an incarnation of royal cruelty and deceit. But where Louis XI. was astute, St. Louis was frank; where Louis XI. was unjust, St. Louis observed an equity which would have excited the derisive laughter of a Cavour or a Palmerston, if the Middle Age could have tolerated those who are grandmasters of "diplomacy" in our day. Finally, the policy of St. Louis was less expensive than that of Louis XI.; and since it was incomparably less expensive than the policies now in vogue, our utilitarians should accord to it their heartfelt admiration.

II. -

In the palmy days of Gallicanism, and of its contemptible sister-school, German courtier-theologism, one often heard the name of St. Louis cited as that of an opponent of the "encroachments of Rome." Even in our own time, when both of these schools were dead, and waiting for the Vatican Council to bury them, theists of celebrity *et id genus omne* were wont to utter the same absurdity with complacent solemnity. Poor Renan said: "The Church had commanded kings to obey; Philip Augustus *and St. Louis protested*, and Philip the Fair dared to resist."¹ That Philip Augustus protested against the order, issued by Pope Inno-

¹ *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, xxiv, 146.

cent III., to put away his concubine, and to restore Queen Ingelburga to her rights, is true; but he repented in time, and obeyed. That Philip the Fair resisted the just demands of Pope Boniface VIII. is also true; but he was obliged to acquiesce in the vindication of that Pontiff's conduct by the Fifteenth General Council. That St. Louis protested, in the sense in which Renan, Michelet, etc., use the term, is false. The principal, if not the sole, reason for supposing that St. Louis would have been a Gallican, if there had been such a thing in his day, is founded on an unauthentic document—that celebrated forgery which bears the pseudo-title of "Pragmatic Sanction."¹ Elsewhere we have done justice to this pretended edict of St. Louis,² and here we need only say that no true erudite of our day defends its authenticity. But there are some, for instance, Viollet and Wallon, who insist that even though St. Louis did not issue the supposed Sanction, he might have done so in all consistency; for, they contend, his principles were those defended in it. This curious theory was that of Bossuet, who did not fully credit the document. The great bishop of Meaux exclaimed to those who, even among his partisans, decried the authenticity of the Sanction: "Even though this Pragmatic were apocryphal, its doctrine ought not to be rejected."³ Let us see, therefore, what was the attitude of the grandest Christian of the thirteenth century toward the Holy See. This attitude will appear without distortion if we consult, not the prejudices of Henri Martin, Beugnot, Faure, or the rank and file of English authors, but those original sources, the neglect of which constitutes the capital sin of a historian. In this matter those sources are the official documents preserved in the *Tresor des Chartes*,⁴ and cited by Lecoy de la Marche; the pontifical letters collected by Rinaldi; many documents published by the Bollandists; and last, but by no means least, the "Registers of Pope Innocent IV.," comprising many hitherto unknown illustrations of the reign of that Pontiff, especially in the matter of his relations with St. Louis, which M. Elie Berger recently unearthed from the archives of the Vatican and of the National Library of France.⁵ In the year

¹ The title is absurd in the premises. The word "Pragmatic" is derived from the Greek *πράγμα* and the Latin *sancio*; and it would be appropriate if the edict sanctioned some previous ordinance. But this document sanctions nothing.

² In our *Studies in Church History*, Vol. iii., ch. 9.

³ *Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani*, pt. ii., bk. 2, ch. 9.

⁴ In the National Archives of France.

⁵ *Les Registres d'Innocent IV.*, Paris, 1884-1887. This monumental work merited the "prix Gobert," from the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. M. Berger's two introductions, one historical and the other diplomatical, form a mine for the polemic whose duties bring him to a study of this important period of European history; and the entire work is another proof of the sagacity which dictated the establishment of the École Française in Rome.

1235 St. Louis attained his majority, and from that time he governed his kingdom by his own sole authority, although he took frequent counsel from his wise and holy mother until the end of her life, in 1252. One of the first communications held with him by the then reigning Pontiff, Gregory IX., was of a nature to indicate that his Majesty of France was a personage not merely ordinarily *grata* to the Holy See; we find the Pontiff conceding the extraordinary privilege of exemption from any possible interdict to the private chapels of the royal family, and what was still more wonderful in that age, the king and his family were allowed to communicate with the excommunicated without consequence of censure.¹ At the renewal of the struggle between the Holy See and Frederick II., that German emperor who proclaimed that "the world had suffered from three impostors, Moses, Christ, and Mahomet," we hear Pope Gregory IX. asking for aid and counsel from his Most Christian Majesty, invoking the ancient friendship between the tiara and the lilies, and concluding: "Just as the tribe of Juda was called to a special blessing from among the other tribes, so the kingdom of France is illustrious above all others through a divine prerogative of honor and grace. Just as the tribe of Juda, a figure of France, defeated and subjugated all its enemies, so the kingdom of France, fighting the battles of the Lord, and combating for the liberty of the Church in both the East and the West, delivered the Holy Land from the pagans under the leadership of your predecessors, reduced the empire of Constantinople to the Roman obedience, saved Rome herself from a multitude of perils, and conquered the pest of Albigensian heresy. Just as the tribe of Juda never abandoned the worship of the true God, so in the kingdom of France the Christian faith has never vacillated, devotion to the Church has never weakened, ecclesiastical liberty has never been imperilled."² Certainly the recipient of this praise had not yet shown any tendency to interfere with the prerogatives of the Holy See. And in the subsequent years his conduct during the struggle between the Church and the Empire proved his intense devotion to the Papacy. Undoubtedly he tried to mediate between the contending parties, for a love of peace was the dominant feature of his character; but his active sympathies were with the Supreme Pontiff of Christendom. Immediately on the arrival of the special legate of Pope Gregory IX. in France, the holy monarch ordered the publication of the anathema against Frederick which the prelate had brought; and he facilitated the levy of the tax on ecclesiastical benefices which was to furnish the means of combating the imperial enemy of the

¹ *Tresor des Chartes*, Archives Nationales, J. 684, 686.

² *Tresor*, Arch. Nat., J. 352; *Inventaire*, Num. 2835.

Church. The English chronicler, Matthew of Paris, tells us that the Pope wished St. Louis to do more; that he desired France to declare war against Frederick; and that when St. Louis refused, he annulled the election of one of the king's uncles, Pierre Charlot, to the bishopric of Noyon. But the truth is, as we gather from Baronio, that the Pontiff did not desire immediate war on the emperor, for he was about to try the effect of a council on the recalcitrant. As to the affair of Charlot, the election to the See of Noyon was annulled for reasons unconnected with the matter of Frederick II. This Charlot was a bastard son of Philip Augustus, and the Holy See had dispensed with the impediment *publicæ honestatis*, in order that the royal wish for his admittance to the priesthood might be gratified; but it was not the intention of the Pontiff that the higher dignities of the Church should be open to one who was tainted by infamous origin. When the Thirteenth General Council (First of Lyons) was convoked, and Frederick opposed its meeting by every means in his power, St. Louis adopted every means to further it. In the height of his insanity, the German seized the Papal legate and some French bishops who were accompanying him to Italy, maltreated them, and imprisoned them. Immediate preparations for war, however, on the part of France, induced him to give full satisfaction for the insult. Before the Council of Lyons could meet, Pope Gregory IX. died; and when his successor, Celestine IV., also died, after a reign of a few days, the intrigues of Frederick, more than probable infidel though he was, to raise himself to the Chair of Peter led to an "interpontificium" of nearly two years. Then St. Louis voiced the sentiments of Christendom, when he wrote to the Sacred College this very un-Gallican message: "Since there is a question of defending the independence of the Church, you can rely on the aid of France. Be firm; throw off the yoke which has pressed your necks so long!"¹ And here we would take advantage of an opportunity to show the utter unreliability of Matthew of Paris (formerly styled Matthew Paris), whenever that English chronicler undertakes to write of French affairs. He asserts that St. Louis threatened, in his letter to the cardinals, to choose a Pope by his own authority, *by virtue of a privilege to that effect conferred on St. Denis by Pope St. Clement*. A Pontiff was soon chosen in the person of Innocent IV., and one of his first acts was to assure the king of France of his affectionate respect: "God has already made your name great among the greatest." The Pope also besought the aid of his Eldest Son against the

¹ Hულიard-Bréholles; *Histoire Diplomatique de Frederic II.*, in introduction, page cciii. Paris, 1860.

perjured emperor, who was then conspiring against the personal freedom of the head of the Church.

The Thirteenth General Council met at Lyons in 1245, and by a unanimous vote of the synodals the Emperor Frederick II. was deposed. But one resource was open to the disconcerted prince ; he might induce the temporal rulers of Christendom to unite against the "usurpations" of the arrogant churchman who presumed to dictate to the salt of the earth. To gain the king of France to his views would be equivalent to a conquest of all the other sovereigns of Europe ; therefore, besides the circular which he sent to every monarch, he sent to St. Louis his chancellor, who was empowered to make the most brilliant promises. Frederick knew well the spirit which actuated many of the vassals of the French crown ; therefore he cunningly suggested that Louis should arbitrate in his cause, "together with his peers and barons, as became so grand a monarch and so powerful a state." He promised to give to the Church whatever satisfaction this tribunal should deem proper ; he would accompany the French king in his projected Crusade, and he would not lay down his arms until the entire kingdom of Jerusalem was conquered. In return, besides the revocation of his deposition, he would ask for only one little concession ; he was to be allowed to glut his imperial vengeance on the Lombards.¹ Naturally such terms were unacceptable to both Innocent IV. and St. Louis. The latter could not sit as an equal with those vassals whose pretensions he was combating ; but for the love of peace, and in the interest of the Crusade, he consented to intercede with the Pontiff. Innocent granted the requested interview ; and in November, 1245, the Most Christian King prostrated himself before the Sovereign Pontiff in the cloisters of the abbey of Cluny. The conferences lasted for fifteen days, Queen Blanche alone assisting. The Pontiff finally announced that he could not accept the conditions formulated by the culprit ; but in order to show that he was not averse to an ultimate reconciliation, he agreed to allow Frederick to wait upon him at Lyons, there to try to clear himself of the charges, especially of heresy and heinous violence, which the Christian world had made against him. It is not probable that either the Pope or the king believed that Frederick would dare to attempt a formal justification of his notorious crimes ; at any rate, the perverse man affected to regard the pontifical offer as a refusal of justice, and ere long St. Louis learned that he had resolved to march on Lyons, not for the purpose of conferring with the Pontiff, but in order to seize his sacred person. Then the disgusted monarch broke off all negotiations ;

¹ Huillard-Breholles, *loc. cit.*, p. cccvi.

he announced to the Pope his resolve to attack the excommunicated traitor, and would have led his intending crusaders across the Alps, had he not learned that Frederick had decided to remain in Italy, and had not the Pontiff ordered him to sheathe his sword. Probably we have adduced a sufficiency of proofs in the matter of attachment of St. Louis to the See of Rome; but it will not be amiss to present a few more instances of an utter absence of any "Gallican" ideas of a false independence on the part of this Catholic hero. Firstly, then, it has been asserted that Innocent IV. condemned a league which certain French barons formed for the purpose of upholding their own judicial decisions when they differed from those of the episcopal tribunals. But we reply with Wallon,¹ that St. Louis was foreign to this league, as is fully proved by the absence of his seal in the original Act. Again, when the monarch returned from the Seventh Crusade, he received a letter from Innocent IV., in which the Pontiff lauded the zeal which he had ever displayed in defending the rights of French ecclesiastical establishments against the exactions of some of the royal bailiffs and certain barons. "The king," says the Pope, "does not know of these crimes (when they are committed), and he grieves when they are brought to his knowledge." The many favors which Alexander IV. showered on St. Louis also show that the king was a prince according to his pontifical heart. And that these concessions were granted simply because of the virtue of the applicant, and because Rome realized that he would never abuse them, is evinced by the fact that when the king begged that some of the favors might be extended to his heir, the request was refused. Rome is never blind. The relations of St. Louis with Pope Clement IV., the last of the potentates who were contemporary with him, indicate a perfect harmony of thought between the two powers—a thorough respect for the rights of each. As the Bollandists expressed the idea: "*Negabat alter alteri quod justis rationibus concedendum non putabat, nec inde amicitia lædebatur.*" During the vacancy of the episcopal see of Rheims, Pope Clement conferred several benefices which were of episcopal right; but he soon revoked the collation, lest he might appear indifferent to the "right of regalia" enjoyed by the kings of France. St. Louis showed an equal appreciation of the difference between pontifical and royal prerogatives when the Greek emperor, Michael Paleologus, having asked him to arbitrate between the Pontiff and himself, he replied that such a rôle was above the powers of even a king of France, since the Roman Pontiff was the supreme judge in Christendom. He would promise the emperor

¹ *Saint Louis et son Temps*. Paris, 1865.

merely the exercise of his "good offices" at the pontifical court. When many of his courtiers advised St. Louis to claim as a royal fief the county of Melgueil, near Montpellier, then in the possession of the bishop of Maguelonne, he followed the advice of Pope Clement, and respected the claims of the bishop. When St. Louis thought of taxing the merchandise which passed through the port of Aigues-Mortes, which had been constructed in the interests of pilgrims to the Holy Land, and wishing only to use the revenue for the maintenance of the port in good condition, he consulted with Pope Clement; and received permission to levy the desired imposts, "after consultation with the bishops of the province, the barons of the neighborhood, and the consuls of Montpellier, and on condition that the duties would be moderate and never afterward increased."¹ Here, then, we see St. Louis asking for the intervention of the Pope in a purely temporal matter; the Pontiff admits that the king can decide as he thinks best, and the monarch deems it advisable to follow the counsel of his Holiness. Certainly a more perfect harmony could not have been desired. Did our limits permit, we could multiply instances of this concord; but the reader will probably conclude that the course of St. Louis toward the Holy See was always such as one would have expected, *a priori*, so pious a monarch to follow.

III.

The best efforts of Pope Gregory IX. had been devoted to the preparation of a new Crusade; and in the next pontificate the urgency for such an expedition became extreme. Jerusalem, which for some years had been in Christian hands, was captured in 1244 by the Mussulmans of Egypt, who had become masters of Syria. Aid from the West was tearfully sought by the few Christians of the Holy Land whom the scimitar had spared. But the king of England and the German emperor ignored every appeal; the other princes, St. Louis excepted, were too feeble to do else than pray to heaven for the success of a holy cause. To France, therefore, then, as always, the reliance of Christendom in every dread emergency, the entreaties of Pope Innocent IV. were directed; and St. Louis arose from a bed of sickness, donned the cross, and having proceeded to Notre-Dame in the dress of a humble pilgrim, went to Lyons for the blessing of Christ's vicar upon his enterprise. It is not our purpose to describe this expedition. In 1248 St. Louis led his army out of France, not in royal array, but in a pilgrim's guise, and with bare feet, to impress his followers with the truth that they were about to engage in a holy task, and one which needed a special blessing for its success. In the same penitential

¹ *Acta Sanctorum*, Aug. V., 485.

dress he entered Damietta, chanting the *Te Deum*. When the final reverse overtook him, he was able to say with the Apostle, "Quum infirmor, tunc potens sum." How much of the responsibility for the failure of the Seventh Crusade must be cast upon the German emperor, Frederick II.? When St. Louis was about to depart, Frederick feared that a new French principality would soon be founded in the Orient, and he asked of the king a promise that all of his conquests should be annexed to the kingdom of Jerusalem. The saint replied that he would effect nothing to the prejudice of the emperor, but that he could only promise that all his actions would be for the good of the Church. Frederick appeared to be satisfied; he ordered his officers in Sicily not to overcharge the French for the provisions they would buy in that island. But the Arab historian, Makrizi, declares that Frederick sent a special messenger, disguised as a merchant, to warn the sultan, then sick at Damascus, of the French intention to attack Egypt.¹ Such a course was perfectly consistent with the entire career of Frederick II. He had already shown how little spirit he had for the Holy Wars, when, in 1227, after years of incitement by Rome, Italy, Germany, and Hungary, he had finally set sail from Brindisi, only to return three days afterward, alleging that he was sick—conduct which entailed upon him his first excommunication by Gregory IX.² And when finally he did appear in Palestine, it was only for the annoyance of the Christians, he having hastened to make an alliance with the persecuting Sultan of Egypt. We are justified, therefore, in believing the Arab historian, when he says that this false Christian (and probably renegade) betrayed the plans of St. Louis. Joinville, the companion of the holy monarch during the best years of his life, and his most reliable biographer, narrates that when Frederick heard of the captivity of the hero, he burst into a frenzy of joy, and gave a grand feast to his court. Then he sent, says the seneschal, a messenger to the sultan, ostensibly for the purpose of negotiating for the release of the king, but really in order to insure the prolongation of his duration. In order to rid ourselves of so unsavory a subject, we

¹ The work of Makrizi is translated in the *Bibliothèque des Croisades*, vol. iv.

² The Bull of excommunication recites that Frederick was thus punished because he had, five different times, violated his solemn vows, emitted with the clause that he would incur excommunication if he broke them; because he had not furnished the troops and money which he had promised to the eastern Christians; because he had despoiled their king of his title and his revenues; because he had prevented the Archbishop of Tarento from visiting his diocese; because he had robbed the Templars and Hospitalers of their Sicilian revenues; because he had not observed treaties for the keeping of which the Holy See had become his security; because he had robbed of his property Count Roger, a Crusader, and under the protection of the Pope; because he had imprisoned unjustly the son of that Count Roger, etc.—In Labbe, vol. xi.

hasten to add, that the later conduct of the German emperor was such as to confirm the recital of Makrizi. Not satisfied with allying himself with the Sarrasins in their own land, he invited to the Italian peninsula those of them who resided in Sicily, and gave them lands around Lucera, in a state which was a fief of the Holy See. He adopted the manners of the infidels, composed his body-guard of them, and chose their prettiest women for his hours of lasciviousness. Shame like this well befitted the closing years of the Hohenstaufen, a dynasty the most salient characteristic of which was a perennial attempt to destroy the Papacy, an institution which buried it, as it has buried, and ever will bury, others of the same stamp. The first use which the Saracens made of their royal captive was to endeavor to obtain from him an order on the Templars and the Hospitalers for the surrender of their fortresses in Palestine. When he refused, and the sultan threatened to put him to the most frightful tortures, the king replied that the infidel might work his pleasure. At length, liberty was offered to him in exchange for the surrender of Damietta, then held by the noble Margaret, the queen of St. Louis, with a small garrison of Frenchmen; and in addition, for the sum of a million golden bezants—about two and a half millions of dollars. “If the queen consents,” said the monarch, “I shall pay that amount for my soldiers, and shall deliver Damietta as my own ransom; you must know that such as I am are not exchanged for money.” One incident that occurred before the departure of St. Louis from Egypt deserves mention as indicative of the true spirit of Christian knighthood. The sultan had been murdered by his emirs, and the chief assassin rushed into the presence of the king, sword in hand, and demanded that Louis should dub him knight there and then. The wish was not preposterous in the mind of the Mussulman; for had not Frederick, the head of the Holy Roman Empire, knighted the emir Fakr-Eddin? But the French monarch could not prostitute an essentially Christian dignity, and calmly he awaited death from the horde of indignant miscreants. The majesty of his mien awed the Saracens; they drew back, and the disappointed candidate swore to observe the treaty.¹ If this incident does not give the reader some idea of the ascendancy which St. Louis exercised over the minds even of infidels, we would remind him that the emirs debated among themselves whether or not they should offer him the sceptre of the late sultan. Then Joinville, being asked by the monarch in an apparently serious tone whether he ought to accept, replied that none but an insane man would receive a diadem from those who had murdered the previous wearer.” “And nevertheless,” said St.

¹ *Memoires de Joinville.* Edition de Wailly, p. 185.

Louis, "I would accept it."¹ Voltaire did not credit this episode; but we can understand how St. Louis may have conceived the sublime idea of availing himself of the infidel sceptre, or rather of its attendant influence, in order to convert his new subjects to the faith of Christ. History furnished him with many precedents for such a hope.

In 1270 St. Louis entered upon his second Holy War, that which is known as the Eighth Crusade. The commercial rivalry of the Venetians and Genoese, joined to the scandalous dissensions between the Templars and Hospitalers, had encouraged the Mussulmans to greater progress than they had ever dared to anticipate; and the condition of the Oriental Christians appealed again to the great heart of France. Tunis was chosen by the king for his base of operations; he had been persuaded that the Tunisian prince was disposed to become a Christian, and he therefore relied on that portion of the African coast as his main source of supplies. But the usually circumspect monarch had been deceived, perhaps unwittingly, by his brother, Charles of Anjou, who had an ulterior motive for landing in Tunis, he being desirous of preventing any Tunisian attack on his kingdom of Sicily—a worthy intention, but which hampered the main object of the Crusade. The reduction of the castle of Carthage and successive defeats of the Tunisians and other Mussulmans appeared to augur well for the expedition; but the delay of Charles of Anjou to join the Crusaders had already filled the army with dismay, when a malignant dysentery incapacitated all for action. Among the many leaders and nobles who succumbed was the count de Nevers, the youngest son of the king; and soon the holy monarch himself was stricken. To prepare himself for death was an easy task for one who had ever lived the life of a saint; but mindful to the last of the welfare of the nation committed by God to his care, the hero gave to his heir a written copy of those instructions which we read as "The Teachings of St. Louis." Since this document is not only a monument of the purest faith of the Middle Age, but an epitome of as wise a policy as statesman ever devised, as well as a faithful mirror of the testator's entire career, we subjoin some of its passages: "My dear son, the first thing I recommend to you is that you direct your whole heart to the love of God. Beware of anything displeasing to God; above all, beware of mortal sin.² If God sends adversity to you, receive it patiently, knowing that you have deserved it, and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

² Through all the years of his manhood St. Louis had been accustomed, from time to time, to tell his familiars how his mother, the saintly Blanche of Castile, had often said that she would rather see him dead at her feet than know that he had committed one mortal sin.

that it will be profitable to you ; if He sends you prosperity, thank Him humbly, so that pride may not injure you.¹ Go frequently to confession. Attend all the services of the Church with great recollection.² Be gentle and charitable to the poor and the suffering. Maintain the good customs of your kingdom, and abolish the bad ones.³ Do not burthen your people with taxes. Always have around you worthy men, seculars as well as religious. Hear sermons willingly ; and eagerly seek for prayers and indulgences. Let no man be so audacious as to utter a word in your presence which might lead another into sin ; let no man speak ill of another behind his back ; and if any one blasphemes God or His saints, revenge the insult at once.⁴ Be rigid and loyal in the administration of justice. If you know that you possess what belongs to another, restore it immediately ; if the ownership is doubtful, let prudent and just men investigate the matter.⁵ Let your best endeavors be exerted for the furtherance of peace within and outside your kingdom. Maintain the franchises of your good cities and communes ; for by the strength and wealth of these cities and communes the peers and barons will be compelled to respect you. Honor and love most especially all religious and all ecclesiastical persons. It is narrated of my grandfather, King Philip (Augustus), that when one of his councillors remarked that it was strange that

¹ On the glorious field of Massourah he had prostrated himself, and cried : " I thank God for all, good or evil, which He sends to me."

² He had always heard two Masses every day ; and when he was reprovcd, he would say : " These gentlemen would find no fault were I to spend as much time in the chase or in other pleasures."

³ He had abolished private wars, judicial duels, etc.

⁴ From very ancient times it had been customary in France for any man to slap the face of one who had uttered a blasphemy, or even such a phrase as " Go to the devil ! " In the days of Justinian, and throughout the empire, death was inflicted on him who swore by the head or hair of God (*Novella 67*). Philip Augustus decreed against blasphemers a penalty of four golden livres (about \$80.00), and if the culprit was too poor to pay it, he was thrown into the nearest river, and pulled out only when he was nearly drowned. At the accession of St. Louis, men often took the law into their own hands, and great cruelties were sometimes practised. Pope Clement IV. remonstrated with St. Louis for allowing such treatment, and insisted that there should be no danger to " life or member " in the punishment. Consequently, in 1269 a royal ordinance mulcted blasphemers in amounts varying from five to forty livres ; those who could not pay, and were under forty years of age, were whipped ; the other impecunious culprits were pilloried and imprisoned. Jacques de Vitry and Etienne de Bourbon narrate how a certain knight, before the issue of this edict, gave a very heavy blow to a citizen who had blasphemed egregiously ; and when he was called to account by the king, he replied : " He outraged my heavenly Master, and I struck him even as I would have done had he insulted my earthly king." St. Louis told him to act similarly when occasion warranted him.

⁵ His subjects often upbraided St. Louis with excessive zeal in the matter of restitution ; for instance, they said that he had restored to the king of England far more than justice demanded.

he should allow certain clerics to interfere with his rights, he replied that he knew very well that certain clerics so acted, but that when he reflected how very good the Lord had been to him, he preferred to relinquish some of his rights rather than to raise difficulties with the Church.¹ Love and revere your father and mother, and obey all their commands." As to ecclesiastical benefices, confer them on worthy persons, and after having consulted with prudent men. My son, I instruct you to be ever reverent toward the Church, and toward the Supreme Pontiff, our father. Honor the Pope, for he is your spiritual father. Destroy heresy as far as your power will permit you."³ When the dying

¹ This passage should be considered by those who think that St. Louis was the author of the Pragmatic Sanction; for this monarch was much more scrupulous in ecclesiastical matters than his grandfather dreamed of being.

² People of our day who read the life of St. Louis must think that he carried this filial deference to an extreme. Joinville, in all simplicity, gives some curious instances of the subjection of the king to his saintly, but rather imperious, mother, even in matters of his married life. And he insisted on his devoted spouse, the noble Margaret of Provence, being in all things an obedient daughter-in-law. The following passage is interesting: "So severe was Queen Blanche toward Queen Margaret that she would not permit, so far as she could have her way, her son to enjoy the company of his wife except at night, when they retired together. Their favorite palace was at Pontoise, and they preferred it because the king's apartment was immediately above the queen's, a winding stairway connecting them. On this stairway they used to converse, having arranged with the chamberlains on duty that when the queen-mother would appear in the corridor leading to the apartment of her son, they would strike their wands on the door of that apartment; and then the king would hurry at once to his quarters. In the same way, if the queen-mother was approaching the rooms of Queen Margaret, the officers would give the signal on her door; and then she would hasten to her domicile. On one occasion the king had gone to his wife's chamber, where she was lying at death's door, because of a recent difficult *accouchement*. Suddenly Queen Blanche appeared, and taking the king by the hand, she exclaimed: 'Come away; you have no business here!' When Queen Margaret saw her mother-in-law leading the king away, she cried: 'Alas! You will not allow me to have my lord, either in life or death.' Then she fainted, and they thought her dying. The king returned to her, and they had much difficulty in reviving her." Old chroniclers say that Margaret followed her husband in his first Crusade, principally that at last she might have him to herself. But it seems that the gentle queen really venerated Blanche, and loved her. When the news of the queen-mother's death reached Palestine, Margaret showed every token of deep sorrow; but we note that Joinville thought that she grieved because of her sympathy with the king.

³ The sole ordinance issued by St. Louis in reference to heresy is dated in 1250. Previously he had been unable to follow the dictates of his heart by modifying the rigor of his mother's ordinance of 1229, which was, however, strictly in accord with the common law of the time. The revolts excited by the remnants of the Albigenses in the south of France had forced St. Louis to apply the laws against heresy with rigor. But the submission of the count of Toulouse caused the barons of Languedoc to cease their struggles against the royal authority, and then the king was free to pursue his policy of reconciling the North with the South. The chief articles of the decree of 1250 are these: "The properties taken from heretics in virtue of the ordinance of 1229 shall be restored to them, unless they have fled from the kingdom, or unless they continue in their obstinacy. Wives shall not lose their properties on

saint had handed this document to his heir, the future Philip III., he had himself raised from his bed, and kneeling, he received his Sacramental Lord. Then he lay on the ground, which he had ordered to be strewn with ashes. Having received Extreme Unction, he calmly awaited his summons to be dissolved, and to be with Christ. At midnight of August 25, 1270, the everlasting glory of the French monarchy cried: "Now we go to Jerusalem," and he had gone indeed to the heavenly Jerusalem.

He who discerns in St. Louis, as he undertakes his crusades, merely the French warrior who is ambitious of conquest, will not realize the true significance of the monarch's efforts. Nor will that significance be grasped by him who regards St. Louis as possessed by the sole idea of restoring to Christendom the holy places which were sanctified by the tears and blood of the God-Man. With St. Louis, under the cuirass of the Christian warrior throbbed the heart of an apostle of the Christian faith. He had not designed merely to subjugate the Holy Land to European or probably French domination. He had intended to convert the heretical and Mussulman inhabitants of the Orient; and to effect that work his serried battalions were accompanied by a little army of Dominican and Franciscan friars. According to the chronicle of Primat, these missionaries converted five hundred Arabs during the saint's short sojourn in Saint-Jean-d'Acre; and hence we may judge of what they effected during the seventh and eighth Crusades. Godfrey de Beaulieu and Etienne de Bourbon, who saw the converts in France, speak of many Saracens who were baptized during the king's first expedition, and accompanied him on his return, afterward marrying French women, and raising families which for many years remained under the direct protection of the crown. About the time that Pope Innocent IV. sent the Franciscan, Piano Carpini, into Tartary, our saint sent many other friars on the same apostolic mission. The results of his enterprise were only partial and isolated; but they show what was the policy of St. Louis in that Eastern Question which was then far more vital than it is in our day. In a word, his design was to arrest the advance of pagan barbarism, by force when that was necessary, but constantly and principally by the Christianization of the orientals. And if we look for his successors in this order of ideas, where shall we find them? "In the camps, or on a throne?" asks Lecoy de la Marche; "among the partisans of Russia, or among the defenders of the Ottoman Empire? No; they will be found in the humble tunic of those heroic friars whose glorious path St. Louis opened. They will be found in the persons

account of the crime of their husbands. The goods of heretics who die in the faith shall be restored to their heirs.

of those persevering missionaries who are preaching the Gospel in the heart of the old oriental world, and who, like certain ambassadors of St. Louis, incur thousands of dangers in order to probably save a few souls. These men may truly be termed the heirs of the spirit of St. Louis. When they cross burning plains and arid mountains, they can sustain their courage by the thought that they are realizing the dream of the wisest and most perspicacious of French kings (for three-fourths of them are Frenchmen). And when they fall under the strokes of their executioners, when they shed their blood in the cause which St. Louis championed so vigorously, they may well be saluted with that exclamation which once greeted the departure of another martyr: 'Son of St. Louis, ascend to heaven!'

IV.

That the thirteenth century, the century of St. Louis, was the zenith, the *apogée*, of the Middle Age; that, together with the twelfth century, it "formed the most important, complete, and resplendent period in the history of Catholic society;"¹ is admitted by not only Catholic polemics, but by most of our modern adversaries, from Voltaire to Guizot. It remained, however, for the picturesque theist, Michelet, to discover that modern skepticism dates from the thirteenth century, and that the chief personification of the Christian idea in that period, St. Louis, was a victim of religious doubt. "Such was the aspect of the world in the thirteenth century. At the summit, the 'great dumb ox of Sicily,' ruminating his questions. Here, man and liberty; there God, grace, the divine foresight, fatality; at the right, observation proclaiming human liberty; at the left, logic impelling invincibly toward fatalism. . . . The ecclesiastical legislator drew back at the brink, fighting for good sense against his own logic, which would have precipitated him. This steadfast genius paused on the edge of a sword between two abysses, the depth of which he realized. A solemn figure of the church, he kept his balance, tried for an equilibrium, and perished in the attempt."² The eloquent historian flattered himself that he understood the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor; but he thought that none of the scholars of the thirteenth century appreciated the delicacy of that position "between two abysses." He continues: "From below, the world looked up to the elevated region in which he calculated

¹ Montalembert, in the Introduction to his beautiful *Histoire de Sainte Elisabeth d'Hongrie*.

² So the early fellow-students of St. Thomas termed him. He was born in Aquino, a town of Terra di Lavoro, in the kingdom of Naples; but that kingdom was then one of the Two Sicilies.

³ Michelet, *Histoire de France*, vol. ii., bk. 4, ch. 9.

and understood nothing of the combats which were fought in the depths of that abstract existence." Having invented this tremendous struggle, of course Michelet comprehended it. "Beneath that sublime region raged the winds and the tempest. Beneath the Angel was man, morality beneath metaphysics, St. Louis beneath St. Thomas. In St. Louis the thirteenth century had its Passion—an exquisite, intimate, profound Passion, of which previous ages had scarcely any presentiment. I speak of the first laceration which doubt effected in souls; when the entire harmony of the Middle Age was disturbed; when the grand edifice on which society had been built began to totter; when saints cried against saints, right waged war on right, and the most docile souls saw themselves obliged to examine and to judge. The pious king of France, who asked for nothing but to submit and to believe, was very soon forced to struggle, to doubt, and to choose. Humble though he was, and diffident of himself, he had to resist his mother; to act as arbitrator between the Pope and the emperor; to judge the spiritual judge of Christendom; and to recall to moderation him whom he would have preferred to regard as a model of sanctity. Afterward the Mendicant Orders attracted him by their mysticism; he entered the Third Order of St. Francis; and he took part against the University. But nevertheless, the book of John of Parma, received by very many Franciscans, filled him with strange doubts." Michelet wastes many pretty phrases in an attempt to convince his reader that St. Louis was a skeptic because he once resisted the will of his mother; but he did so in order to don the cross, she having feared, like many others and even himself, that the expedition might be futile. Michelet presents the saint as a skeptic because he combated the University and the pamphlet of William de Saint-Amour; but he did so in order to protect the Dominicans and Franciscans.¹ Michelet discerns skepticism in the relations which St. Louis had with Pope Gregory IX.; but it is absolutely false that the French king was called upon "to judge the supreme judge of Christendom." As to the book entitled "The Eternal Gospel," it is by no means certain that it was written by the Franciscan general, John of Parma; but when Michelet tells us that the faith of St. Louis must have vacillated when he saw some of his Franciscan friends defending a condemned book, we are asked to believe, not that the pious king was a skeptic, but that he was a ninny.

Michelet asserts that "the thirteenth century had its Passion"; he perceives in his sombre tableau the creakings of a social edifice which is about to tumble into chaos, and he judges that this social

¹ Fleury, *Histoire Ecclesiastique*, bk. lxxxiv., ch. 32.

disorder *must have* affected the faith of men, especially of him who was the foremost layman in Christendom. But the interesting historical writer (a great historian he is not) ignores the notorious fact that the eleventh century was far nearer to chaos than the thirteenth. Let the reader remember the state of Italy and Germany before and after the German emperor, Henry IV., "went to Canossa;" a state of affairs that wrung from the heart of St. Gregory VII. the exclamation, "I have loved justice and hated iniquity; therefore I die in exile." Certainly the eleventh century was not a period of skepticism. But Michelet thinks that "the man, St. Louis," must have plunged into the abyss of doubt, because, as he affects to believe, "the Angel, St. Thomas," knew not how to withdraw his faith from the clutches of his logic. It is true that St. Thomas was frequently the adviser of St. Louis in religious matters, as he probably was in things political;¹ but the logic of Michelet could not have "clutched" his mind very firmly when he arrived at this conclusion. But what authority is there for the supposition that the Angelic Doctor "fought for good sense against his own logic," and that fearful "combats were fought in the depths of that abstract existence"? Certainly neither St. Thomas nor his contemporaries even hint at such struggles; and who has found any indications of skepticism in the works of the Angel of the Schools? Take up the treatises on the liberty of man, grace, and predestination, which seem to have served as a foundation for the ravings of Michelet. Of course, we meet the usual *videtur quod*; but with what triumphant serenity the master always pronounces his *patet*, or his *manifestum est*! Very different from the judgment of Michelet and his school is the appreciation of St. Thomas by one who had studied all the scholastics with a profundity to which Michelet was always a stranger. In his admirable work on Abelard, M. Charles de Rémusat says: "St. Thomas of Aquino includes the whole of theology in his wonderful work. He lays down the *pro* and the *contra* of every question, and of every proposition in each question; and presenting every possible objection and the answer to it, he opposes authority to authority, reasoning to reasoning, giving, without ever weakening, *without ever doubting*, a work which is as dogmatic in its conclusions as it is skeptical in its examinations. The *Summa Theologica* presents the whole of religion as an immense dialectical controversy, in which dogma always ends by being in the right. It is the frankest and most developed negation of dogmatic absolutism." Now Michelet seems to hold that as the master is, so is the pupil. Therefore,

¹ Bollandists; Ad Mensem Martii, *Viti Sancti Thomæ*."

since "St. Louis realized on earth and in practical life that which preoccupied the genius of St. Thomas in the world of abstractions," we may conclude, with all due admiration for the most poetic pamphleteer (not historian) of modern times, that the faith of St. Louis was as unshakable as that of the Angelic Doctor. We have not thought it proper to waste any of our limited space in quoting any of the instances of fact which Michelet adduces as fanciful supports of his amusing theory. They are too puerile for serious attention; but the reader may be better satisfied, if we furnish one specimen which is a worthy exemplification of all. Michelet discerns skepticism in the mind of St. Louis, when that monarch asks Joinville: "What is God?" The seneschal thus naively records the incident: "He called me, one day, and said: 'On account of your subtle mind I do not like to ask you concerning the things of God; but since these friars are present, I shall put one question to you. It is this: What is God?'" That here the king was only playing the catechist, half jocularly and half seriously with his familiar companion, appears from the fact that he complimented Joinville because the seneschal's reply was identical with that contained in the book which he then held in his hand.² The fact is, and it serves as another indication of his character, that St. Louis was very fond of catechizing his friends, and even his private soldiers. He also, on occasion, preached sermons. During his voyage to Africa, the sailors wanted to go to confession; whereupon he preached to them a discourse on the nature and benefits of the Sacrament of Penance.³ In his library at Paris, which was *open to the public*, he was wont to explain to the nearest student some passage of the works of the Fathers which generally formed his literary pabulum.⁴ Once he reminded a lady of the court that she had arrived at an age when a woman could not occupy her mind with other beauties than those of her soul, unless she was willing to incur ridicule.⁵ Once he asked Joinville what was his father's name; and when the seneschal replied that it was Simon, he asked the poor man how he knew that such was the case. Then, says Joinville, "I told him that I knew it, because my mother had so informed me. Then he said that we ought to believe most firmly all the articles of our faith, to which the Apostles had testified."⁶

¹ Gorini; *Defense de L'Eglise*, pt. I., ch. 20, Paris, 1853.

² Joinville, *loc. cit.*, p. 194.

³ Belloloco, "Vita Sancti Ludovici," in the *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules*, vol. xx.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Gulielmus Carnotensis, "De Vita et Miraculis Sancti Ludovici," in the *Recueil*, etc., *ibid.*

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 197.

Michelet says that St. Louis must have been affected by the spirit of skepticism which began to invade the Christian world in his time. "In St. Louis the thirteenth century had its Passion. . . . I speak of the first laceration which doubt effected in souls." He would be indeed an enterprising indagator into the recondite who could determine the date of the entrance of incredulism into the world; but when Michelet discovered that date in the thirteenth century, would he not have been more worthy of admiration, if he had found his champion skeptic, not in St. Louis, but in the German Frederick II., who regarded Christ as one of the three imposters who had deceived the world?¹ Skepticism had infected humanity long before the thirteenth century. There are three kinds of skeptics; those who do not believe in the Catholic Church, those who do not believe in any of the forms of emasculated Christianity, and the gross materialists who deny God and the immortality of the soul. The last form did not appear in Christendom until about the time of the full development of the Renaissance, toward the end of the fifteenth century. But the other forms of skepticism appeared in their full audacity, simultaneously with the intellectual movement of the eleventh century. In France and Northern Italy appeared the Manichæans; Leuthard destroyed the crucifixes and other religious images; Gondulphus preached the absurdity of Baptism, Penance, and the Eucharist; Turin and Milan heard many proclaiming that the Son of God is each soul illuminated by the Lord. And then the twelfth century beheld Tanchelm posing as the Son of God; Peter de Bruis abolishing churches; and the Cathari, Patarines, etc., attributing creation to the devil, and proclaiming fate as master of men. But the reader may ask, could Michelet have expected men to credit his presentation of St. Louis as an incredulist? Well, the attempt was not extraordinarily audacious at the hands of him who had not only declared that Pope St. Gregory VII. was a skeptic, but had so far blasphemed as to cast the same foul aspersion on the Divine Saviour of men. "There is a moment of fear and of doubt. Here is the tragic and the terrible of the drama; it is this which rends the veil of the temple, and covers the earth with darkness; it is this which troubles me when I read the Gospel, and causes my tears to flow. That God should have doubted of God! That the Holy Victim should have cried: 'My God, My God, why hast Thou abandoned me?' This trial has been experienced by all heroic souls who have dared great things for the human race; all of these have felt more or less of this ideal of grief. It was in such a moment that Brutus exclaimed: 'Virtue, thou art only a

¹ The authority for this accusation is Pope Gregory IX., in his Epist. 12 to the Archbishop of Canterbury. See Labbe's *Concilia*, Sæc. XIII.

name.' It was in such a moment that Gregory VII. cried: 'I have followed justice and hated iniquity: therefore I die in exile.'¹ The veriest tyro in ascetical or even moderately spiritual matters knows that the expression of the holy victim of Henry IV. did not issue from a heart submerged in the despair of doubt; that the words of the dying Pontiff were rather a sublime indication of his invincible trust in God, of his confidence that a reward in heaven would be the recompense for an earthly suffering which had been entailed by his worthy fulfilment of his duties as vicar of Christ. As to the calumny against Christ, which Michelet dared to pronounce at the foot of the cross, let us say, with Gorini, that he only joined the crowd who passed in front of the sacred tree, blaspheming: "*prætereuntes autem blasphemabant.*" The sublime lessons of the cross were foolishness to Michelet, as they ever will be to all of his school; and therefore such as they cannot understand St. Louis of France. We who have spent much time in the study of the prince who, even according to Voltaire, was as pious as an anchorite and possessed of every royal virtue, must agree with the judgment of St. Francis de Sales, that "St. Louis was the beloved of God and of men, and one of the grandest sovereigns upon whom the sun has shone." We must say, with Chateaubriand: "Each epoch has a man who represents it. Louis IX. is the model man of the Middle Age; he is legislator, hero, and saint. Marcus Aurelius showed power, united with philosophy; Louis IX. power, united with sanctity; the advantage remains with the Christian."

REUBEN PARSONS, D.D.

¹ *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii., bk. 4, ch. 9.

ASPECTS OF PESSIMISM.

PESSIMISM, in the more general acceptance of the term, is a tendency to take a despondent view of things, to see more evil than good in the present life, and to apprehend worse things in the future. In its more special meaning it signifies a particular doctrine, which we shall shortly consider, concerning the preponderance of evil over good in the world. In the course of this paper the word will be made to bear, without, it is hoped, any risk of confusion, either of these meanings indifferently.

At all times there have been optimists and pessimists who, for various reasons, have answered "Yes" or "No" to the great question, "Is Life Worth Living?" and whose way of regarding life has been influenced largely by their natural temperament or the circumstances in which their lot has been cast. Men of high moral character, whose minds are intent upon the hereafter, will never take a wholly despairing view of life, for they feel that their destiny is in their own hands, and that the immortal part of them will outlive this present period of suffering. Those, on the other hand, who are given to comparing life as it is with what it might have been, and do not take the future life into account, will almost necessarily be led to desponding conclusions about man's destiny. Witness the following lines by a French poet :¹

PEU DE CHOSE.

La vie est vaine,
Un peu d'amour,
Un peu de haine,
Et puis—Bonjour !

La vie est brève :
Un peu d'espoir,
Un peu de rêve
Et puis—Bon soir !

Among the ancient Greeks and Romans there was a pretty general agreement as to the gloominess of man's prospects after death, and it was only a small number of the more enlightened and never very popular thinkers, such as Plato and Socrates, who held that death was only the beginning of a completer life. Plato, in the third book of his "Republic," censures Homer for saying of the dying Hector :

¹ Leon Montenaeken.

“Ψυχὴ δ’ ἐκ ῥεθίων παμένη Ἀιδόσδε βεβήκει,
 ὅν ποτ’ ἔμην γούωσα, λιποῦσα ἄδροτῆτα καὶ ἵβην.”¹

The odes of Horace, though they sing of the joys of life and proclaim the praises of love and wine, are marked with a pervading note of sadness. Their author lived in degenerate days, when the old Roman ideals had long ceased to influence the mass of the people, and, like many of the more educated among his countrymen, he formed his life according to the principles of epicurean pessimism, gathering what pleasure he could in a world where pain predominates.

“Huc vina et unguenta et nimium breves
 Flores amoenos ferre jube rosae,
 Dum res et aetas et sororum
 Fila trium patiuntur atra.”²

And again :

“Dum loquimur fugerit invida
 Aetas : carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero.”³

Not so Horace's contemporary and friend, Virgil. The times were bad in which he lived, but there was hope of better things to come—“Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.” Selfishness, luxury and shameless immorality were universal, but much might be done by wise legislation, seconded by that new patriotism which his own national epic, the “Æneid,” was intended to promote. This poem breathes the spirit of optimism, of pride in the past and hope for the future. Rome, in spite of nearly two centuries of headlong decadence, was still secure in her dominion of the world, and it was hoped that a rest from civil strife might give opportunity for the revival among her sons of the civic virtues of their forefathers. But the decadence of Rome, although retarded, never ceased after it had once set in. The revival that actually came about was far different from the one anticipated by Virgil.

In the Christendom of the Middle Ages, men's deep religious faith and the absorbing activity of their lives secured them from any wide-spread tendency to doubt about the importance of life or the beneficence of the power which rules the universe. It was not until Protestantism had stirred up the spirit of free inquiry

¹ “And the spirit fled from his limbs and went down to Hades, bewailing its evil lot as it left the flower of its manhood.”—(*Iliad*, xxii., ll. 362-3.)

² “Hither bid them bring wine and unguents and the all too short-lived blossoms of the lovely rose, whilst thine age and fortunes and the black threads of the triple sisterhood allow.”—(*Carm.*, ii., 3.)

³ “Even while we speak envious time will have sped : make the most of every day, trusting as little as may be to the morrow.”—(*Ibid.*, *Carm.*, i., II.)

that men began to ask how the predominance of evil in the world is consistent with the doctrine of an all-wise Creator. It was in answer to this question, as it was proposed in his own day, that Leibnitz wrote his "Théodicée" "to vindicate the ways of God to man." Leibnitz was the first philosopher of modern times who tried to reduce optimism to a regular doctrinal system. He endeavors to show that, out of all possible worlds, infinite wisdom must necessarily form the most perfect, and that the one in which we live could have been no better than it is. Before proving this theory, which really involves a denial of God's omnipotence, he has to overcome the difficulty of the manifest existence of evil in the world. For the purposes of his argument, he divides evil into three kinds: (1) metaphysical evil or imperfection, which is unconditionally willed by God as essential to created being; (2) physical evil, such as pain, which God wills conditionally as a punishment for sin or as a means to greater good; and (3) moral evil, which he fails to account for satisfactorily, but without which he declares that the world would have been, on the whole, worse than it actually is.

Pope, in his "Essay on Man," a work largely inspired by the "Théodicée," says :

" All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee ;
 All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see ;
 All Discord, Harmony not understood ;
 All partial Evil, universal Good ;
 And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite,
 One truth is clear, WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT."

—*Essay on Man*, Ep. I., ll. 289-294.

Leibnitz failed in trying to prove too much, but his writings gave rise to a large class of would-be apologists for the divine order of the universe, who went still further than their master, and endeavored to prove the beneficent character of Providence merely from the amount of material well-being which He bestows upon us. Such a method of demonstration, however effective when judiciously applied, could, under the circumstances, only harm the cause it was intended to further, and it ended by leading men to the conclusion that, however great the sum of worldly blessings may be, it is small when compared with the number and the greatness of the evils which afflict mankind. And indeed, when viewed apart from the ulterior designs of God, the face of Nature is scored with the marks of physical and moral failure. She seems to have written in the hearts of men a moral code which she herself is flagrantly and constantly transgressing. The animal kingdom is a scene of disorder, violence and unnecessary cruelty, while the history of mankind is largely a monument of misery and crime.

There is hardly a nation on earth whose foundation has not been due, in great measure, to successful robbery. Everywhere there are patent instances where the unjust prosper and the virtuous are unfortunate. No wonder is it that Ecclesiastes, speaking of the days of his vanity, before his eyes had yet been opened to the true meaning of life, says: "And therefore I was weary of my life, when I saw that all things under the sun are evil, and all vanity and vexation of spirit."¹

With this compare the lines of Byron:

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er the days from anguish free,
And know, whatever thou has been,
'Tis something better not to be."

Of all the great thinkers who have pondered over the nature and destiny of man, there is no one who has given to the world so clear and so true a picture of life as Shakespeare. Shakespeare was no pessimist. Had he been so, indeed, had he been committed to any philosophic system or to any one-sided view of things, he would not have been Shakespeare. But though not a pessimist, inasmuch as he was far from denying the value of life when regarded as the prelude to another life to come, still, throughout his writings, he represents man's sojourn upon earth as an apparently aimless career through a world of delusive joys, disappointed hopes and cruel uncertainties, where heroes of lofty ambition and stainless honor expend their lives, like Henry V., upon ill-advised enterprises whose intrinsic wrongfulness they fail to see; or where great and exalted souls like Lear and Othello become the victims of designing minions or even of their own minor weaknesses.

But it is in *Hamlet* that we find the best example of a deep and sensitive mind, unsteadied by the principles of faith, brought face to face with the dark problem of existence. Gervinus says that in this play Shakespeare has transcended his own times by a leap of two centuries. And indeed in that England of Queen Elizabeth, when men's minds were filled with the new wine of the renaissance, when life, for them, had begun to have a new meaning and its sphere to be indefinitely enlarged, there was little place for desponding reveries such as we meet with in *Hamlet*. It was a time of action and of hopes, of new fields for action, and as long as men are active, they will, theoretically at least, be neither optimist nor pessimist; they will not pause to question whether life is vain, nor search for reasons to persuade themselves of its profitableness. They will simply follow the stream of life as it eddies about them, rejoicing in the vigor of its current and the freshness of its flow.

¹ Eccles., ii., 17.

When Shakespeare wrote "Hamlet," the England which had sacrificed her faith just at the advent of her ripening vigor, too proudly conscious of her position of independence among the nations of the earth, was dazzled by the glamour of her new freedom and by the hopes that were born of her "splendid isolation."

The revival of classical learning, the invention of printing and the discovery of new lands beyond the sea had filled Europe with a new energy and a new enthusiasm. In the new order of things Italy had led the way; the other continental nations had followed in her wake, and now England had caught the spirit of the times. Her middle classes, no longer the victims of feudal aggression, were steadily amassing wealth by their commercial enterprise. Her fleet, which had lately destroyed one of the largest armaments that ever put to sea, was powerful enough to protect her trade all over the world and to compete with Spain and Portugal in founding colonies in newly discovered lands. Englishmen naturally took a pride in their country's greatness, and the national enthusiasm found utterance in the works of a galaxy of writers who made the Elizabethan period the golden age of English literature. And this was the time in which Shakespeare conceived the idea of Hamlet, a character in most respects so unlike the age in which it was produced. The age was active, enthusiastic and optimist, while Hamlet is reflective, self-conscious and inclined to pessimism. To call him absolutely a pessimist would be far from the truth, for underlying all his doubting and despondent moods there is in his intellect a foundation of high moral principle which gives a distinct purpose to his life. It is the irony of circumstances and the imposition upon him of a burden beyond his strength, combined with his reflectiveness and the weakness of his will, which lead him to doubt about the profitableness of life. And it is precisely in this reflectiveness, this self-analysis, and skepticism as to the goodness of his cause, that he is, in some sort, a precursor of the modern spirit.

In the eighteenth century the tone of European literature was largely optimistic. Besides Pope and Leibnitz, numerous other writers, Christians and deists, took upon themselves, with varying show of discretion, the task of fighting the battles of divine Providence. One of these champions of optimism, Abraham Tucker, in arguing the inherent blessedness of this life, calculates that the whole amount of the sufferings of a lifetime may be equivalent to a minute of pain once in every twenty-two years. It was in perverse optimists of this sort that David Hume found an easy prey, when he argued from the facts of human life against the supposition of a wise, benevolent God.

It was at the close of the last century that a more pessimistic tone

began to pervade literature. Of this tendency, we have examples in the poetry of Shelley and Byron. But the first modern writer to reduce pessimism to a philosophic system was Arthur Schopenhauer. In the year 1819 he published his "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*" ("The World as Will and Idea"), but it was not until the middle of the century that the work attracted notice. Since then, Schopenhauer has been the acknowledged leader of modern pessimism.

It is not our present purpose to give a detailed account of Schopenhauer's system. It will be enough here to sketch its main outlines. With him the only reality, the one absolute existence, is will—will, blind and impersonal. All phenomena, all bodily forms, animate and inanimate, together with all the energies of nature—light, gravitation, even consciousness itself—are mere manifestations of will. The one unconscious, universal will manifests itself in rational and sentient beings as the *will-to-live*, "which has knowledge of its own volition and what it wills; a knowledge, namely, that what it wills is nothing else than this world, life exactly as it stands." Moreover, the individual will is not free, but is determined by the laws of cause and effect, which hold sway over the other phenomena of the universe. It is of the essence of will to strive, and to strive is to suffer. Hence, as life is only a phase or manifestation of will, it is necessarily a state of suffering. Our nature is a perpetual striving, and may be compared in every respect with an insatiable thirst. Our only respite is in the unconsciousness of sleep, or in the unselfish contemplation of the beautiful, when our striving after personal ends is for a while suspended. All pleasures are negative, being nothing more than a release from pain, while the non-æsthetic pleasures of life are mere illusions. We saw that, according to Leibnitz, this world is the best of all possible worlds; Schopenhauer declares it to be the very worst possible; in fact, if it were any worse, it could not exist at all.

It might be thought that the natural outcome of such a system as this would be an escape from life by suicide. But not so. The mere vulgar suicide commits an immoral act by giving way to the desire of his will to escape from present suffering, whereas it is the duty of each one to deny the will-to-live. Suicide, says Schopenhauer, "is so far from being a denial of the will-to-live, that it is a phenomenon due to strong affirmation of will." The true and virtuous denial of will consists in "the shunning, not of the sufferings, but of the pleasures of life." The self-murderer really wills to live, for he wills "the unimpeded existence and affirmation of the body," only circumstances prevent him from attaining his end.

The ideal man in Schopenhauer's system is practically the same

as with the Stoics. He is one who, by continued self-abnegation, has raised himself to a state of perfect calm and of indifference to all the interests and pleasures of life.

Schopenhauer's system was further developed by the amateur philosopher, Edward von Hartmann, in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious." Hartmann agrees with Schopenhauer in saying that it belongs to the essence of will to be eternally dissatisfied, but he rejects the notion that pleasure is negative. There is such a thing as positive pleasure, but the amount of it in the world is far outweighed by the pain. The more intellectual and cultured people are, and the more keenly alive they become to the higher pleasures of life, the greater, too, becomes their sensitiveness to pain; so that intellectual people have more to suffer than unintellectual. But, although enlightenment adds to the sum of our sufferings, nevertheless it is the duty of every one to produce it as far as he can both in himself and others. For the result of education and enlightenment will be that more men will become persuaded of the inherent misery of life, and, when this persuasion becomes general, mankind, as a whole, will, by a contrary act of volition, destroy the will-to-live, and by so doing put an end to the melancholy drama of existence. This grand consummation does not imply anything in the way of suicide on the part of mankind either by their violently destroying themselves or by renouncing the act of reproduction. What is meant is this: "The will which produces the existence of the world at the same time condemns the world to suffering." This "the unconscious idea, in spite of its logicalness and omniscience, cannot prevent," because its will has acted blindly. It must, therefore, have recourse to consciousness which is able to control its own will and make it act in opposite directions which neutralize one another. The conscious will of the existing world may thus be led to will its own destruction. But the act must be that of the Great All—a stage in the whole process of nature, and not merely a detached effort of a portion of the individuals in whom consciousness is realized. Hence, consciousness must combine and assert itself as a whole by the united effort of the majority of its individual members. Now this can only be when by far the greater part of consciousness is concentrated in mankind here on earth, and if the whole amount of the will-to-live in organic and inorganic nature is exceeded by the contrary will in mankind. When the population of the globe has attained the proportions necessary for this result, and when education and general culture have made mankind willing and able to destroy the will-to-live, then "the whole world, by renouncing the will to which it owes its reality," will be "all at once annihilated."

Such, in brief, are the two chief attempts which have been made

in modern times to construct a systematic philosophy of pessimism. The works we have just passed in review have not made, and are not likely to make, many converts among men of consistent thought. The "Philosophy of the Unconscious" is mainly interesting as a literary curiosity. If ordinary men become pessimists, it is, commonly, not because they have made an act of faith in a blind, unconscious will, or because they are convinced of the actual preponderance of the pains of life over its pleasures. It is because they have ceased to have any faith at all, and because they see no object for which they are living. Pessimism exists as a grave danger in our own times, and it promises to be a still graver danger in the future; but the writers who are doing most to promote it, and who are gradually leavening the world with pessimistic ideas, are not pessimists themselves, nor are they indeed men the positive part of whose teaching, though they often call themselves "positivists," is likely to obtain a wide acceptance. They are scientific enthusiasts who have invented a "summum bonum" of their own, and are unconsciously discrediting the idol they have set up by damning it with faint praise. This idol, this "summum bonum," in the mind of many among the scientific "naturalists," is the gradual evolution of mankind into a state of universal happiness, exempt from the pains and imperfections of our present scale of existence. According to the theory of evolution, all imperfect conditions of being tend to disappear, being driven out by those which are fittest to continue in existence. Hence it follows that the human society of the distant future will consist of individuals far healthier, wiser and more virtuous than those who inhabit the world at present. Mr. William Watson, a poet who has imbibed something of the doctrines of evolution, describes this earthly paradise as follows :

- " With oceans heedless round her feet,
And the indifferent heavens above,
Earth shall the ancient tale repeat
Of wars and tears, and death and love;
And, wise from all the foolish Past,
Shall peradventure hail at last
- " The advent of that morn divine
When nations may as forests grow,
Wherein the oak hates not the pine,
Nor beeches wish the cedars woe,
But all, in their unlikeness, blend
Confederate to a golden end—
- " Beauty : the vision whereunto,
In joy, with pantings, from afar,
Through sound and odor, form and hue,
And mind and clay, and worm and star—
Now touching goal, now backward hurled—
Toils the indomitable world."

For us who live now it is the sacred duty, according to present "evolutionary" ethics, to forward the advent of this happy state of things as soon as possible, and reap the reward of our virtue in the comfortable persuasion that we have hastened, in however small a degree, the redemption of mankind from misery and sin.

Unfortunately it is only the destructive part of their theory which the naturalists can succeed in propagating. They discredit religion without providing any adequate substitute. The ideal which they hold up in order to give a meaning to life and an incentive to virtue, is far too shadowy and impalpable to be grasped by the generality of men, and it is probable that the belief in it will not long survive the present generation. But this much is certain, the negative teaching of the naturalists, their denial of a personal God and the immortality of the soul, is spreading rapidly among the educated and half-educated classes of Europe and America. Such a result can lead only to pessimism—to a general disbelief in the value of life. The stages of the process are likely to be somewhat as follows. Men who have ceased to believe in the future life will continue to observe the moral law from sheer force of custom and the absence of temptation. If they happen to have speculative beliefs about virtue being its own reward, or about the progressive development of humanity, they will falsely attribute the moral character of their lives to the influence of these beliefs, forgetting all the while that their righteousness, such as it may be, is largely due to the surviving influence of Christianity. The voice of conscience will live on, but its commands will have no sanction beyond the prospect of an uncertain happiness in the present life, and of that cloudy Utopia which only our remote posterity will enjoy. At last, after successively renouncing the authority of the church, the divinity of Christ, and the existence of a God who deals out rewards and punishments, the world will finally see its way to getting rid of the last superstition of all—the idea of the essential difference between good and evil. The claims of conscience will be weighed in the balance and found wanting. "Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not commit adultery," will rest ultimately upon the sanctions of civil law, and the only prick of conscience, if secularists have their way, will be the fear of the police-constable.

When the world has lost its conscience and its hope of any good beyond the present life, the terms "sacredness," "sublimity," "merit," and others of like nature which express what we hold to be the most valuable possessions of our life, will have lost their meaning. There will remain nothing for which men will care to live, and they will look back with despairing regret upon the hopes and ideals which gave "a sublime rhythm" to the lives of

their forefathers. Such a state of things, let us hope, is too bad to be realized. It seems inconsistent with Christ's promise to His church, and we know, at any rate, that it can never become universal. And yet, as things are at present, there seems reason to fear that a large portion of mankind may be reduced to the state we have described. Every day we hear of members of the various Protestant sects giving up the last remnants of the faith and becoming agnostics or professed atheists. Everywhere we meet with men who are yearning for some ideal, some enthusiasm to give a meaning, even though fictitious, to their lives. They look with envy and impotent longing on the spectacle of a church which can teach her children to pass through life without any misgivings as to the worth of the objects for which they are striving. They would gladly make their act of faith, were it only for the sake of the happiness which faith brings with it in this world; but faith has departed from them like the season of childhood, and they have persuaded themselves that, like childhood, it can never return again. Even Mr. Watson, an agnostic who seems scarcely alive to the spiritual insufficiency of his creed, says in his lines to Mr. Aubrey de Vere:

“Not mine your mystic creed; not mine, in prayer
And worship, at the ensanguined Cross to kneel;
But when I mark your faith how pure and fair,
How based on love, on passion for man's weal,
My mind, half envying what it cannot share,
Reveres the reverence which it cannot feel.”

In our days culture has been proposed as a substitute for religion, and poetry offered as a better guide for our lives than the loving word of God. “More and more,” says Matthew Arnold, “mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete, and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy, will be replaced by poetry.” But it were as well to offer moonlight instead of warm sunlight, for poetry and culture are largely a reflection of religion, and history shows us that they cannot long survive its absence. Men of a vaguely speculative bent and a more than ordinary share of refinement like M. Arnold or Emerson, may here and there be found, who think they find in culture all that they need to direct and purify their lives; æsthetic movements and Brook Farm experiments may, when they are successful, beget an elevating influence for a time; but in the end culture, left to itself, will become the culture of Nero and Petronius Arbiter, and society that of Herculaneum and Pompeii. Even Goethe, the most cultured of our modern apostles, did not find culture entirely sufficient for his

moral needs, and his admirers have often to plead the privileges of genius in his defence. How would David have welcomed such apologists of his transgressions?

But whatever culture may do for the lettered minority of the world, it can never find its way among the ignorant masses, who are falling rapidly away from their religion and look for nothing in its place but drink and lucre and degrading vice. Religion has always striven to join rich and poor, lettered and unlettered, in one united family; culture, left to itself, can only divide.

So far, in considering the subject of pessimism and its bearing on religion, we have supposed that the value of life will depend upon the character of its hopes and aims rather than upon the sum total of its pleasures, and we have contended that, since religion alone can persuade mankind of the worth of any aim or object which transcends the present existence, pessimism must become general as soon as religion loses its influence. But, in reasoning thus, we have left out of count the arguments of such as maintain that life is worth living for its own sake, and because of the joys and pleasures that it involves. A complete discussion of this question would take up a larger space than we have at our command, would require, in fact, a lengthy excursion into the region of psychology. It will be enough to point out here that, in spite of the defective character of nature as a whole, and in spite of the vast amount of suffering in the world, there is still left for mankind a very large measure of well-being. Happiness is attainable by most men in ordinary circumstances, and a really miserable man ought to be, and, in the experience of many, actually is a rarity. Though the life of no one is exempt from numerous daily crosses, yet there are comparatively few who may not share with the squirrels of the forest and the linnets of the field in the pure joy of living. Life is sweet, and Providence has willed it so. It is only in our own days when the Giver of gifts is ignored, that the gifts themselves are beginning to turn to stone. Men who live for themselves have begun to discover that their pains outweigh their joys, and they cry out in their despair:

"Who would these fardels bear,
To grunt and sweat under a weary life;
But that the dread of something after death,
The undiscover'd country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will;
And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of?"

In our days men are more inclined to be scandalized at the evils of life than to be dazzled by its pleasures, and it is an important duty of the Church to deal with the difficulties of such non-Catho-

lies as find it hard to reconcile the evil and misery of the world with the idea of a beneficent Creator. To such as these pessimism is indeed a grave danger, and the question which they ask is one which cannot meet with a satisfactory answer outside of the Catholic Church. The difficulty in the case of most men is one which affects their feelings rather than their intellect. It is not that they are disturbed by the metaphysical difficulty of the actual existence of evil, in however slight a degree; but the quantity of it which they find in the world is a shock to their sympathy with their fellow-creatures. Now with theologians the case is just the contrary. The real difficulty with them lies in the existence of evil *simpliciter*, and the answer to this part of the question involves considerable reasoning from theology, and at the best leaves much of mystery behind; the quantity of that evil adds but little to the difficulty. Let us take, for the sake of illustration, the case of a cultured agnostic who, ill at ease because of his undefined intellectual position, is eager to make his act of faith in a personal and all-wise Creator. He looks round the world for evidences of divine wisdom and goodness, and the vision that meets his eye is bitterly disappointing. Everywhere he sees instances of unmerited suffering and of prosperous knavery. Fortunes are made and lost by the merest chance without any reference to merit. Many a Desdemona is persecuted upon false suspicion, and numberless Iagos, unlike their prototype, live and die in wealth and honor. In our large towns children are born and huddled together like rats in a sewer, amid scenes of revolting cruelty and immorality, while a few streets off, the children of the rich, it may be, start life not only in comfortable surroundings, but with all the advantages of a good moral training. Temptation and crime seem to depend upon circumstances and are far commoner in certain classes of men than in others. Yet the Christian teacher invites us to regard all these human beings, who go through life with such hopeless disparity in their equipment for life's battle, as the children of the same just and loving Father.

But let our supposed inquirer look into himself and see if what he finds in his own particular case is not equally telling against the goodness of Providence. It is true, perhaps, that his lot will compare favorably with that of his most prosperous fellow-men. He has succeeded in his undertakings; he is not conscious to himself of any great sin and, amid all his doubts, he has even been, after his own fashion, a sincere searcher after truth. He would be willing to grant that, if all men were as well off in life as himself, there would be no unreasonableness in calling them all the children of a kind and loving Creator. But let him look more closely and examine the darker side which his character presents, He

will find that, though he has enjoyed happiness beyond the lot of most men, yet his happiness has left much to be desired. The amount of disappointments, bodily pains and anxieties which he has endured would, if added together, reach a considerable total; so much so that his condition for long periods of time has been one of contentment rather than of actual happiness. His moral character too, his daily frailties, the frequent clouding of his judgment and the weakness of his will under temptation, have left him far and manifestly short of perfection. In short, within his own microcosm evil has abounded, and it has abounded too in the macrocosm of the world, only in a higher degree. Why should the difference of more or less alter the nature of his difficulty? Cannot a God of infinite power and wisdom compensate great evils as well as small? A little more or a little less may affect the powers of a finite but not of an infinite agent. The problem of the existence of evil, even after all sufficient explanations are made, is a trial to our faith and is intended to be such in a world whose very object is to be a place of trial. Christian faith teaches us that out of every evil God will raise up good, that physical suffering will be productive of future happiness, and that, in the case of moral evil, no one, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, is unfairly handicapped in his chances of salvation; for at every man's judgment the knowledge that he had and the influences of his environment will all be taken into account.

The truth is that our inquiring agnostic has been arbitrarily setting up as his standard of justice a certain balance of good and evil which he considers reasonable and capable of being permitted by infinite wisdom. The proportions fixed upon are approximately those which he has found in his own particular case or in that of others whom he considers moderately happy. But he finds numberless cases of persons who have endured greater afflictions and have had fewer moral advantages than his criterion allowed, and, instead of considering whether that criterion has been wrongly constructed, he is inclined rather to deny the existence of Providence. His only reason for admitting a certain minimum of evil in his standard was that his own feelings happened to revolt against any greater allowance. In fact, he has been led chiefly by his feelings and has not brought the light of reason to bear upon their dictates.

We may now turn to consider a particular kind of pessimism which has often been brought up as a charge against the Catholic Church. Catholics are often accused of so far building up their hopes in the life to come as to undervalue and neglect the duties of their life in the present. The philosophy of the saints and teachers of the Church has, it is said, always been one of con-

tempt for and discouragement of human aims and efforts. The purest and noblest love between man and woman has been regarded as vanity and a turning aside from the love of God, while all great undertakings in commerce, colonization or politics are mere distractions from the one thing necessary to every man—the saving of his individual soul. It is in this supposed apathy that some writers have found the reason why the Latin Catholic nations of Europe have been left behind in the race of enterprise and progress by the Teutonic Protestant peoples of Germany, England and America. That such charges are unfounded the history of the Church at all times plainly shows. Popes like Nicholas V., Leo X. and St. Pius V. can scarcely be accused either of discouraging human effort or undervaluing human interests. Nor is the teaching of the Church with regard to the paramount importance of the spiritual issues of life in any way opposed to the best and fullest development of humanity during their sojourn on earth. It is true that the saints have withdrawn from the world either bodily or in spirit and have encouraged others to do the same; but their retirement was from the evil that was in the world rather than from the world itself. It was the counterfeits of life that they opposed, its false promises, its tyrannies of custom and its foolish standards of worth and honor. St. Benedict, St. Dominic and St. Ignatius would have turned the earth into a garden of Eden could they have had their way. Their doctrine was a complete theology, “wealth of nations” and philanthropy worked into one and founded upon the one grand recipe for all true prosperity: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” They taught men to see the true relations between time and eternity, the immeasurable superiority of the loving soul to the objects of its earthly love. “Let them that have wives be as they that have them not” was not meant to weaken the love of husband and wife, but to intensify and spiritualize it, to transfuse and blend its carnal adjuncts in that heaven-blest commerce between soul and soul, of which the bodily union is but a symbol, and which is itself a symbol of the heavenly marriage of Christ with the Church triumphant in heaven, and of the mystic reception of the individual soul into the unity of the communion of saints. Nor can the Church be accused of hampering her children in their civic and political duties or in checking the progress of the human race. Lord Macaulay, in his “Essay on Machiavelli, says: “The crusades, from which the inhabitants of other countries gained nothing but relics and wounds, brought to the rising commonwealths of the Adriatic and Tyrrhene seas a large increase of wealth, dominion and knowledge. . . . Italian ships covered every sea. Italian factories rose on every shore.

The tables of Italian money-changers were set in every city. Manufactures flourished. Banks were established. The operations of the commercial machine were facilitated by many useful and beautiful inventions. We doubt whether any country of Europe, our own excepted, has at the present time (1827) reached so high a point of wealth and civilization as some parts of Italy had attained four hundred years ago." Moreover, some two centuries further back, the greatest political liberty flourished in Italy, and its decay set in when the influence of the Church was diminished by the withdrawal of the Papal court to Avignon in 1309. If, in our own days, the Catholic nations of Europe are, on the whole, less progressive than their Protestant neighbors, this is no more due to the influence of the Church than the downfall of Rome was due to the influence of Christianity. It should always be remembered, too, that Italy, Spain and France have each, in their turn, been leaders of more than one branch of intellectual progress.

The reason why such accusations as the foregoing have been made against the Church is the fact that her recognition of the vast difference between the spiritual and temporal issues of life is taken to imply a neglect of these latter. If such were the case, it would follow that all purely scientific researches, observations of eclipses, polar exhibitions and biological theories are, in her estimation, mere vanity, and out of all connection with salvation. But such is by no means the mind of the Church. When she says: "Vanity of vanities and all is vanity," she does not invite us to return to a state of primeval simplicity, or to give up any of the legitimate interests of modern life. What she does teach us is that all these things are in themselves of no real value unless, by a right intention, they are brought into connection with our spiritual life. "Whether you eat or drink or whatever else you do, do all for the glory of God." We are taught in ethics that, though many human actions are, in the abstract, indifferent, *i.e.*, neither good nor bad, yet, in the concrete, they receive their character from the goodness or the badness of the intention which prompts them. In precisely the same way all human sciences, arts, enterprises and interests may receive a character of goodness from the rectitude of purpose of those who are engaged therein. The painting of pictures, for instance, is a thing in itself indifferent; but the picture may be painted to honor God and His saints, to earn an honest livelihood, or even for wholesome amusement, and, in such cases, the work is meritorious. On the other hand, it may be painted out of envious rivalry, to flatter a patron, or to minister to the lust of the eyes, and then every stroke of the artist's brush serves only to body forth the evil that is in his heart. This doctrine, it is clear, can in no wise interfere with the progress of art. A good

Christian painter may have an intense love of his art ; his daily thoughts may be constantly flowing upon it ; he may even be said to live for it ; and yet he may, at the same time, in a certain sense, despise it. He is ready to sacrifice it at the least sign of God's will, and he inwardly values it only in so far as he has made it a part of his service of God.

What is true of painting, which we have taken by way of illustration, is true of all forms of human effort on however large a scale. It is true of inventions and discoveries ; it is true of the expansion of empires, and, indeed, the expansion would go on with far less of jostling and jealousy and dread of universal upheaval if only its promoters regarded their own endeavors with a certain wholesome depreciation. Nor need this depreciation be any bar to genuine success. No one, for instance, can accuse St. Ignatius of Loyola of any want of energy or enthusiasm in his cause, and his labors, as we know, were crowned with eminent success. Yet he declared that if the whole of his life's work were destroyed by the suppression of the religious order which he had founded, one-quarter of an hour's prayer would suffice to restore him to his ordinary tranquillity of mind. Yet his holy and unselfish zeal was intenser and more far-reaching than the restless ambition of Napoleon, while his fiery energy was under the control of a calmer and even more resolute spirit. The career of Napoleon was a pageant of chartered egotism ; that of St. Ignatius of Loyola was a suppression of self in the perfect performance of God's will.

It is not from the influence of the Church that there come the despair of life and the waning of its energies. Father Hecker, in "The Church and the Age," exclaims indignantly against the false notion that divine grace is given only at the cost of natural strength, and he assures us that the time is fast approaching when the Catholic body will be marked by that spirit of initiative and enterprise of which it has lost so much since the Reformation. The evidences of revival meet us on every side, while the decay of the various Protestant sects brings this revival into greater prominence. Moreover, men are beginning to see that departure from the Catholic Church means the abandonment of a system which can provide for the spiritual needs of all classes of men as no other system can. The note of pessimism and hopeless lamentation which rings through so much of our *fin-de-siècle* literature is an instructive sign that men who have lost their faith in the supernatural life are at a loss for some motive to direct and vivify their present aimless existence. Life, without religion, has become insufferably monotonous, and men are turning everywhere to find the ideals and motives which religion alone can permanently sup-

ply. Many look to science for their light and guidance, but those who do so commonly depart from their principle of accepting nothing without proof by constructing scientific religions of hero-worship and nature-worship, and by demanding of their followers greater acts of faith than those which they condemn in their Christian opponents. Moreover, the tendency of science seems to be, at present, in the direction of reasoned pessimism and its natural consequent dejection. Each new scientific discovery shows us with more appalling clearness the limited character of our knowledge. Every improvement in the telescope, while it reveals millions of suns never observed before, strengthens at the same time our conviction that there are millions of millions of others which we can never succeed in detecting. It happens, too, from time to time, that new phenomena in astronomy, chemistry or light threaten to overthrow or, at any rate, greatly to modify our most fundamental conceptions of the laws of nature. But, what is perhaps the most discouraging fact of all, it must happen before long that no human intellect will be comprehensive enough to deal with the baffling array of facts which are being multiplied daily in every department of science. If a man is a specialist, his vision will be too confined, and, if the field of his attainments is widely extended, his knowledge will not be detailed enough for the purposes of scientific induction.

The effect of these considerations upon non-religious minds is often to make them despondent about the value of human action. If our knowledge is so limited and uncertain, if the whole society of mankind and the results of its striving are infinitesimal when compared with the gigantic scale of the universe, "then," say they, "it does not matter what we think or what we do. Nothing matters." And so life becomes to them a dismal enigma, and man himself a being too great for his ends, living in a world which is too small for his desires.

The Church, on the contrary, far from being dejected by the discoveries of science, welcomes them as illustrations and symbols of her teaching. If there are mysteries in the universe which show us the limits of our knowledge, she is glad that we are thereby humbled, and consoles us with the thought that there will be one day explained to us mysteries in the spiritual order of vastly deeper interest to ourselves than those which now astound us in the material world. The physical universe which we see is, indeed, stupendous in its vastness and complexity, but the wonders of it are small when compared with those in the universe which we do not see, and the capacity of a single human soul is vaster than the ungauged regions of space.

Although the spirit of the Church is not one of dejection but of

eternal joy and hope, and although she is ready to identify herself with human purposes in order to connect them with the shaping of our destiny in the after-life, yet she encourages in her children a frame of mind and a way of regarding life which, in some respects, resembles the despondency of pessimism, though, in reality, it differs from it *toto cælo*. It is not the abysmal despair of a Schopenhauer, but the mourning of a David or a Jeremias; a frame of mind which at one and the same time is in accord with the apparently conflicting texts, "Rejoice in the Lord always" and "Blessed are they that mourn." The Church does not try to hide from her children the vast amount of evil that there is in the world, and recognizes that the existence of it is, to a large extent, a mystery. But she teaches also that the mystery will some day be cleared up, and that out of all evil good will eventually come. Moreover, she teaches that moral evil ought to excite our regret incomparably more than physical. In fact, most of the physical suffering that is in the world is the result of sin, and unless the sum total of sin is diminished, no amount of searching after physical comfort can add materially to the happiness of mankind. It is this truth which explains that disappointing fact of modern times, that all our improvements in machinery, commerce and methods of communication, all our ways of deadening pain and providing cheap luxuries have not, as far as we can see, made our lot, in any striking degree, better than that of our forefathers. Was a Frenchman in the days of St. Louis, or an Englishman in those of Edward I., appreciably worse off than his descendants in the nineteenth century? Many would say that his lot was even preferable.

Along with our material progress there seems to be going on a gradual moral decadence, a growing insensibility to the evil of sin. Nor is this indifference confined to such as are leading immoral lives; it affects even those who are constant in the daily practice of virtue. We will quote the words of Mr. W. A. Mallock, who, speaking of this latter class, says:

"Sin from which they recoil themselves they see committed in the life around them, and they find that it cannot excite the horror or disapproval which, from its supposed nature, it should. . . . It is a malady of the modern world—a malady of our own generation which can escape no eyes that will look for it."¹

In place of the hatred of moral evil we now see everywhere an increased horror of physical suffering, and a sympathy for the distress of the greatest criminals. That vigorous moral indignation and stern sense of justice so remarkable in Dante's "*Inferno*," is a sentiment which we are rapidly losing. Listen to the follow-

¹ *Is Life Worth Living?* Chap. viii., p. 148.

ing extract from the thirty-second canto. The poet, in his journey through Hell, has just encountered, but not yet recognized, the spirit of the traitor, Bocca degli Abbati, who had brought about the defeat of his own party at the battle of Montaperto.

"Then seizing on his hinder scalp I cried :
 'Name thee, or not a hair shall tarry here.'
 'Rend all away,' he answered, 'yet for that
 I will not tell, nor show thee, who I am,
 Though at my head thou pluck a thousand times.'
 Now had I grasp'd his tresses, and stript off
 More than one tuft, he looking, with his eyes
 Drawn in and downward, when another cried,
 'What ails thee, Bocca ? ' " ¹

Doubtless the poet thought that the traitor's spirit, enshrined though it was in eternal ice, had met with a retribution far short of his deserts.

The Christian saint who sees, and in tears of blood bewails his own sins and those of his fellow-men, has an incomparably wider and clearer vision of the evil that is in the world than is ever seen by the eye of the disappointed philanthropist. Yet the saint is not the sadder man of the two. He knows that in the end good will prevail, and no passing triumph of evil can ever be a stumbling block to him. The mere philanthropist is always likely sooner or later, to fall into pessimism. His ideals are human, and he knows, in his heart, that they can never be attained. The grief which he feels for his own failures and those of his fellow-men is a kind of blight which admits of no cure. He has placed his heaven on earth, and he sees it evaporate before his eyes.

Although the consistent Christian knows that moral evil is of incomparably greater moment than physical, still his knowledge cannot render him indifferent to the latter. Whatever our principles may be, our feelings will always be human. True religion does not seek to deaden but to guide and elevate feeling, and in so doing, it will often add to its intensity. The belief that his young bride is already the guest of God will strengthen the bereaved lover to bear his calamity with courage, but it cannot lessen his sense of loss ; nay, the very virtues which merited heaven will serve to make that loss even more intense. The knowledge that Lazarus was resting in the peace of Limbo did not prevent the Master of Life from mingling his tears with those of the mourners who stood weeping around the tomb.

Since suffering in the world and the failure of human efforts is largely a result of sin, the Church makes it her first endeavor to diminish the cause rather than the effect. But she does not ex-

¹ Cary's translation.

pect that the success of her efforts will ever be complete. Evil may be lessened, but it will always abound; individuals may be perfected, but communities will always be more or less honey-combed with evil. It is true that the Gospel contains a system which, if practiced, could unite the world in one harmoniously working republic exempt from the common curse of decay; but such a golden age will never come, and the terrible evils resulting from its absence will be a factor in the trial of the elect until the end of time. The mission of Christianity is primarily with the inner life of man and begins its work with individuals rather than with nations. Its divine Founder spoke directly to the hearts of men, and it was no part of His work on earth to frame a model polity. If individuals are virtuous the State will take care of itself, and, on the other hand, no form of government, however good in the abstract, can withhold a decaying nation from its fall. Christianity did not save the Roman Empire from ruin, nor did it, as far as we can see, greatly retard the progress of its decay. If the Roman world in the days of Constantine had sincerely embraced and not merely outwardly professed the teaching of the Gospel, the barbarian conquest of Christendom might never have taken place. But then, as now, the number of formed and practical Christians was small, and their influence was powerless to prevent the growth of corporate wickedness. So, too, the Christian republics of Italy, after being freed, by the influence of Pope Alexander III. from the tyranny of Frederic Barbarossa, flourished indeed for a few years amid the blessings of religion and liberty, but were forced at last, one after another, to have recourse to the stern remedy of despotism. The millennium of Christ and His saints can never come upon earth, and the most that we can hope for is a distant approach to it. For aught that we know, Christianity may be yet in her infancy; her conquests in the past over the ruthless barbarians of Europe may be small when compared with her future triumphs among the countless populations of India and China. The reforms of Gregory VII. may be repeated on a far grander and completer scale in a world entirely Catholic. And yet, if all this were accomplished, the ideal of the Christian Church might still be incalculably far from realization. For in the Church itself there will always be abuses and outside her pale there will never be wanting sinners to convert. As long as the number of the saints is, as it always will be, a minority, there will never cease to be abundance of sin and misery and decadence. The grace of God has made many a saintly man, but never yet has it been permitted to make a saintly nation.

In view of the utter hopelessness of ever completely converting the world, and in view also of the misery which sin draws in its

train, the Church encourages her children to regard this earth as a vale of tears. But side by side with our sorrow there should always be a deep-seated element of joy in our service of God, and a sustaining hope of happiness in the life to come. In fact, however unsatisfactory the general aspect of the world may be, however far others may be wandering from their true destiny, and however poorly equipped we ourselves may seem for the battle of life, it is nevertheless true that the order of things into which each one of us has been born is perfectly well adapted for his own particular trial. We shall be held answerable only for the badness of our will, and whatever is the inevitable result of the circumstances in which we are placed will not be imputed to us as a fault. The destiny of an unevangelized bushman is not as high, perhaps, as that of an instructed Christian, but he will not be punished for his sins of blameless ignorance, while his virtues will receive their due reward. Every man's salvation is in his own hand, and each one who is faithful to his particular mission in life, has the joy of knowing that to him, at least, the evil of the world has not been a stumbling-block. For every man born into the world there is an attainable ideal, and that is his own true self, such as God intended him to be in view of his environment. No one who corresponds with the opportunities and the wealth of grace that lie in every act and circumstance of daily life can fail to be an optimist as regards his own career in the world. The trial of a soul whose lot has been cast upon degenerate days must consist largely in coping with the evil of his surroundings, and his failure in life is in proportion to his acquiescence in what is unsound in the spirit of his times: but it is his own fault if he succumbs in the struggle.

The history of the Church is a constant struggle against degeneracy, and the miracle of her divine institution manifests itself most clearly in her great historic revivals. She knows that, however low the world may sink in degradation, there is a point beyond which the "gates of hell" will not prevail, and that she herself will remain as a powerful renovating influence until the end of time. She knows, too, that the fruits of her struggle against evil, though not always manifest, are always abundant; that life within the pale of her active membership is never thrown away, and can be made as profitable now as at any period of her history. The spirit of the church is active and practical. She would have her children live in the present, and not in the past or the future. Her bidding to them is: "Say not: What thinkest thou is the cause that former times are better than they are now? for this manner of question is foolish."¹ Her activity and the conscious-

¹ *Eccles.*, vii., 11.

ness that she is doing good in the world, produce in her a character of cheerfulness and joy, while pessimism in her children is prevented by the knowledge that all personal sin may be remedied by a change of heart.

This healthy and prudent optimism which the Church endeavors to foster in her sons is a preservative against another form of despondency which comes from contemplating and taking to heart the essential impotence of man and the want of permanence of his work. Our hopes, it may be, in the progress of the race are shaken by the only too frequent demonstration of the truth of the saying :

“The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones.”

The work of a wise monarch or statesman is always liable to be undone by an incompetent successor, and when a Pericles has raised his country to a high level of power and prosperity, there is but too often no one left to take his place or to avert threatening ruin from the state. The results, moreover, of human effort seem to bear no proportion to the toil and expense incurred in producing them. That outburst of patriotism and national vigor which was swayed by the First Napoleon, ended only in depriving France of the flower of her manhood. In the domain of art, too, monuments worthy of the admiration of all time have been continually swept away by man's energy for destruction. Mr. Ruskin, speaking of the loss of such treasures, says :

“Fancy what Europe would be now, if the delicate statues and temples of the Greeks—if the broad roads and massy walls of the Romans—if the noble and pathetic architecture of the middle ages, had not been ground to dust by mere human rage. You talk of the scythe of time and the tooth of time. I tell you, time is scytheless and toothless; it is we who gnaw like the worm—we who smite like the scythe. It is ourselves who abolish, ourselves who consume; we are the mildew and the flame, and the soul of man is to its own work as the moth, that frets when it cannot fly, and as the hidden flame that blasts where it cannot illumine. All these lost treasures of human intellect have been wholly destroyed by human industry of destruction; the marble would have stood its two thousand years as well in the polished statue as in the Parian cliff; but we men have ground it to powder, and mixed it with our own ashes. The walls and ways would have stood—it is we who have left not one stone upon another, and restored its pathlessness to the desert; the great cathedrals of old religion would have stood—it is we who have dashed down the carved work with axes and hammers, and bid the mountain grass bloom upon the pavement, and the sea-winds chaunt in the galleries.”²

Yet there is another side to the picture which will be revealed when the hand of man is no longer lifted to destroy, when every chosen soul, chiselled into a temple of perfect beauty by the hand of divine love, shall stand eternally exempt from the wearing en-

² *The Political Economy of Art.* Lecture II. Accumulation, p. 98.

ergies of time. As long as time shall last the fruits of human effort will indeed continue to decay; the noblest performances of genius will gradually disappear from the earth; nations will become decivilized and lost to all sense of what is beautiful in art, while thousands of their children will be born and bred in an atmosphere of smoke and bustle and blasphemy. Yet the influence of the Church will still remain, and the souls of the suffering poor, instructed where to find their truest riches, will be chastened and refined by the sufferings which shall be born of the injustice and luxury of their oppressors. A diamond is still a diamond though it lie hidden in a sewer, and a human soul in the state of grace, though its lot be cast in the foulest purloins of a corrupt city, is an object of greater importance and a thing of greater beauty to contemplate than the outward splendor of the wisest and greatest of nations. The durable monuments of the Romans and the perfect art-works of the Greeks were a product and an image of what was virtuous and noble in their producers, just as the great cathedrals of the age of St. Louis and the political splendor of the nation which produced them, were due to the practice of civic virtue by the French people in accordance with the precepts of the Gospel. But the essential life of Christianity and a plenteous realization of the Gospel ideas is not necessarily connected with external grandeur, and may conceivably exist without it. The Church scorns to have the success of her mission in the world measured by the standards of material progress or even of intellectual culture, though a sufficient measure of these will always be found where her teaching is faithfully carried out; indeed, as has been said before, a complete subjugation of the world to the doctrines of the Gospel would produce a reign of universal peace and material happiness, and a republic of saints would constitute an ideal state. But the world being as it is, the temporal estate and condition of men cannot show us whether their life is a success in the only true sense of the word, or whether it is, as far as their real interests are concerned, a complete and disastrous failure. Many a noble life is brought down by sorrow to the grave; and the victim of oppression and injustice has passed into another order of things where his works follow him. Many a time upon the earth does the curtain fall over some great and soul-stirring tragedy; but the true finale of the play takes place upon a stage which we cannot see, and where the works of men are weighed in a new balance of justice and retribution.

In conclusion, the good which the Church of God looks for is a good which is unseen. Even in the domain of poetry and art the greatest beauties are often least upon the surface and are invisible to all but the trained observer. But it is still more strictly true in

the spiritual order that the greatest goods lie behind a veil and are but dimly apprehended even by the eye of faith. Vast as is the gulf between the intellectual and sensitive orders among living creatures, there is a still wider separation between the gifts of intellect and those of grace among mankind ; and it is her knowledge of this difference which influences the Church in her relations with the natural and supernatural life of her children, and in her estimate of the relative greatness of moral and physical evil in the world. With her the primary and all-important question is not whether man can be perfected as a social being, or whether the sum of our present joys does or does not exceed that of our sufferings. Humanity can never attain its highest aspirations in this world, and the words *good* and *evil* can be rightly interpreted only with reference to a life that is yet to come. To many of us life is a period of continuous suffering, and the natural end of it a blessing, and to those who ask whether it is worth living, the true answer is that, whether joyous or sorrowful, it carries with it the most solemn of all responsibilities, and that in the noble words of the " Psalm of Life : "

" Life is real, life is earnest
And the grave is not its goal ;
' Dust thou art, to dust returnest '
Was not spoken of the soul."

JAMES KENDAL, S.J.

ST. BEUNO'S COLLEGE.

CHURCH AND STATE.

"Præterea, libet enim id fateri quod est, sua debetur gratia æquitati legum, quibus America vivit, moribusque bene constitutæ rei publicæ. Hoc enim Ecclesiæ apud vos concessum est, non repugnante temperatione civitatis, ut nullis legum præpedita vinclis, contra vim defensa jure communi justitiæque judiciorum, tutam obtineat vivendi agendique sine offensione facultatem. Sed quamquam hæc vera sunt, tamen error tollendus, ne quis hinc sequi existimet, petendum ab America exemplum optimi ecclesiastici status: aut universe licere vel expedire, rei civilis reique sacræ distractas esse dissociatasque, more Americano, rationes. Quod enim incolumis apud vos res est Catholica, quod prosperis etiam auctibus crescit, id omnino fecunditati tribuendum, qua divinitus pollet Ecclesia, quæque si nullus adversetur, si nulla res impedimento sit, se sponte effert atque effundit; longe tamen uberiores editura fructus, si præter libertatem, gratia legum fruatur patrociniæque publicæ potestatis."—Encyclical *Longinqua oceani* addressed to the American hierarchy, January 6, 1895.

SOME persons who have never learned to doubt of their own infallibility, are very fond of declaiming against "Union of Church and State" as against an unmixed evil, and of extolling "Separation of Church and State" as one of the special blessings of modern times. They evidently imagine that they are giving utterance to some axiomatic truths, seen intuitively under the strong light of civilization—to some first principles of ethics, which it were an insult to our cultured age to explain—or, at the very least, to some immediate deductions from the natural law, which no one is permitted to call in question, at the risk of being placed under a social ban. If you venture to suggest a doubt upon the subject they will stare at you, as at an intellectual curiosity preserved by a strange fate since the days of mediæval darkness; or, maybe, they will denounce you to the high inquisitor of vulgar prejudice as holding un-American doctrine and harboring treasonable designs against the liberties of your country.

Yet the truth of the matter is, few expressions in the whole range of human language are more vague and undefined. In fact, on the lips of the crowd they may mean almost anything, and they may mean nothing. The majority come to them only at second hand, and repeat them by rote, with little more than a confessed notion that they are popular and serve as the shibboleth of liberalism.

This circumstance alone is sufficient to arouse suspicion. In this country, as is well known, even the soundest and staunchest Catholics are sometimes praised for their liberalism, because the word liberalism, as used among us, is susceptible of a good mean-

ing. But liberalism, as it exists in Catholic countries, is not the same harmless thing. It is essentially a system of disguises and counterfeits. It has no rules of conduct except compromise, accommodation and surrender. It changes front as rapidly as the chameleon changes color. It has as many *aliases* as the professional "confidence man." It is progress; it is patriotism; it is philanthropy; it is anything you please, except genuine, outspoken Catholicism. It seeks, above all, to follow the tendency of the age, and to float along upon the tide of public opinion. It never scruples to sacrifice the most sacred interests of religion for a temporal consideration. It is a traitor within the camp, always ready to parley with the enemy and sign terms of capitulation, and then to claim the credit of having established peace between the Church and the world. Its whole past history is a record of intrigue, deception and fraud. Before adopting its watchwords and joining in the cry for separation of Church and State, it is important for us to know precisely what we mean.

I.

The State and the Church are the representatives of the temporal and the eternal. The State is a secular society, whose direct object is to promote man's present welfare in this world; the Church is a spiritual society, whose direct object is to help man to reach his final destiny in the world to come. They are different and distinct from each other, and pursue different and distinct aims. But it does not follow therefrom that they can and ought to be separate and independent of each other, or that they can and ought to pursue their aims separately and independently. Many things that are different and distinct from each other are not destined to be separate and independent. The soul is different and distinct from the body, and yet nature itself shrinks from the separation of soul and body. Even so did Catholics of old shrink from the separation of the Church and the Christian State. The idea of separating one from the other originated with the so-called Reformation, which proclaimed the *emancipation* of human reason.¹

According to the Reformers, the individual was the sole and all-sufficient judge in religious matters, amenable to no authority, and quite competent to pass upon the law of God, to interpret and expound it, to admit or reject portions of it, according as his "reason" should dictate. The leaders, it is true, confined this principle to revelation. But more logical minds soon extended it to other matters. If Luther, they argued, might discard the Book of

¹ Taparelli, *Ord. Rap.*, Introduct.

Machabees and the Epistle of St. Jude, why might not his disciples discard other portions of the writings generally considered inspired? Why might they not, with equal reason, reject all revelations and inspirations, if they saw fit? Why not extend this convenient doctrine to the precepts of the natural law as well, and explain them as they thought best? Who would set the limits? The father had proclaimed the principle: "*Our lips are our own; who is Lord over us?*" The sons pushed it to its legitimate conclusions.

If the State accepts these conclusions to the full, holding itself and its members bound by no particular set of religious doctrines and laws, nor indeed by any religious obligations whatever, there will be no common link of union between the secular and the spiritual, between the temporal and the eternal, between the human and the divine. In other words, there will be a total separation of Church and State. If, on the contrary, the State stops half-way, holding itself and its members bound by some religious obligations, without, however, conforming to all the doctrines and laws of the Church, there will exist a common bond in respect to those points which the State accepts; that is, there will be only a partial separation of Church and State. In the latter case there is room for much variety in the relations between Church and State, ranging the whole way from almost complete separation on the one hand, to almost complete union on the other hand, according to the smaller or larger number of points which they hold in common.

A total separation has existed, and perhaps still exists, under some so-called liberal governments of continental Europe and of South America. They are based on avowedly irreligious principles, and, so far from favoring the Church, they do not recognize her as an institution sanctioned by law. Hence they refuse to protect her in her civil rights, or to grant her and the religious orders approved by her the immunities conceded to purely secular corporations. They confiscate and appropriate ecclesiastical property, declare the religious communities non-existent, then ostracize or starve the individual members, and tax them for their very charities and services to the public. They force clerical students into the army, compel the State officials and employees to desecrate the Lord's day, and contrive in various other ways to do violence to the Christian conscience. Their attitude toward the Church is one of secret or of open hostility, persecution, oppression; their set purpose is to crush out Catholicity and, together with it, all religion.

The political creed of these governments was first announced to the world in the words: "The law should be atheistic." All

Europe shuddered at the blasphemy, and when Count D'Althon Séé, true to his principles, proposed establishing a professorial chair, to teach what he impiously styled the "religion of atheism," the death-rattle of expiring conscience changed at once into a cry of horror and dismay. Discomfited, but not destroyed, the advocates of this sacrilegious doctrine disguised it under another name, called it "Separation of Church and State," and reappeared upon the scene with fairer prospects of success. Before long they gained access, not only to the cabinet of the politician and to the assemblies of the *liberal* Christians, but even to the consciences of some sincerely pious, but misguided and unsuspecting, Catholics. The clergy, as a body, watched the movement with great apprehension; the bishops protested; the Vicar of Christ condemned it. The very first proposition of the encyclical, *Quanta cura*, proscribes the doctrine, "That the best interests of public society and civil progress require, by all means, that human society should be established and governed without any more regard to religion than if it did not exist."¹

Presented in this form, the doctrine may seem less shocking, but it is quite as blasphemous, and far more dangerous, because more insidious. What matters it whether the State acknowledges no God, or, while it acknowledges one, makes no account of Him? If anything, its conduct in the latter case is more impious than in the former. At bottom it is the very rankest kind of irreligion—a practical application of the epicurean maxim: "Let the gods go asleep above us."

In this country there is not and, let us hope, never will be, a total separation of Church and State. Despite much infidelity, indifference and scepticism among the masses of the population, we have not, as a State or a nation, apostatized from God. Despite much corruption, bribery and dishonesty in high places, there exists a correct public conscience, a strong sense of right, which asserts itself whenever important issues are at stake. In striking contrast with the rulers of some other lands, whose aim is to banish God from the minds and hearts of the people, our chief executive considers it his duty to dwell, in his annual message, upon the blessings bestowed upon the country by the Giver of all good gifts, and to exhort the nation to show its gratitude by public acts of thanksgiving and prayer. And, what is still more refreshing, even in our political campaigns and at the hustings, aspirants to the highest honors which the sovereign people can confer, do not consider it out of place to make a reverential appeal to the religious

¹ "Optimam societatis publicæ rationem civilemque progressum omnino requirere ut humana societas constituatur et gubernetur, nullo habito ad religionem respectu, ac si ea non existeret."

feeling of their fellow-citizens for whose votes they are bidding. Our legislative assemblies are opened with some form of prayer, and the Lord's day is kept holy, at least externally, by a general cessation from labor.

But how deeply rooted in our whole national system is the sense of religious responsibility, nowhere appears more clearly than in our courts of justice. While in many other lands which boast of their free, constitutional government the judiciary are mere tools of the revolutionary faction that calls itself "the Government," and are hampered by a thousand arbitrary, and often unjust, enactments passed by the servile chambers; our highest tribunals go behind the letter of special legislation, and, disregarding the technicalities of the statute-book, decide the most momentous cases solely on principles of equity. Beyond and above the written law we recognize the unwritten law, which is in reality nothing but the natural law imprinted upon the human conscience, as understood and applied by Catholic antiquity. It is a part of our Catholic heritage, handed down to us through English common law, from times when there was the most intimate relation between Church and State and when the canon law of the Church interpreted the civil law of the States. The principles and traditions of those olden days have entered into our national life and habits of thought. They guide and influence the body politic, as well as the people at large. They pervade our national Constitution itself, and distinguish it from those godless paper instruments popularly called Constitutions, though they are nothing but one-sided contracts drawn up for the set purpose of delivering the Church, as well as the nation with all its rights and liberties, into the hands of Free Masons and Jews.

So true is all this that some Catholic writers, and among them the learned and patriotic Dr. Orestes Brownson, have not hesitated to affirm that our social fabric is founded upon distinctively Catholic principles, really at variance with the prevailing spirit of Protestantism. However that may be, Americans as a class admit, without contention, that the general principles of Christianity are deeply imbedded in our national and political life. And if occasionally there arise men who sound a note of discord, they put our people into a state of nervous irritation. Some of the readers of this REVIEW will no doubt remember an anti-Catholic oath-bound society which started a few years ago in a Western city, and was known as the "American Union" or "American Alliance." If not identical with the A. P. A. it was certainly the precursor. One of its many unfounded assertions was that the "Fathers of the American Republic" had dug a ditch, broad and deep, between Church and State, and had provided very effectually that no one

should ever fill up that ditch. Thence the spokesmen of the society drew the most unpatriotic as well as irreligious conclusions, hostile alike to State and Church; and some of them announced those conclusions in language far more offensive than even the *Apaists* have ventured to use. Taken to task by both Catholics and Protestants, they soon subsided, and slunk back into the darkness from which they had sprung.

What concerns us at present is the argument made against them. "The Fathers of the American Republic," it was answered, never thought of digging a ditch, broad and deep, between Church and State; that treasonable work the members of the A. U. are attempting to do. The framers of our Constitution, we are free to admit, were not all professing Christians, but the majority felt, with Washington, that religion and morality are the firmest supports of the State. None of them favored the infidel policy afterwards adopted by the French revolution or wished to divorce the State from the Church. They did not, indeed, show a special preference for any one of the various Christian denominations existing in the country at the birth of the Commonwealth. They could not have done so consistently. Before the State the Episcopalian and the Catholic, the Puritan and the Quaker were all to be equal, because they had all helped to build it up, and the fundamental principles of the Christian religion, common to them all, were to guide the public conscience in the discharge of official duties. For this reason some Protestant authorities have maintained that Christianity, in general, embracing all believers in Christ as the Redeemer of mankind, is the established religion of the land. Certainly this is a somewhat loose conception of an established church. Yet it expresses very well the actual relation between Church and State in this country.

II.

What Americans object to is not that *partial* union of Church and State which results from the adoption by the State of Christian principles of government, but that *complete* union which implies the establishment of a "State Church." The bare mention of a State Church makes their blood run cold, and conjures up scenes of horror and oppression. And certainly if it were the monster depicted to our youthful imagination, it would merit the execration of all lovers of humanity. But it so happens that the picture is altogether different from the reality. Poetic truth is not always historic truth, and even poetic truth is often shockingly disregarded by those who are wont to be quoted as authorities in this matter.

Most of the information possessed by the multitude is derived

from writers whose first qualification for authorship is a self-complacent ignorance of the subject to be treated. Even a moderate acquaintance with the question now under consideration would make their task exceedingly prosy and prove fatal to success. But so long as they are at liberty to explore the fields of fiction, and to give full play to a morbid imagination, they are prolific and dash off an unlimited amount of ribaldry and abuse—"sound and fury signifying nothing," but far more telling than argument with the classes to which they address themselves. Unlike the reverential judges of the Athenian *Arcopagus*, whom St. Paul praises for adoring the God whom they knew not, these men blaspheme what they know not—"quod ignorant blasphemant."

The result is that popular misconceptions concerning complete union of Church and State are almost innumerable. Nevertheless, from the very nature of the case they may be reduced to two heads. There are some—and they are mostly Protestants—who take complete union of Church and State to mean "the usurpation or absorption by the Church of the functions of the civil power." These good folk are perpetually haunted by the spectre of "papal aggression." Gifted with second sight, like a certain historic personage who distinguished "Jesuits" in disguise on the floor of the Senate chamber, they behold the emissaries of the Pope swarming into the National Capital and invading all the departments of State. They perceive the "Court of Rome" extending its "Briarean hands" in every direction, dictating the political action of parties and "plotting against the nation's autonomy." Already they hear the death-knell of our liberties. They quite expect that before long the Pope will "issue new bulls of excommunication against all honest Protestants and absolve Romanists from their oath of allegiance." They see tribunals of the Inquisition erected, and hurdles, racks and dungeons starting up on all sides. They dream of "Spanish Armadas" and "Sicilian Vespers" and "St. Bartholomew's Days." They are sure that the "Papists" are actually arming and drilling numerous companies of young soldiers for a war of extermination against all who will not acknowledge the Pope's right to "universal temporal dominion." In mortal fear lest the days of antichrist be close at hand, they call upon all evangelical Christians to combine in defence of the American principle of "a free Church in a free State."

There are others—chiefly Catholics—who, by way of direct antithesis, can see nothing in complete union of Church and State, except "the usurpation or absorption by the State of the functions of the ecclesiastical power." They take for granted that one condition of complete union is the carrying on of diplomatic intercourse with the Vatican, and this they consider fraught with the

gravest danger to the Church. They deplore that wily politicians and ministers of State invariably take advantage of it to outwit the simple-minded Church authorities. They are sure that the Church will be compelled to concede many dangerous privileges and prerogatives, and that the State will arrogate to itself many more. They foresee that the civil power will gradually encroach upon the spiritual domain until the clergy become mere servants and pensioners of the State, dependent upon the bounty of the public exchequer for their daily bread, and, as a consequence, little in touch with the people, whose eternal welfare will be sacrificed for the sake of a "fat living." They recall the frequent and bitter conflicts on the subject of *investiture* and the royal *placet* and *exequatur*, and they observe that similar conflicts are still going on wherever there exists even the shadow of a State Church. They direct attention to the fact that, on the strength of ancient grants, governments which have utterly broken with Christian traditions continue to exercise the right of "presentation" and "patronage" to the great detriment of souls, even beyond the limits of their political jurisdiction. They argue that in the event of complete union of Church and State one of two things will inevitably happen: either the Church will meekly acquiesce, and the consequence will be that the highest ecclesiastical offices will be filled by creatures of the State, or the Church will resist the pretensions of the State, in which case episcopal sees will often be vacant, and remain so until a candidate is agreed upon who will be sufficiently pliant in the hands of the State. They remark that under such circumstances the best that can be expected from the clergy who aspire to ecclesiastical preferment is that they will pursue a policy of neutrality and subserviency; that so long as they are only in the inferior ranks they will take great care not to declare themselves; that when they have reached the goal of their ambition they will be courtiers and politicians, living in the antechambers of princes and the salons of statesmen much more than in the midst of their flocks. And, while worldly-minded ecclesiastics will enjoy the favor of the great, the worthiest priests, the most active religious, the most zealous prelates will be hampered in their work, opposed, persecuted, exiled. But it is especially at the election of a new Pope that the influence of the secular power is to be dreaded. Even at present, though many of the larger States are wholly indifferent to Church affairs, the interference of some European courts with the papal conclaves is a source of great embarrassment and anxiety. What then might be expected, if complete union of Church and State were universal in the Christian world and all Christian governments tried to make good their respective claims? Among those who would glory most in the

titles of "Oldest Son of the Church," "Protector of the Faith" and "Catholic Majesty" there would be many Frederick Barbarossas and Napoleon Bonapartes, who would contrive "to run the machinery of ecclesiastical government" to suit their own ambitious projects. In this manner, as history shows, the way is paved to corruption, dissension and schism. Save us from the meddling of the secular power; save us from a "State Church."

The Protestant objection is, as we hope to show, purely chimerical. The Catholic objection points to a real evil and a serious danger, but it does not sufficiently distinguish between what is essential and what is accidental, nor between legitimate privileges sometimes wisely granted by the Church and the abuse made of them by the State. The answer to both objections is found in a characteristic saying of the Middle Ages: "Extra chorum cantas, frater"—you are chanting false, brother; you are out of tune; you are singing to another air. Or, to give the force of the words in the modern language of the legal fraternity: "Your objection is not well taken, sir," you are combating a fictitious enemy.

The only essential requisite for complete union of Church and State is that the State be guided in its official acts by the tenets of a certain definite church or creed, and that, in return, it extend to such church or creed a protection and patronage not enjoyed by dissenting sects. This plainly supposes a church, organization or ecclesiastical society of some kind, bound together by organic laws—be its government democratic, oligarchical or monarchical—be its authority vested in councils or conferences, as among the Methodists; in synods or general assemblies, as among the Presbyterians; in single churches or congregations as among the Congregationalists; in convocations, as among some other sects, or, finally, in a hierarchy, as in the Catholic Church. In other words, it supposes an aggregation or body of believers, agreeing or feigning to agree in some faith, or, as Protestants commonly express themselves, agreeing upon a "confession."

If religion is considered as something purely subjective to the individual conscience, without any common articles of belief accepted by all the church members, and, still more, if it is considered as a mere sentiment of the will instead of a conviction of the understanding, a church organization is logically out of the question; because every society must have some basis whereon to rest, or, in the cant phrase of our politicians, some "platform" whereon to stand. Hence, from a default of one of the terms, a complete union of Church and State is intrinsically impossible. It is manifest, therefore, that wherever the principle of private interpretation is strictly adhered to, a State church cannot be established without self-contradiction. For in this case men cannot be

united into a religious society, whose decisions they will all feel bound to respect, either as church members or as citizens; on thoroughly Protestant principles an established church is conceivable only as a sub-department of the State. And here is the true reason why in this country our natural sense of justice instinctively revolts at the thought of a complete union of Church and State. "Americans," to quote Doctor Brownson, "understand this union in a Protestant sense, as it exists in England, Scotland, Denmark, Sweden and, indeed, in all Protestant and schismatical States . . . in which it is not so much a union of Church and State as a subjection of the Church to the State. In these Protestant lands the Church is a State establishment, and its ministers are a branch of the national police. The State determines its faith, its discipline and worship. It holds from the civil power which governs it and whose bidding it is bound to do."

The Protestant notion of a State church is derived from the well-known maxim of the early reformers: "*Cujus est regio, ejus est et religio*," which means, "He that owns the country owns the church, and he that makes your laws for you, has a right to make your religion for you." Anything more despotic, or more inconsistent with the much-vaunted principles of private interpretation and freedom of conscience, it is hard to conceive. But, then, Protestantism is essentially a mass of contradictions, which have been hitherto kept together in some countries by the aid of the civil power. Notably has this been the case in England. Now, however, the English people are growing weary of State interference in ecclesiastical matters, and, hence, though they are religiously inclined and retain more of Christianity in their constitution than any other people of Europe, they discuss very freely the disestablishment of the National Church. As Catholics we are far from blaming them, yet we are not overjoyed at the prospect, because, if we are to take the experience of other lands as a criterion, we have every reason to fear that disestablishment will eventually lead to political atheism, the canker-worm which has been gnawing at European society until it has left little more than the outward shell and semblance of Christianity.

According to Catholic teaching, the State has no right, of itself, to impose any faith upon its subjects, or to tamper with ecclesiastical discipline; on the contrary, it must guarantee freedom of worship and of church organization, and must govern in accordance with the divine law, as it is understood by the community under its legitimate spiritual superiors, united to the Pope of Rome. When the civil authorities comply faithfully with these conditions, there is perfect union of Church and State in the Catholic sense.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that such a union nowhere

exists at the present day. The nearest approach to it, in recent times, was witnessed in the little republic of Ecuador, under the martyred hero, Garcia Moreno, whose political acts may not all have been sufficiently seasoned with the salt of Christian prudence, but whose motives were unquestionably upright and worthy of that other martyred hero, St. Canute of Denmark, who also fell by the hands of a faction, a victim to duty and love of fatherland. The so-called Catholic countries—France, Italy, Austria, Spain—are very far removed from the Catholic ideals. True, if mere numbers are to be taken into account, they are undoubtedly Catholic, because the faithful are greatly in excess of the infidel element which lords it over them and denies them the plainest justice. But, as usual, “the children of this world have been wiser in their generation than the children of light.” While the enemies of the Church were most active, the faithful were listless, and confided their interests to the liberal party, which, like the treacherous wife of Samson, caressed and conjoled them until they had fallen asleep, then shore them of their strength, mocked them in their disgrace and delivered them, bound hand and foot, into the power of the secret societies. The consequence is that France, Italy, Austria, Spain, with an overwhelming Catholic majority, are now politically atheistic, and do not concede to the Church as much liberty as is guaranteed to her by some heretical countries.

Nor were the relations between Church and State always satisfactory in Catholic times. Instead of protectors of the Church, some Catholic monarchs were among its bitterest persecutors. Indeed, Dr. Brownson does not hesitate to affirm: “The Church is more efficiently protected by the Constitution of the American Republic than she has ever been in France since Philip the Fair; in Germany since the extinction of the Carolingian emperors; in England since the Norman Conquest, or in Spain since the death of Isabella the Catholic; although she is not once recognized by name in the Constitution and the fathers of the republic very likely had no intention of recognizing her at all, for they regarded her as dead, and no longer a danger to their Protestantism or infidelity. There is here a real union of Church and State in our sense of the term, and though not perfect, yet almost as perfect as has ever existed.”

Hence the stern and unflinching Gregory XVI., as well as his milder successor, Pius IX., used to say, if we may believe common report, that there was no quarter of the globe in which he was so much Pope, no portion of his vast spiritual domain in which he was so free in the exercise of his supreme authority, as in the youthful republic of North America. If there is any cause for complaint it is not against the American Constitution, but

against its misapplication and abuse, or rather against the flagrant and unconscionable violation thereof by men with whom liberty means the freedom of wrong-doing and the enslavement of right, and who always have two sets of weights and measures—one for themselves and another for the victims of their persecution. With the Constitution, Catholics are perfectly satisfied. Still, we do not mean to assert that the relations between Church and State in this country are absolutely perfect, nor to extend to the spiritual order the proud boast that “time’s latest empire is her best.” We can conceive a union of the temporal with the eternal so complete that they shall lend a helping hand to each other and in a manner supplement each other.

It is precisely in this sense that the reigning Pontiff, Leo XIII., expresses himself in his encyclical “*Longinqua Oceani*,” quoted at the beginning of the present article. Referring to the good understanding that exists between the United States and the Catholic Church, he remarks: “Moreover—and it gives us pleasure to acknowledge the fact—thanks are due to the equity of the laws which obtain in America, and the customs of your well-ordered Republic. For the Church among you, unopposed by the Constitution and government of your nation, fettered by no hostile legislation, protected against violence by the common laws and the impartiality of the tribunals, is free to live and act without hindrance.” Then he adds: “Yet, though all this is true, it is an error that must be uprooted, to suppose that thence it follows that the model of the most desirable condition of the Church is to be looked for in America, or that it is universally lawful or expedient for civil and ecclesiastical matters to be kept disconnected and apart in the same manner as in America. The fact that Catholicity with you is in a good condition, nay, is even enjoying a prosperous growth, is to be wholly attributed to the fecundity with which God has endowed His Church, in virtue of which, unless men or circumstances interfere, she spontaneously expands and propagates herself, but she would bring forth more abundant fruits if, in addition to liberty, she enjoyed the favor of the laws and the patronage of the public authority.”

Surely this language is both clear and reasonable. It requires no explanation; no sensible man, however little he reflects, can fail to understand it. It requires no justification; no well-meaning man, whatever his religious views, can take it amiss. We are not a little surprised, therefore, to learn that any one should have thought of “explaining it away or slurring it over.” There can be no worthy motive for such conduct. Truth loves to appear in its own colors; it does not apologize for existing; it has an inde-feasible, God-given right to exist. Error, on the contrary, seeks

disguises; it has no rights; it can, at best, be only tolerated. To suppress one jot or one tittle of Catholic truth, or to compromise in the least with error, is dishonorable, if not even criminal. The "disciplina arcani," observed by the early Christians, was a wise provision for times of persecution; but it was meant to screen the sacred mysteries from profanation, and not to withhold the truth from the world. In our days there is no longer the same excuse for reticence. On the contrary, it is the greatest folly to attempt to conceal the teachings of the Catholic Church from the world, because any one who wishes will find them fully presented by our standard writers. It is a dangerous policy to mince and minimize those teachings. It acts as a boomerang, which returns with redoubled force upon those who use it. Such a policy was resorted to by some in England when Catholic emancipation was first mooted. They retarded the whole movement, because they asked for emancipation with a restriction, to the exclusion of those whom they considered too "Roman." Such a policy, again, was resorted to by some when there was question of the re-establishment of the English hierarchy. They furnished Mr. Gladstone years after with arguments against "Vaticanism," because they professed to be Catholics indeed, but not "Ultramontanes." Fortunately, every one who claims to be a Catholic must now be "Roman and Ultramontane." Gallicanism, with all its concomitant errors, was forever buried by the Vatican Council. It is time to have done with trimming and truckling to real or supposed prejudices, especially in the United States. Americans love frankness and candor. They want to be told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Nothing irritates them more than to find that they have been "taken in." They may not always agree with you, but they will admire you if you speak to them plainly. This the Pope does in his encyclical. He teaches nothing new. He merely repeats what has always been taught in the Catholic schools, viz., that the Church is then most happily circumstanced when it is not only fairly treated but actively favored by the State; in other words, when the Catholic ideal of union of Church and State is fully realized. Even a partial separation of the two is more or less at variance with man's destiny upon earth and with the designs of the divine founder of Christianity. It is not the normal condition of Christian society. Hence it is "an error that must be uprooted," to hold that in America is to be sought the *model* of the most desirable condition of the Church.

III.

Yet perfect union of Church and State, though desirable in the abstract, is not always practicable or even consistent with justice and

equity.¹ The Church was indeed commissioned to spread the light of faith everywhere. Her ministers were told to go into the whole world and announce the Gospel to every creature. She received an undivided spiritual empire, according to the prediction of David, "I will give to thee the gentiles for thy inheritance and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession." Jew and gentile are therefore morally bound to enter her communion and render allegiance to her. But, however clear her title to universal sovereignty over the consciences of men, so long as nations have not enrolled themselves under her standard, they are not her subjects, and consequently union of the Church with the State is simply preposterous. Fancy her dictating to the Roman Cæsars—to a Nero, a Caligula or a Diocletian—and launching against them the thunders of her anathemas! Or fancy those tyrants protecting, favoring and fostering her!

There was, it is true, even in pagan Rome a sort of State religion, but it was an idolatrous religion. It was because the Cæsars believed the prosperity of imperial Rome to depend upon preserving the old superstitions, upon burning incense before blocks of wood and stone, upon listening in breathless silence to the ambiguous oracles of Apollo and his augurs and upon piling the spoils captured in battle on the altar of victory, that they waged against the new religion a relentless war, protracted through three centuries of blood. All the while the State was abusing its authority in the most flagrant manner. Nevertheless the Christians recognized its existence, and, however strong their convictions, however undeniable their right to worship the crucified Nazarene as their God, they bowed in all that was lawful to the powers that were. They believed, they preached, they practised the religion of the Gospel; they confessed the name of Jesus before governors and peoples, before patricians and plebeians; they bled and died, and from their very ashes there sprang up a nation of believers.

And yet the old paganism maintained its hegemony in State affairs. The worship of the mythological divinities was identified with the most intimate relations of private and public life. Jupiter swayed the destinies of gods and men; Vesta guarded the sanctity of the household; Ceres presided over the harvest and the vintage; Bacchus led the banquet and the feast; Mercury protected and promoted commerce; Minerva encouraged literature and philosophy; Thetis decided suits in the halls of justice; Nemesis punished the guilty. In brief, idolatry was the State religion and, by its lying omens, often terrified the emperors into acts of

¹ *Cfr.* Manning's Reply to Gladstone's "Vaticanism."

persecution which their better nature abhorred. It was not until Constantine had knelt before the mysterious sign in the heavens—not until the vast majority of the people had embraced the teachings of the gospel—not until the laws of Christian morality had begun to govern the conduct of the community at large—not until pagan principles and pagan maxims had died a natural death—not until the temples of the false gods had been deserted, for want of worshippers, and the altars had ceased to blaze with the fire of sacrifice, for want of idolatrous priests, that Christianity came forward, and without violence, without aggression, without intrigue, but by a natural sequence of events and the power of divine truth, took its place as the State religion, and the Christian Church became the State Church.

Turn we now from the civilized Romans to the savage hordes of the North—to the Britons, the Saxons, the Angles, the Franks and the Danes—and we shall see that everywhere the subjugation to Christian faith and Christian rule was brought about in a similar manner. The blood of martyrs flowed and fertilized the Gospel seeds, and a new generation started into being. The existing national customs were not destroyed, but purified; and by an insensible, providential agency, pagan barbarism was transformed into Christian civilization. The secular power was not interfered with or supplanted, but assisted and supported. Instead of being guided by the natural law alone, the State was guided by the whole law of God, both natural and positive, as expounded by the Church of Christ. “Until a Christian world existed,” observes Cardinal Manning, “there was no *apta materia*. It was only when a Christian world came into existence that the civil society of men became subject to the spiritual direction of the Church. So long as individuals only subjected themselves, one by one, to its authority, the conditions for the exercise of its office [as a State Church] were not fully present. . . . It is only when nations and kingdoms become socially subject to the supreme doctrinal and judicial authority of the Church that the conditions of its exercise are verified. . . . When the whole had become Christian the whole became subject to the divine law of which the Roman Pontiff was the supreme expositor and executive.”

Upon this subject our canonists are unanimous in teaching, with Cardinal Tarquini, that “over infidels, that is, such as have never been admitted by Baptism into the communion of the Church, she exercises no directive power.” They base their conclusion upon Chapter V., verse 12, of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, where the Apostle writes: “What have I to do, to judge them that are without?” Whence they infer: 1st. That a pagan civil society is wholly extraneous to the Church of Christ. 2dly. That a pagan

society, as far as its religion is concerned, is unlawful, because there is but one lawful religious society, and that is the Church of Christ, to which pagan society is extraneous. 3dly. That, therefore, between such a society and the Church of Christ there is a perpetual warfare, waged on the part of the Church by the spiritual weapons of the word—"non gladio sed lingua."

Heathenism is no more ; yet, in many respects, the complexion of modern society is as pagan as when St. Peter first bent his steps along the "Via Sacra," to plant the emblem of salvation on the highest pinnacle of the seven-hilled city, or when St. Augustine landed on the shores of Albion, to announce to Ethelbert the glad tidings of the Gospel. Many nations have apostatized from the faith and from Christ. In the words of the Psalmist : "The gentiles have raged and the people devised vain things. The kings of the earth stood up and the princes met together, against the Lord and against his Christ." Countless thousands, even in our large cities, within the very shadow of a Christian temple, are unregenerated pagans, in nowise under the jurisdiction of Mother Church ; others, though they have received a doubtful Baptism, have never known or acknowledged her authority. The State has revolted, as a whole and in its public life, from the unity of the Christian dispensation. In this respect, writes Cardinal Manning, it differs *toto cælo* from mediæval society. The ancient world was without the unity of the Church *de facto et de jure*; the modern world is without it at least *de facto* ; and this has changed the moral conditions of the subject. The Church never, indeed, loses its jurisdiction *in radice* ; but, unless the moral condition of the subject justify its exercise, it never puts its forth.¹

These few reflections will suffice to convince all fair-minded American Protestants, that their fears of "papal aggression" are wholly unfounded. Upon closer inspection and analysis of the subject, the spectre which haunts them will prove to be nothing but an innocent optical illusion. It is conjured up by inherited prejudice, and will be readily dispelled by a little closer acquaintance with Catholic principles and claims. Briefly, all their objections are met by simply assuring them that, on the part of Catholics, they have nothing to dread from complete union of Church and State ; because, in this country, the essential conditions for complete union of Church and State, in the Catholic sense, are wanting, and therefore such a union is absolutely impossible.

But the case is altogether different in a civil society of Christians united in the profession of the same faith. Such a society is distinguished from others in that it consists of the same members

¹ Reply to Mr. Gladstone's *Vaticanism*.

as the Church. The same individuals, therefore, are bound by a twofold obligation—an obligation towards the State, whose immediate and direct aim is to promote the temporal felicity of its subjects, and an obligation towards the Church, whose mission is to insure the eternal bliss of mankind. Their study upon earth must be, according to the prayer of the Church, "so to pass through temporal goods as not to lose those that are eternal."

The Catholic State, therefore, in respect of the Church, is like a circle intersecting another circle, having some points in common, while others lie without its periphery. Some of its political and social relations may be dictated by purely temporal considerations. But many others will have a religious bearing. The peculiar views of political parties about national finances and national banks, about free-trade and protective tariff, about a gold and silver standard, about standing armies and military posts, may be matters of indifference from a religious point of view, but the education of youth, the laws regarding divorce, the licensing of places destined for public amusement, the management of asylums and reformatories, and a hundred other things of a like nature, are all of vital importance to the Christian believer; and upon these his conscience and his Church claim a hearing. Now upon all, or nearly all of these, men like the Rev. Mr. Talmage and the Rev. Mr. Snyder hold opinions widely different from those held by the authorities of the Catholic or the Anglican Church. One denounces as immoral and degrading what another recommends as moral and refining. Yet the State, which is the guardian of public morality, must of necessity take some stand in regard to these matters; and, therefore, whether it will or not, it must conform its conduct to the ethics of the one or of the other. "There can be no political or social problem," said Proudhon years ago, "that has not behind it a religious dogma."

Nothing, therefore, is more inaccurate or misleading than the bold and broad assertion, which seems to have become an axiom with certain schools of thought, that the Church has nothing to do with politics, because they lie wholly outside of her sphere. Were politics only the petty wranglings and squabbings of parties quarreling over the spoils of office, the assertion might be allowed to pass unchallenged. But politics, in the nobler and truer sense of the word, deal with the proper administration of public affairs, and the conduct of moral agents, with all their duties and responsibilities, with all their rights and privileges. And in this sense the assertion, that the Church has nothing to do with politics, because they lie wholly out of her sphere, is certainly incorrect. For the Church embraces as her sphere the whole range of conscience and moral obligation; and politics are simply the expression

of the public conscience or of "the conscience of the State," as Mr. Gladstone very appropriately calls it. So long as the general politics of a country are conformed to the moral law, the government will be administered in the true interests of the people. When they have become corrupt, the nation will soon fall a victim to the rapacity of unscrupulous factions. Politics represent the collective morals of society. The ethics which regulate the actions of the individual, the ecclesiastical laws which bind the private Christian in his personal relations with other men, become politics in the government of states. The civil ruler or sovereign is bound by those laws in his official capacity no less than in his private life; and within the limits of these laws, the subject owes his ruler fealty and civil allegiance. Both the one and the other admit the same objective standard or rule of morality. They freely embraced Christianity; but, having once embraced it, they are bound by its laws.¹

IV.

Perfect union of Church and State is, therefore, a necessary consequence of such a condition of civil society as we have just been supposing. It is no longer optional either with the ruler or with the subject, but a stringent obligation resulting from their common religious convictions.

For, the civil society of Catholics, argues Cardinal Tarquini may be viewed under a twofold aspect, viz.: *materially*, in as far as it is a collection of individual believers, and *formally*, in as far as it pursues the specific end of a civil society. And from neither point of view can it be indifferent to the interests of the Church, or deaf to her voice.

Viewed materially, that is simply as a collection of individual believers, attentive to their Christian duties, the social body is bound to have at heart the welfare of the Church, which is the same as the spiritual welfare of all its members; and to listen to her warnings, which are identical with the warnings of their consciences. To be wanting in this respect is a virtual denial of the faith and treason against God, whose will all the citizens recognize in the authoritative utterances of the Church. Men enter her vast spiritual communion, with all their relations towards their fellow-men, the king with his sceptre, the soldier with his arms, the lawyer with his brief, the diplomatist with his mission to foreign parts, the writer with his pen, the scientist with his theories; and in all their relations with others, public no less than private, they are bound by the laws of the Gospel, as interpreted for them by the infallible teacher to whose authority they submit. For the

¹ Cfr. Card. Manning, *Four Great Evils*, p. 76.

supreme spiritual jurisdiction of the Church extends over the entire field of faith and morals ; and the end which she proposes to herself is final and absolute, subordinating and influencing all other ends. In a thoroughly Catholic commonwealth, therefore, complete union of Church and State is the natural condition of society ; a severance of that union is a crime, an act of infidelity, a breach of a sacred trust. To that union, as well as to Christian wedlock, we may apply the words of Christ, "What God hath joined, let not man put asunder."

We shall come to the same conclusion if we consider Catholic civil society formally, that is, in as far as it pursues its own specific end as a society. For such a society, as is manifest, must promote the temporal welfare of man, not absolutely but relatively, not independently, but dependently on the eternal destiny for which he was created.

"The end," writes the Angelic Doctor, "which the civil ruler must propose to himself and others is eternal bliss, which consists in the possession of God." And again : "Whosoever is required to do a work directed to something else as to its end, must take heed that his work be adapted to that end. The smith makes a sword, so that it may be serviceable in battle ; the builder constructs a house, so that it may be suited for a dwelling. Since, therefore, the end of this present life is heavenly bliss, it is a part of the ruler's duty so to order the present life of the multitude that it may be a preparation for heavenly bliss ; to enjoin what will aid men to reach their eternal destiny, and, as far as in him lies, to forbid what will prove an obstacle." Now, this eternal destiny the Catholic believes it impossible for him to reach, except in the bosom of the Catholic Church and by obedience to her precepts. For him conscience, religion, and Church are convertible terms ; conscience is only the monitor reminding him of his obligations, religion is the collection of those obligations and of the dogmas underlying them, the Church is the accredited depository, the custodian and the interpreter of those dogmas and obligations. Whether this belief is well-founded or not, whether the human intellect is capable of attaining to absolute certainty concerning religious truth, or is doomed to be forever the victim of doubt, all these are questions belonging to the domain of dogmatic theology, and foreign to our present purpose. Suffice it to remark in passing, that religious truth, once found, obligates the State, no less than the isolated individual ; the judge on the bench and the popular delegate in the council chambers of the nation, no less than the priest in the pulpit, or the sexton in the vestry. "Thou hast confessed the sins of Charles," said Soto to a powerful monarch, "confess now the sins of the emperor."

A Christian sovereign has one set of duties as a private Christian, and another set, not less stringent, as a Christian ruler. "As a private Christian," writes St. Augustine, "he is bound to conform his private life to his faith; as a Christian ruler he is bound to make and enforce such laws as are conformable to his faith. Thus did Ezechias, when he destroyed the groves and shrines dedicated to the worship of idols; thus did the king of Ninive, when he induced all the citizens to appease the wrath of the Almighty in sackcloth and ashes; thus did Nabuchodonosor when he forbade his subjects to blaspheme the God of Israel. . . . When the kings of the earth did not yet serve the true God, but devised vain things against the Lord and against his Christ, impiety could not be prohibited by law; because the laws of the land rather increased it. But now that the prophecy has been fulfilled which says, 'All the kings of the earth shall adore Him, all the nations shall serve Him, who will dare tell the sovereign: 'Take no heed whether your subjects defend or attack the Church of your God; it is not your duty to see if the citizens be religious or irreligious, believers or unbelievers?' As well might you say to the ruler: 'It is not your duty to see if the citizens be moral or immoral.' Or tell me, is it less criminal in the Christian soul to be unfaithful to her God, than in the wife to be unfaithful to her spouse?"

When God laid the first foundations of human society, He said: "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help like unto himself." Behold here the aim of all society—to give man a help like unto himself, a help conformable to his nature and his needs. Now, is a help conformable to his nature and his needs, if it does not assist him in the prosecution of his last end? And what is his last end, but eternal salvation? Catholic civil society, therefore, cannot prescind from the eternal salvation of its members, whose attainment is the direct object of the Church. In other words, the Catholic State cannot logically disconnect itself from the Church to pursue its own private ends. Even a partial disunion or separation introduces a fatal dualism, which reason as well as revelation must condemn. For, as St. Augustine argues, the happiness of the State rests on the same foundation as the happiness of the individual citizen—"non aliunde beata civitas, aliunde homo." To understand the real malice of this partial separation of Church and State in a Catholic community, or, what amounts to the same thing, of political indifferentism in religious matters, it is sufficient to remember that it cuts off civil society from the benefits of the redemption, which come to us through the true Church as through their channel.¹

Referring to the advocates of this partial separation, Pius IX.

¹ Conf. Card. Hergenroether, *Church and State*, *passim*.

declared in his well-known address to the prelates assembled from all parts of the world for the canonization of the Japanese martyrs, that "those men destroy totally the necessary connection which, by the divine will, exists between the natural and the supernatural." And Monseigneur Pie, the pious and illustrious Bishop of Poitiers, commenting upon these solemn words, remarks that, what is called "the spirit of the age," claims the right of living according to the dictates of unaided natural reason alone, and considers that it cannot forego that right without signing its own death-warrant. Hence it logically rejects revelation, or a supernatural manifestation of God's good pleasure, as an infringement upon the "Rights of man," defended by Voltaire and Thomas Payne. Herein consists the essence and the virus of *Naturalism*, which is the political creed of many who would shrink from it with horror in the intercourse of private life. "Very many," observes the learned prelate, "throw themselves into the arms of this naturalism, more or less specious, more or less gratifying to fallen man. Their intellectual pride is flattered by it, and their other passions are not molested. Holding on to a few principles of natural morality, they escape the humiliating and often painful supervision of a divinely constituted authority, and are left to their own devices."

Like an experienced and skilful physician who makes the diagnosis of a case at a glance, Pius IX. pointed to this as the chief ailment of modern society. "You are aware, Venerable Brethren," wrote the Holy Father in the memorable encyclical dated 8th December, 1864, "that in these times there are found not a few who apply to civil society the impious and absurd principles of naturalism, and who do not blush to maintain that the good of public society and of civil progress imperatively demands that human society be established and governed without any more regard to religion than if it did not exist at all, or at least that no distinction be made between true and false religions."

And here we beg to note incidentally that by these words the Sovereign Pontiff did not mean absolutely to condemn partial separation of Church and State or the practice of political toleration extended to dissenting creeds, when Christian civil society is not in its normal condition which he presupposes. What he does condemn, and what every Catholic must condemn with him, is the doctrine that the system of total, or at least partial, separation described by him is in itself the best and most favorable to progress and enlightenment. As though Christ were not in "the true light which enlighteneth every man who cometh into this world!" As though man were morally free to grope his way through the dark and intricate mazes of modern social and political life guided solely by the small, flickering torch of natural reason!

V.

But we must hasten to give at least the skeleton of another argument which addresses itself more directly to the understanding of the worldly and carnal-minded who relish only the things that are of earth.

If you ask any of this class of men what they consider the mission of civil society to be, they will promptly reply that it is the temporal felicity or well-being of man upon earth. Well then, assuming their premiss, we argue: The temporal felicity or well-being of man in civil society depends, in a great measure, upon perfect union and harmony of mind and thought. But perfect union and harmony of mind and thought are unattainable without unity and agreement in religious matters. Therefore the temporal felicity or well-being of man in civil society depends, in a great measure, upon unity and agreement in religious matters.

But unity and agreement in religious matters are morally impossible without perfect union of Church and State. Therefore the temporal felicity or well-being of man in civil society depends, in a great measure, upon perfect union of Church and State. Therefore civil society must promote that union by all the lawful means in its power. To understand the full force of this argument it is well to remember that, according to St. Augustine's definition, society is an assemblage of men living together in concord—a harmonious multitude of intelligent beings intent upon the pursuit of happiness, and so far from clashing or interfering with each other, that they give each other mutual aid and assistance. Its perfect type was found among those early Christian communities, of which the Sacred Text records that "all were one heart and one soul." And how is that union of heart and soul to be attained if there is diversity of opinion, or perhaps dissension, concerning the most important of all questions that can engage the attention of man concerning his eternal destiny in the world to come and the means by which he is to reach it? Union of heart and soul is attainable only through truth, because the intellect is made for truth, and it will not rest except in the possession of truth.

It is all very well to "respect one another's religious convictions," as men are now fond of expressing themselves. Yet it frequently places us in the most embarrassing circumstances. It is all very well to say that we shall "agree to disagree;" we all understand that often this is the only course left us in a community divided upon religious issues. But it could not have been intended by Christ when He elevated human society to the supernatural plane, and proposed to it the attainment of a higher and nobler aim—the realization of that divine ideal, of which even Plato and Aristotle seem to have had some faint foreshadowings. There is

scarcely anything so conducive to social happiness as a free and unconstrained expression of our inmost feelings, or anything that so mars it as a forced reticence and reserve concerning those things that are uppermost in our minds and that constitute our purest and holiest pleasures. Nor, indeed, is it possible to be so guarded as never to wound the religious susceptibilities of others. He that knows himself to be in the possession of religious truth will seek to communicate it to others, or, at least, he will consider himself called upon to defend it against real or fancied aggressions, and will justly prefer his duty towards his God and his conscience to courtesy towards his fellow-men.

In a community divided upon religious matters it is impossible to avoid bickerings, animosities and strife without falling into what is infinitely worse—absolute religious indifferentism. Need we allude here to the religious wars which have at different times devastated many fair provinces of Europe, or to the scenes which have disgraced even our own brief national existence? Only a few years ago a minister of the Gospel felt inspired to inaugurate a religious war, and to lay before Congress a formal petition to remodel the Constitution with the view of depriving Catholics of the privileges and immunities of American citizenship, and there have existed at various times, and now exist, organizations whose avowed purpose is to disfranchise all that acknowledge the spiritual sovereignty of the Pope. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that all these persons are *in bona fide*, that they are animated by the purest motives and think that they are doing a service to God; or, if you will, let us suppose that they are enthusiasts, zealots, bigots, religious maniacs; this will only strengthen our position. As a matter of fact, all religious movements not conducted by the true Church of God, usually begin in fanaticism and end in apathy or systematic contempt of all forms of religion. Such, as both history and our own experience testify, has been the logical outcome of the Protestant Reformation. Surrounded by a thousand jarring, wrangling sects, each claiming to be the mouthpiece of heaven, the peace-loving citizen too often ends by being thoroughly disgusted with them all, and, first in public and then in private, gives up the practice of religion and perhaps even the belief in Christianity. Many go further still: disinclined, or unfitted by nature and education, to make a special study of the questions that agitate the religious world, they satisfy themselves that any effort to find the truth must prove abortive, and conclude that not only Christianity but all religion is a huge swindle and imposture.

The State is even more embarrassed than the private individual. It is bound, on the one hand, to safeguard public morality, and yet, on the other hand, it cannot presume to sit in judgment on

questions of Christian morality any more than on questions of Christian dogma. Both belong to the spiritual order, and therefore fall directly under the supervision of the Church. In brief, as Garcia Moreno used to say, the Christian State must be the right arm of the Church. But how can it be the right arm of the Church if the Church is represented only by an ever-increasing number of warring sects? How can it be the guardian of public morality, if the highest ecclesiastical courts return contradictory judgments as to what is moral or immoral? The civil authorities are puzzled where to draw the line, and, despite their best intentions, they run the risk of practically favoring immorality and irreligion. Thus it happens that, wherever the State does not recognize the authoritative decisions of the Catholic Church, the laws affecting public morals are becoming daily more and more relaxed. There may now and then be restraining causes which will temporarily stay the progress of the evil, but the State, as such, is utterly helpless. Separated from the Church, it has no objective standard or criterion of Christian morality, and, therefore, it cannot efficaciously enforce morality. The wider the breach between the secular and the spiritual, the more rapid will naturally be the decline of public morality and, therefore, of public peace and happiness. Hence it is that, in many lands, there goes up from every side the wail of the Latin poet :

Sævior armis
Luxuria incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem."

Pius IX. was right, therefore, when, speaking of Catholic civil society, he condemned the following proposition: "In our age it is no longer expedient to maintain the Catholic religion as the only State religion, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship."

It is scarcely necessary to remark that the word "State religion," as here used by the Holy Father, points to a real union of Church and State in the Catholic sense, and not to a mere semblance of union, such as is still kept up in certain countries in which the State has rejected not only the authority of the Catholic Church, but Christianity itself. Yet, may not some advantages accrue to religion and to society from a purely external union between the ecclesiastical and the civil power, from diplomatic relations between their respective representatives, from concordats by means of which a *modus vivendi* is agreed upon, in brief, from the accidentals of union when the essentials are wanting? Many American Catholics, who judge other lands by our own, will answer emphatically: "No, there can be no advantage in such a sham union. It simply comes to this, that, for the sake of a miserable allowance, paid

by the State out of the ecclesiastical property which it has robbed, the Church is kept in perpetual bondage. The sooner she shakes off her shackles, the better it will be for her. The Holy See will then be free to promote the most worthy persons to ecclesiastical dignities; the clergy, dependent upon the faithful, instead of an infidel government, will labor zealously among them and for them; the laity, in their turn, will take an interest in Church affairs, because they have a share in them, and all will appreciate their religion the more, because it costs them something. Let Catholics abroad learn a lesson from us, and very soon religion will revive and flourish among them."

This reasoning is certainly very specious and, at first sight, appears convincing, but it proceeds on the assumption that the conditions elsewhere are the same as among us, and that what is possible here is also possible there. Now, nothing could be further from the truth. Here the faithful have long been accustomed to give generously to the Church; there, on the contrary, they have been supported by the Church. Here even the common people can easily lay by a little of their earnings; there the masses are starving for want of the necessities of life. Here the Church is mostly composed of those whose ancestors for generations had to fight for their faith; there the Catholics have not yet learned to defend their rights. Here there is an inherited love of conservatism; there any wild theory, broached by some daring leader, carries away the crowd. Here there is a vigorous public opinion which, as a rule, makes for righteousness; there the fatherly interest of the Sovereign Pontiff seems at times to be almost the only safeguard of religion and Christian civilization.

Whether the diplomatic intervention of the Holy See will suffice for any length of time to restrain the forces of lawlessness and impiety within their present bounds, God only knows. The indications are that, in several countries, the usurpers of popular rights, who have foisted their rule upon the nation, are bent upon bringing about a complete rupture with the Church. Should they succeed in their attempt, there is no foretelling what persecutions may burst upon those unhappy lands. For human perversity has reached its climax. The Vicar of Christ knows this full well and does his utmost to protect his flock from the ravening wolves. If he is forbearing and goes to the very limits of concession and conciliation, it is not for the sake of earthly gain, but for the sake of immortal souls which are in jeopardy. The seeming union between the Catholic Church and the infidel State, kept up by the Holy See, is meant to prevent a real union of Church and State of the Protestant type—that is, a subjection of the Church to the State. For there is no disguising the fact that

the more union of Church and State in the Catholic sense diminishes, the more union in the Protestant sense increases. "A free Church in a free State" is a figment or an imposture of infidel politicians, intended to deceive the unwary Christian. The Church and State are not like two forces moving in parallel lines without ever crossing each other's paths. They rather resemble two planets revolving in their respective orbits, but often coming within the sphere of mutual attraction. They are constantly and necessarily acting and reacting on each other. The only question is whether the spiritual shall preponderate over the material or the material over the spiritual; whether the State shall be the willing auxiliary of the Church or the Church the unwilling slave of the State.

It is not the Pope only who advocates perfect union of Church and State. The bitterest enemies of the Church are quite as pronounced as he upon the subject, only they wish to bring it about in a different manner and for a different purpose. Not to mention the Tsar of Russia, in whose hands the schismatical State-Church is nothing but a powerful political engine, it is well known that Bismarck's day-dream was the establishment of a strong State-Church, of a great national Church, which should unify the various portions of the new empire under the "Kaiser" as pope and the Prince-Chancellor as high camerlengo. What particular set of doctrines was to be taught as of faith divine, whether that of the conservative Lutheran Church or that of the handful of apostates from the ranks of Rome, styled Old Catholics, was a secondary consideration. The main point was that everything should redound to the glory of fatherland. The cardinal principle of the national religion was to be statolatry—that is, adoration of the State, of the great and worshipful Prussian empire and of its tutelary genius, Prince Von Bismarck. "Allah is God and Mahomet is his prophet."

Whether a perfect union between Church and State, in the Catholic sense, will ever again be established, whether a full reconciliation of the secular with the spiritual will ever be effected, it is vain to inquire. "This much at least is quite certain," wrote a learned contributor to the *Dublin Review* years ago, "that they can never come to a sincere agreement unless one or the other of the parties suffer a change of principles and becomes what Scripture calls 'a new creation.' The governments must submit to a baptism, or the Church, by proving unfaithful to God, must relinquish her office of teaching the truth, and, as a necessary sequel, must perish altogether. For the religion of atheism has hitherto not assumed a tangible shape. Only a complete revolution in thought and feeling can give peace to the world. Such changes we see little reason to anticipate as yet; the dawns of

hope that we can trace in the sky are very faint ; nor would we altogether trust them. It is more consonant with the tone of present literature and with social habits and tendencies to hold that a long conflict is still to be fought, and that troubles are likely to thicken in the course of the next few years. But here at all events is a master-key to the problems that so confuse our public life, if we have the skill to apply it."

R. J. M.

HYPOTHETICS.

IF man never conceived ideas other than those forced upon him by experience, it would be difficult to understand the benefit of possessing an intellect at all. Susceptible merely of impressions from without, he would gradually accumulate a knowledge of the present and the past ; but every striving after future progress would be a plunge into the dark, and any real development resulting from the effort would be the product, not of calculation, but of chance.

All there is of advancement, of civilization, all that makes human history worthy of the race, is the outcome of that form of anticipation which we call hypothesis. Without a succession of hypotheses, science would be at a standstill, literature would lose half its treasures, and even the interest of the daily press would begin to fail. We should want a new name for a world consisting solely of facts, and for a race unable to think or act outside the confines of the actual.

Hypotheses are the dolls and Noah's Ark of grown-up mankind. No observant mind can fail to recognize this. Prophecy, even as a mere exercise of imagination, lifts us above the monotony of dull present facts. Let us only imagine how things may go on in the future, and the history of times to come becomes more possible than the history of the past. Hypothesis does not claim to be prophecy, but it possesses even a greater charm.. Whole generations of boys, and men too, will be delighted with Jules Verne, because he excels in the production of a novel world by the skilful use of a hypothesis. It has become a favorite mode both of advocating and refuting socialism, to assume its universal acceptance, and picture the state of the world in a hundred years to

come. These are delightful trivialities, amusing and not useless; they serve to pass an idle hour, and may end in giving point and interest to an aimless life.

But when it comes to serious work, the use of hypothesis calls for a treatise, and the value of its product for a censorship. In Mark Twain's modernized fable of the fox and crow, the nineteenth century bird, wiser than its ancestor, firmly clutches the cheese with its claw before attempting to sing a note. Yet even in this wise, modern world we still see mouths opened to announce some revolutionizing discovery, and dropping in the act the hypothetical "if" on which the truth of that discovery depends. So long as the cheese is there not a sound can be uttered; swallow it, digest it, turn it into solid substantiality and strength, then sing your song at will. So long as the "if" is in the premise, no true find has been made. Work the "if" into a truth, and we will not wait to be revolutionized by your discoveries; we will revolutionize ourselves.

Yet, even as necessity is the mother of invention, so hypothesis is the preceptor, the tutor, the go-cart and leading strings of discovery. Necessity says you must do something. Hypothesis tells you how to set about it. Hypothesis gives no truth to its products, but it anticipates the unknown and the desirable, colors them with probability, gives goal, direction and incentive to the search. No man will begin explorations till he has some notion what he is about. He must have something definite to look for, or some definite place to look in, and in either case some consideration to make search worth his while. To look for a needle in a haystack is not so hopeless after all. The man knows what he is looking for, and where to look for it. But he must first have an inkling that there is a needle there, and he must be badly in want of one before the task will be worth his while. Offer a reward of £1000 for every needle found in that situation, and, putting aside fraud, I fancy not a few needy souls would be found hanging round the farm-yards of the country, making furtive pokes into the hayricks whenever they thought themselves unseen.

We leave out of count discoveries made by chance. Those that come from laborious investigation need a definite starting-point and a definite direction. The starting-point must be an unsolved problem—a question asked, but not answered, or not satisfactorily answered. It must be a question worth a solution, one that the world is interested in, or will be interested in, when it hears of it. The world is interested in the question whether Mars is inhabited, whether there are new gases to be found, whether the validity of human knowledge can be rendered impregnable to doubt. Here are three types: the first supplies a definite object and a definite

place where to look for it; the second provides an indefinite object, but a definite field; the third supplies the object itself, and only asks the explorer what can be made out of it.

But given the object and the field of search, a motive to make labor worth the while, and a laborer willing to work, nothing but an intelligent anticipation of results will tell the laborer how to set about it. If life in Mars is to be discovered, no good will come of spying through a telescope, multiply its resolving power as we will. We must study spectra, and look for life-supporting air; we must study life itself, and find out under what minimum of conditions life can subsist. We shall end in discovering a possibility or an impossibility, and perhaps must rest content with that. If a new gas is to be discovered, we must cultivate suspicions about the purity of known gases, pry about after adulterations, test weights and volumes, practice every kind of violence to obtain chemical resolvents. To silence the clamor of the sceptic and the agnostic, the idealist and the advocate of methodic doubt, each man must satisfy himself of the validity of his own knowledge, learn all that has been said for and against it, abolish or set up systems, reduce all adversaries to a contradiction, wring out their confession, prick their inflated skin, let the bad gas out, make them empty and dumb.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge was as brilliant in mind as he was indolent in body; there was no limit to his schemes, and every limit to their execution. During his lifetime he talked about his "great work" of philosophy just as if it were in the press. When he died he left the legacy of writing it *ab ovo* to another man.¹ One of his schemes embraced the whole range of human knowledge. Of this he wrote the preface and the table of contents, and then stopped. This preface touched deeply on the science of method. It was a favorite theme with Coleridge; over and over again in his works he insists on "the necessity of a mental initiative to all method:"²

"In order to make your facts speak truth," he once observed, "you must know what the truth is which ought to be proved—the ideal truth, the truth which was, consciously or unconsciously, strongly or weakly, wisely or foolishly, intended at all times."³

A somewhat paradoxical speech, which those who do not know Coleridge might take for an encouragement of huckstering philosophers. What he meant, however, was this:

¹ J. H. Green, the pupil of Coleridge, who expounded the doctrine of his master in a two-volume work, entitled *Spiritual Philosophy*.

² *The Friend*, vol. iii., p. 133.

³ *Table Talk*, p. 234.

"No investigation in the non-mathematical sciences can be carried on in a way deserving to be called philosophical, unless the investigator have in himself a mental initiative, or, what comes to the same thing, unless he set out with an intuition of the ultimate aim or idea of the science or aggregation of facts to be explained or interpreted."¹

In the preface just mentioned (which, unfortunately, I cannot now lay my hands on) Coleridge illustrated this view by the example of Columbus, fortified against all difficulties, and undaunted by every kind of physical and moral obstacle, to carry out and bring into reality the hypothesis of a western route to the Indies. Great discoverers, he observes, seem to possess an intuition almost amounting to second-sight; a power of perceiving meanings in small indications, which ordinary minds regard as chimerical.² So keen is their vision, so strong their hope, that they will stake lives and all, confident of the result. "Robur et aes triplex" surround their heart, because the light of prophecy is in their mind.

Such hypotheses are regarded by the general as maggots in the brain; and maggots they remain, till the result converts hypothesis into fact. Then, the discoverer is hailed as a genius; till then, as eccentric or mad. Dryden's epigram on the kinship of great wit to madness is true, not only in the sense in which he originally intended it,³ but in this secondary sense, that success or failure in results determines which, in the opinion of the world, it shall be.

In order to succeed, it is not enough to build up a complete logical structure. Out of logical structures we build libraries, not worlds. Truth is secondary where amusement, not instruction, is the aim. Given that it is novel men will buy and read; but it remains "so-and-so's system," and never becomes the system of the human race. It is all very well, says humanity; but where are the facts?

It is another tale when hypothesis, wedded to enthusiasm, gives birth to great realities. James Watt wrote no books, published no theories, blasted no trumpets, tickled no prurient ears; but he boxed in an almighty power, tamed it, let it out to drive the world. Emerson tells us how he did it better than I can. He says:

"Steam was till the other day the devil which we dreaded. Every pot made by any human potter or brazier had a hole in its cover to let off the enemy, lest he should lift pot and roof, and carry the house away. But the Marquis of Worcester, Watt and

¹ Note to the same place, by H. N. Coleridge.

² "Knowing much of the past, alike from the teaching of others and from their own experience, they are apt to perceive the future as with the true eye of the seer, and surprise the thoughtless with seemingly prophetic decisions." So George Moore (*The Power of the Soul Over the Body*, chap. v., p. 215.)

³ "Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiæ."—*Seneca*.

Fulton bethought themselves that where was power was not devil, but was God; that it must be availed of, and not by any means let off and wasted. Could he lift pots and roofs and houses so handily, he was the workman they were in search of. He could be used to lift away, chain and compel other devils far more reluctant and dangerous, namely, cubic miles of earth, mountains, weight or resistance of water, machinery, and the labors of all men in the world; and in time he shall lengthen and shorten space."¹

So do great men engrave their own effigies in the hearts of the race, not by their speculative endeavors, but by their practical productions; and only by their hypotheses so far as they issue in solid facts. Again, who does not feel himself a better man, and the human race a better race, after reading about Schliemann's discoveries at Troy? Yet a mere boy of seven was Schliemann when his mind conceived and anticipated the fruits of that mighty life-work. From those tender years he talked and thought of this, and of all other things only for this. "Thanks to God," he writes in his old age, "my firm belief in the existence of that Troy has never forsaken me amid all the vicissitudes of my eventful career."² "And who," asks Professor Virchow:

"Who would have undertaken such great works, continued through so many years—have spent such large means out of his own fortune—have dug through layers of *débris* heaped one on the other in a series that seemed almost endless, down to the deep-lying virgin soil—except a man who was penetrated with an assured, nay an enthusiastic, conviction? The Burnt City would still have lain to this day hidden in the earth, had not imagination guided the spade."³

Imagination, not as a source of delusion making fancies mimic facts, but as a creator of possibilities, director and incentive of energy—the initiative of severe inquiry, ending in facts year by year more duly appreciated at their proper worth—the death-blow of historic scepticism.

It is not always so; other and equal efforts, with less light in the eye and less balance in the mind, bring forth untimely fruits that struggle through a spasmodic existence and die. Not long ago, Professor Piazzi Smyth thought that he recognized in the Great Pyramid an epitome of human science, history and religion.⁴ How it all got there he showed by an obscure passage from Josephus. That it really was there he proved by a careful description of the monument. It exhibited the progressions of the solar system. It squared the circle. It established the true dimensions of Noah's ark and the Tabernacle in the wilderness. It gave divine sanction to the English system of weights and meas-

¹ *Conduct of Life*, No. 1. p. 24.

² *Ilios, City and Country of the Trojans*, p. 5.

³ Preface to *Ilios*, etc., p. 9.

⁴ *Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid*. By Prof. C. Piazzi Smyth, F.R.S.S.; L. and E. Astronomer Royal for Scotland. London, 4th ed. 1880.

ures. It contained *in nucleo* the whole of divine revelation; of whose creed the main article was "I believe in the sacred cubit of 25.025 inches," and whose baptismal vow was expressed in the formula: "I renounce the metric system, with all its works and pomps." It exhibited the chronology of ancient times, epitomized in stone the world's past and future history, and indicated unmistakably the end of the Christian dispensation.

The world smiled, amused with so novel a curiosity. The Royal Society accepted the indignant resignation of so ingenious a member with complacency.¹ The world of science *can* be very severe, the world of sense very much amused, until hypothesis is reduced to fact.

Yet the world in great masses can be very lax, if you can only touch on or flatter its feelings and its prejudices. About the time this theory was promulgated, there existed a multitude of men and women ready to receive it. "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid" was condensed into popular form, and appeared amongst a flood of six-penny 8vo. pamphlets under such titles as these: "The British Lion and the Tribe of Judah," "The Lineal Descent of Queen Victoria from King David," "Cui bono?" "Forty-seven Identifications of the British Nation with the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel," and the like. From what we can recall of our early devouring both of these pamphlets and of the proceedings of "the Anglo-Israel Association," the history of the British people was given only as far back as their Assyrian captivity, the period before this being already recorded in the Old Testament. Queen Victoria was the lineal successor of David. The three lions on the royal standard were the lions of the tribe of Judah. The Coronation Stone at Westminster, once the crowning stone of the Scottish kings at Scone, was identified as the ancient Stone of Destiny from Tara. This Stone of Destiny now turned out to be the identical Stone of Bethel, which served as a pillow for Jacob's weary head.² It was brought to Ireland by the royal daughter of Zedekiah, under the guardianship of Jeremiah the prophet, who anointed her queen of Ireland. She ruled over the Tuatha de Dananns—that race which, with the Milesians, was then in joint possession of the land. These people, as their name implies, were the remnant of the tribe of Dan. In their wanderings they had not only preserved their name, but had impressed it on the geography of Europe in the rivers Dniester, Dnieper, Danube and Don.

The theory was in full blossom just when agrarian disturbances

¹ *Ib.*, p. 657.

² For the documentary basis of this part of the story, see Stanley's *Westminster Abbey*, Appendix, p. 492.

were rife, But the ancient Isaac had foreseen that long ago. Did he not say that "Dan shall be like a snake in the way, a serpent in the grass, that biteth the horse's heels?"¹ and did he not instantly add, with intense anxiety, "I will look for Thy salvation, O Lord"? The dream of Nebuchadnezzar was not omitted. England was the stone cut out of the mountain without hands, that smote the feet of iron and clay in a tabulated series of victories over France and Spain from remote times down to Waterloo. No one could move without a verse to back it up. The prince of Wales went to India, but one of the prophets told us that long before. When Beaconsfield came back triumphant from Berlin we remembered the prophecy that in those days ten men should take hold of the skirts of a Jew. As a religious sanction for the rampant jingoism of the time the theory gained wide popularity, and amongst a considerable section of "Bible Christians" the identity and glorious future of the British nation became a creed, against which it was blasphemy to utter a doubt.

But it is not only among the unlearned majority that such credulities are rife. In the higher walks of advancement we have heard many an enthusiastic cry of triumph subside in shame. Twenty years ago (to revert to a theme already touched upon) rationalistic criticism was trampling down the remains of antiquity, ignorant that under those ruins lay a power ripening for its destruction. With the siege of Troy and the Julian origin of Rome, the sacred history of the law and prophets fell into discredit. Homer, Virgil and the Jewish Canon were alike the exponents of exploded myth. It was taken for granted that before the early Greek historians there existed neither education, literature nor culture. Writing was an unknown art at the very time when the Pentateuch and the Books of Kings claim to have been written. In those days the geographical knowledge of each tribe was confined to its own narrow territory, and travel and foreign empire were alike unknown. Whatever had come down to us in writing was to be judged not according to any ancient eastern standard, but by the stringent code of accuracy which we of the present century have just begun to desire, and have as yet failed wholly to secure. As a canon of veracity, our own ignorance of secular corroborative testimony for the statements of Scripture was sufficient to rob those statements of all credibility. All this, added to a world of German textual and psychological speculation, was an exercise in hypothetics—an æronautic effort in the region of intellect—an endeavor to fly unsupported alike by earth and air. The Bible, while regarded as sacred, presented many difficulties.

¹ Gen. xlix., 17, 18.

Let us regard it as a secular document, and see whether those difficulties disappear. The policy was successful. The difficulties disappeared with the Bible which presented them.

But there was faith and reason still left on earth—faith natural and divine. Schliemann, Petrie, Layard and Botta, Schrader and Bliss took to their spades instead of their pens—looked out for something to write about before beginning to write—preferred grubbing and digging for facts under ground, to creating fancies in the clouds above. They melted the wings of Dædalus, they strangled the rampant scepticism, they re-established the belief of Europe. Out of the dirt-heaps of Mysia rose the Troy that was. Men walked again in the footprints of Priam. The everlasting monuments of Egypt became volumes of history. The Amorite, the Hevite, the Moabite again dwelt in the land. Scholars revisited the free libraries of Nineveh, and learning a new alphabet in their old age, began to share in the literature of four thousand years ago. Everything which the relentless force of modern criticism had proved false, the still more irresistible force of ancient documents proved true. It was what Prof. Huxley has called “the great tragedy of science; the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.”

A greater and more sudden blow never fell on the pride and self-sufficiency of man. Never was there a sharper exposure of inflated ignorance. “We are just beginning,” says Prof. Sayce (himself, if we are to believe the press, something of a stumbler in the subject):

“We are just beginning to learn how ignorant we have been of the civilized past, and how false our ideas have been in regard to it. We are just beginning to realize that the fragments of Hebrew literature contained in the Old Testament are the wrecks of a vast literature which extended over the ancient oriental world from a remote epoch, and that we cannot understand them aright except in the light of the contemporaneous literature of which they formed a portion. . . . The period of scepticism is over, the period of reconstruction has begun. We shall find that the explorer and decipherer have given back to us the old documents—and the old history—in a new and changed form it may be, but nevertheless substantially the same.”¹

The rabid search for new hypotheses which distinguishes our age, may end in most cases by an advancement of the truth they are intended to destroy. In most cases however, the promulgation of new and distinctive theories are loud in their profession of a desire to ascertain the truth, and not to destroy it.

Thus the author of “Supernatural Religion,” brings himself before the English world as an exponent of the German destructive criticism on the plea of “contributing towards the establishment

¹ *The Higher Criticism and the Monuments.* Rev. A. H. Sayce, S.P.C.K. 1894. Pp. 24, 25.

of truth in the minds of others who are seeking for it."¹ And at the same time observes that :

"To no earnest mind can such an inquiry be otherwise than a serious and often a painful task ; but, dismissing preconceived ideas and prejudices derived from habit and education, and seeking only the truth, holding it, whatever it may be, to be the only object worthy of desire or capable of satisfying a rational mind, the quest cannot but end in peace and satisfaction."²

What the author of "Supernatural Religion" attempted against the New Testament, Colenso had already tried against the Old. Failing to recognize the three degrees of falsehood—the fib, the lie, and the statistic—the Bishop of Natal, armed with German ordnance and helped by his own arithmetical proficiency, deduced from the statistics of the Pentateuch the historic falsity of its narrative. The whole of his ponderous work reeks with professions of devotion to truth. "God's will must be done," he says, regretfully. "The laws of truth must be obeyed. . . ."³ Prefixed to each volume stands the motto :

"We can do nothing against the truth but for the truth." St. Paul, 2 Cor., xiii., 8.

He commits his first volume "to the hand of Almighty God, beseeching Him mercifully to accept and bless it, as a feeble effort to advance the knowledge of His truth in the world." He believes "that in endeavoring to do faithfully to the best of his power such a work as this, he is but discharging, however imperfectly, his duty as a minister of the National Church . . ." and, "feeling sure that whatever pain its publication may cause to many excellent persons, the truth will prevail at last, . . . he heartily thanks God that life and health have been spared to him to bring the work to a close."⁴

Now all this is very hard to believe. Not because sincerity and love of truth are *a priori* to be confined to one party or one set of writers ; nor yet because sincerity and love of truth are the natural accompaniment of loyalty to old beliefs as such. It is hard to believe because, when a man is really pained at the loss of his old belief, and is really "seeking only the truth" at all costs, he will at least rigidly forbid speculation to run ahead of discovery—refuse to draw categorical conclusions from hypothetical premises—and decline to assert as a matter of course what he knows is a matter of unestablished assumption. The bare fact that an au-

¹ *Supernatural Religion, an inquiry into the reality of Divine Revelation.* Longmans, 1874. Preface.

² *Ib.*, Introduction, p. 19.

³ *Ep. Colenso on the Pentateuch.* Part I. Preface, xxxvi.

⁴ *Ib.*, Part iv., Pref. xxxviii. ; Part ii., Pref. vii. ; Part ii., Pref. xxxlv.

thor is even *tempted* to these excesses indicates the very prepossessions he so eagerly disclaims. How far such writers actually yield to such a temptation is evident from the eagerness they show to make out the strongest possible case against their former belief—how of two suppositions they fix on the least favorable—how in course of their argument the “if” drops out, and the hypothesis assumes the disguise of a demonstrated fact.

How such ingenuous professions of loyalty to truth can coexist with so sophistical a use of hypothetics is to most minds an inexplicable mystery. The professions are so honest, the practice so dishonest. Yet we can hardly venture to charge such revolutionizers of belief with deliberate hypocrisy. There is in fact a deadly and widespread fallacy abroad nowadays regarding the human intellect. This fallacy I have nowhere seen so ably treated as by Dr. Mozley in his “*Essay on Blanco White*.” That fallacy, he declared, consists in the impression “that the intellectual part of human nature is no department of human probation.”

“Every one allows that man is tempted, and is capable of sinning through the flesh; but it seems there are some who deny that he is capable of sinning through the intellect. . . . The Gospel dispensation has mainly introduced this deeper, larger, and more searching morality. It conducts a man to a more ample development of his moral nature than he ever enjoyed before. The Church watches anxiously over the department of the human intellect, and cautions man against his dangers there. She tells him you may not see so clearly sin here as you do in the bodily instance; it is not so palpable as ocular, tangible sin is, but it is as real. Look into yourself; do you not feel an excitement, a stimulus, a pungency in pursuing an intellectual process? Does not a particular movement, accompanied with pleasure, carry you along? Examine this, and see if it has not the same substantial liability to sin that an operation of animal nature has. . . . As the undisciplined bodily appetite rushes into grossness, so the undisciplined intellect abandons itself to a lie—the former issues in carnal sin, the latter in the sin of heresy.”²

Again, explaining the pain alleged of these writers in attacking formerly accredited beliefs, he observes :

“A life of pain gone through in pursuit of truth, and the consequence in part of that pursuit, seems to give a man authority, creates interest, and attaches a character of heroism to him. An infidel tells us, in his justification, that his unbelief gives him much pain; that he has followed his doubts at every stage with reluctance and uneasiness; that he has got nothing by the course his mind has taken, and is a disinterested witness; he requires confidence and trust on that score. The fact of the pain he informs us of we do not doubt. Man is naturally a believing creature. Unbelief violates a real part of his nature, and unbelief is therefore pain. But this pain is neither a voluntary nor a self-mortifying one. He pains one part of his nature to gratify another. The intellectual element, imperious, proud, and aggressive, is mistress, and he humors her at the expense of better feelings. . . . If the intellect can sin, its successes must produce mental misery, as the natural consequence of a violated nature,

¹ *Essays Historical and Theological*, vol. ii., pp. 142, 149.

² *Ib.*, pp. 142-4.

and the use of a morbid internal stimulus. . . . This is a martyrdom in a sense, and who would pray for it?"¹

And finally:

"Amongst the ideas that have been abused and that have been distorted, this one of the search after truth stands foremost. A splendid and majestic phrase has covered a process that will not bear inspection."²

Hence it is fair to conclude that hypothesis professedly sought under cover of a desire of truth, in a generation where "truth" is "regarded as a kind of property; an article of mental success; not revered as an object, but appropriated as a thing,"³ are to be doubly suspected and doubly investigated. And that such hypotheses may rise not only from the desire of truth itself, or even of novelty and fame, but possibly also from a passion for the pursuit of an idea, and a morbid love of the search for solutions and for "situations" in the intellectual life, in preference to the stable possession of truth itself.

Another phenomenon of hypothetics presents itself in that nine-days' wonder, known as the "Clementine theory," which, on account of the recent controversy at Manchester, caused some stir in England during the past year. This theory, professing to trace the growth of the Roman claims to the credulous acceptance in the third century of the spurious "Clementine Recognitions," seems to have originated in a passing suggestion made by Dr. Salmon,⁴ and has been painfully elaborated by Mr. Puller. The motives which actuated this latter gentleman are thus expressed in his own words:

"It is the sense of the importance of helping my brethren to have clear and true views on the matter [of the controversy with Rome] which led me to . . . give this course of lectures. I confess that I enter on them with fear and trembling; not for any doubt as to the side on which the truth lies, but from my consciousness of the very imperfect way in which I shall be able to handle the subject, and for the dread that I may do more harm than good by my treatment of it. I will ask your prayers that I may be helped and guided to say what shall tend to promote God's glory and the church's well-being and the good of souls. I will do my utmost to be fair and accurate. . . . I do not want to gain a victory by any assertions or arguments which will not stand the test of investigation."⁵

This profession is satisfactory enough. But look at the practice. Mr. Puller boldly and confidently takes up an heretical and manifestly worthless document, obscure in origin, uncertain in date, on the face of it possessing neither authority, influence nor

¹ *Ib.*, pp. 140-145.

² *Ib.*, p. 145.

³ *Ib.*, p. 146.

⁴ *The Infallibility of the Church*, p. 361 *seq.*

⁵ *The Primitive Saints and the Church of Rome*, F. W. Puller. Longman's 2d ed, 1893, Lect. I., pp. 3, 4.

respectability, and openly rejected by the consentient voice of those very fathers who are supposed to have been duped by it,¹ and sets up a scarecrow like this, without pretence of proof or justification of his conduct, to frighten men away from facing the plain facts of the Roman supremacy.

What, we ask, can explain such a barefaced advance in hypothetics, and such an endeavor to clothe hypothesis in the garments of established fact? What, we ask, except the desperation of men who would fain hope, with a show of decency, to cling to the name, after rejecting the central principle of patristic Catholicism? Such a device, as patently fallacious as it is clumsy, reminds one of those second-rate artists, who, being obliged to represent angels with unmistakably fleshy limbs, are forced, *par consequence*, to mount them on equally solid looking clouds, to prevent the forces of gravitation from having their due effect.

But though every kind of absurdity may follow from accepting conclusions regardless of the hypothetical nature of their premises, the greatest advances in human knowledge have started from a hypothesis, converted by the process of investigation into a fact. The world, born and bred for thousands of years in the conceit that our globe was the centre of the universe, blundered on in its explanation of the heavenly phenomena. The poets invented the Chariot of Phœbus; Ptolemy reduced mythological astronomy to a science; the vulgar imagined that the sun stole back unobserved by night to the starting-point of its daily race. Individual theologians were imbued with the error, but Augustine and Aquinas had left on record the uncertainty of our understanding of Scripture, and the Church was divinely held aloof. Then came Copernicus to cut the traditional system out of the world's belief. It was only hypothesis against hypothesis, and had little chance. He was not much heard. Galileo, following him, was determined to be heard, and stepped out of his own department into the enclosed garden of Theology. He knew *that* would fetch the point, and it did. Censures fell upon him; punishments were inflicted; but he had been heard. As the time went on the astronomical question got disentangled of its theological weeds. The faults of the man were forgotten, the truth of the system survived. Under the incentives of a bold hypothesis men finished their searchings by finding that hypothesis a fact and its consequences a revolution in human belief.

The successful issue of this experiment, more than any other, tended to force on the human mind the value of hypothetics in the advancement of knowledge. It provided all materials for the for-

¹ *The Roman Claims*, Father Bernard Vaughan, S.J., pp. 67, 89.

mation of a canon and criterion of the use of assumptions. If, on the commonly received ground-work of principles, no solution of a seemingly not insoluble question can be found, let the contrary assumption be made the basis of a new investigation. This will put every old fact into a new relation, and is bound to lead to the discovery of new facts impossible before. The evidence of new facts added to old ones will soon tell either for or against the new hypothesis, which will end by being elevated into a fact or high probability, or else in being proved highly improbable or false. The new hypothesis will then be modified as far as necessary, or abandoned for a third, and so on, until, by a series of closer approximation, the solution is reached, whether in the confirmation of the old by the new, or in the establishment of the new by the joint evidence of both.

We need not, however, necessarily restrict the use of this canon to cases like that just described. Given any series of phenomena, the question to be solved is this: What is the nature of the force or cause producing these phenomena? A mind limited to facts of actual experience would be incapable of finding a solution. But a mind possessing initiative would give the imagination free play.¹ It would matter little how extravagant the imagination may be, so long as the curb of logic is ultimately applied, and no conclusion is credited with a higher value than its premises allow. Time may be wasted by too wild an hypothesis, but that is merely a question of personal convenience. However wild it be, take it, stick to it, be consistent with it, and see how the facts arrange themselves under it; if in perfect order, that is sufficient recommendation at present. Investigate further on the strength of it, frame experiments, anticipate results, try the experiments, and observe whether real results correspond to anticipation; something positive or negative is sure to come of it.

Nevertheless, imagination is at times an unruly colt, and there is such a thing as the unhinging of human minds through giving the fancy too free a play. Men get attached to "the imagination of their hearts," yield to the fascination of extravagance, begin to dream of fame and of revolution in the world of science. Their wild chimera grows into a monster, like the imprisoned genie dragged up by the Arabian fisherman, who could only be got back into his bottle by a stout denial that he ever came out of it.² Such abuses of hypothetics, however, are only *per accidens*, and can be avoided by a man of sober judgment who will carefully observe the following corollaries:

¹ The observations of Prof. Tyndall on this subject are too well known to need reproduction; as, for example, *Fragments of Science, On the Scientific Use of the Imagination*, etc.

² *Arabian Nights*, "Story of the fisherman and the Genie."

(a) Because a consistent system can be built up on a given hypothesis, this does not prove the truth of that system, so long as the hypothesis remains an hypothesis.

(b) If a system explains all these facts alleged or known, this *may* indirectly prove that system to be true. But it does not follow that its fundamental hypothesis is true, until it be shown that on no other hypothesis could the system be founded on the facts explained.

(c) When this has been done, the hypothesis becomes an ascertained fact—not by the consistency of its results (*vide a*), nor yet by the truth of its results (*vide b*); but by the exclusion of every other hypothesis, and the necessity of this one.

(d) Consequently, the initial hypothesis is proved true when it is transferred from the beginning to the end of the process; when the conclusion of the system is the hypothesis converted by legitimate logic into an ascertained fact.¹

(e) Nor is this a vicious circle. The work of an hypothesis is not to lay the first principles, the premises of a science, but to investigate and determine the direction of the search. It is by search, not by hypothesis, that the first principles must be discovered and their truth be made clear, and from these must follow logically the conclusion which at the beginning was presupposed *as a term, not as a basis*, of demonstration. "The final cause," as philosophers say, "is first in intention and last in execution." The hypothesis is the final cause of investigation, attracting and eliciting the activities of the agent; the same proposition, stripped of its hypothetical character, is the final effect of its activity.

This canon, or rather the instance which brought it into notoriety, gave occasion to one of the most far-reaching revolutions in philosophy the world has seen. In the eighteenth century (if we except the Catholic universities) scholastic philosophy had become well-nigh obsolete. In the previous century Descartes had invented that system which should take its place. The old scholastics always began with the principle, founded on universal experience, that in the human mind certainty was prior to doubt. Descartes reversed the order and assumed that doubt was prior to certainty. His hypothesis was never ascertained to be a fact; but even as a doctrine, methodic doubt was only a lame success,

¹ It is amusing how obvious a truth often appears, after it has once been discovered and made evident:

"Scientific anticipations," says Cardinal Newman, "are commonly either truisms or failures—failures if, as is usually the case, they are made on insufficient data—and truisms if they succeed; for conclusions, being always contained in their premises, never can be discovered" (Turks, Lect. IV.). Yes, but in such cases we are apt to forget that our knowledge of the conclusion is due entirely to the initiative of the mind which formulated the premises.

and attempts towards mending it were made by Leibnitz and Wolff. Locke rejected the new hypothesis without giving fresh force to the old; he unconsciously instigated scepticism, which was dragged out of his system and developed by Hume. The abandonment of the old first principles had not thrown much light on the subject. Metaphysics had become hopelessly bogged. Kant of Königsberg was watching the struggle. The state of things before him led to the question whether metaphysics were possible at all. He was too ignorant of scholastic philosophy to plant his finger on the point whence the confusion had arisen. He accepted blindly the hypothesis that doubt was prior to certainty. He must look round for some other fundamental principle from which to make a departure. He found it in contradicting the truth taken for granted alike by the old school and the new, viz., that the mind conforms itself to the object of its knowledge and not the object to the mind. A brilliant thought broke upon his mind—the unformulated “canon of the contrary-hypothesis,” which had produced such marvellous effects in astronomy. The account of the inspiration is given in his own words:

“It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the object, but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects *à priori* by means of conceptions, and thus extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition. . . . We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them *à priori*. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an *à priori* knowledge.”¹

On that hypothesis is built the “*Critik of Pure Reason*.” If that hypothesis be a fact, then things must be, on the whole, as Kant describes them. The “*Critik of Pure Reason*,” in so far as it keeps to its express subject (viz., the procedure of human knowledge), is consistent enough. But taken as a whole, Kant’s teaching will not hold good. To the student of Kant this is clear. From one point of view it issues in Pantheism; from another, in absolute scepticism; from a third, in a somewhat elevated, but heterodox theism. What Kant himself really meant to hold is worthy of all praise, but this in spite of his system. Ardent admirers say he is misunderstood, but *securus judicat orbis terrarum*; the world is still tearing Kant’s remains to pieces, and finds the task an easy

¹ *Critik of Pure Reason*. Pref. to 2d ed., p. xxviii. Meiklejohn’s translation.

one on account of the looseness of connection between part and part. To maintain such a system as a whole and all its parts requires a mind wide enough to embrace contradictories at once.

We have the greatest admiration alike of his genius and of his personal character and the keenest enjoyment in studying his works. We speak purely of the hypothesis which instigated him and the results he has attained. These results may be briefly stated as follows :

1. If the mind is *not* conformed to the object, but conforms the object to itself, then our intellectual processes must be such as the bulk of the " Critik " describes.

2. If so, it follows that knowledge is confined to phenomena, that supersensible knowledge is impossible and metaphysics a fraud.

3. If all this be true, it follows that man is subject to a " natural and unavoidable delusion," since we cannot attain that which we are naturally impelled to believe we do attain. And this delusion reaches its highest point just when man reaches his highest dignity—in his intellectual relations with God, his exercise of freedom, his immortal destiny.

Supposing then, that in spite of these appalling results, Kant's system were in itself a logical whole, what has it done towards establishing the truth of the hypothesis on which it is built? Absolutely nothing. The supposition retains its hypothetical nature from first to last—a monstrous "if" exulting as a giant to run its race, and only clad now and then in categorical garments just to hide its nakedness. Moreover, it is evident from the outset that Kant has no intention of proving the hypothesis at all. He takes it as a foregone conclusion, and the reader is likely to do the same, unless he keeps a sharp lookout on the procedure. But the world, stupid and gullible as it is in some respects, and in matters which appeal to the passions or touch the experiences of life, is in the long run a shrewd distinguisher, and refuses to be quickly and permanently moved till it knows the reason why. It rebelled against Copernicus and his hare-brained hypothesis. But Copernicus changed his notes for gold, converted his hypothesis into a fact, advertized it through his posterity and won his way to victory. He used the canon, and fulfilled the corollaries too. Kant used the canon, but neglected the corollaries, and the world, refusing to catch the forced enthusiasm of the few, declines to be moved, leaves transcendentalism standing in the cold, because the world waits in vain to see the Kantian hypothesis turned into a fact.

¹ *Id.*, Meiklejohn, p. 264.

Yet the world ought to feel grateful to Kant, for the gems of thought which lie buried in his bulky writings. One of these, admirable alike for its acuteness and its humor, will form an apt conclusion to this sketch :

"The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, *i. e.*, his firm belief, is a *bet*. It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance that he appears to be under no apprehension of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken—a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition our judgment drops its air of triumph; we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief."¹

We wonder whether the Sage of Königsberg smiled or was grave as he wrote these lines.

ERNEST REGINALD HULL, S.J.

ST. BEUNOS' COLLEGE.

¹ *Id.*, Meiklejohn, p. 449.

PROTESTANTS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

THE statement that the religion of most of us, of those especially whose faith has remained unchanged, is, to a great extent, hereditary, is, we suppose, somewhat of a truism. If so, it is, like most truisms, apt to be overlooked, and will most certainly bear repetition. In the case of Catholics the child passes, almost imperceptibly, from the authority of the parent—generally of the mother—to that of the priest, and finds the teachings learned in his earliest infancy confirmed by him whom he has been taught to recognize as entrusted with Divine authority. The bias of hereditary training being, moreover, far stronger than most of us imagine, this unbroken succession of authority tends, in the majority of persons, to a firm, if somewhat unreasoning, faith. That it is as well that it should be so, who can doubt? That such a faith approximates, very nearly, to that of the “little children” of whom our Lord bade us take example, is surely self-evident. A faith like this, even if assailed—as assailed it is almost sure to be—will be strong in the fact that there has never been any conflict of authority, never any contradiction between the lessons learned in infancy and those learned in later years.

That such a faith is, however, not altogether complete is also undeniable. We need, in order to be able to “give a reason for the hope that is in us,” to fulfil that other apostolic injunction, “Examine yourselves whether ye be in the Faith.” That is to say, that the mere fact that priest and parent have taught us exactly what our parents and theirs in turn and ever backwards have believed, does not, of itself, prove that teaching true. The “tradition” thus inherited may be, and doubtless is, a valuable witness to the sincerity of our belief, but is not necessarily an evidence of its truth.

All this, however, may be regarded as beyond the province of a layman, who can lay no claim whatever to any knowledge of theology. The point of principal importance in the present instance is the fact that the faith of Catholics being, as it must be, to a great extent hereditary, and deriving from that very circumstance a large measure of its hold upon the great mass of men and women, also gains a very material assistance from the absence of any conflict of authority, of any contradiction in its teachings. That which we learned at our mother's knee, which we learned more

fully at our first communion, again, and yet again, as life drew on, must, and does, influence us by the mere fact that it is utterly and entirely consistent with itself. It is for this very reason that we know it to be true. Not for this reason only, but certainly for this among many others. This self-consistency, so manifest, so unquestionable, entirely satisfies that ultimate court of appeal—humanly speaking—the inward conviction of the individual. Beyond that, how is it possible for us to go? “If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God.”

But it is this principle of authority in matters of religion as it concerns Protestants—that is, devout Protestants in good faith—that we have at present to deal with. Missions to non-Catholics, to those particularly known as “evangelicals,” have been prosecuted of late years with much zeal and fervor, and, doubtless, with a large measure of success. The Bull of our Holy Father Leo XIII., pronouncing Anglican orders null and void has for the present, at least, made the Anglican question of less immediate moment. Our would-be “Catholic” friends in that communion must be allowed a reasonable space of time in which to recover from their very natural soreness of disappointment. They expected the impossible, and have got nothing. It was, therefore, only fitting that at the last Catholic Truth Society’s conference in England, the question, “How to reach the Nonconformists,” should have received practically more attention than any other.

If among Nonconformists—our Anglican brethren style them “dissenters”—you include the small remnant of the once-powerful “evangelical” party in the Church of England—their sympathies being much more with the former than with those of their own communion who incline to “sacerdotalism”—we may, possibly, as being ourselves an ex-“evangelical,” be allowed to discuss, as briefly as may be, some aspects of this question with which we are familiar. It is, of course, perfectly true that the main facts of the relations between Catholics and Nonconformists have become generally known to those who have studied them, but it is also none the less true that, inasmuch as the experience of each individual convert must, of necessity, differ from that of every other, so that experience, though chiefly of interest to the person most concerned, may serve to throw some fresh ray of light on what still remains, and must continue a difficult problem. In other words, every one who has been either an “Evangelical” or a Nonconformist, before the grace of God led him or her into the true Church, may help to make the inner workings of the Protestant mind more clear to Catholics, who must needs know them in order to win them to the Faith.

Having simply stated the fact that, though now a Catholic, by

the grace of God, we were for many years a strict "Evangelical," and the further fact that of all our immediate relations, we are, so far, the only Catholic, let us deal, to the best of our poor ability, with the principle of authority in religion as it concerns devout Protestants.

Their religion—it has many by-names, but it is, to all intents and purposes, one and the same in what they love to call "fundamentals"—is, to a greater extent, if possible, than that of Catholics, a matter of inheritance. How else account for their true devoutness combined with an intense hatred of all that savors of "Popery," to take no other instance? Were it not for the strength of hereditary bias how many would remain Protestants in an age of disintegration such as this is? It is, as a simple matter of fact, the force of habit, of training, which enables men and women who must otherwise, one would think, yield of very necessity to the assaults made upon their faith from all sides, to remain true to the lessons learned in their early years. That is to say, that the principle of authority in religion, so far as it influences Protestants, is dependent for its very existence upon the force of hereditary training. In other words, the religious authority of Protestants is, as to its origin, parental authority.

Herein consist both its strength and its weakness. Its strength, inasmuch as the force of habit is immeasurably greater than we are inclined to concede; also, for the reason that parental training, aided by parental example, and acting on the mutual affection of parents and children, tends, as it must naturally tend, to strengthen the force of habit. With many persons, in the case of women especially, the fact of living in constant association with a pious mother, or, after her death, in constant, loving memory of her, of itself makes that mother's creed something sacred, something which it would be an insult to her, an insult to God Himself, to question or to doubt. How can that be erroneous which she believes and practices, the faith in which she lived and died? Would it not pain her, even in Paradise—the thought is illogical, unreasoning, if you will, but very natural, even if half-unconscious—were we to forsake the faith that to her was all in all? This is, I admit, but a faint shadowing of the reality; but it is, I maintain, a true description, so far as it goes, of a fact of daily experience; of a fact, moreover, which constitutes not, by any means, the least bitter part of that sacrifice which every convert makes.

But, herein, also, consists its weakness. Setting aside the responsibility which it lays upon the parent—in which Catholics, of course, have a very full share; setting aside, also, the dangers arising from any personal inconsistencies, which, of itself, constitutes the gravest part of parental responsibility, for Catholic as

well as for Protestant—there arises, in the case of the latter, a menace to this authority from which that of the former is happily free, the danger, I mean, of contradiction between what is taught by the parent—both by word and example—and what is learned in later life. The child, in each case, is told, “This *is* the truth of God;” but, as an ultimate issue, the Protestant parent—were the question asked in words, as it must be, at times, in thought—“How do you *know* that is truth?” must, necessarily, answer in some such phrase as this, “Because I am convinced that it is so.” Beyond that appeal to personal conviction, to personal spiritual experience, what other answer can there be? The weakness, therefore, lies in this, first, that should either the experience of the child, which invariably precedes conviction, or the conviction itself, which is the outcome of a long series of uniform experiences, fail for any reason (of which there may be many) to correspond to that of the parent, there ensues, as an inevitable consequence, a weakening of the authority of religion itself (as taught), that authority having been hitherto identified with that of the parent.

This does not, however, by any means constitute the sole weakness of the Protestant principle of authority, dependent, as it must be, on the authority of the original individual teacher. Difference of temperament alone may cause that want of correspondence between the spiritual experiences (and consequent conviction) of the child and those of the parent, but such a divergence may be, and has been, overcome by the working of a stronger, or purer, or more concentrated will on one less trained, less certain of itself. The failure to see things spiritual in the same light as the parent, may be, will doubtless be, regarded as an evidence of an “unconverted” state; the emotions aroused by affectionate entreaties, by the prayers and tears of a fond mother, will be mistaken for the wished-for convictions, and all will be peace again for a while.

The weakness, therefore, chiefly consists in the *possibility* of a conflict of authority. That of the first teacher—the parent—is accepted during childhood, not only as a necessity, but as a matter of course, with simple, unquestioning faith. That of the next teacher, schoolmaster, minister, as the case may be, will be accepted at the outset very much in the same way; coinciding, as it most probably will, with that of the parent, the teacher being of the parent’s choosing. But as the years go on there must, sooner or later, come a time when the boy—the girl is less exposed to the danger, but it exists even for her—must choose his own teacher in things spiritual. Should his temperament closely resemble that of the parent who trained him, that is, should a special maternal or paternal phase of hereditary bias be unusually strong in him, he will in all probability choose one whose teachings conform, in

"fundamentals" at least, with those with which he has always been familiar. This familiarity in such a case would naturally have made those teachings dear to him for their own sake, as well as for the sake of her from whom he first learned them. If not, if there has been that want of correspondence of which I have spoken, a gulf bridged over by illusory feelings and emotions, then no familiarity can make such teachings more than simply tolerable, at best, for fear of paining the parent whom he loves.

But the choice, be it for good or for ill, must be made, and he who can honestly choose the path wherein his parents walked with God is surely to be accounted happy. But there is no strong probability, amounting almost, if not altogether, to a moral certainty, that he will do so. He does not pass, like the Catholic child, from the teachings of his mother to those of the priest, to find that both speak the same language, that the living, visible authority of the Church to which both mother and priest appeal is ever one, invariable and divine. The teacher whom he may choose, or whom circumstances stronger than ourselves, that mock our wisest plans, may choose for him will either teach him the same lessons that his mother taught him or cause him to unlearn them slowly but surely. It depends on so many things, trifles we are apt to call them, accident, temperament, want of filial affection; Protestants give the causes many different names, and judge those harshly by whom they are influenced, but there is, after all, only one cause, the inherent weakness of the Protestant principle of authority.

Thereafter, the choice once made, who may foretell the issue? In this, at last, we reach the chief danger that menaces this principle of authority, namely, that such a conflict must, of its very nature, and does, as a matter of fact, lead to a denial of all authority in religion. If the first teacher chosen contradicts, in certain well-defined points, the lessons inculcated by the parent, it follows by an unavoidable sequence that, should these new teachings fail to correspond to the boy's experiences and to the conviction which springs from them—his only tribunal of ultimate appeal—for any of the various reasons that led to the same results in earlier life, there must ensue a refusal, more pronounced this time, since there is little or no affection involved, and the influence of inherited tendencies (which always retain *some* influence as regards his relations to his parents) is wanting, to accept the teachings themselves. That is to say, that if he follows out his course to a logical conclusion, which but few of us do, he will pass from teacher to teacher until he ends either in utter unbelief or in the fold of the Catholic Church.

In this very weakness, then, of the Protestant principle of

authority, and in the consequences which that weakness involves, consists—could we but persuade them to see it—the clearest possible intimation of the duty of Protestants in respect of the Catholic Church. Authority there must surely be, inasmuch as they cannot deny that every parent has authority to teach his child what he himself believes, at least until the child (boy or girl) reaches an age at which he or she is supposed to be capable of choice. If there is none after that, what is he to choose? Why, indeed, should he choose at all? Moreover, if there is no authority except that of the parent—limited to a certain definite period of the child's life—what proof is there even of this authority? But, if parental authority does not actually exist, and is, in a certain very definite sense, divine, there must surely be *some* authority to correspond to it, to which we are equally bound to submit. If so, where is it to be sought for, and how is it to be known?

Parental authority, however, being, as stated, divine in a very real though limited sense, must also, on that very account, be—in so far as it is divine—infallible as well. And this for the very obvious reason that any authority that claims our allegiance must at least believe in itself. A doubtful authority is a self-contradiction. The parent who instructs a child in the principles of a faith about which he or she is uncertain, is surely guilty of a heinous moral fraud. There may be, and need be, no actual claim, no definite consciousness of personal infallibility; there must be a consciousness of moral certainty—"Ye shall *know* the truth"—otherwise the disciple will be quick to detect—for children's minds are keener than we realize—the half-expressed note of *uncertainty*, an uncertainty of which we ourselves may be scarcely conscious, which we should, probably, deny strenuously were we brought face to face with it.

It amounts in fact to this, that the conviction which is the fruit of a long series of consistent experiences is, of its very nature, equivalent to that implicit confidence with which a true Catholic accepts an infallible decision of the Pope. Moreover, the unquestioning faith with which a child believes the teachings of a parent is surely a proof not only that the authority on which those teachings rest is divine—of which there is no doubt—but is, as we said just now, in a very real sense infallible. Not only so, but if the child is to submit to that authority not merely of constraint, but by conviction; is to accept its teachings not simply because he must, but because he really believes them, he must accept them on this ground alone, "This must be true, because my mother says so."

An unsatisfactory position, if you will, yet it is, after all, practically that of every very young Catholic child as well. The parent

is infallible first, and then the Church; for the Protestants, the parent is infallible—to all intents and purposes—after that . . . ? There is the weakness of their case, could they only see it. But it remains true, nevertheless, that the child believes *solely* on the authority of the parent. If he or she can continue so to believe until experience has developed into conviction, that conviction constitutes “good faith,” and the moral certainty of it is equivalent, *while it endures*, to that of the Catholics. If, however, from any of the causes specified there results that absence of conviction, of which so much has been said, there is no longer “good faith” on the part of those who, from *whatever* motive, remain content with a mere formal or habitual allegiance to their original creed. “He that loveth father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me.”

Since, therefore, in order to gain the attention of “Evangelicals” and Nonconformists, that we may win them, if possible, to “the truth as it is in Jesus,” we must endeavor, as far as we can, to enter into their feelings, we have ventured to insist, even at the risk of repetition, on this point of authority as not only divine—if it has any claim on our allegiance—but also, in effect, infallible, in the sense of being founded on a moral certainty. Further, that since every devout Protestant has, at one time or other, accepted this parental authority as divine and infallible—though not, so to say, “in set terms”—we may surely ask them what other authority is to replace it, supposing that it should fail for any cause? Nay, even supposing it to continue all through their later life (in memory or in fact), that from conviction, from deliberate choice, they have accepted the parent’s creed, may we not fairly ask them, “On whose authority?” If the answer be, “On that of my father’s or my mother’s life,” the next query is, obviously, “On whose authority did they accept it?” which reduces the whole series of beliefs to a matter of tradition, confirmed by individual conviction. But of the two the tradition comes first and is, in fact, the starting point, if not the cause, of that succession of consistent, and, probably, general, experiences which result in individual conviction. If so, if the foundations of the Protestant principle of authority be actually tradition and conviction, wherein does it differ from that of Catholics?

As to its essence, wherein but in this that the authority to which Catholics submit is not only divine and infallible, but one, immutable and eternal, “the same yesterday and to-day,” of which even its bitterest enemies admit that “Rome never changes;” that its claims to our allegiance are confirmed by the invariable experiences and the unalterable convictions of countless millions during nineteen centuries, by an unbroken chain of tradition; finally, by the fact, so often insisted on, that for a Catholic there is no fear of

any possible contradiction between the teachings of our parents and those of the Church. Whereas, for the Protestant, although the original authority in religious matters is accepted with an unquestioning faith, that authority must either be replaced by another—accepted, if at all in any *real* sense—in the same way, or must remain the sole foundation of the faith of the individual. In this latter case the acceptance depends either on the personal conviction of the disciple or on that of the teacher, practically on the concordance between the two; a concordance which, from its very “accidental” nature, offers no security of permanence. There remains, however, this fact, namely, that any *real* authority must be, to all intents and purposes, Divine and infallible. In other words, the genuine acceptance of any authority to which our convictions lead us to submit must involve a moral certainty that its teachings are “the truth.”

The objection may here be made that no Protestant has ever claimed individual or corporate infallibility; that, on the contrary, the assertion (the *fact*) that the Church is infallible is one of the chief difficulties that Protestants have to overcome. To which we answer, that if the preceding argument has any force, the Protestant principle of authority in matters of faith involves of its very essence—if it be not a myth, or an arrant hypocrisy, which God forbid—a moral certainty founded on conviction, which conviction (let me repeat it) is the growth of a long series of consistent experiences. Further, that such authority, accepted with the unquestioning faith (is not *all* true faith of this nature?) which a moral certainty inspires, is to all intents and purposes infallible, otherwise there is either no genuine submission to it or an utter want of logical consistency, either self-deception or hypocrisy.

Is the objection disposed of? We may be told that but few of us pursue the moral certainty upon which our faith must rest, otherwise it is delusion, superstition and not faith at all, to its ultimate source. That if this be true in the case of Catholics, which proves what we have said about the “hereditary” nature of the faith of most of us, still more is it true in the case of Protestants, who, if consistent, should be either Catholics or agnostics. Admitted; nevertheless, we maintain that the moral certainty which, is the outcome of the conviction of a Protestant *in good faith*, is for him as real (*while it endures*) as that with which a Catholic, *also in good faith*, accepts the teachings of the infallible Church of God.

Let us give an instance of what we mean by moral certainty, an instance, by the way, drawn from our own experience. We know a man, now growing old, who has been a devout and consistent “Evangelical” all his life. To him “Popery,” with all that savors of it, is as false as “Protestantism” is to us. Of his own faith he

has absolutely no doubt, probably he never has had. The experiences of a lifetime have confirmed that conviction with which, when he came to the age of choosing, he accepted as "*the truth of God*" the faith that his mother taught him, and which, till then, he had accepted, on her authority, as implicitly as a devout Catholic accepts the teachings of the Church. By inheritance, by temperament, by training, by a life-long series of consistent experiences, his conviction has grown fixed and unalterable, unless by a miracle, that what he believes he has been taught by the Holy Spirit of God Himself. Were he in very deed conscious of personal infallibility, he could not be more morally certain that he is "right" than he is now.

The position of such a man is surely as easily to be understood as it is, apparently, unassailable. Asked such a question as this: "Suppose that you and I were to choose some verse of Scripture whereon we differ, and that if each of us were to kneel down and ask the guidance of the Holy Spirit, with equal sincerity, should we then necessarily agree?" he would answer, "Any man who *really* asks such guidance *must* be taught the truth." To the further question, "Suppose we still differed, what then?" We know not how he would reply, unless it were to say more emphatically, "He *must* be taught the truth." Which is equivalent to "He *must* agree with me, because I *know* that I am right." Humbly, be it noted, and without a suspicion of spiritual pride, without saying, in so many words, "*You* are wrong, because *I* am right," but it amounts to that. He would be the last to claim infallibility, the first to condemn the claim of the Catholic Church, but *he is morally certain of the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit.*

That is practically the Protestant principle of authority in matters of faith. It is not *called* authority except in the case of parents, nor recognized as infallible in the sense which we attach to the word. But the parent's authority over the child is an authority God-given, the parent's teaching must be accepted without question, therefore it is, to all intents and purposes, divine and infallible. When the child comes to choose he or she must choose to believe as the parent believes, *or* some other faith. In the first case, the choice will be decided by conviction, plus temperament, plus filial affection, plus tradition. In the second case temperament will undoubtedly be the dominant factor—certain forms of faith, such as Methodism, Broad Churchism, Ritualism, having their peculiar attractions for certain classes of minds—aided by what we call "accidental circumstances." But in either case the faith chosen must rest upon a moral certainty, otherwise it is not faith in any true sense.

When, therefore, we seek to understand our Protestant breth-

ren, as we must do if we are ever to win them to the truth as we *know* it, we find that they are men and women "of like passions with ourselves;" that their faith, in all its varieties, rests for each individual upon conviction and tradition, is, for each individual, a moral certainty. As the only Catholic member of a devout, consistent Protestant family, we venture to assert, subject, of course, to correction by those who have a wider experience, that a possible point of agreement is to be found in this fact, namely, that there *is* a principle of authority in religious matters common, in a limited but very real sense, to Catholics and to Protestants, an authority which rests upon tradition and conviction, and which results in a moral certainty, which Catholics and Protestants, inasmuch as they submit to it in those things which concern our eternal welfare, evidently recognize as divine. If divine it must be true, if divine and true it cannot deceive us; therefore it is infallible. But if morally certain, divine, true and infallible, must it not also be one and the same for all men? How comes it, then, that although apparently the *same* authority is binding on Catholics and Protestants alike, the result is an evident and fundamental difference? Where does the flaw lie?

Is not the answer sufficiently plain? On the one hand, a uniform, unbroken tradition of nineteen centuries confirmed to the point of moral certainty (the proof, in one sense, of infallibility) of countless millions who have proved the sincerity of their convictions by their lives and by their deaths. On the other, a multiplicity of mutually-contradictory traditions, dating back three centuries at most, confirmed by the convictions of those who adhere to them by personal choice or from force of habit. On the one hand, an authority not only recognized as *one*, divine, true and infallible, but proved to be so by the consistent experiences of unnumbered generations. On the other, an authority tacitly acknowledged as divine, a moral certainty of (individual) infallible guidance. The one authority admits of no doubt, fears no possibility of self-contradiction, *knows* itself to be divine, and therefore claims to teach men infallibly. The other, obeyed only because chosen, only so long as it suits us; which does, in fact, speak with different voice to different men. Could we but persuade our brethren that there is indeed but *one* authority, that of the *one* "Church of God," that as there is one Lord, so there is only *one* faith, divine, true, infallible, would they not hasten to join with us so that there might at last be "one Fold" under the "One Shepherd."

F. W. GREY.

THE CLERGY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.

IT is a common thing in these days, to regard "the priest in politics" as a patent anomaly. Protestantism has established a complete divorce between things secular and spiritual, temporal and eternal. The intense contrast between the puritanical Sabbath with its almost ghostly solemnity and the thrifty workdays of the week, exemplifies the principle in point. Owing to the further logical development of "individualism" in faith, we find public religion rendered impracticable to a large extent through multiplied subdivisions of belief and authors, and gradually committed to private enterprise, until it comes to be a matter which the State abstracts from and ignores. As far as the people or rulers retain Christian principles, religion will indirectly and informally affect politics to a certain extent. A man who, in his heart, believes in the sanctity of marriage will not vote for measures which weaken the marriage bond. His religion influences his politics because he has got a conscience. If the majority are of his mind, it is as clear a case of religion entering into politics as when a mediæval Pope put down his foot and forbade a measure hostile to Catholic morality. The difference is that in the latter case the authority of religion was publicly recognized. It is perfectly evident to those who believe in liberty of conscience that the clergy of all denominations are bound in conscience, as professing to be God's ambassadors, to use their whole influence in the interest of what they hold to be right. Indeed, this is the duty of every man, and of the clergy only in a greater degree. Furthermore, if they use their influence to the advantage of their own sect, provided it be without injury to others, they are no more to be censured than the representatives of any other interest in the country. The limits of this due interference in political matters is reached only when the matter is one which in no way bears on morals or religion. But those who think at all deeply, will recognize how easily questions which at the first proposing seem purely secular and indifferent, ramify in their consequences, and entangle themselves with supernatural interests. Hence he must needs be a man of very bounded horizon who would content himself with pulpit platitudinizing and prefers a calm indifference to questions which affect the morality of millions. No doubt many such are to be found in every denomination, but one can hardly view them as ideals of the Christian priest, who by profes-

sion should be a man, not merely of public but of catholic and cosmopolitan spirit.

Least of all to the Catholic priest is such an attitude of supine apathy becoming—to him who is the inheritor of that grand conception which reached its fuller development in the middle ages, of a marriage between an universal church and an universal empire; a conception which, perhaps, has yet to come to a fuller maturity as the social and political problems which are now crushing us to earth find their solution in a truer and nobler brotherhood of nations than Charlemagne ever dreamt of. Body and soul, members and head, wife and husband, these and similar are the analogues of secular and spiritual, State and Church—"a free Church in a free State" understanding by freedom, not mutual indifference but the greatest possible facility for healthy development which is secured by mutual aid and co-operation. Both alike, in the Catholic conception, have for their end man's happiness here and hereafter. Their separation, much more their hostility, cannot but be disastrous. The miserable past may teach us that the terms and conditions of their union and harmonious working is a problem yet to be solved, seeing that those former solutions have been fatal to the liberty, now of one, now of the other. That the very nature of things postulates imperatively their co-operation is a truth which the experience of godless politics is making daily more evident. Every plantation that the heavenly Father has not planted shall be uprooted, and the violent, unnatural divorces of religion from politics cannot but lead to unnatural issues. "*Quos Deus conjuxit, homo non separet.*"

Urged by these considerations, we contend that the priest ought to have, as he always has had and will have, his voice in politics; that, in the way his profession allows, or rather invokes, he should use his whole influence for what he conceives to be the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. The anti-clerical and the secularist may strive to exterminate the cleric, but while he is to the fore he has no moral option but to cry aloud and spare not where the interests of truth are concerned.

Now, if the priest has his part to play in politics, still more is he bound to interest himself in the social question which bears so much more directly on the ethical and religious development of mankind. Let us assume for the present, against certain liberal optimists, that there *is* an urgent social problem pressing for solution, a problem touching the rights of the laborer, that is, of the numerical majority in every civilized community. Granting this, is it possible or tolerable that the Catholic priesthood should maintain an attitude of apathy and indifference? Waiving the question as to whether there is or is not an injustice to the poor

crying to heaven for vengeance, or an extreme of misery crying to charity for succor, the very fact that there are so many who assert the existence of such evils is reason enough to make indifference in the clergy inexcusable. Were it but the cry of a few fanatics or interested partisans here and there, prudence might disregard it, but the clamor of a multitude is not without cause, and is always worth attending to.

It is hardly needful to insist on the truth that a concern for the temporal necessities of the poor, quite apart from their spiritual well-being, is an essential part of Christian charity. Not merely as a bait or allurement to higher things, but for its own sake, the alleviation of pain, hunger, misery, ignorance, degradation, is a good work which Christ counts as done to himself. There is a pseudo-charity which has no real feeling for these ills, but condescends to them in the spirit of bribery, and regards their relief as a fair means to a good end: Not so Christ, who rebuked those who followed him only for the sake of the loaves and fishes, and on another occasion pitied the starving crowds who had listened to Him for three days, and were about to return, weary and fasting. Doubtless, the tender commiseration He showed for their sickness and want moved them to hear Him as one who really loved them, and had a keen interest in their *entire* welfare. But this is not to follow Him for the sake of loaves and fishes. True charity is the quickest road to influence; but true charity does kind deeds for kindness' sake, and not merely for some other end, however high and holy.

Therefore, the mere alleviation of the necessities of the poor, apart from all spiritual considerations, is a duty binding on all Christians, and more especially on the clergy. May we not even say that, in order of time and urgency, it is a principal duty, though not in order of dignity and necessity? This principle is involved in St. John's argument: "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" which seems to mean, if a man is not moved by what is natural, sensible, evident, how can he pretend to be moved by what is remote, spiritual, inferential; if he is indifferent to starvation and bodily suffering which should appeal to his very first and most fundamental instincts of benevolence, with what face can he go about distributing tracts and good advice? For the higher rests on and grows out of the lower, and grace presupposes nature. There is much of this pseudo-spirituality abroad which refuses to admit that any mere temporal evil, *as such*, is worthy of a Christian's compassion, which is eminently calm and philosophical in contemplating the sufferings of others, and armed with trite consolations as to the inestimable moral advantages and chastening

effects of transitory afflictions. No Christian can deny these advantages, but they do not in any way lessen, however they may compensate for the inherent bitterness of the chastisement. It is a mistake to be wiser than God or more spiritual than Jesus Christ. If He afflicts us for our good it is always unwillingly; and the slightest twinge of pain or throb of heartache finds in Him a tender compassion beyond all measure of human sympathy.

A zeal for souls which does not presuppose an affection of pity for the poor human body and human heart is a delusion not far removed from hypocrisy. Therefore we conclude that, viewed merely as a question concerning the existence of a great deal of unnecessary human suffering and injustice, the social problem is one demanding the close attention and keen interest of the Church and the clergy. Certainly no one who knows the history of Catholic Christianity can fail to see the great stress it has always laid on what are called the "corporal" as opposed to the "spiritual" works of mercy. Whole orders and congregations have existed who have made the temporal sufferings of mankind their principal care, and if they have made use of the resulting opportunities of doing spiritual good as well, yet this is something incidental and by the way. Nor does the Church interpret the words: "I was hungry and you fed me" and the rest, as directly signifying the satisfaction of spiritual cravings, but first of all in their natural sense of bodily hunger, thirst, and all manner of want and misery.

Now, if a compassion for this or that individual case of distress is an outcome of charity, a wider-seeing charity will inspire a zeal for the relief of the collective misery of the masses where such exists. When Christians were yet "a feeble folk," a little leaven hid in a great mass, almsgiving was necessarily left to private enterprise and unsystematic, but when greater powers were put at the Church's disposal, and she rose in secular influence, her care for the poor became universal and organized. The precept of charity binds the Christian State and its legislators as stringently as it does the individual. All those wonderful means which a divinely directed progress has put into the hands of modern governments for the prevention and relief of destitution, and for the moral elevation of the people, give that precept a width and depth of meaning hardly suspected in by-gone days. One must not undervalue individual efforts in behalf of the distressed, which will always be a necessary supplement to public measures, and which are so invaluable to the giver as means of drawing out all that is best in the human heart. But as things are in modern society, which, though professedly non-Christian, is still dominated by much Christian sentiment, it would be criminal negligence in a Catholic priest, or a minister of any denomination, to use anything

less than his whole influence in favor of universal and public remedies so far as they are feasible and expedient.

The priest is one destined to the service of man, and of the whole man, body and soul. Nor is his ministry merely to individuals singly, but to all collectively, to society, to the State. He differs from other public men in that he views secular problems explicitly in their bearing on morals and religion from a higher standpoint; and in the methods which he uses, which are, as a rule, individual and confined to the category of moral, rather than of political or material power. When, however, we consider the social problem in the light of those spiritual interests which are the priest's highest, if not always his most immediate concern, indifference to it becomes still less excusable. We have already noticed the fact that although it is repugnant to Christianity to use works of mercy simply as a bait or bribe to allure men into an outward conformity with religion, yet when such works are evidently done out of genuine kindness, and would as evidently be done apart from any ulterior result, they cannot fail to dispose men to lend a willing ear to their well-workers. It is hopeless to persuade a hungry man to come to a mission if one shows a calm and philosophical indifference to the emptiness of his stomach. He will naturally be skeptical about one's tender interest in his spiritual welfare. Nor will it mend matters very much if he is relieved in such a way as to imply a contract of "do ut des." So with regard to the masses. If the clergy in any locality are indifferent to their needs, or if their interest is inspired solely by some other motive than sympathy, however high and holy, they will perhaps not undeservedly lose that loving, loyal trust and affection which is a *sine qua non* for their spiritual influence. Wherever, on the contrary, they display (as in Ireland) a genuine sympathy and fellowship with the sufferings of their flocks, there they are followed as Christ was followed by the crowds, who, seeing His love for their bodies, could well believe in his love for their souls. Here, of course, we assume that the masses must be at all times the Church's principal care. "Pauperes semper habetis vobiscum." Whatever exaggeration there may be in Lasalle's estimate, which represents the laborers as 90 per cent. of the population of Germany in his time, or in Henry George's, who allows a similar percentage to England at the present day, it is hardly an exaggeration when applied to the 200,000,000 of the Catholic Church. Were we dealing with a secular society, we might maintain that a numerical minority was in point of ability and worth a true majority, and deserving of prior consideration. But here the Church is essentially individualist, her ultimate end being the salvation of souls, and no man, from this point of view,

is worthy of more consideration than another. The interest of the *numerical* majority of her children is therefore the Church's chief interest; that is to say, the interest of the laboring classes. She, like her Divine Master, views the multitudes that follow her so faithfully through all ages, and is moved with compassion because they have nothing to eat.

Again, if it is hard for the rich to enter into the kingdom of God, it is in some ways still harder, not for the poor, but for the destitute and degraded, and perhaps for the same reason, namely, that both are concentrated on the things of the body; the rich on luxuries and superfluities, the destitute on the bare necessities of subsistence. Of course, the error of the latter is eminently excusable, especially where destitution is the child of misfortune, not of sin. "Having food and raiment, let us be therewith content," says the Apostle; but he lays no such duty of contentment on those who have neither. Destitution and vice play into each other's hands. So far as vice takes the lead there will always be a sediment of misery in spite of the most ideal social economy. But if there is anything in present social or political institutions which forces the weaker classes into destitution, and thereby into vice and degradation, it is imperatively the duty of the priesthood to investigate the evil, to see if it be remediable, and then to use all its influence to effect the remedy. Of course, destitution never forces free-will into vice in any individual case, if, by force, we understand that which produces psychological necessity; but the fact remains that the temptations and pressures due to destitution, as a general rule, do inevitably lead to moral corruption. Although civilization need not go on to sanctification, yet it is (at least a certain degree of it) a prerequisite for the establishment of anything like a stable Christian community. No doubt there is something in Christianity for the lowest intelligence and crudest morality to lay hold of and strengthen itself by; but every mental darkness and moral obliquity is an obstacle to its full development and a potential source of danger to its purity and persistence. The cause of civilization, truly conceived, is the cause of God and religion. Both tend to the fullest possible perfection, mental and moral, of the greatest possible number, and though religion carries on the work where secular civilization drops it, yet up to that point they are co-operant for one and the same end. It is, then, in the interest of religion that all should co-operate cordially for the removal of the cause of destitution and degradation. It may be denied that such inculpable destitution exists, or that it does so to any notable degree. It may be said that the evil exists of necessity, and that no political or social reform can be devised which does not involve the like or greater evils. Yet none of

these statements must be taken for granted, but they demand the serious consideration of the clergy, whose interest it so closely concerns.

Another reason why the clergy are bound to interest themselves in the social problem is that the question is really, at root, an ethical question. This is coming into clearer recognition every day, even in the writings of non-Christian sociologists. We hear the older economists very deservedly reproached for their abstract and unreal treatment of man as a money-getting animal, with a complete ignoring of his many other and infinitely complex springs of action. We are told that what is really wanted is a yet unborn "science of human nature," which, of course, involves ethics as one of its subordinate sciences. We find candid avowals from the most hostile quarters that, rightly or wrongly, man has always been, must always be, a religious animal, and that religion is one of the prime movers in social life. And when we examine the problem for ourselves we see how it all hinges on notions which belong to ethics and to natural religion, such as desert, justice, remuneration, selfishness, altruism, equality, property, liberty, fraternity, personality, the State, its origin, constitution, functions; the end of man, here and hereafter, his true perfection, development, and many other questions all more or less ethical, and, therefore, indirectly religious. Much as "Chair-Socialism" may be despised as theoretical and impractical by short-sighted "men of action," yet those who read history know how, in the long run, there is nothing so practical as theory, and that many a revolution was first conceived by an idle theorist dreaming in his easy-chair. The social question is one to which, as guardians and disseminators of religious and philosophical truth, the Catholic clergy, at all events, are bound to give their full attention. It is no small matter to decide whether, under the existing system of competition, the laborers are or are not suffering an injustice; and if they are, whether it is a material or a formal injustice. Yet this is only one of the grave doubts suggested by what is called the "Social Problem." The fact that socialism has made its appearance only in countries imbued with the aroma of departing Christianity is due to its being, according to some, a perversion; according to others a development of certain Christian principles touching equality, fraternity, property, riches and poverty. To whom does the true exposition and defence of Christian principles belong except to the clergy of the Catholic Church?

Laveleye, ("*Socialisme Contemporain*") takes it for granted that the present interest displayed by the Catholic clergy in Germany in the social question has for its sole motive the triumph of the

Church. Seeing that political power is passing into the hands of the masses, seeing that little is to be hoped for at the hands of monarchs and nobles, seeing that by apathy in the past they have to some extent alienated the trust and loyalty of the millions, the Black International hopes to retrieve its lost influence by some sort of an alliance with the Red. It is not in any hostile spirit that this criticism is made. Laveleye freely allows that the triumph of the Church is a spiritual cause, an unselfish end. There is none of that vulgar narrowness which views the Roman Church as a commercial speculation. Yet there is a latent insinuation that the triumph of the Church is a distinct cause from that of the popular temporal welfare; that it is simply as means to this higher but wholly distinct end that the clergy want to identify themselves with the prominent movement of the day, which in our time happens to be socialism. Such critics have no adequate notion of the Church's mission, and fail to see that her cause includes that of civilization as the greater includes the less.

It is only in keeping with the history of the Church's development by natural events under the guidance of Providence, that the initiative in many causes which she has subsequently made her own, should be taken from without. Thus heresies have been instrumental in the evolution of her dogma. They have roused her to condemn explicitly what before she had condemned only implicitly, or perhaps had in no way ever touched upon. They have drawn her out and revealed to her her own mind. We ourselves individually often are ignorant as to what we believe, or what we like, or what we do, until some opposition exposes us to ourselves. So it may freely be conceded that the social question was raised, not by the Church, but by those outside her, perhaps by her opponents. Yet, the question being raised, she is bound to consider it, and formulate her mind on the subject. She is bound to protest against any false or immoral solution of it; to sift the true from the untrue, the wheat from the chaff, and to adopt it and make it her own. That the Church never interested herself about this precise form of the social problem in past ages only means that it did not then exist. About the cause of the slave, and the poor, and the oppressed, she has interested herself in every age and country where she has had liberty and scope, and has not been made the tool of selfish factions and private ambition. Whatever her misfortunes and afflictions have been in that line, her principles, her faith, her aspirations are eternal, irrepressible, and ready to break out and assert themselves unchanged as soon as the contingent restraint is relaxed. Therefore the charge of self-interest made against the Church's recent activity in the matter is narrow and unmeaning. Even were she using the

movement as a means to her highest end, that end is eminently an unselfish and benevolent one. No doubt it is an end which, in the eyes of many anti-religious socialists, is wholly vain and delusive; or even mischievous and obstructive to material progress; and so far their hostility to what is called "Catholic Socialism" is logical enough. But if they accuse clerics of feigning sympathy with the social question in the interests of religion, may we not retort very justly against those who are so obviously using it in the interests of irreligion and immorality? Can we credit those with a disinterested zeal for benevolence, justice, right, equality, fraternity, liberty whose first principles or negations are fatal to every one of these much-abused and perverted notions? It is to save the ignorant and undiscerning masses from these would-be "angels of light" that the Church has roused herself in these days, if not to the solution of the problem, at least to the scrutiny and detection of false solutions, which would result in a state of things "worse than the first" seven times over. We hope, then, we have said enough to justify abundantly the activity shown by the Catholic clergy in Germany and elsewhere with regard to the great question of this day and of the immediate future. If, as Professor Nitti hints ("Catholic Socialism"), in certain countries they seem to be lethargic and inactive, it may be that there the question is not so burning, or that the clergy are few and overworked, or not sufficiently educated to deal with the question. Be this as it may, wherever the question does come to the front it is one which intimately concerns the interests of religion, and even if it did not, it is one which concerns the higher interests of humanity, and as such it cannot fail to enlist the keenest attention and sympathy of every priest who recognizes himself to be the representative of the Healer of the Nations.

GEORGE TYRRELL, S.J.

Stonyhurst, Eng.

THE PROTEST OF COMMON SENSE AGAINST SOME
COMMON NONSENSE.

IT is undoubtedly a fact that a great many Catholic laymen, to whom there have never been afforded opportunities of receiving systematic and comprehensive instruction on the subjects of Catholic faith and its ancillary philosophy, are disposed to seriously mistrust the ability of common sense to vindicate itself in the matter of religion and sustain its dignity before the eyes of the skeptic, the unbeliever and the scoffer. The insinuations of the first, the denials of the second, or the ridicule of the third may cause not the shadow of an alteration in the personal attitude of such a Catholic towards the teachings of Holy Church, but he stands abashed, silent and embarrassed before his antagonist, impotent to voice the blessed convictions which possess his soul, and so retires in confusion from the contest, pursued by the cheap derision of the seeming victor, who unduly felicitates himself on the superior readiness of his tongue.

Some Catholics of this sort are even inclined to regard as rash and presumptuous the conduct of those of their brethren in faith who are not so ready to yield to the clamor of opposition in matters of religion, opining that the deliverances of a layman on such subjects are, to say the least, hazardous and superfluous, when there are so many men who have pledged their lives to God's service, for the spread of the saving truth and the frustration and extermination of ubiquitous error. But the priest cannot always be at hand to confute, with his learning, the errors and heresies with which the Catholic layman is daily confronted, and the stand for truth must largely be maintained by men of mere common sense, with no actual and technical acquaintance with Catholic theology and philosophy. It is indeed rash in the inadequately instructed layman to venture a defence of certain points of detailed Catholic doctrine, ability to discuss which implies the possession of information acquired only by long and laborious study; but the anti-religious thought of the day is not attacking such doctrines, for the good reason that its assaults are directed against the very fundamental beliefs upon which those doctrines rest. And these fundamental, primary beliefs are within the mental possession of the plain, common-sense man, and can readily be developed into explicit consciousness when one questions his inner self, not in that spirit of arrogance which flings the gratuitous lie into the very face of mild-speaking truth, and, like "jest-

ing Pilate," will not wait for answer, but in that spirit of confidence in the ultimate pronouncements of consciousness which becomes the sane man who has not committed himself to some of the nondescript absurdities which parade the intellectual world of to-day, labeled philosophy, and denying the fact of being itself.

It may probably be retorted that such primary beliefs, beyond all others, require for their defence against antagonism the trained philosophic mind, and that when common sense is challenged regarding them, something distinctively transcending common sense is needed to stand and give adequate answer to the challenge. In purely philosophical matters, Reid endeavored to state the whole case of common sense, and only succeeded in making himself quite as unintelligible and unconvincing to ordinary minds as the theories he combated, and St. Augustine seems to argue against common sense when, writing of the fundamental notion of Time itself, he exclaims: "*Quod ergo est tempus? Si nemo ex me quærat, scio: si quærenti explicare velim, nescio.*" What, then, is time? If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain to one who asks, I know not. (Confessions, xi., 14.)

But the great African saint and philosopher did not mean that interrogation as to Time reduced him to ignorance of its significance. The import of his declaration is simply to the effect that he could conceive, but not comprehend, the idea of Time, and he did not hesitate to intimate that the idea was one which, being in itself fundamental, could only be obfuscated by attempts at definition. But surely St. Augustine would not have felt the slightest embarrassment in confessing his inability to completely define the idea of Time to one who ventured to deny that he, or any one, could have such an idea. He would probably have answered that Time is time, and would have stoutly maintained before his antagonist that, to say the least, his own assertion was just as weighty as the other's denial. The rich substratum of our intellectual life defies analysis, but it imparts meaning and order to all the minor coruscations of thought. The reasons of its existence cannot be confined within the limits of definition, but nevertheless announce themselves in the inner sanctuaries of thought with indisputable credentials of sovereignty. Ultimate principles compose the real wealth of intellectual life, and when we are asked to express them in demonstrable terms, we may well avail ourselves of the philosophy of the enamored Juliet, and retort that "They are but beggars that can count their worth."

Surely, if the profound and saintly Augustine, with mind illumined both by singular graces and by vast learning, did not hesitate to declare the incompetence of human thought to grasp within an act of complete and detailed comprehension the basic

truths of religion and philosophy, the ordinary man of common sense need feel no shame when forced by importunate questioning to the same predicament. When the tiresome skeptic, who lays the flattering unction to his soul that the ceaseless projection of interrogations is indicative of the highest wisdom, demands an explanation of the ultimate truths which form the regulative basis of all healthful religious and intellectual life, the plain man of common sense need draw on no high intellectual powers to reply that these truths cannot be explained for the very simple reason that they are ultimate and self-evidential. Of course, such a reply may only excite the disdain of the skeptic, who affects a supreme contempt for belief in any centres of intellectual rest—any standard of truth “which verifies itself and stops the question” (Poland, “Truth of Thought,” par. 7), but would rather think, and think, and think everything away into a maze of absurdity. All the logic of Aristotle is incompetent to demonstrate what cannot be demonstrated, but which goes to form the reservoir from which all demonstration proceeds; and hence the plain man of common sense is just as effectual, or ineffectual, towards silencing the skeptic, completely enamored of his folly, as would be one who had mastered all attainable knowledge.

There is a pretty story of a learned and beauteous lady of Padua, daughter of the famous jurist, Giovanni d'Andrea, who frequently lectured before her father's pupils on philosophy and jurisprudence, and who, whilst lecturing, concealed herself behind a curtain, lest her hearers

“Should let their young eyes wander o'er her,
And quite forget their jurisprudence.”

So the ultimate pronouncements of truth are delivered from behind a veil which cannot be penetrated by mental vision. They do not come forth, armed and truculent, to compel by force men's allegiance to them, for the very simple reason that it is man's supreme dignity, and at the same time his supreme responsibility, that he may believe or not, just as he will; but they do come forth with a power of calm convincingness which cannot be withstood by any candid man who has not some eccentric theory to maintain, or who has not become addicted to a habit of persistent and unreasonable interrogation directed towards all things.

The dual aspect of the ultimate truths of religion and philosophy, as propounded by the Catholic Church; their interior obscurity and their exterior luminosity, and the embarrassing consequences which must necessarily flow from their denial, has been well adverted to by the profound and ingenious Donoso Cortes, in his famous essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism :

"It should be known that there is no mystery amongst those which faith teaches and the Church proposes to us which does not unite in itself, by an admirable disposition of God, two qualities which ordinarily exclude each other—obscurity and evidence. Catholic mysteries are like bodies at once luminous and opaque, in such a way that their shadows can never be brightened by their light, nor their light obscured by their shadows, remaining perpetually obscure and perpetually luminous. At the very time they shed their light over creation they keep their shadows for themselves; they make everything clear, and can themselves be made clear by nothing. They penetrate everything, and are themselves impenetrable. To him who admits them there is no obscurity but their own; to him who denies them, day becomes night, and his eyes, deprived of light, find nothing but obscurity in all directions. And yet men in their blindness prefer denying to admitting them; light appears intolerable to them if it come from a sombre region, and their gigantic pride condemns their eyes to eternal obscurity regarding the shades found in one sole mystery as a greater difficulty than those that extend in all directions."

In earlier ages the propogandists of Pyrrhonic doctrines were few and far between, and their teachings were known only among the learned classes, the ordinary man being too busily engrossed in the concerns of external life to indulge in philosophizing and introspection. As Brother Azarias says, in his admirable little volume on "Aristotle and the Christian Church": "Small place had philosophy in the intelligence of the child of Nature, just emerging from his woodland home, with his simple habits and few wants." But in the more effete civilization of the last three hundred years, amongst those who have not been nurtured on truth, such as propounded by the Catholic Church, the attitude of doubt, interrogation, and denial has grown most popular, producing two types of adherents—the professional and the amateur, the adept and the tyro. England is fairly entitled to the rather dubious distinction of having produced the leading representatives of the former class; men who have maintained so dogmatic and contemptuous an attitude of mind towards all those convictions which the human race holds nearest and dearest, that the Duke of Argyll indignantly exclaims of them, that "they would stare into the very burning bush itself, without a thought that the ground on which they stand must be holy ground."¹

There is no humility, no reverence, no consciousness of unworthiness in these men. Could a new Addison arise to dissect the head of a modern agnostic or atheist, he would doubtless have to report, as the "Spectator" did of the dissection of the beau's head, that the "*elevator*, or the muscle which turns the eye towards heaven, did not appear to have been used at all." (Spectator, 275). They have declared their independence from all theological beliefs, and have reiterated *ad nauseam* that they cannot believe what is not explanatory in the terms of ordinary knowl-

¹ *Reign of Law*, chap. ii.

edge. "When you confront us with hypotheses," says Frederic Harrison, "however sublime and however affecting, if they cannot be stated in terms of ordinary knowledge; if they are disparate to that world of sequence and sensation which to us is the base of all our real knowledge, then we shake our heads and turn aside." What a mad independence is this! It is the independence of destitution—the independence of one who would lay waste his inner life and call it peace! They declare that the imagination stands paralyzed before such conceptions as are implied in the belief in God and immortality, and that consequently they must "shake their heads and turn aside." But let these men only divest themselves of the wretched egotism of their souls, and give heed to the suppressed admonitions of their inner nature, and there will come a struggle, and, as Hallock says, "When the time for a struggle comes, the imagination that affirms may be more than a match for the imagination that denies." (*"Forum,"* vol. ii., p 586.)

The fundamental convictions of religion form one of the most universal and oft-repeated experiences of the human kind. In the light, then, of that dominant agnostic philosophy of the day, which insists on the testing of all things by the indubitable facts of recorded experience, what possible argument can there be against these convictions? And this experience is not one which may be challenged as being possible only under certain and limited conditions, for the force which gives rise to it is persistent. Adverse argument, superficially understood facts of Nature, and the aberrations of intellectual pride and despair, may render an individual mind unresponsive and repellant to this force, but there is ever a general tendency to fall back to the old lines of thought. When there is a successful effort made to readjust the mind, with all its acquired load of facts, observations and conclusions, back to the old condition—and this condition is unquestionably a lowly one of humility and spiritual prostration—there follows an immediate correspondence with the persistent force of objective religion which sends the proud philosopher to his knees, and brings from his lips an humble and unconditional credo. The fact that certain men have never undergone any such experience no more militates against the truth evidenced by such experience in other men than does the fact that one born blind has never beheld the sun call into question the existence of that luminary. Such men have no "spiritual optics," and they read the universal scroll of things with a dull, undiscerning eye, which can obtain no insight into its real and divine significance; just as Peter Bell could see a primrose in a primrose, and nothing more. The reasons why such men wish so earnestly to disengage their minds from all control, or even suggestions, of the supernatural, are quite obvious, and

the truth has been told them very frequently and undisguisedly of late; by few with more bluntness than by Prof. Mivart, in a quite remarkable and characteristic article, entitled "Professing Themselves to be Wise, They Have Become Fools," published in the *AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW*, Vol. XVI.

There may be no hypocrisy in some of the teachers of agnosticism and atheism; they may sincerely believe what they indoctrinate, but their beliefs are unquestionably the results of their inclinations and wishes, rather than of their unbiased intellectual research. They wish there were no God, no hereafter, and suppressing relentlessly every admonition of their inner nature that there is a God, is an hereafter, they exert all their ingenuity of mind towards the bolstering up of their predilections, and at last attain an actual belief in the shallow fallacies which they teach.

The tyro in skepticism, agnosticism and kindred isms is an insupportably tiresome individual, who has nibbled at Spencer and has committed to memory some of the materialistic aphorisms of "philosophers" such as Tyndall and Huxley, Buckner, Vogt and Haeckel, and their imitators. This is the individual the Catholic of common sense meets almost daily, and common sense is quite competent to expose the vapidty of his arguments every time he opens his mouth to enunciate some choice dictum gleaned from his favorite authorities. Such a one tells the Catholic in a defiant, don't-you-wonder-at-my-daring manner that he does not believe in God or immortality because the existence of the one or the certainty of the other cannot be demonstrated. It is generally a young man or a young woman who makes this bold, bad declaration—one who has yet to learn that it is absurdly foolish to affect a cheap and untenable singularity; and that the questions he or she so triumphantly puts have been completely answered a thousand times.

The man of common sense, when confronted by positive or hypothetical denials of the existence of God or of immortality, has always at hand a ready answer which cannot be too much insisted upon. "If there were no God; no immortality," he may say to the skeptic or to the unbeliever, "you or I could have no such ideas." And the simple reply of the common sense man cannot be answered, whether in his crude way of thinking he consider the ideas of God and immortality within him as of unmixed supernatural origin, innately implanted by God in the act of creation, or whether he have a vague intuition of the unquestionable significance of that power of the human mind which reads between the lines, as it were, of the presentments of sensible experience, discerning the ulterior and theological import of phenomena, and abstracting therefrom ideas which the commonest

common sense and the most profound candid philosophy must recognize, and does recognize, as indubitably beyond the scope of material causes.

"But listen," remonstrates the skeptic, "to the explanation of the origin and genesis of religious notions as given by Spencer"; and then he proceeds to read long passages from the First Part of the "First Principles," or from the seventh chapter of the "Data of Ethics"—passage pregnant with exemplifications of the cardinal and subversive error of materialistic evolutionary philosophy; the error of superior, overshadowing effects produced by inferior, inefficient causes. Homogeneous nebulousity, into which a force inducing instability is arbitrarily introduced, without any explanation whatever as to its origin, is made to produce heterogeneous coherence; effects are made to multiply themselves, evolving into conditions of segregation, equilibration, etc.; inorganic matter is made to produce organism, and organism, life; sentient life produces mind, etc., and so on along the whole category until the backward course sets in, and dissolution proceeds to impel everything back to a condition of chaotic collapse. And thus, in a most inconsiderate fashion, the agnostic proceeds to satisfy all the *a priori* requirements of his philosophy, wresting the aspect of every fact of nature and of history in order that it may square with his bias of thought, and then he calls upon the world to admire his work as the very perfection of inductive, synthetic reasoning. This is, indeed, a strange philosophy—one that would have made an old-fashioned scholastic philosopher, with mind permeated by convictions regarding efficient causes, stand amazed and aghast.

And, by the way, with what reason does a philosopher who believes that all things must evolve and dissolve in ceaseless alternation, and who must therefore consistently maintain that dissolution is just as important a process in the endless flux of things as evolution is; with what consistency, may it be asked, does such a philosopher propound any ethical doctrines at all, since according to his philosophy moral chaos and dissolution is just as important and necessary a condition of affairs as moral order? It may, of course, be readily replied to this objection, that evolution is the present process, and that consequently rules of conduct promoting progressive and ascensive moral evolution are now the proper thing; but it may in turn be asked of the evolutionist how he determines within himself that evolution is now in order, and that the time for dissolution has not yet arrived? The evolutionist impatiently replies that the question is an absurd one, and appeals to the fact that man holds in contemplation unattained ideals, and that he further is irresistibly conscious of the obligation incum-

bent upon him to strive as he can to attain the realization of such ideals. "As life has advanced," writes Spencer, "the whole accompanying sentiency has become increasingly ideal." ("Data of Ethics, par. 12.") But what a whole begging of the question is this! It is the same old weary story of puny causes accomplishing relatively great effects. What under the sun could have influenced the first forming of ideals in the primitive intelligence, fresh in its evolutionary ascent from the bonds of matter? What adequate causes could induce any intelligence, with its origin in a purely material basis, to look upwards and forwards, when the whole history and philosophy of its being would tend to influence it to look backwards and downwards? There is but one adequate reply to this simple objection, and it involves an almost ludicrous aspect of the evolutionary hypothesis, and consequently it is not one that the evolutionist cares much about availing himself of. It is this: that the universal scheme of things started (if the expression be allowed by the evolutionist) in a developed condition, and that dissolution was the first order of change; therefore, dissolution having reached its consummation, evolution then sets in, implying the gradual and progressive recovery of pre-existing conditions. If the evolutionist wishes to take refuge in such an absurd notion, he is quite welcome to it. In the meantime, the man of common sense denies and rejects *in toto* such explanations of evolutionary psychology as advanced by Spencer, for the simple reason that he opens his argument with throwing into sentient organism an intrinsically engendered element which sentiency cannot yield—the element of mentality busying itself with ideals.

Not only is it a necessary truth, recognized by all who have not committed themselves to an irrational denial of the existence of necessary truths—that an effect cannot transcend its cause—but it is a corollary truth that a cause must be superior to its effect, for the very obvious reason, that to produce an effect equal to itself a cause must inevitably exhaust itself and become annihilated in the act of production. Hence the mind abhors the notion of a cause producing an effect equal to itself, but also declares that the cause must survive the effect; and in this survival is manifested the superiority of the cause over the effect. These indisputable facts suggest a ready, common-sense notion of the Infinite. Given the sum total of finite things, the necessary existence of their cause before their creation, and also the survival of such cause after the act of creation, and its implied superiority to the product, and you have the Infinite. It is not necessary to suggest any further elucidation of this indirect demonstration of the existence of the Infinite, but enough it is for the present to show that we have thus placed before the mind an object of consistent, logical

thought THAT IS NOT FINITE. And what is that which is not finite?

"Meanwhile," writes Spencer, "with exasperating disregard of all philosophical consistency, "there has been developing the ghost theory." ("Data of Ethics," par. 44.) Has there, indeed? May we be permitted to inquire of the "apostle of understanding" from what efficient and precontaining cause the ghost theory asserted itself in the evolved savage? Why, in the name of all that is reasonable, should the savage, or even the highly evolved and civilized man, with mind produced and evolved solely from material causes, entertain any thoughts concerning what is non-material? The ghost theory of the savage can only arise from the inherent religiosity of his mind, and the fact that he fixes upon the spirit of his departed chief or relative as the objective point towards which to direct his religious sentiments, simply argues deficient intellectuality, and further argues against the agnostic and pantheist, that it is the natural and spontaneous impulse of man to direct his religious thoughts and aspirations towards a definite and semi-comprehensive end, rather than towards the vague and unknowable.

That men have always thought of and aspired for God and immortality, is an argument in support of the real, objective validity of those ideas which common sense unhesitatingly relies on, and which nothing but the commonest nonsense can seriously impugn. It is just as natural for a man to be religious in the innermost recesses of his being, as it is for him to breathe; and if his baser nature held out to him the same solicitations to thwart his vital function of respiration, as it does to stifle the nobler aspirations of his soul, he would doubtless make the attempt. It might be said that such an insinuation contradicts the assertion just made, that it is natural for man to be religious, implying that it is more natural for man to seek the avenues of degeneration than it is for him to "lift his eyes to the mountains whence cometh life." But if any one choose to dispute which is the dominant nature in man, he is really not worth arguing with, and his position is either resultant from some insuperable bias of thought or from some puerile itch for affected and combative opinions.

From an evolutionary point of view, the irreligious or unreligious man is a startling example of degeneration and atavism. "Each function," says Spencer, "has some relation, direct or indirect, to the needs of life; the fact of its existence as a result of evolution being in itself a proof that it has been entailed, immediately or remotely, by the adjustment of inner action to outer action; consequently non-fulfilment of it in normal proportions is non-fulfilment of complete life." ("Data of Ethics," p. 30.)

What a cogent arraignment is this of Spencer's own philosophy! There can be no more acute incompleteness of life than is there in the life of that man in which there is systematically suppressed that overmastering function of the soul which may be designated as the function of worship, and which demands for its complete and adequate discharge that it be directed in well-defined channels towards some objective end, in whose coherence it may rest satisfied, and not towards a so-called end, before whose abysmal vagueness it could assume no attitude save that of mere wonder and paralysis of aspiration. Spencer argues, with truth, that the popular conceptions of supernatural power have been undergoing a gradual process of abstraction, but he insists on the "lame and impotent conclusion" that there can be no end to this process, and that it must inevitably culminate in the complete dissipation of all objective, definitive elements from religious ideas. "A life comes into a man," ironically says R. H. Hutton, of such doctrines, "the depths of which he cannot sound, and his very conviction that he has not the capacity to comprehend its fulness is to empty it of all significance!" (Essay, "What is Revelation?") Without adverting at length to Spencer's utter disregard of the well-established proofs that all existing religions among savage nations present unmistakable practices of exalted origin, and suggest, in their most degraded practices, traces of pure, theistic faith, rather than a progressive evolution from ever lower aspects of thought,¹ it may pertinently be called to mind that what he says of religious conceptions may be also said of the conceptions of human personality, as current in different ages and among different people. The popular conception of personality has undergone a process of abstraction, but does this fact justify one in absurdly concluding that such conception must finally be emptied of all coherence and significance, and that men must live out their lives without really knowing whether they had lived or not? The idea of personality is truly a most abstract one, and it is a vulgar mistake to hold that it is so completely comprehended that it may not be analogically attributed to the Supreme Being; and yet, notwithstanding its high degree of abstractness, this idea of personality, as applied to human beings, asserts its real, objective validity most unmistakably. In the same manner the idea of a personal God is one that no degree of abstractedness can cover over with the impenetrable veil of the Unknowable.

¹ "Like an old precious metal, the ancient religion, after the rust of ages has been removed, will come out in all its purity and brightness; the image which it discloses will be the image of the Father; the Father of all the nations upon the earth; and the superscription, when we can read it again, will be—not only in Judea but in all the languages of the world—the Word of God."—Max Muller, *Science of Religion*, chapter i.

And this is the sort of religion—the religion of the Unknowable—which many supposed was to supplant all other religions! When the gospel of this religion is preached, and the sublimities of its indefinable, delusive and elusive *summum bonum* are expatiated upon as indicating the true goal of human endeavor and aspiration, one is reminded of how the mischievous Launcelot, in the Merchant of Venice, “tried confusions” with his “true begotten father,” who, being “more than sand-blind, high gravel-blind,” knew not his graceless son.

GOBBO—Master Young Gentlemen, I pray you, which is the way to Master Jew’s?

LAUNCELOT—Turn up your right hand at the next turning, but at the next turning of all, on your left; marry, at the very next turning, turn of no hand, but turn down indirectly to the Jew’s house.

GOBBO—By God’s sonties, ’twill be a hard way to hit.

And so the poor bewildered individual who asks the apostle of the Unknowable what he should do to lead the perfect life, what path he should take, will receive an answer like Launcelot’s reply to his father’s query, and well may he exclaim, with the nonplused old man, that “’t will be a hard way to find.” The religion of the Unknowable is truly one which directs man to turn to the right and to the left, with a final indirect turning into nothing at all; but the man of common sense is not “sand-blind and high-gravel blind,” and from such ambiguous doctrines he turns aside in disgust. He demands that the paramount concern of his life shall not be expressed in terms of absolute unreasonableness, and nowhere will he find the dignity of his rational nature so much respected with so ample a concomitant satisfaction vouchsafed to all the religious tendencies of his nature, as within the fold of the Church, which is truly—

“The very opener and intelligencer
Between the grace and sanctities of Heav’n
And our dull workings,”

The dabbler in modern philosophic literature has heard or read of a foolish doctrine called materialistic monism, teaching the production of all the diversified conditions of the universe from a simple material principle, and he is much disposed to consider this doctrine a very fine thing. He reproaches the man who maintains old-fashioned Christian convictions concerning creation, and tells him that he is adhering to a vulgar and exploded dualistic conception of the universal scheme of things. The cool, inconsiderate ease with which these advocates of purely materialistic evolution evolve everything from primitive diffuse matter, remind one of a story told concerning a certain old professor who

occupied the chair of philology in a university located in a town called Middletown. This old gentleman was a very profound and learned man, but his insatiable penchant for digging at verbal roots made him at times exceedingly wearisome to his pupils. He was, in truth, one of that class satirized by Cowper:

" . . . learned philologists who chase
A panting syllable through time and space,
Start it at home, and hunt it in the dark
To Gaul, to Greece, and into Noah's ark."¹—("Retirement.")

The old gentleman had been unusually expatiative one morning before his class, and had been holding forth on etymological intricacies with an earnestness and laboriousness which would have done credit to a Grimm or a Max Müller, when one of his pupils interrupted him, and, with an affectation of absorbing interest in the subject matter of the professor's lucubrations, arose and said:

"Doctor, has it ever occurred to you to trace the derivation of the name of our town?"

"Why, no," replied the professor. "Have you given the matter any study?"

"Yes, sir, I have," rejoined the young man, "and I am firmly convinced that Middletown is derived from Moses."

"Why, bless my soul," exclaimed the astonished professor, "in what manner have you arrived at such a conclusion?"

"Easily enough," imperturbably answered the young man, "by simply dropping 'oses' and adding 'iddletown.'"

And the process of reasoning by which the evolutionary monist satisfies his mind and endeavors to convince the world that everything is evolved from matter is just as grotesque as the etymological process by which the young student derived Middletown from Moses.

If these gentlemen who descant so largely on the dignity of their idea of the materialistic unity would exercise a fair modicum of common sense, they would speedily awake to the fact that their much vaunted doctrine is completely and irretrievably punctured by one of the primary laws of physics. It is the inevitable tendency of any physical body to consummate its activity and realize its potencies spontaneously, and this tendency can only be checked by the resistance of a superior power. Hence, if the original conglomeration of nebulous matter, viewed as a whole before any processes of segregation and individuation had set in,

¹ Cowper's absurd contempt for certain branches of knowledge and learned research, concerning which he was in total ignorance, exemplifies in a striking manner a truth as expressed by J. S. Mill: "We know how easily the uselessness of almost every branch of knowledge may be proved to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it." (*On Representative Government*, p. 140.)

could not attain the developed conditions which resided within it potentially, save by slow processes of evolution, occupying countless ages of time, it must either have done so in obedience to the preordained plan of the Divine Creative Will, or it must have been resisted in its tendency to accomplish its development by an extrinsic, and, by necessary implication, an evil power. The first conception rejected, the other horn of the dilemma must be grasped, and hence the much talked of doctrine of materialistic monism, with its boasted unified conception of things, turns out to be a very vulgar dualistic conception after all—the dualism of Zoroaster and the ancient Persians. Nay, it is a dualism not even as respectable as the dualism of Zoroaster, for, according to the renowned Magian, Orumzsd must in the end triumph over Ahri-man, but the doctrines of evolution and dissolution, as expounded by Spencer, teach that a series of alternate and senseless triumphs will go on without end; now the principle of construction must prevail, and now the principle of destruction, and so on, *ad infinitum*. This is another doctrine at which the man of common sense “shakes his head and turns aside.”

There is another class of vagarists whom the Catholic of common sense almost daily encounters, and these, far from ventilating any obviously atheistic, agnostic or materialistic doctrines, congratulate themselves as being Christians of a very superior kind, and they usually manifest a large liberality of speech in communicating their complacent convictions. Their chief contention is that they have developed a deep power of insight into the real significance of the teachings of Christ, and they have deduced, as one of the principal and most salient features of their belief, the doctrine that worship by form and creed must be condignly abolished and relegated to the limbo of religious inadequacies. “The substance of Christ’s teaching was his doctrine of enthusiasm, or of a present spirit dictating the right course of action and superseding the necessity of particular rules. (Seeley, “*Ecce Homo*,” Chap. XXI.)

The position of these teachers has been amply discussed and their claims completely refuted (see article on “*Ecce Homo*,” by Cardinal Newman in the “*Catholic World*,” vol. iii.), but it may not be inopportune to say a few words concerning a book universally popular among those favoring a creedless, formless religion—“*Natural Law in the Spiritual World*”—from the pen of that prolific scientifico-religio-sentimentalist, Prof. Henry Drummond, especially the two chapters of that work which are most read by the Simon-pure Christians just adverted to—the chapters on “Parasitism” and “Semi-Parasitism,” attacking creeds, theology, worship by form, and chiefly church-going.

Professor Drummond is a most nimble theorist, hopping from one hypothesis to the other, as the fancy seizes him—now advocating the biological definition of life advanced by Spencer “as a correspondence with environments”; now adhering to the opposite doctrine as enforced by the Duke of Argyll in his “Unity of Nature,” where life is defined as a resistance to enviroing conditions that would engulf and destroy it; now claiming that the discovery of certain scientific laws has effectually dissipated the mysteries of the supernatural condition, placing man in possession of the profoundest secrets of eschatology, and now insisting on the unfathomable mysteriousness of the simplest laws of nature; now insisting on the strenuous and ceaseless strife required to prevent one’s spiritual nature from degenerating, and now urging that the attainment of salvation is the most easily accomplished task imaginable. Truly, the kaleidoscopic character of the professor’s “religion” is most astonishing and bewildering, and convicts him of being a waverer in religious matters, with about as much coherence and definitiveness of conviction as Bob Sawyer, of Pickwick fame, had with regard to the politics of Eatanswill—neither “buff nor blue,” but a “sort of compound of all kinds of colors.” And this is the sort of teacher who thinks he has a needed message to deliver to the world, calculated to allay the spiritual unrest so prevalent outside the Church! Truly, it has been an affliction of the age, that men with minds seething with all sorts of vague, undigested, and incoherent “views” on religious matters, and touched, moreover, by a most acute form of the *cacoëthes scribendi*, have not felt themselves restrained from disseminating their hazy ambiguous doctrines amongst millions of people so spiritually esurient that they will swallow with eagerness the most diluted concoction offered them. Professor Drummond’s book contains some very well-written chapters, notably his really fine chapter on “Biogenesis,” but his work as a whole, like all of its kind, reminds one of the caption placed by Dr. Johnson over the final chapter of “*Rasselas*”—“The Conclusion, in which Nothing is Concluded.” His religion and philosophy are mere bubbles, blown to generous proportions by a strong breath of conceit, but which speedily burst when contact is had with the requirements of common sense.

What Professor Drummond really knows about Catholicism may be correctly inferred from the following, which he adduces as a striking and shocking exemplification of the “parasitic” religion considered by him as engendered by the forms and practices of Catholic worship. “We can never dismiss from memory,” writes he, “the sadness with which we listened to the confession of a certain foreign professor. ‘I used to be concerned about re-

ligion,' said he, in substance, 'but religion is a great subject. I was very busy; there was little time to settle it for myself. A Protestant, my attention was called to the Roman Catholic religion. It suited my case, and instead of dabbling in religion for myself, I put myself in its hands. *Once a year,*' he concluded, '*I go to Mass.*'"

And a man so ignorant or so prejudiced as to accept and repeat, in sober earnestness, this absurd declaration as the testimony of a Catholic, is actually listened to by some as a pleader against the forms of Catholic worship! To use a strong expression of Macaulay's, made under less provocation than this, such conduct is "enough to make us ashamed of our species." Professor Drummond is a most entertaining writer at times, but he is touched with the prevailing weakness of scientific men of the day—the weakness which induces them to throw aside at times the tools of their profession, and to take up in their stead the delicate instruments of another profession, for which they have had no training, and to blunt them with their clumsy handling. His grand project for the abolition of all churches whatsoever, and the establishment of an independent, spontaneous faith, is as chimerical as the scheme of the Laputian wiseacres as described by Gulliver, which had for its object the complete suppression of all the formality of language. The professor magnificently concedes that there may be a little good in formal worship and in church going, but the whole body of his arguments is against such practices—practices without which religion could not and would not assert itself, and hence he and his teachings are completely, and without hesitation, rejected by sound common sense.

The arguments of men of Prof. Drummond's stamp seem to imply that man is an uncontaminated spirit, capable of serving and adoring his Creator with an unimpeded spontaneousness which needs no forms to excite or sustain it, instead of being, as he is, a weak, erring creature, reduced by his many deprivations and deficiencies to the necessity of exerting all his activities in accordance with such forms and methods as will insure to them the maximum of immunity from frustration by adverse influences, a necessity from which the activities of his spiritual life are by no means exempted. Hutton, in his somewhat remarkable essay on "The Incarnation and Christian Influences," eagerly embraces the doctrine of the Incarnation in an independent fashion, and declares his conviction that the truth of that doctrine places man in such close relationship to his Father that he needs no forms of faith to spur him on in his devotion. It is very true that the assumption of humanity by the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity brought men into closer and more direct relation to God, and

relieved theism of the oppressive idea of the dread, unapproachable solitariness of God which characterized Judaism; but the fact that the Incarnation brings man closer to his God does not interfere with the other fact that between God and His creature there lies an immensity of unaccomplished obligation on man's part, which, by reason of its vastness, must be worked in systematically. Christ made man's end more clear to him, and indicated the way and method of salvation, but the whole trend of His teaching goes to emphasize the fact that the gulf between God and His creature cannot be spanned without immense effort on the creature's part; no mere ebullition of "spiritual enthusiasm" will suffice to accomplish the great task. Face to face with his God, as it were, man is paralyzed by the imperativeness and massiveness of his obligations, and nothing but a methodization of his spiritual endeavors will relieve his spiritual aspirations of the stunning vagueness which would otherwise characterize them, eventually nullifying them and producing in their stead their "loathsome opposite."

It is the old, old story of a best way, and it were absurd to suppose that Christ would not have pointed out to man, unequivocally and definitely, the best way in which to shape his spiritual life into coherence; and of course, the best way as thus indicated by Christ would be the best way for all time to come.

Were it not for forms of faith man could not give expression to the religious aspect of his nature. When one places his mind into direct attitude towards the mere idea of the existence of God, his spiritual faculties are stunned, as it were, by vague and fruitless yearnings, and regulative rules of faith, which lose no value in being recognized as conditional necessities, coessential with the mortal existence of man, must assert themselves. A religious life unregulated by defined manifestations of its existence inevitably loses coherence, and dissipates itself into the thin air of spiritual egoism, and from such into something infinitely worse.

The Catholic of common sense, without any deep insight into theology or philosophy, may reply to the absurd charges of Drummond that, given the fact of God's existence, and the further fact that man's end is God, there is an antecedent certainty not only that there is a best formal way by which to accomplish that end, but also that that best way must be indicated for all time by an infallible source. For God, proposing Himself to man as his end, and revealing to him no aids towards the accomplishment of that end, would be a cruel, mocking God, and would belie His own goodness. Our infinite capacities are such that of ourselves we can do nothing really effectual towards reaching the Infinite, and therefore Christ, the Incarnate God, the bridge between the

Infinite and the finite, established and bequeathed to His faithful a method of salvation. This method, infallible as its founder was and is infallible, being prescribed for man, a social being, necessarily became embodied in an organized institution, the Church. It is impossible for the Church in an entirely impersonal way to be infallible, and as the life of any organization of human activities must always converge to a dominant, distinct and definite personality, so must the infallible power of the Church find its expression and exercise in that personality which may preside over the organization of the Church.

Many a Catholic does not appreciate his blessedness in having within the fold of the Church a centre of rest. He accepts his good fortune quite as a matter of fact, and discharges his obligations as a Catholic with perhaps a touch of perfunctoriness, and with a lack of realization of personal concern. But, of course, such is not the truth with regard to the vast majority of the faithful. If our Church had any inherent tendencies to engender religious parasitism, it would have gone by the board long since. Of course, there are people within its fold who are not capable of appreciating, with Newman, the great dignity and importance of the ego in religious matters; but the mental deficiencies of such people are not the products of the Church's methods, but are preserved by those methods from degenerating into something worse. Prof. Drummond expresses much righteous horror concerning the religion of the Catholic lower classes on continental Europe, a very trite subject of aspersion upon Catholicity which has been completely disposed of by Balmes. But, of course, it cannot be expected of a writer like Prof. Drummond to have any knowledge whatever of Catholic literature, and so he innocently repeats the old threadbare falsehoods which he has heard or read concerning Catholics and Catholicism. The undying and ever splendid, rejuvenescent vigor of the Catholic Church is an unmistakable indication of the personally vigorous faith of the great majority of her members. She encourages an active, independent frame of mind on the part of her children, but rightly insists that the truest independence is obtained when there is recognized the limit and scope of human possibilities. The experiment of withdrawing from her guidance has been tried, with results into which there can be rightly read no interpretation derogatory to the claims of the Church; and the only decent aspects of those portions of the civilized world whose people have lived upon a viciously practical extreme of Buckle's theory are such aspects as have been preserved to them by the irrepressible beneficence of Catholic teaching.

The confusion worse confounded prevalent outside the Church

has been well described by Drummond ("Natural Law," etc., p. 213):

"What is religion? What am I to believe? What seek with all my heart, and soul and mind? This is the imperious question sent up to consciousness from the depths of being in all earnest hours; sent down, alas, with many of us, time after time unanswered. Into all our thought and work and reading the question pursues us. But the theories are rejected one by one; the great books are returned sadly to their shelves; the years pass, and the problem remains unsolved. The confusion of tongues here is terrible. Every day a new authority announces himself. Poets, philosophers and preachers try their hands on us in turn. New prophets arise, and beseech us, for our soul's sakes, to give ear to them—at last in an hour of inspiration, they have discovered the final truth. Yet the doctrine of yesterday is challenged by a fresh philosophy to-day, and the creed of to-day will fall in turn before the criticism of to-morrow. Increase of knowledge increaseth sorrow, and at length, the conflicting truths, like the beams of light in the laboratory experiment, combine in the mind to make total darkness."

Is it to be wondered at that pessimism, with all its degenerating and enervating influences, has seized upon the minds of those who have rejected the bases of truth, and are futilely endeavoring to build up a new temple with the disjointed fragments? Is it surprising that Huxley has defined the exercise of man's most dignified faculty as the "malady of thought?" But the saddest phase of this lamentable state of affairs is that the self-sufficiency which has destroyed so much happiness does not seem to realize the wretchedness of its own condition, but is rather disposed to regard its degradation as elevation, and to consider the seething chaos of its mental world with the calmest self-satisfaction. The propagandists of modern infidelity and doubt have sought to tear from life all the truths that make it worth the living, advancing the most flippant, frivolous and unsubstantial reasons as sufficient necessities for the work of laceration. They have thrown millions of minds into the direst confusion, and have then impudently told them that the possession rather than the loss of the old religious truths has been productive of this confusion. Their exultant invitations to shallow, pessimistic thought, and the almost childish glee with which they propose the supposed possibilities of their irreverent criticisms are infinitely absurd—absurd, however, in a serious way, as being an exhibition of such "fantastic tricks before high heaven as make the angels weep."

But the magnificent structure of Catholic truth remains unshaken, secure for all time on the impregnable rock of Peter, and full of the divine life which shall prevail over the world. The Church will always have griefs to sustain and difficulties to contend with, but

"Nothing is a misery
Unless our weakness apprehend it so."

We cannot be more faithful to ourselves
In anything that's manly, than to make
Our fortune as contemptible to us,
As it makes us to others.

VINCENT D. ROSSMAN.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

THE MEANING OF SCRIPTURAL NUMBERS.

TO the casual reader of Scripture there doubtless does not appear any special significance in the fact that our Lord said that the good seed brings forth a hundred-fold, or in the fact that He spoke to them a parable about one, two and five talents instead of some other number, or in the fact that He chose just twelve Apostles. Such a reader sees the lesson to be conveyed without giving special heed to the numbers mentioned.

However, it is an undeniable fact that the Fathers, in interpreting Scripture, have written much to explain not merely the meaning of the text itself, but also to show why our Lord used the special numbers, one, two, three, etc., in preference to some other. In other words, the Fathers maintained that there was a symbolic meaning and a moral lesson in the numerical part of the parable or narrative, as well as in the doctrinal portion of the narrative.

In their day, and for centuries before, the intellectual bent was such that not only did words have their meanings, but numbers also were supposed to contain some mystic meaning, some symbolism, which would be clear to the initiated, at least, if not to the less privileged mortal.

So far has this symbolism become obsolete, that to-day, as I said, it does not strike the reader except in a few obvious cases, as, for instance, number three.

Some relics of the symbolism of numbers as a profane science are still to be found in the occult sciences and in various superstitious practices. These, however, are not of Patristic origin, but probably antedate the Scriptural symbolism of the Fathers, and come to us through pagan channels, which had their source in Pythagoras and his school, and perhaps even farther back still, in Egyptian mysticism.

For the better understanding of the symbolic value of numbers

in Scripture, a few words on Pythagoras and his system will not be out of place. It is claimed that Pythagoras, who lived about 500 B.C., was the originator of the theory of symbolism in numbers, although it is quite probable that what he taught was borrowed from Egypt. The fact is that very little is known about him with certainty, for so many fables have been invented that his life is a tissue of contradictions and absurdities. On account of these absurdities, St. Chrysostom¹ speaks of him with great contempt. He says of him: "He performed many tricks of magic, for a man certainly cannot converse with cattle, as is related of him, except by the arts of magic. It is perfectly plain that a man who thus interviewed brute beasts could not be a benefactor to men, but rather a source of great detriment. In sooth, human nature was capable of a higher philosophy than this." St. Chrysostom then goes on to say that Pythagoras pretended that when men eat beans they devour the heads of their parents, and, what is more to our subject, that "all things are regulated by numerical laws."¹ In which words Pythagoras would seem to imply that a mathematical and fatalistic necessity governed all things. St. Chrysostom does not in this place explicitly condemn Pythagoras's use of numbers, but there is sufficient condemnation in what he said before and in what he says of him in another place, namely, that "Pythagoras had not a single sound notion of God"; that "Those things which even a widow knows among us, Pythagoras was utterly ignorant of."²

In spite of the uncertainty connected with Pythagoras, mathematics at any rate is said to have been much advanced by him and his school; he is said to have been the discoverer of the Pythagorean proposition about the square of the hypotenuse, which is familiar to every schoolboy.

Their philosophy seems to have been based on the mathematical and numerical relations of things. Substances were regarded as abstract numbers. Numbers were in some sense the elements of the universe. Each number, therefore, had its virtue.

In a few words, their doctrine was somewhat as follows:

One represents the origin of things; it symbolizes reason, because unchangeable.

Two represents matter, brute force, evil, the female sex; it is the symbol of opinion in philosophy, because unlimited and indeterminate.

Three represents mediation, the male sex.

Four represents justice, because the first square number, the product of equals; it also represents potential ten, because $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$.

¹ In *Joan. Hom.*, 2.

² In *Joan. Hom.*, 66.

Five represents reproduction; it is the symbol of matrimony, from the union of three and two, the first male and female number.

Little is said about number six.

Seven represents virginity, because it neither produces nor is produced by any number from one to ten, that is, it has neither factors nor product; hence, it is called *παρθένος* or *Ἀθήνη*.

The heavens and all nature are a harmony composed of seven notes. Longfellow has given us a few lines on this phase of Pythagoras's doctrine:

"Great Pythagoras of yore
Standing beside the blacksmith's door,
And hearing the hammers as they smote
The anvils with a different note,
. . . . formed the seven-chorded lyre."

(To a child.)

Ten governs the universe.

Certain classes of numbers, such as odd, even and square numbers, had their special symbolism. The odd numbers represented the limited, the even that which was unlimited, because the latter could be perpetually halved, while the odd, one, three, five, seven, were indivisible, and hence limited. The place of honor seems to have been given to the odd number, as Virgil indicates in Alpheisibœus's invocation of Hecate.

"Numero Deus impare gaudet,"¹ which has been well rendered by our own Bard of Avon, "Good luck lies in odd numbers. . . . They say there is divinity in odd numbers, either in nativity, chance, or death."

Whatever uncertainty there may be about Pythagoras and his system, there is no doubt that the doctrine of the Neo-Platonists exerted an influence over the Fathers.

Philo, the Jew, is a type of this school. He flourished about 40 A.D., at Alexandria, where this school was centred. He has written extensively on the Old Testament, and is constantly discovering a deep symbolism in the numbers used.

As Philo was a Jew, his belief in the true God modified the pagan interpretation of numbers.

With him number one represents God; four is the symbol of the elements, the seasons of the year, justice; it governs music and all mathematics. It is the potential decade, as with Pythagoras, that is, adding the first four numbers, $1 + 2 + 3 + 4$, you get 10. Six is a perfect number, because of its divisibility in excess of all other numbers from one to ten; that is, it is the only number of the first ten, factorable by one, two, and three. On account of this divisibility it is a figure of the corporeal world.

¹ *Eccl.*, viii., 75.

Seven, on the other hand, denotes the incorporeal world, because, as we remarked in connection with Pythagoras, it is unfactorable, nor does it enter as a factor into ten. Therefore, it represents virginity. It represents peace and quiet, and is a type of the human mind, which dominates over the faculties of men and keeps them in peace and tranquillity. This notion is derived from God's rest after the six days of creation. This number is considered very fortunate.

One hundred denotes perfection, because Abraham was one hundred years old when he begat Isaac.

Ninety-nine is next door to perfection. It was in the ninety-ninth year that God appeared to Abraham.

The following passages from Philo will illustrate his doctrine and his method of reasoning: He wishes to explain why God adorned the heavens on the fourth day, and not on some other day.

On the first three days God separated the light from the darkness, created the firmament, the earth, and the sea, but on the fourth day the heavens received their adorning, because four is a perfect number, the cause and potentiality of ten, ten being the term of the immensity of numbers. Then he shows the relation of four to other numbers and to music, one represents a point, two a line, three a surface, four a solid, hence four is in great honor. He adds that four represents the elements and the seasons of the year.

After much of this sort, he concludes: "Since, therefore, number four has been accorded so many privileges, the Creator necessarily adorned the heavens on the fourth day with most beautiful and divine embellishment, namely, the light-giving stars."²

In another place, commenting on the six days of creation, he says: "There were six days, not because God needed time, but because the world should be created according to order; and number is proper to order." Then he proceeds to show how number six is the most fitting representation of the creation of the world, since six represents generation. (*Ibidem.*)

Whether Philo believed in the fatalistic necessity attached to numbers, as might perhaps be inferred from the way in which he speaks of the fourth day of creation, I shall not attempt to decide; however, it is certain that this fatalistic notion was repudiated by the Fathers, as we shall see later on in the case of St. Ambrose.

That the Fathers were indoctrinated with the Neo-Platonist views about numbers, there can hardly be any doubt.

Certainly there can be no doubt that even the greatest of the

² *De Creatione Mundi.*

Fathers attached much importance to this symbolism, for according to St. Augustine, "The learned and studious esteem wisdom and number."

This assertion he proves in countless places, by his treatment of the numbers mentioned in the narrative of the Gospel. For instance, in his discourse on John v., where our Lord cured the man at the pool of Bethesda, who had been sick for thirty-eight years, he says: "Even in the number of years there is a type of infirmity. He had been eight and thirty years under his infirmity. I must now explain to you at some length how this number typifies infirmity rather than health. Attend carefully: the Lord will be present to me that I may speak what is suitable and that you may comprehend. The mystical number forty, *numerus sacratus*, is a symbol of perfection, as I believe you know. At any rate, the Sacred Scriptures prove it in many places. This is the number consecrated by the fast of Moses, of Elias, and of Christ." He asks himself in what the perfection of this number forty consists, then, by way of conjecture, offers two reasons, and after giving them, he adds; "whether the first reason or the second be the true one, or whether there be some other more probable explanation which is unknown to us, but which is understood by those better versed in these things, this much is certain, that some kind of perfection in good works is symbolized by the number forty."

St. Augustine, as you see, speaks conjecturally, but admits that there is certainly a symbolic meaning in number forty. He speaks in this conjectural way in several places: "Perhaps there is a suggestion in the very number."¹ Again, "the number hints at something symbolical" (*ibidem*). In expounding number one hundred and fifty, he says: "The Book of Psalms hints clearly enough that this number has a symbolic meaning."²

From this manner of speaking it is obvious that St. Augustine recognized some lurking meaning in the number expressed in the Scripture, but that he was doubtful as to the real meaning. In other places, however, he speaks more plainly and positively. In commenting on John vi., 19, "when they had rowed about five and twenty or thirty furlongs, they see Jesus walking upon the sea, and drawing nigh to the ship." St. Augustine says: "The very number of furlongs has a meaning which should not be overlooked," and then he proceeds to explain the symbolism of twenty-five and thirty.³ Again, of number five: "This number is in special honor in the Old Testament."⁴ "Number fifty," he says, "symbolizes a great mystery."⁵ Again, in trying to explain the

¹ In *Heptateuch*, l. 4, § 2.

² In Psalm 89, § 9.

³ In *Joan. Tract.*, 25, § 6.

⁴ In *Heptateuch*, l. 4, § 2.

⁵ In Psalm 150, § 1.

reason why in certain places in the Old Testament, when an addition is made the result is not always arithmetically exact, he says: "All these things, which appear to be insoluble difficulties, have without doubt some deep reason behind them; but I doubt whether all can be reconciled, if they be taken literally, especially in the matter of numbers, for in the Scriptures we believe, and rightly too, that numbers are symbolical in an eminent degree (*sacratissimos*) and full of deep mysteries (*mysteriorum plenissimos*); this we gather from those parts of Scripture in which we have certain knowledge that the numbers are of this symbolic character."¹ The importance attached to the symbolic meaning can hardly be doubted after these words. This is St. Augustine's testimony. St. Ambrose speaks in the same way. On the way out of Egypt the Children of Israel encamped forty-two times, "which number," says St. Ambrose, "teaches us many mysteries by reason of numbers ten, four, and two included in it."²

Sometimes the number is chosen simply because it symbolizes perfection, as in the case of the six days of creation. On this subject St. Augustine thus speaks: "No one is so foolish as to dare to say that God could not have created all in one day, if He so willed, or in two days, if He so preferred, fashioning, for instance, the spiritual creation on the first day and the corporeal on the second, or creating the heavens and all their adornments on one day and the earth and all that it contains on the second. In one word, it was in His power to fashion the universe just when, how and in what time He pleased. Who will dare to say that anything can resist His will?" Then he proceeds to give the reason why six days were assigned to this work of creation. It is, he says, because number six is a perfect number, and symbolizes the completion or perfection of the work. He then draws attention to the passage in the book of Wisdom, xi. 21: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight."³ In passing we might remark that perhaps this passage, just cited, will explain the peculiar opinion of St. Augustine about the days of creation, which comes up for discussion in the treatise "De Deo Creante." While theologians and scientists are laboring to find plausible explanations of the exact meaning and duration of the days of creation, St. Augustine very simply disposes of the whole matter by saying that the day of Genesis is not a day at all, but that the whole narrative of the six days is an allegory, symbolizing a work brought to perfection in order and harmony.

Besides the general signification of perfection found in some

¹ In *Heptateuch*, l. 1, § 152.

² *Tract. de 42 mansionibus Filiorum Israel*,

³ *De Genesi ad Litt.*, l. 4, § 7.

numbers, there are other numbers which, though of definite value, still denote universality or multitude, as, for instance, in the case of the twelve Apostles, the five wise virgins, the hundred and fifty-three fishes, as we shall see more at length later on.

It should be noted here that with all their reverence for the mystical meaning of numbers, the Fathers recognized the necessity of caution in the matter, and did not regard the hidden utterance of the number as oracular. For example, when Tichonius, the Donatist, had established seven laws by which Scripture could be interpreted with almost mathematical exactness, as he pretended, among which laws was one called the law of numbers, St. Augustine protested against the excess to which Tichonius carried his doctrine. "If," says St. Augustine, "he had said that these mystical rules open out some of the hidden recesses of the law, instead of saying that they reveal all the mysteries of the law, he would have spoken truth; or if, instead of saying that these laws will unseal every sealed mystery, he had said that they can unravel many mysteries, he would have said what was true and would not have destroyed the usefulness of principles which, if used with moderation, would be very serviceable."¹

In another place St. Augustine repudiates altogether a certain interpretation given by some to number eight, because it militated against Scripture. From the passages we have cited, in which he attributes nothing more than a hint or suggestion to the number, or when he ventures merely as far as a conjecture, a perhaps, it is clear that, although much meaning was accredited to this symbolical interpretation, nevertheless the method was not used without caution. St. Ambrose was no less on his guard against Pythagoras. When commenting on the six days of creation and the seventh day of rest, he says: "Number seven is good, but we do not explain it after the doctrine of Pythagoras and the other philosophers, but rather according to the manifestation and division of the grace of the Spirit; for the prophet Isaias has enumerated seven as the principal gifts of the Holy Spirit. This number seven, like the adorable Triune God, who is without time, without limits, and the author of number, is not bound down by the laws of number."² In other words, this is a rejection of the fatalism of the philosophers, who circumscribed everything within numerical or calculable limits. We have already seen with what contempt St. Chrysostom speaks of Pythagoras.

In spite, however, of their caution, which sometimes goes so far as contempt, the Fathers speak with great respect for the mystical meaning of numbers. Even to the most sceptical mind there

¹ *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 3, § 42.

² Letter to Horontianus,

can be no doubt that certain numbers have a special sacredness, as St. Augustine says: "There is no one who does not see that number three has a sacred character from its connection with the Trinity." And so for some other numbers connected with our Lord and His earthly mission, as, for instance, seven and eight, as we shall see later on.

The method of interpretation in use among the Fathers will become clear from a few illustrations, together with a brief outline of some of the principal meanings assigned by the Fathers to the numbers in Holy Scripture. In my illustrations I shall limit myself almost exclusively to St. Augustine.

1. One denotes unity, simplicity, the origin of all, God. St. Augustine has something on this number. After explaining number seven as the number of sanctification, and then showing how a certain perfection is found in number fifty, by squaring seven and adding one, he says: "One is added to signify that He who, on account of His sevenfold operation is represented by seven, is, nevertheless, only one," as though he had said God completes all things, God, who though one and simple, has a sevenfold, yea, a manifold power.

2. The doctrine about number two is not as definitely fixed as the doctrine on some other numbers. Two is sometimes bad, or unlucky; sometimes good. For example, the second day of creation was not commended for its goodness in Scripture, as were the subsequent days, the even-numbered animals in the ark were unclean. Matrimony, which is the union of two persons, and, consequently, represented by the first even or unlucky number, is not as good as virginity, which is represented by the odd or lucky.

St. Augustine, in commenting on John v., speaks indefinitely in regard to number two; in fact, what he says does not specially characterize or single out two from other numbers. He says: "Since some good is symbolized in number two, we find this good eminently in the twofold law of charity." He has shown the imperfection of number thirty-eight, the number of years of the sick man at Bethsaida, which wants two of the perfect number forty. To reach forty, some good had to be added to the imperfection of thirty-eight, and this good he finds in the two laws of charity.

3. Obviously, number three denotes the Father, Son and Holy Ghost; like some other numbers of Scripture it denotes universality; it symbolizes the soul, because of the three powers, and because it is an image of the Trinity; or, as St. Augustine says, because "we are bidden to love God in a threefold manner, with

our whole heart, with our whole soul, with our whole mind."¹ He says elsewhere "ternarius numerus in multis sacramentis excellit."²

4. Four denotes the four quarters of the earth, the four elements, the four seasons of the year, the four gospels. As three symbolizes the soul, or the spiritual, so four is the symbol of the body, or the corporeal. "It is evident," says St. Augustine, "that number four denotes the body, on account of the four well-known elements of which it is composed, and the four qualities, dry, wet, hot, cold. Whence also it is subject to four seasons—spring, summer, autumn, winter." He then adds: "These things are as plain as day. Elsewhere number four is treated of with more subtlety, but less clearness."³

5. Five is a specially sacred number in the Old Testament, because it represents the law, as symbolized in the five books of Moses. Five is also used to signify universality or an indefinite multitude, somewhat like number three. The first meaning is illustrated in St. Augustine's sermon on Psalm 143, where he speaks of David and Goliath. "David took five stones out of the brook, and put them into the shepherd's scrip."⁴ "The five stones were the Law; for the Law is contained in the five books of Moses. And in the Law there are ten commandments affecting our salvation, to which all the other precepts are directed. Therefore the Law is symbolized both by number five and number ten. And for this reason David fought under the symbol of number five and sang to number ten, saying: 'I will sing to thee on the psaltery and an instrument of ten strings.'⁵ And yet he did not cast all the five stones, but only one, for in the number of stones he showed the number of books, in the use of one the unity of those who fulfil the Law. For Unity itself fulfilleth the Law, that is Charity."⁶

The second meaning of number five, that is multitude or universality, is exemplified in the parable of the ten virgins, five wise and five foolish, whereby number five is understood the proper control of the five senses. The five prudent virgins are those who serve God by the right use of their senses, and hence the five prudent virgins denote thousands, all those souls who will enter into the kingdom of God.

6. Six denotes creation and generation, being the sum and product of one, two, and three, as we saw above in regard to the six days of creation. It denotes the Gospel, because it adds one to the Law, number five.

7. Probably there is no number more full of meaning to the

¹ In Psalm 6, § 2.

² Ad. Jan. Epist. 55, § 33.

³ In Psalm 6, § 2.

⁴ I Kings, xvii., 40.

⁵ Ps. 143, 9.

⁶ Sermo in Psalm 143, § 5.

Fathers than number seven, meanings, too, which would appear contradictory, unless we note the fact that there is very often some other number, in relation to which it is considered. Hence by varying the term of comparison, the signification varies.

Seven denotes the creature and whatever passes with man's temporal life, for man is divided between body and soul, the former represented by four, the latter by three, as we saw above. After the seven days of this temporal existence will come the eighth day, the day of judgment. It is for this reason, says St. Augustine, that the prophet Amos several times reiterates God's angry words, "For three crimes of Damascus, and for four I will not convert it," "For three crimes of Gaza, and for four I will not convert it," "For three crimes of Tyre, and for four I will not convert it," "For three crimes of Edom, and for four I will not convert him," "For three crimes of the children of Ammon, and for four I will not convert him," "For three crimes of Moab, and for four I will not convert him," "For three crimes of Juda, and for four I will not convert him," "For three crimes of Israel, and for four I will not convert him"¹ Three in these denunciations, St. Augustine says, represents the spiritual part, and four the corporal part of man, therefore all man's sins, spiritual and sensual, are here symbolized.

An interesting and curious application of this meaning of seven is found in St. Augustine's explanation of number seventy-seven. He reckons seventy-seven persons in the genealogy of Christ as narrated in St. Luke. Ten represents the Law, on account of the Decalogue. Eleven exceeds the Law by one, and therefore represents the transgression of the Law, that is to say, sin. Seven represents man in his double nature, spiritual and corporal. Hence the product of eleven and seven, which is seventy-seven, represents all the sins which man commit, and this is why St. Luke has seventy-seven persons, ascending from Christ, through Adam to God himself, "because in this number is represented the blotting out of all sins through baptism."² The idea of creation or the creature is found in number seven for another reason also, namely, because God labored for six days and rested on the seventh.³

Seven and eight are sometimes contrasted so that seven typifies the Old Testament, because the seventh day was sacred, and eight the New Testament, because the eighth day is sacred among us on account of the resurrection of Christ on that day.

But the most common interpretation is that which regards seven

¹ Amos i., 2.

² *Sermo de Concordia Evang. Matt. and Luc.* in *generationibus Domini*, § 33; *Sermo in Matt.* xviii., 21, 27, § 7.

³ *Sermo xxiii.* in *Diabus Paschalibus*, § 10.

as the number of grace, the number of the Holy Spirit, on account of His sevenfold operation or sevenfold gifts. In this respect seven is very often contrasted with ten, the number representing the Law, because of the Decalogue.

Seven also often signifies sanctification because of its relation to the Holy Ghost, the Sanctifier, and because God sanctified the seventh day by resting after the creation.

Perfection in general is often symbolized by this number.

On the miracle of the seven loaves in St. Mark (viii. 1-9), St. Augustine says: "The seven loaves signify the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost; . . . the seven baskets of fragments the perfection of the Church. For perfection is very often typified by this number." Again, it denotes universality. "Number seven," says St. Augustine, "in which the type of universality is found, is attributed to the Church because of her universality."¹ He explains how universality is found in number seven when commenting on St. Luke, xvii. 3, 4. "If thy brother sin against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day be converted unto thee, saying, I repent, forgive him." Here seven means no matter how many times he sin against thee. "And why is it," asks St. Augustine, "that seven means as many times as may occur? An evident reason is in the fact that all time is included in the revolving cycles of seven days."² "Seven times a day I shall give praise to thee (Psalm, cxviii. 164), means I shall never cease in thy praise, for he who says seven times means all time, whence it is that in the revolution of seven days is included the passage of ages."⁴

8. Eight is sometimes the symbol of the judgment which will follow this life, which in its turn is represented, as we saw by number seven.⁵ It also very frequently typifies the resurrection, and hence eternal beatitude, for it was on the eighth day, which is the first day of the week, that Christ rose from the dead.⁶ I shall speak of this more at length elsewhere.

9. Nine is the number of the angels, on account of the nine choirs. Whether there is any connection between the number of choirs in the fallen angels and Milton's majestic lines embodying the pagan legend of Vulcan's nine days' fall from Olympus to Lemnos, is hard to say :

"Nine days they fell; confounded chaos roared
And felt tenfold confusion in their fall."⁷

¹ *Ad. Jan. Epist.*, 55, § 2.

² *Sermo in Luc.*, xvii. 3, 4, § 1.

³ Psalm, cxviii. 164.

⁴ *Sermo in Marc.*, viii. 1-9, § 2.

⁵ In Psalm 6, § 1.

⁶ *Ad. Jan. Epist.*, 55, § 23.

⁷ *Par. Lost*, vi. 871.

Again, perhaps, there is some special fitness in this relation of number nine to the fallen angels in the incantation of the witches in Macbeth :

“Thrice to thine, and thrice to mine,
And thrice again, to make up nine.
Peace ! the charm’s wound up.”

But, as St. Augustine says, when trying to solve a similar problem, I leave the solution of this to those better versed in these matters.

10. Ten denotes universality, because it contains seven, which expresses the creature, and three, which denotes the Creator, the Trinity. It also denotes the eternal reward, as figured in the denarius. Perhaps the most frequent meaning of all is the Law, on account of the ten commandments.

Thus we have a brief outline of the meaning of the first ten numbers. Examples, interesting and at times curious, might be multiplied to illustrate this meaning, but one or two will suffice.

No clearer and more comprehensive illustration of the doctrine of numbers can be had than in the passages of St. Augustine, in which he explains the symbolism of twelve as found in the number of Apostles, and of one hundred and fifty-three, the number of fishes caught by the disciples.

In commenting on St. Matthew, xix. 28, “Amen, I say to you that you who have followed me, in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the seat of His majesty, you also shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel,” St. Augustine asks : “Will only twelve sit as judges? What about the Apostle Paul, will he be separated from the others? Far be it from us, he says, to say or even think such a thing. Will he take the place of Judas? This cannot be, for Matthias was elected in Judas’s place and filled up the number twelve. Then Paul will not be among the judges perhaps, or maybe he will judge standing, as there are but twelve seats. Not so, it cannot be that he who labored more than all the others should be obliged to stand up and judge.¹ St. Paul’s case, therefore, forces us to reflect and examine carefully why twelve seats are mentioned. We find other numbers in Scripture with the indefinite meaning of a multitude. For instance, in the case of the five wise and five foolish virgins. . . . The reason why five denotes multitude is because in the number five we see represented the proper conduct of the five senses of the body. All those, therefore, who live in proper restraint, no matter how many they may be, are repre-

¹ 1 Cor., xv. 10.

sented by these five virgins. In the same way Dives,¹ while in torment in hell, said that he had five brothers. Here the Jewish people is understood, because Moses, the Lawgiver, wrote five books. Again, the Lord, after the Resurrection, bade the disciples cast their nets on the right side of the boat, and one hundred and fifty-three fishes were taken. . . .

By this number the Lord indicated the just in the kingdom of heaven. . . .

But how is it that there are only one hundred and fifty-three? The Scripture means by this number *millia millium*, thousands of thousands.² Read the Apocalypse, where you have a hundred and forty-four thousand from the Jewish people alone;³ consider the number of martyrs, and the seven thousand of whom Elias speaks, who did not bend their knee before Baal.⁴

These surely exceed one hundred and fifty-three. Therefore, the hundred and fifty-three fishes mean not merely the small number of one hundred and fifty-three saints, but a multitude of saints and just, so that all those who are predestined to the resurrection of eternal life are understood to be comprehended in those hundred and fifty-three. St. Augustine then proceeds to show how the computation is made from one hundred and fifty-three to thousands of thousands. The Law has ten precepts, while the spirit of grace, by which alone the Law is fulfilled, is called septiformis, seven-fold. Therefore, let us examine this number seventeen, and see what it means. Ten represents the Commandments, seven the grace of the Holy Spirit, by which grace the Commandments are kept. Number seventeen, therefore, contains all those predestined to the resurrection, to the kingdom of heaven, to eternal life; that is, those who observe the Law by the grace of the Spirit, not by their own power and merit.

If you take the sum of all the numbers from one to seventeen, inclusive; that is, $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + \text{etc.}$, up to 17, inclusive, you will get one hundred and fifty-three as a result. You will thus find that the immense number of all the saints is included in this small number of fishes. Therefore, as in the five virgins are included innumerable virgins; as in the five brothers of him who was tormented in hell thousands of the Jewish people are included; and as in the hundred and fifty-three fishes thousands of thousands of saints are included; so in the twelve seats not merely twelve men are represented, but the great number of the perfect." "And now," he says, "how is it that number twelve is not limited to the twelve seats, but extends to many? How is it

¹ Luke, xvi. 28.

² Apoc., vii., 4.

³ Dan., vii., 10.

⁴ III. Kings, xix., 18.

that all those who will come from all quarters of the globe are included in this number twelve? The reason is, because the universe embraces four parts, East, West, South and North, and because all those who are called from these parts are called in the Trinity, and made perfect in faith and obedience to the Trinity; since, therefore, thrice four make twelve, you see why it is that the saints who will sit on twelve seats to judge the twelve tribes of Israel include the whole world."¹

This universality of twelve is set forth by St. Augustine in nearly the same terms when speaking of the vision of St. Peter.² The four corners of the vessel or sheet represent the four quarters of the globe, which Scripture frequently mentions, East, West, North and South. Hence, because the whole world was called through the Gospel, four Gospels were written. The vessel was let down three times to indicate the command given to the Apostles: "Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." "Hence is explained, as you already know, why twelve was the number of the Apostles. For not without a purpose did our Lord wish to have twelve, and so far is that number symbolical, that when one had fallen only one could be chosen in his place."³

A word or two more on number one hundred and fifty-three may be of interest, as St. Augustine, time and again, explains the mystical meaning of these fishes.

"In this number," he says, "as in others which are full of symbolical meaning, a wonderful mystery is contained." Ten represents the ten commandments of the Law, but the Law availeth not without grace; that is, number seven is added to ten. The spirit is added to the letter, for without grace the law is vain; 'the letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth.'⁴ The sacred writings bear witness to the fact that the Holy Spirit is represented by number seven, for number seven represents sanctification. . . . Where else do you find the first mention of sanctification unless on the seventh day, on which God rested from all His work?"⁵ Fittingly, therefore, is the Holy Spirit represented by number seven. Isaias speaks of the sevenfold office of the Holy Spirit (xi. 23). Does not the Apocalypse mention the seven spirits of God (Apoc., iii. 1), while in reality it is one and the same Spirit, dividing to every one according as He will?"⁶

Therefore, adding to ten, the number of the Law, seven, the number of the Spirit, we have seventeen, the Law fulfilled in grace. This number has a subtle and interesting relation to one

¹ *Sermo in Psalm*, 49, § 8.

² *Sermo in Psalm*, 103, § 2.

³ Gen., i. and ii., 3.

⁴ Acts x., 9-16.

⁵ II. Cor., iii. 6.

⁶ I. Cor., xii. 11.

hundred and fifty-three. If you make seventeen the base of a triangle, from which the Trinity is evidently inferred, and ascend to the apex, subtracting one at each step, till you finally come to number one at the apex, you have all the numbers from one to seventeen, the sum of which is equal to one hundred and fifty-three. Therefore, not merely one hundred and fifty-three saints are here expressed as predestined for eternal life, but thousands are herein contained.

There are still other relations in one hundred and fifty-three. It is thrice fifty, with three added for the mystery of the Trinity. Fifty, which represents the descent of the Holy Ghost, is made up of 7×7 , with the addition of one. One is added to signify that He, who on account of His sevenfold operation is typified in number seven, is nevertheless only one.

Therefore, not without a purpose are these fishes one hundred and fifty-three in number, *et magni*, large ones.

That some light may possibly be thrown upon Scripture interpretation by an understanding of the symbolic meaning of numbers has been sufficiently indicated by the above citations. Besides this, the symbolic meaning of numbers is of undoubted exegetical value in the interpretation of the Fathers. Some passages of the Fathers are absolutely unintelligible, if read by themselves without having recourse to other passages, in which the mystical doctrine of numbers is explained. This is notably the case in a passage of St. Ambrose, which is found in the Breviary in the Common of Martyrs.¹ As it stands it certainly contains much mystery and obscurity, and many a priest has been at his wit's end to try to make some show of sense out of it.

St. Ambrose is commenting on St. Luke, where he speaks of the beatitudes. He says: "St. Luke has spoken of only four beatitudes, while St. Matthew mentions eight, but in these eight those four are contained; for St. Luke has, as it were, embraced in his four the cardinal virtues, while St. Matthew has included in his eight a mystical number." And here the difficulty begins. "For," he continues, "many of the psalms are written for the octave, and you have the commandment to give a portion to eight, in which words, perhaps, the beatitudes are referred to; for as the octave is the perfection of our hope, so the octave is the sum of the virtues." "Pro octava enim multi inscribuntur psalmi, et mandatum accipis octo illis partem dare, fortasse benedictionibus; sicut enim spei nostrae octava perfectio est: ita octava summa virtutum est."²

A certain commentator on St. Ambrose says this passage is, to

¹ Cf. *Brev. Rom. Comm. Plur. Mart.*, 2^o low, 3^a Noct., lect. 8^a.

² In *Luc.*, vi. 20.

many, involved in more than Cimmerian darkness, and, I believe, the ordinary nineteenth-century reader, who is unacquainted with the symbolic language of the Fathers, will readily assent to his assertion. After this remark he proceeds to clarify the darkness.

Eight is a mystical number, for two reasons: First, as St. Ambrose says, because many of the psalms are written for the octave; secondly, because we are commanded to give a portion to eight.

This is certainly mysterious enough. Let us see if perchance we can get some light and understanding from other passages of St. Ambrose.

The first reason of St. Ambrose is, that many of the psalms are written for the octave; for instance, the sixth and eleventh. By the octave is understood the resurrection of the Blessed, as appears from many passages of both Greek and Latin Fathers, and from passages of St. Ambrose himself. For instance, in commenting on St. Luke, ix., 28: "About eight days after these words, Jesus took Peter and James and John, and went up into a mountain to pray, and the shape of His countenance was altered." "Why does He say," asks St. Ambrose, "eight days after these words? Is it not perhaps because he who hears and believes the words of Christ will see the glory of Christ at the time of the resurrection? For on the eighth day the resurrection took place, whence also many of the psalms are written for the octave." Here St. Ambrose shows very clearly his doctrine in regard to the connection between the octave of the psalms and the resurrection.

That this interpretation of the first reason given by St. Ambrose in the Breviary is correct, appears from the words which he adds, "for the octave is the perfection of our hope." Surely, if anything is the perfection of our hope, it is the resurrection and our eternal beatitude, as symbolized in number eight, the day of Christ's resurrection.

This same thought is found in many places of St. Ambrose. Perhaps it may be of interest to cite one or two.

When commenting on St. Luke, xiii., 10-11: "And behold there was a woman who had a spirit of infirmity eighteen years," he says: "In the infirm woman there is, as it were, a figure of the Church; when the Church shall have fulfilled the measure of the Law (No. 10), and of the resurrection (No. 8), she shall be elevated to the sublime height of perpetual rest, and shall no longer be able to suffer the oppression of our infirmity.

"This woman herself could not be cured except by the fulfilling of the Law and by grace; the Law in the commandments, grace in baptism, wherein being dead to the world, we rise again to Christ: for in the ten precepts is the perfection of the Law, in number eight is the plenitude of the resurrection."

Speaking of the eighth encampment of the Israelites at the desert of Sin,¹ where there was question of the liberation of the children of Israel from the servitude of Egypt, he says: "So in the resurrection, which is understood by the octave, there will be question of our liberation from the servitude of corruption. Let us, therefore, pray God that we may come to the eighth encampment, or, rather, that it may come to us speedily."² It seems pretty clear, therefore, by these passages, that St. Ambrose understands by "the octave" and "the perfection of our hope," as found in the Breviary, the resurrection and our beatitude, as symbolized in the eighth day, which was the day of Christ's Resurrection.

And now for the second reason of St. Ambrose, why eight is a mystical number. "We are commanded to give a portion to eight," "for the octave is the sum of all virtues." From the structure of the phrases in the passage cited in the Breviary these two seem to be correlative; that is, "we are commanded to give a portion to eight," and "the octave is the sum of all virtues," just as the other two phrases discussed above. "Many psalms are written for the octave," and "the octave is the perfection of our hope," appear to be correlatives. What, then, does St. Ambrose mean? "We are commanded to give a portion to eight." The commandment to which St. Ambrose refers is found in Ecclesiastes, xi. 2: "Cast thy bread upon the running waters: for after a long time thou shalt find it again. Give a portion to seven and also to eight: for thou knowest not what evil shall be upon the earth." The commentator to whom I referred above, who attempts to clarify this passage, says that by eight is meant universality, as St. Jerome and several others have observed. Wherefore, *octo benedictionibus partem dare* is the same as to give one's self to the practice of all virtues. And this is why St. Ambrose adds that the octave is the sum of all virtues. The reason why he says "perhaps," "fortasse," is merely to indicate that this is a metaphorical meaning, since the passage in Ecclesiastes refers to almsgiving, or else to indicate that there is here a mystical representation of the Old and New Testament, as St. Ambrose himself declares often in other places. Thus far the commentator in question. According to this view, "to give a portion to eight" is another way of saying to practice all virtues.

How is this idea of universality found in number eight? This signification is attributed to it in many passages of the Fathers. It seems to be based on the notion of perfection and completeness which is found in the Resurrection. For after the resurrection and our consequent beatitude, there will be eternity, the plenitude and perfection, the crown and term of the period of this life. This

¹ Num., xxxiii. 11.

² *Tract de 42 Mansionibus Filiorum Israel*.

idea is well brought out by St. Ambrose himself, in a letter to Horontianus, in which he explains the very passage of Ecclesiastes which we are discussing.

"The perfection of number eight was known to the writers of the Old Testament, for Ecclesiastes, xi., 2, says: 'Give a portion to seven, and also to eight.' The Hebdomas, seven, belongs to the Old Testament, the octave to the New, for it was in the New that Christ rose, and a day of new salvation dawned for all. It is for this reason that the Old Testament gave a portion to the octave in the solemnity of the circumcision."

Further on he continues thus: "Hippocrates, the father of medicine, divided man's life into seven ages; Solon into ten periods of seven years each. Therefore Hippocrates and Solon believed in seven ages or weeks of ages. In any case, seven is prominent in their theory. But eight introduces one, eternal age, in which we grow into perfect manhood, in the knowledge of God, in the plenitude of faith. It is the octave which hath renewed the whole man. Therefore the seventh age of the world is ended, the eighth has dawned upon us, the age of grace, which hath made man not of this world, but above the world.

"The hebdomas has passed away, the octave has come; yesterday is no more, to-day has come, that to-day on which we have been warned to hear and follow the voice of God. Therefore, that day of the Old Testament has gone, and a new day has come, wherein the New Testament is consummated, concerning which the Lord speaketh:

"Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord, and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the house of Juda a new Testament. Not according to the testament which I made to their fathers on the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt. Because they continued not in my testament: and I regarded them not, saith the Lord."¹

St. Ambrose continues: "The priests of the Law, the tribunals of the Law have gone by, let us approach to the new priest, to the throne of grace."²

Thus it is that St. Ambrose exalts the octave in the priesthood, resurrection, and grace of Christ, and for this reason he wishes us "to give a portion to eight"; that is, to give ourselves to that universal, high perfection of all virtue, which frees us from the bondage of this world, and which is symbolized in number eight.

Thus the mystery of the passage we cited from the Breviary disappears: "Many of the psalms are written for the octave, and you are commanded to give a portion to eight, in which words,

¹ Heb., viii., 8, 9.

² *Ad Horontianum*, Epist., 45, § 4.

perhaps, the beatitudes are referred to; for as the octave is the perfection of our hope, so the octave is the sum of the virtues."

By the octave and eight, St. Ambrose simply means all virtue and the future resurrection in beatitude.

From the preceding remarks and citations, which are little more than an imperfect outline of the doctrine of Scriptural numbers, one fact, in conclusion, is certain, that the Fathers made great account of the interpretation of numbers; and I think it can be said with safety that there is more meaning in the numbers than we imagine, especially when men of mighty intellect like Augustine speak of numbers as they do. This conclusion is strengthened when we reflect on the testimony of chemistry, astronomy and science in general, in regard to the marvellous numerical relations which have been shown to exist in regard to time, distance, the construction of bodies, and many other phenomena. If we go back to those early days, when perhaps numbers as well as words had their meaning, it would be rash on our part to hastily condemn as foolish a word meaning or a number meaning simply because it belongs to a language which, to us, is obsolete. If, therefore, such a language of numbers did exist, it is not improbable that the great Master, in teaching His disciples, adapted His lessons to the methods in use at the time of His teaching. At the present day the numbers tell us merely plain, blunt facts, numerically counted, without any deep mystical meaning, such as St. Augustine was wont to find in them. But if we read them in the light of those who were much nearer to the true Light than we are, we shall at least hesitate to condemn a method of interpretation which, to us, has become almost an occult art; and I think we shall be forced to admit one conclusion at least, that sometimes the numbers are of real exegetical value; and perhaps they may even extend farther, and be of personal value, for in searching out the fulness of the symbolism as taught us by the Fathers, we may derive new thoughts and new light on the mysteries of the Gospel.

JOSEPH H. ROCKWELL, S. J.

WOODSTOCK.

Scientific Chronicle.

ARTIFICIAL SILK.

BOMBYX MORI was born of poor but honest parents. At least we have no honest reason for suspecting the contrary, though none but a fabulist of the Darwin school would pretend to tell us who they were or whence they came. As far as can be made out from vague historic guesses, he seems to have made his first appearance, as a full-fledged being in his own right, in China. A certain air of probability is lent to this opinion by the very order of the constituent parts of his name; for *Bombyx* is not, as might at first sight have been carelessly suspected, his Christian name. On the contrary, it is his surname, and has, as such, remained in the family even to the present time. His front name, for it is evidently an anachronism to call it "Christian," was *Mori*, just as *Craesi*, *Texor*, *Sinensis*, *Huttoni*, *Horsfeldi*, etc., were all scions of the same old stock, BOMBYX. The pith of the evidence is in the fact that the same inversion holds good in the case of Chinese proper names in general. Innumerable examples might be cited, but one or two will suffice for our present purpose. Thus, the well-known name, "Wah Sing," does not, as has, in some quarters, been rashly asserted, mean "Washing," even though members of the family have been, and, to our certain knowledge, are still engaged in the laundry business.

A proper application of the principles of sound philology would have made it evident that, since the Chinese cannot pronounce the letter *r*, the original form of "Wah" was "War," and hence that the members of this family were formerly soldiers. The name, then, of the individual in question is, in plain English, "Sing War," indicating that he used to sing, or yell, or, what amounts to pretty much the same thing, make Chinese music in war, *i.e.*, that he belonged to a military band. As another example, Hung Lam would be, according to our English way of writing it, Lamb Hung, since, as is well known, one of his remote ancestors stole a lamb and was hung for the theft, and in our idiom we prefer to put the cause first and the effect afterwards. One of Hung Lam's descendants was a butcher who made a specialty of dog's meat, and who consequently passed into history as "Hung Bow Wow" afterwards contracted into Hung Wow; they were all Hung anyhow.

The internal evidence then agrees with tradition that the first Mr. Bombyx was either a Chinaman, or that he emigrated to China at an early age. Reliable tradition has it that he was already an elderly, honorable, rich, and therefore respectable, citizen of that land at least 5000 years ago. The more advanced, or retrograde, Chinese themselves however, claim anywhere from 50,000 to 500,000 years of ancestry for

the gentleman. Still, it will not do to place too much confidence in their assertions, for we should then have finally to believe that the rest of the universe was created in China, by China, for China, merely as a highly ornamental tail-piece, of which the symbol is the everlasting Pig-Tail.

Be these things as they may, the *Bombyx* family multiplied and thrived amazingly, till its descendants became as fleas for multitude. They enriched their own land, and, in the course of time, sent out colonies to other countries, as Italy, Turkey, Greece, France, Spain and Portugal. The inhospitable climate of England did not agree with them, and they never could establish themselves firmly there. Even efforts to acclimatize them in the United States have met with but little success.

But wherever they have been known, they have commanded the respect and homage of all men. The leaders of men in church and state, as well as the ones led, the rich and the poor, the just and the unjust, the belles of fashion, the dames of folly, the devotees of prayer, even kings and queens, have bowed down before them, while art and science have followed in their train. Who are they?

Gentle reader, all that precedes has been put down in allegory. *Bombyx* is translated "Silkworm," and *Mori* means "of the Mulberry," so that, taken together, they signify the Mulberry Silkworm, the best, the best known, and the most important species, the one which feeds on the leaves of the mulberry tree. This is, of course, the proper place to enter the usual protest that the silkworm is not a *worm* at all, but a *caterpillar*, which, if it could know of the imputation, would certainly resent it as an insult.

The insect in its state of perfect development is a moth, with pale whitish wings, striped across with a broad brown bar. The caterpillar furnishes the cocoon of silk, the moth lays the eggs for a new generation of caterpillars. But as we do not just now intend to introduce a formal lesson in Natural History, we shall not weary our readers with further details on this point. For almost countless ages *Bombyx Mori* has supplied the world with silk. We have no tables of statistics at hand, but a single example will suffice to afford a glimpse of the enormous extent of this source of wealth. Great Britain alone imports annually of raw and manufactured silk to the value of something like \$100,000,000.

But is the silkworm, as some are beginning to believe, destined to share the fate of Othello? Will his occupation soon be gone? It is true he has not yet gone on a strike, nor has he yet even been "ordered out" by any mothish, or waspish, trades union, but there are indications that he soon may be. A sufficient cause of dissatisfaction will come to light in what follows.

According to reports from over the ocean, and which have found their way into the pages of the scientific press here, there is a considerable industry growing up in France, based on the manufacture of so-called silk from wood pulp. The process was invented by M. de Chardonnet, of Besançon. The exact method of preparing the wood pulp for this

purpose has not been made public, but the rest of the process is no longer a secret. It is as follows:

The pulp, thoroughly cleansed, and looking very much like thick gum, is put into cylinders, from which it is forced through pipes into the spinning department. Here the machinery is very similar to that of the ordinary spinning shed, except that one of the pipes passes to each machine. The pipes are supplied with small taps, fixed close together, and each tap has a glass tube about the size of a gas burner, at the extreme point of which is a minute aperture, and through this the pulp is forced. The glass tubes are called the "silkworms," and some twelve thousand of them are in use in the factory at Besançon. The pulp appears at the aperture as a minute globule. This a girl touches with her thumb, to which it adheres, and she draws out an almost invisible filament, which she passes through the guides on to the bobbin. Then, one by one, she takes eight, ten or twelve other such filaments, according to the thickness of the thread to be made, and passes them through the same guides on to the same bobbin. The subsequent details are practically those of ordinary natural silk spinning.

The chief difference between the natural and the artificial silk is in the greater lustre of the latter. The new product is said to take dye much more readily than the natural silk, but not to be quite so strong.

It is stated that a factory for the manufacture of this material is to be erected near Manchester, England, which will cost \$150,000. This does not strike one as a mighty undertaking, but those financially concerned probably consider it as yet but as a mere experiment, and so are trying to practice a little of the "better part of valor," lest, in case of an uprising of the silkworms, their plans should be frustrated, and the wooden silk be driven from the field by the real, old, silk silk.

SOME NEW POINTS ABOUT X-RAYS.

SINCE the last issue of this REVIEW, some new facts, and not a few new fancies, concerning the X-rays, have come to light. We have judged that a summary of the more striking ones would be sufficiently interesting to be allowed a place here.

(1) *Nature of the X-Rays*.—Mr. L. Fomm, in Germany, has obtained what he considers sufficient evidence of "interference" in the case of these rays, and from data experimentally furnished, concludes that the wave-length is at least fifteen times smaller than the shortest wave-length observed hitherto in ultra-violet light. The confirmation of his experiments, if it comes, will go a long way towards clearing up some of the mysteries that hang about this subject. After all, the name "rays" may yet prove to be no misnomer, and the value of the "X" may yet be found.

(2) *X-Rays of Different Kinds*.—Some one has lately claimed that he has discovered that the X-rays can be produced by the Wimshurst machine. This is a remarkable case of the re-discovery of a lost art, which, however, had not the misfortune of having been lost at all. We

knew all along that the Wimshurst would give X-rays, and virtually said so in our last paper on the subject. One thing nevertheless, of great importance, but which we then forgot to mention, has been further developed, and that is the proof that there are several kinds of X-rays, which differ considerably in their properties. A good account of this is given by Prof. T. C. Porter, of Eton College, who, working with a Wimshurst machine, has shown us how, at least, three kinds of rays may be produced at will.

He accomplishes this by a suitable arrangement of Leyden jars and resistance coils, but to enter into the minutiae of all this would be useless to the general reader. He calls them X_1 , X_2 , X_3 -rays respectively. The difference between them is that their relative powers of penetration are very unlike. The X_1 -rays pass easily through the flesh, but are arrested by the bones, which consequently throw a strong and clearly defined shadow on the fluorescent screen. The X_2 -rays penetrate neither bones nor flesh well, and therefore give a shadow of the whole hand. The X_3 -rays penetrate the bones almost as well as they do the flesh, and so great is their power, that they have lit up the fluorescent screen through nearly nine inches of solid brick, and thirty-seven inches of wood. It is evident that the choice of the kind to be employed will therefore depend on the object in view. Thus, to examine for a diseased condition of a bone, one should use X_1 -rays. To examine a fleshy part, X_2 -rays, and to look for a foreign object lodged in the body, X_3 -rays. What more there is in store for us in this line it is useless to attempt to prophesy, but we are probably not yet at the end of the beginning, much less near the beginning of the end.

(3) *The X-Rays as a Criterion for Death.*—We once, long ago, came across a poem in MSS. with the gloomy title: "Meditations on the River Lethe." It consisted of forty quadruped lines, hitched up in quadrigal stanzas, and curiously enough, but fortunately withal, we can now recall but just one quadriga:

"Some people have a haunting dread
Of being buried ere they're dead;
But when they're buried, then they die,
What horror in such grave to lie!"

We do recollect, however, that other lines ended with such cheerful words as: night, blight, fell, knell, yell, hell, sere, bier, drear, fail, pale, quail, wail, gloom, tomb. . . . The author was a young man, or rather a cross between a man and a boy, in college, who went under the nickname of "Calamity." This was his "given" name, at least it was the name given him by the other boys, but what his family name was we have completely forgotten. Poor fellow, he ended in an insane asylum for teetotallers, but left on record the same redeeming statement, that some folks are afraid they may be buried before they are properly dead.

There seems, indeed, to be some foundation for the belief, for learned essays, pamphlets, and even books, have been written in the endeavor

to prove the fact and to suggest some remedy. The whole business is summed up in the question ; " What is the ultimate criterion of death ? " When all the signs have been duly considered, the answer is, that the only certain criterion of death is the actual decomposition of some vital part of the body. In the case of the transpiercing of the heart by a sword, or in that of decapitation, even our friend Calamity would have no chance to entertain a doubt.

Just here the man of the X-rays steps in, and tells us that the true test is at last found, and that it is perfectly simple. He says he has discovered that dead tissue is much more opaque to the X-rays than is the living flesh. Therefore, in case of doubt as to whether you are ready for burial or not, all you need to do is to ask a friend to turn on the X-rays, and, with the fluoroscope, then and there, compare your " shadow " with that of some one who is surely very much alive. We have had no chance to try it as yet, and we wait anxiously for confirmation of the statement at the hands of competent and disinterested experimenters.

(4) *The Diagnosis of Diseases.*—It has been reported from Berlin that good progress is being made in the diagnosis of diseases, especially heart diseases, by the X-rays, but, in general, satisfactory details have not come to hand. In the case of asthma it has been observed that, during the spasms of coughing, the right half of the diaphragm becomes paralyzed, thus leaving the other half to do all the work. This accounts for the extraordinary distress occasioned by those spasms, and, in the hands of competent physicians, may suggest some efficient remedy.

(5) *Detection of Adulterations.*—Mr. Fernand Ranvez has attempted a certain number of analyses of food substances, by means of the X-ray, for the purpose of detecting adulterations, and has been rewarded with success. Chalk has been detected in flour, brick-dust in cayenne pepper, sand in spices, sulphate of barium in saffron, and many other similar sophistications. Of course, it is not expected that this method will ever take the place of regular chemical analysis, but in many cases in which organic substances have been adulterated with inorganic ones, the fraud will be easily found out, even by one who has had no scientific training in the line of chemical analysis. Success to it.

(6) *Curing the Blind.*—The daily papers, veracious as usual, on the strength of a telegram from San Francisco, started a rumor to the effect that a blind boy, colored, had been enabled to see by means of the X-rays. The story, buoyed up with the usual big, empty, head-lines, ran the accustomed course of newspaper sensations, and then fell flat, and lies so ever since. Stripped of newspaper nonsense, the simple fact was that the experiment was indeed tried, and the result was that the boy declared that he had seen a flash of light. Mr. Edison having been credited with the discovery, immediately denied having had anything to do with the case, but set to work to try the experiment on his own account. Two blind men were the subjects this time, and, after long and patient trials, they testified that they " could distinguish little points

of light." This falls very far short of the ability to see objects. The mere sensation of light, apart from the power to perceive the luminous or illuminated object itself, may have now an external, now an internal origin.

(a) For an example of the former case, close the eyes and direct them towards a strongly luminous object, as a gas jet, an electric light or the sun. The sensation of light will be quite strong, so much so that an interposed opaque body will cast a shadow, whose outline even may at times be vaguely made out. This cannot be called, in any proper sense, seeing an object; at its very best it could only be called seeing a shadow, and if this is all we can do to help the blind to see, it does not amount to very much. Many blind persons who can distinguish no object whatever, can yet perceive the difference between darkness and light.

(b) The cause of that sensation of light which is purely internal is always within us, but the sensation itself is completely overpowered when we are under the influence of the more powerful external cause. To observe it then we must exclude all light from the outside. The simplest and surest way of doing this is to wait till long after sunset, say till 9 or 10 P.M. on a moonless night. Then close the window-shutters and doors, extinguish all artificial lights, cover the head completely with a thick, black cloth, black velvet, for example, and then shut the eyes tight. In spite of all these precautions, and as many more as you wish to take, the darkness will not appear absolutely black. There will be a sensation, more or less pronounced, of light, but that light will be wholly internal, and will not enable you to discern any external object, however near to the eyes it may be placed.

Broadly speaking, this phenomenon is easily explained. The animal body is filled with a meshwork of nerves connecting every part thereof with the brain. Special organs have their special nerves. The organ of sight, the eye, is connected with the brain by a cable called the optic nerve, which itself is made up of an immense number of very fine nerves that have their origin in the retina. The true organ of hearing, the inner ear, consisting mainly of the labyrinth, with its cochlea, canals and fibres of Corti (not the curious external appendage usually called the ear), is connected with the brain in a similar manner. The nerves of taste start principally from the tongue, those of smell from the interior of the nostrils. The organ of the sense of touch is nearly the whole surface, interior as well as exterior, of the body. The epidermis or outer skin, the nails and the hair, have no nerves, and are incapable of sensation. Besides the five senses just enumerated, modern physiologists claim a sixth, which they call the heat-sense, for, say they, the sensation of heat is totally different from that of mere touch, and, moreover, it does not require contact, whereas that must always be present for the sensation of touch. But we do not know that a special set of nerves has been found for this heat-sense.

At any rate, it is through the nerves than the brain receives impressions from without, and translates them into sensations. They have been

likened to sets of telegraph wires, by which communications are kept up between the outlying districts and the centre, or capital, of the kingdom. The comparison is not, however, strictly exact. A telegraph wire will convey sound, or heat (and therefore light), or electricity (and therefore magnetism), either singly or all together. Whereas, neither heat-vibrations nor sound-vibrations are carried to the brain by the optic nerve, while light-vibrations are. Neither heat- nor light-vibrations are transmitted to the brain by the acoustic nerve, but sound-vibrations are. The vibrations by which the sense of touch is excited do not travel either by the optic, or the acoustic, or the olfactory nerves, but by a set peculiarly their own. Moreover, although we come to the knowledge of electricity and magnetism by means of our senses, yet we have no electric- nor magnetic-sense, and they must be transformed, as it were, into something that we can apprehend by one or other of the senses named above, before we can apprehend them at all, as, for example, into heat, or light, or sound, or perhaps into something that can stimulate the sense of touch.

There is another, and a very important, difference between the *rôle* of a telegraph wire and a nerve. If you start electricity at one end of a wire, what reaches the other end will still be electricity. If you set up sound-waves at one end of it, what reaches the other end will still be sound-waves, and so on of the rest. But if a nerve be stimulated, be the cause what it may, the result will be the sensation with which that nerve naturally has to do. It looks as if the nerve were not merely a carrier, but that it has a good deal to do as an efficient cause in producing the sensation. If, then, the optic nerve be compressed or touched at any point of its length, or disturbed in any way, we experience an internal sensation of light, which, however, we instinctively refer to the eye as if it came from an outside source. This is why a man who runs his head against a policeman's club, or sits down too suddenly on the ice, will "see stars," or mayhap a whole firmament of them, whose Right Ascension and Declination are to be found in no published catalogue. In the same way, pressure on, or contact with, the acoustic nerve will give rise to internal sounds that have no external cause. Thus, in some cases of catarrh of the Eustachian tube, every pulsation of the blood produces an internal sound that strongly resembles the beat of a muffled base-drum keeping perfect time with the throbbings of the heart. It is a weird experience, and one to which it takes a long time to get accustomed.

When we took up this thread we did not intend to spin quite so long a yarn, but, even if not highly ornamental, it may prove somewhat useful, and so we let it stand. But, alas, where is the promised "easy explanation?" Why, right here. Even in our normal condition of good health the flow of blood which nourishes the optic nerve, and the vital processes that are going on within it, suffice to stimulate it enough to cause an internal sensation of light without any help from outside objects. In the case of the sense of hearing, the acoustic nerve being generally less sensitive than the optic, the corresponding phenomenon is

rarely noticed, though some cases have been observed. If the optic nerve is paralyzed or dead, then one would suppose that no sensation of light, even internal, would be manifested, and that absolutely black darkness would be the result, and that neither X-rays nor any other rays could make any impression. The following case might perhaps tend to make us modify this opinion :

A short time ago, Dr. Louis Bell tried the X-rays on a blind man. The subject was a very intelligent man in middle life, who became blind five years ago as the result of paralysis. He is, to all intents and purposes, totally blind ; for while now and then able to catch a spark or faint ray of brilliant reflected sunlight, he is quite unable to notice arc or incandescent lights within a few feet of his face. The cause of his blindness is stated by the physicians to be paralysis of the optic nerve, substantially complete in both eyes.

On placing him a couple of feet from the tube and exciting it, he at once distinguished the illuminated area and described correctly its general dimensions and shape. The field of vision, however, seemed to be small. He was plainly able to distinguish the flickering of the tube. A metallic sheet cut off this vision entirely, and he was able to see a bunch of keys, the fingers, and so forth, shadowed on the illuminated surface of the tube.

Now, the interesting feature of the experiment was this : A sheet of cardboard cut off vision as completely as the metal, and the man could see forms and letters cut out of cardboard, as shadows against the tube. Closing the eyelids entirely shut out the effective rays, and he could get no trace of light from the fluoroscope.

In this case the X-rays produced no sensation of vision, for vision was stopped off by a medium highly transparent to such rays. On the other hand, certain rays delivered by the tube were clearly visible to him, although they were unable to pass through cardboard or the eyelid.

The effective rays were apparently not the ordinary ultra-violet ones, for an arc light, rich in these rays, is invisible to him, and he was totally unable to see any trace of a most brilliant volley of sparks delivered from a coil a few feet from his eyes.

What now have we here? These rays, which impressed themselves on the almost dead retina, are certainly not X-rays, since they were refrangible and formed an image of the tube. They are just as certainly not light, in the ordinary sense of the word, for to light rays the man's eyes do not respond. Neither are they ultra-violet rays, as we have already seen. What then? Are they, perhaps, still another set of rays not previously dreamed of? Perhaps; but, in any case, we seem to have stirred up a nest of hornets that bid fair to plague us for a long time to come.

(7) *Dangers and Injuries.*—In the last number of this REVIEW we said that no dangers had yet manifested themselves in the use of the X-rays. Since that date, however, serious troubles have occurred in quite a large number of cases, as well in this country as in other lands. We ask permission to relate two or three typical cases.

Professor Stine, of Chicago, gives the details of one that came under his own personal observation, and which we take the liberty of condensing. A patient had been exposed to a strong action of the rays on his back, for about two hours at a time, on each of two consecutive days. Nothing abnormal was noticed at the time; but in a few days an irritation and itching sensation were perceived over the parts onto which the rays had been directed. The skin became dark brown, or mahogany color, and, in a few days more, red and inflamed. It peeled off in due time, and left no unfavorable after-effects. "The whole occurrence resembled a bad sunburn," says the professor. Other observers have made the same comparison.

Our own experience with sunburns differs from all this in many particulars. When we were young and handsome enough not to care, we often gaily courted a sunburn.

Time A bright and glorious summer day.

Place A rowboat in a quiet bay.

Companions . Other fellows just as gay.

Occupation . A-fishing, but a-catching not.

Result Except a sunburn, mighty hot.

In all our experience there never was any question of weeks, or even of days, of incubation before the trouble broke out. That very same evening every friend that met us would be sure to ask: "Where did you get that nose?" And then they would ring the changes by emphasizing each several word in turn.

In the case of sunburn the first effect is the reddening of the skin, the inflammation. The second is the shedding of the epidermis, which is last in the X-ray burn. If you are pretty tough, a second or a third dose of sunburn will lead you to the third stage, in which you will turn brown, after which you are thoroughly seasoned, and can then stand any amount of exposure without inconvenience. Not so it seems with the X-rays, for, at least as far as has been observed up to date, a first burn renders the skin supersensitive and very liable to a second attack, so that some persons have been obliged to suspend operations entirely. Among others, it is reported that Mr. George L. Newcomb, who, for the past six months, has been actively engaged in work with the X-rays, has been obliged to abandon his work, having experienced severe swelling of the right hand, with the loss of the skin, hair and finger nails. He has since fully recovered all that he had lost, and has, as it were, a new hand again.

But we must return to Professor Stine. In his comments on this subject, he says he has reasons to believe that the injuries are not due to the X-rays at all, but to the ultra-violet ones which accompany them. That they are not due to the X-rays we are willing to believe, and this for reasons to be given later on. That they are the result of the ultra-violet rays we do not believe. The professor's reasons may be good; but as he does not state them, we have no means of judging of their worth. Still, as we are living in the midst of plenty of ultra-violet rays twelve hours a day on an average the year round, it would seem that they cannot

be so very dangerous after all, and that we must attribute to some other cause the injuries reported. Of this a few more words anon.

The next case is that of the well-known electrician, Professor Elihu Thomson, who made an experiment with the X-rays for the express purpose of getting at the truth with regard to these injuries. For this end he generously refrained from calling in some poor relation, but tried the experiment on his own person. As a scientist he went about the business scientifically. He protected by a metal plate the greater portion of his left hand, leaving only the little finger uncovered. This he exposed very close to a strong X-ray bulb for half an hour. No effect was perceived till more than a week later. "Then the finger reddened, became extremely sensitive, swollen, stiff, and, to a certain extent, painful. A slight blow or pressure would produce sharp, burning pains." In the course of the next three weeks appeared a blister, covering the whole of the exposed side of the finger. This last statement is important, because it tends to show that the effect is not due to the X-rays themselves, for *they* pass entirely through, but to something whose action penetrates to a certain distance only. Professor Thomson remarks that "the long period of incubation remains to be explained," and notices that this is akin to what takes place in germ diseases. Anyhow, he found what he was looking for, and concludes by saying: "Personally, I have been quite more than satisfied with the results of my inquiry into the action of the rays on my own tissues."

Besides a number of other cases that have been reported by the scientific press, there are many that have not been rushed into print. Several of the workmen and attendants in Mr. Edison's X-ray laboratory have been severely afflicted. One of these latter came under our own observation. The young man had been exhibiting the bones of his right hand, day in and day out, and several hours a day, for weeks together, but was finally obliged to give up and put his hand in a sling. At the time we saw it the hand was badly swollen and very stiff. The skin was hard and dry and somewhat cracked, while the color was a very dark brown with a strong tinge of *green*. If we recollect right, there had been no blistering.

There have been reports of perfect recovery, but none, as yet, of any permanent injury, though it is evidently too early to come to a settled conclusion on this point.

Now, as to the cause of these injuries. We have already mentioned two opinions, one of which is that it is the X-rays themselves that do the damage; the other that it is due to the ultra-violet ones which accompany them. Neither of these seems satisfactory. Mr. Tesla, who has probably worked these rays up to as high a point as anybody else, speaks quite dogmatically on the subject: "They (the hurtful effects) are not due to the Roentgen rays, but merely to the ozone generated in contact with the skin. Nitrous acid may also be responsible to a small extent. The ozone, when abundantly produced, attacks the skin and many organic substances most energetically, the action being no doubt heightened by the heat and moisture of the skin. After exposing the hand, for instance, for some time, the skin loses its elasticity, which

causes a tension and pain, and subsequently an inflammation and blistering." Mr. Tesla has noticed that rubber insulation, however heavy, on the terminals of a high-frequency coil, is ruined in a very short time by the ozone generated. This accords perfectly with what we noticed nearly twenty-five years ago, viz., that the action of the ozone generated in working the Holtz machine injured the ebonite supports so that the machine would not give its best results. We surmised that the sulphur of the ebonite was converted into sulphuric acid on the surface of the supports, and so spoiled their insulation. Having analyzed the substance found on the supports, we proved our surmise to be correct. After replacing the ebonite supports by ones of glass, we had no further trouble, and the machine has worked well ever since. We learned from this bit of experience to avoid ebonite, whenever possible, where high-tension electricity is to be employed.

(8) *Prevention of Injuries.*—"An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," says the proverb. The facts related in the last paragraph being so, it is not difficult to suggest a remedy, or, rather, a prevention, for the injuries attributed to the X-rays. Mr. Tesla even proposes two of them. The first and more radical one is to hinder the access of air to the skin while exposing, as, for instance, by immersion in oil. Ozone is an extremely active form of oxygen, and is produced in large quantities by the action of high-tension electricity on the oxygen of the air. Therefore, if we exclude the air, we cut off the supply of raw material, and the ozone works have to shut down. In some cases this would be clearly impracticable, and in almost any case very inconvenient. We, therefore, are driven to resort to the second method, which, though less radical, seems to be amply sufficient for all practical purposes.

This second method consists in allowing the electricity to have its way, as far as the producing of the ozone is concerned, but in hindering it from reaching the skin after it has been manufactured. To accomplish this, we may guard the exposed parts by interposing between the person and the bulb a screen of aluminum, either in the form of a wire-netting or of a thin plate, connected electrically to the ground. The induction will then take place between the bulb and the screen, and not between the bulb and the tissues of the subject. In this case, whatever ozone is generated at the surface of the screen will be diffused and diluted to harmlessness in the surrounding air. Mr. Tesla gives us to understand that, since he has made use of this arrangement, he has experienced no trouble. An efficient prevention for any possible dangers being provided, we may now revel to our heart's content in the mysteries of the still mysterious X-rays.

T. J. A. FREEMAN, S. J.

Book Notices.

THE AMBASSADOR OF CHRIST. By *James Cardinal Gibbons*, Archbishop of Baltimore. 12mo., pp. 405. Baltimore: Murphy & Co.

A new book by Cardinal Gibbons! The appearance of this work is a notable event in the literary world. The distinguished position which the author occupies in the American hierarchy, together with his learning and piety, give the assurance that anything which comes from his pen will possess unusual value, while the great excellence of his previous works, and their phenomenal success, bespeak for the new book a royal welcome.

On former occasions the Cardinal has defended the teachings of the Catholic Church and the principles of Christianity; now he sets forth the dignity, excellence, power, and authority of the Catholic Priesthood. This book may not appeal to hundreds of thousands of readers, as did former works by the same author, nor will so many draw wisdom directly from its pages, but if it instruct those who are the guides and teachers of the people, and make them more zealous, more holy, and more learned, its effect will be so far-reaching that it will be felt not only by thousands, but by millions of Catholics throughout this country and other parts of the Christian world.

If the work of the Christian teacher is so excellent, that the Holy Spirit says: "They that instruct many to justice shall shine as stars for all eternity," who can exaggerate the excellence of the work of him who instructs the Christian teacher! This is the aim of the Cardinal's new book, and its appearance is certainly a notable event in the literary world.

In treating the subject of the Christian Priesthood, His Eminence follows the general lines laid down by pious authors who have preceded him in the same field. After pointing out the excellence of the sacerdotal state, he considers the question of vocation, and the duties of seminarians. From the seminary it is but a step to the altar and the mission with all its exacting requirements. The learned author takes up each duty of the Priesthood and considers it in all its bearings, pointing out to his readers the virtues that they must possess who would discharge these duties well, and the means to acquire those virtues.

In general it may be said that the same qualities which have distinguished the Cardinal's previous works distinguish this one—firm grasp of subject, logical arrangement, apt illustration, full and accurate quotation, and concise, clear language. These, however, are not the most distinctive features of the work. Other authors have written on the same subject, whose books have had all of these excellencies, and yet they do not appeal to the Catholic Priesthood of America with near the same force. If they did, a new work on the subject would not be needed. But this book appeals to the seminarians and priests of every rank in America with peculiar force, because it is written by a member of the American Hierarchy, who has labored as priest, bishop, archbishop, and cardinal on American soil for all the years of his priestly life. He knows well the difficulties and dangers that beset the path of the priest in every country, and the virtues and qualifications re-

quired for the work of the ministry, but he knows particularly well the obstacles that lie in the path of the American priest, and the special equipment which is required to fit him for his work. He has overcome these obstacles when they were greater and more numerous than they are now; he has well equipped himself for the work, when the aids to such equipment were very much fewer.

Here, then, is an American Cardinal who has been a student in an American seminary, who has labored so successfully as priest, bishop, and archbishop that he has earned the love and respect of the American people, Protestant as well as Catholic, and who has been honored by Our Holy Father with the dignity of the cardinalate, addressing his fellow-priests of America, and telling all the secrets of his success. He has exemplified in his own life the excellence of all the precepts that he lays down in this book. He has put them all into practice, and they have borne fruit. How much more strongly, then, they appeal to us than do the words of some unknown ancient author who has written perhaps in a foreign tongue for the priests of another century and another clime. Nor must we forget to note that the Most Eminent Author has taken care to make his illustrations keep pace with the other good features of his work. While he does not neglect the examples which the history of other times and other countries furnish, he draws very largely for illustration on the history of our own time and country, and on his personal experience. This gives a peculiar force and aptness to the examples that they otherwise would not have.

Altogether, we may in all truthfulness say, here is a book whose appearance is a notable event in the literary world, and which will make the Priesthood of America, and other Christian countries more zealous, more holy, more learned.

J. P. T.

PHILOSOPHIA LACENSIS SIVE SERIES INSTITUTIONUM PHILOSOPHIÆ SCHOLASTICÆ
EDITA A PRESBYTERIS SOC. JESU IN COLLEGIO QUONDAM B. MARIE AD LACUM:

INSTITUTIONES PSYCHOLOGICÆ SEC. PRINCIPIA S. THOMÆ AQ. AD USUM SCHOLASTICUM ACCOMODAVIT. *Tilm. Pesch, S.J.* P. I., Psych. Naturalis. Lib. I. Friburgi. St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1896. Pp. xv., 470. Price, \$1.90.

The "Cursus Lacensis," of which this volume forms part, embodies the instruction in philosophy given by the Jesuit professors in the house of study—Maria Laach—belonging to the Society before its exile from Germany in 1872. The design of publishing this series of advanced philosophical texts sprang from the new life infused into Thomistic studies by the Encyclical of Leo XIII.—*Aeterni Patris*—of August 4, 1879. The initial volume, treating of natural philosophy, appeared in 1880, from the same hand that has given us the present work on psychology. Those who are familiar with that work can point to none other, except, perhaps, to its more extended and less didactic counterpart in German by the same author—"Die Grossen Welträthsel"—that treats the underlying principles of physical science with so much erudition and wealth of interpretation. Five years later a second portion of the course was published in a volume dealing with general ethics. The ill health of its author, Fr. Meyer, has delayed the appearance of the second half of this classical work on moral philosophy.

Between 1887 and 1890 were issued the three handsome octavos, which, in the average six hundred pages allotted to each, cover with the adequacy demanded by the subject, the field of Logic. If we may overlook some inconveniences in the arrangement of the material, Fr.

Pesch's "Institutiones Logicales" stands to-day without a peer in the bibliography of neoscholastic logic.

Three years later came the "Natural Theology," by Fr. Hontheim, a work deserving companionship with its predecessors in the course. Students interested in this class of literature have been eagerly looking for the present volume on psychology. Never before has there existed so large and fervent a devotion to this branch of knowledge as has been enkindled to-day. Psychology may be called one of the fads of the times. Diluted and sweetened to the youthful taste, it is administered to the lads and misses in our common schools. No college curriculum would be worth the mention that did not include a more or less extended study of the subject, nor would the university be regarded as fairly equipped for its essential work in which a psychological laboratory did not exist, provided with all kinds of mechanism for measuring the quantity, time-relations, etc., of mental phenomena. Doubtless much good comes, or may at least come, of all this feverish interest in the physiological side of psychology, and what harm there may be in the countless false inferences and hasty generalizations, to say nothing of the megacephalousness developed in boy and girl, is, we may take it, accidental—an abuse of the essentially good. The truth here, as elsewhere, is great enough to prevail, and in the end the "new psychology," cleansed of accretions from materialism, will be found verifying, illustrating, filling out the content of the traditional philosophy. Be all this as it may, the student of the latter philosophy looks with special interest on new works by its professed masters to see in what way they view the recent tendencies, what they find in physiological-psychology apt for assimilation, what for rejection. Works of this kind exist in German, such as, for instance, those by Drs. Constantine Gutberle and Engelbert Fischer, as well as in the French of Mercier, Bonriot, Surbled, Farges and others. Hitherto our Latin text-books have followed pretty much the well-beaten paths, little or no attention being shown in them to the physiological side of psychic life. Designed as they almost exclusively are, to be guides in philosophy for youths preparing to enter on the study of theology, their purpose and limits leave to the professor to supplement by special lectures what he may deem necessary for putting his pupils *au courant* with the purely experimental methods and results. In the larger, more exhaustive volumes of the "Cursus Lacensis" the Catholic student will naturally look for some of the concrete facts and inductions of modern psychology, or at least for a fuller discussion of the subjects and problems it has raised. This expectation will be in no wise lessened when it is known that the psychology of the series is in the hands of Fr. Pesch. The breadth of view he has shown in the natural philosophy and the logic warrants the hope of like erudition and thoroughness of analysis being brought to bear on the present subject. A rapid survey will suffice to show in how far the hope is here realized, in how far suspended until the advent of the after divisions of the work.

In this, as in the author's other volumes, the student enters the subject through its history. A very compact narrative traces the historical picture of the subject matter of psychology (pp. 2-14), and furnishes data for the apt definition embodied in the etymology of the term itself—the *scientia de anima*, or in fuller form: *scientia quæ ab operationibus vitalibus viventium corporeorum notis ad naturam sive essentiam primæarum principii interni, quod anima appellari solet, detegendam et declarandum analyticè progreditur; et ex natura sive essentia animæ detecta et declarata ad declarandum melius operationes vitales synthetice iterum*

regreditur (p. 15). A working definition of the *ψυχή*—or *anima*—is here assumed as “the root principle of life in a living organism”; the final, perfected definition as the “*principium substantiale in viventibus corporeis essentialiter a materia distinctum, quod est ultima ratio interna vitæ illorum*” (p. 16), embodies the outcome of the entire scientific investigation, yet determines at the start the general subject matter (*objectum materiale*)—*omnis anima ejusque proprietates et operationes*—as well as the special point on which the whole study focuses (*objectum formale*), the precise nature of the *anima*.

Thus, too, we have the border lines between psychology and its neighbor sciences—logic, ethics, æsthetics, physiology, anatomy, anthropology, zoology and botany—determined (16–18). The definition also suggests at once the sources of psychological doctrine—consciousness, external observation and experiment being primary the sources, all the biological sciences, together with philology, history, ethnography, etc., adding their respective data as adjunct material for the building up of a complete structure of psychology (23–26).

Much has been written in recent years on the method of psychology. Our author shows the inadequacy of the various forms of the purely *a posteriori* or empirical method advocated by different writers, as well as the danger and insufficiency of the purely *a priori* or metaphysical, and argues justly in favor of the mixed method—the analytico-synthetic—which, as the above definition of psychology manifests, starts analytically from facts of inner and outer experience and works inwards towards a rational explanation of this root or cause and then regresses from the conceptions and principles thus established to a fuller interpretation of the original data. This method, besides its conformity with common sense and sane logic and the nature of the living organism, finds its justification in the satisfactory results it has produced in the traditional philosophy (pp. 26–34).

Definition and method both give the main lines and divisions of the science. The first part, physical or natural psychology, will deal mostly, though not exclusively, with phenomena, and will, therefore, advance chiefly on ways analytical. The second part, anthropological or metaphysical psychology, will discuss more minutely the nature of the subject as already presented through experience, and will, consequently, be built up principally by synthesis, by deduction (34–36).

At the outset we are confronted with the position of materialism negating the possibility of a scientific psychology in the sense here advocated. The author devotes some space to establishing the reality of his science and its just claim on the *anima* as its proper subject-matter (pp. 36–42). Thus far we have spoken of the vestibule of the building. We cannot here penetrate farther into the interior than may be necessary to catch a bird's eye view of its ground plan.

The present volume covers but one book of the first part of psychology, the part which the author calls “physical or natural psychology,” “biological psychology” or “philosophical biology.” The discussion starts with a general description of a living organism, its parts, and the respective functions of the latter, especially as these directly subserve cognition. We next advance through a classification of vital phenomena to a conception or definition of life, to the consequent differentiation of the living from the non-living world, to a philosophical classification of the animate orders, to a closer determination of the substantial nature of the principle of life, its “localization” in and relation to the organism, to a yet more precise definition of the special nature of the soul in man, its immateriality, simplicity, unicity, origin, etc., as well as to a like definition of the “*anima*” in animal and plant.

At first sight, as one surveys the field here covered, one is apt to think himself launched of a sudden on the deepest depths of metaphysics, and to suspect that the author has lost sight of the course he had originally mapped out. A little close reading, however, is all that is necessary to discern that the author is all the while keeping close to facts and simply stating the legitimate inferences which may be readily verified by appeal to the empirical data he has gathered and classified and holds close to his deductions.

At the same time we cannot but regret that Fr. Pesch has sacrificed to some degree the usefulness of his work by such rigid adherence to an ideal plan and method. Here, as in his "Logic," he has in view the advantage of novices in philosophical study. Accordingly, he lays down at the start the leading facts, concepts and definitions of his subject, develops these to a moderate extent and leaves the fuller unfolding of the same to the after portions of the work. There will follow the present volume another, in which organic functions will be explained synthetically, in the light of the analytically obtained content of this first book. Then the second or more pronouncedly metaphysical division of psychology will come to the front and fall into four divisions or books dealing respectively with the human intellect, the will, the life of the soul within and without the body. The latter half will therefore apparently demand much reference to and no little repetition of doctrine laid down in the present opening book. This plan has, of course, its utility for beginners. We believe, however, that only to well-advanced students of philosophy and to professors will these volumes be of real service, and from this point of view it would seem preferable to have left a large amount of the discussion presented in this first book, especially that bearing upon the specific nature of the human soul, its origin and relation to the body, to the anthropological or metaphysical half of the science, and to have confined the matter here to the more exclusively empirical side of the subject, to what concerns sub-human biology, and the processes of man's life intrinsically dependent on his organism. This, however, is a matter in which there is room for some variance of opinion.

From what has been said the reader most interested in the "new psychology" may infer that the physiological side of the subject has received in this volume no very considerable treatment. Apart from the compressed description of the animal organism (pp. 44-80) there has been no call for further doctrine on this line. The second book, dealing with organic functions, will probably give occasion for ampler discussion of recent theories. Two more volumes, we believe, are to be given to psychology, which, with the second volume, also promised of Fr. Meyers' "Ethics," will bring this magnificent course of neo-scholastic philosophy to its completion. The absence in the series of a special volume devoted to general metaphysics may be explained by the fact that the third volume of the logic deals with the concepts or ontology, under the caption of *Logica Realis*.

No words of commendation need here be added concerning this monument to Catholic philosophy. Outside of the gigantic work of Fr. Urraburu, still unfinished, there has as yet been produced nothing in its line comparable to the "Cursus Lacensis," either for breadth or depth, thoroughness of treatment, erudition or timeliness. Works such as this are possible in our day only to scholars trained by the discipline that makes the Society of Jesus what it is within the Church, as well as outside her pale, in every department of intellectual endeavor.—F. P. S.

BROTHER AZARIAS' ESSAYS. Vol. I., Essays Educational, pp. 283; Vol. II., Essays Philosophical, pp. 250; Vol. III., Essays Miscellaneous, pp. 273. Chicago: D. H. McBride & Co. 1896. Price, \$1.50 per vol.

It is a coincidence no less felicitous than noteworthy that Br. Azarias should have left scattered through many a review and magazine and lecture manuscript just such essays as when fitted together give an adequate portrait of his mental features, and that by consequence those whose well-loved task it has been to gather up his literary remains should find that in this posthumous collection Azarias lives again in traits here perhaps more strongly reflected than in those by which he stands revealed through the works he himself had put forth in enduring form.

No one familiar with the writings of Br. Azarias can fail to have admired the many—but especially the triple-sidedness of his mental endowments—endowments which, though distinct each in its own formality, were none the less interfused in every work he produced. Br. Azarias was first and last a teacher—an educator. To teach, however, to educate, was the function, the deliberately chosen profession of his life. Back and below was the scholar, the philosopher, the man of letters. A scholar in the higher meaning, the term has come to assume “a cultivator of studies, a student of knowledge in its largest sense,” as Sumner put it. The instinct of this endowment bore him along the lines on which his professional work was laid to the sources and streams of the historical facts and principles and theories that entered and enter into the education of the human mind. The keen insight which patient, conscientious labor had given to this mental quality, the critical habit thus engendered, enabled him to discern with unflinching accuracy primal facts from the accretions which passion or prejudice or other personal subjectiveness had fastened thereon, while the fulness of his intellectual stores, gathered from countless sources of past and present lore, allowed him to draw forth the old and the new for the up-building of those works with which he has enriched our Catholic historical literature. Nothing probably that the author produced exemplifies so vividly the scholarly side of his mind as the present volume of educational essays, essays to which, by the way, the pathetic interest attaches of their representing the work in which his life went out at the Champlain Catholic Summer School. In them he carries his readers into the early Christian schools, describes the beginnings and development of the cloistral schools, and the larger growth of the Palatinate institutions. Primary schools of the middle ages! “Time was, and that not very long ago, when men were convinced that in France [especially] primary education began after the Revolution. They could see nothing previous to that epoch but an ignorant people, deprived of all educational facilities for their children. That there was primary education prior to 1789 is still to many an unknown fact” (p. 171). And yet a statute of the diocese of Rouen, issued in the year 1230, commands “the clergy frequently to exhort their parishioners to be careful and exacting in sending their children to school,” and turning to benighted Italy, the home of the Papacy, we find at the same date, “out of a population of 90,000 in Florence, 12,000 children attending the schools, a ratio of school attendance as large as existed in New York city in the year of grace 1893” (p. 177).

“To many, indeed, it will be a surprise,” as Cardinal Gibbons remarks in his neat preface to this volume, “to learn that the education of the young was a matter of great solicitude to the bishops and priests of the so-called Dark Ages. Br. Azarias shows that primary schools

were established and maintained not by taxation, but by the self-denying efforts of teachers and the voluntary contributions of the people" (p. v.). From the school we are taken to those centres of intense strife—intellectual and often otherwise—the mediæval university and university college, and afterwards we are told of the rise and growth of normal schools. On both these much misunderstood and misrepresented subjects the author pours floods of new light from original and recondite documents. Had Br. Azarias written nothing but this collection of educational essays he would have deserved the gratitude of Catholics, for, excepting Miss Drane's larger though somewhat less erudite "*Christian Schools and Scholars*," we have nothing in English that presents so reliable and thorough a vindication of the relations of the Church to mediæval education.

Overlying and surrounding the scholarly quality there was the philosophical habit, the germs whereof were richly native to the mind of Azarias, but whose strength and reach were the outcome of his own cultivation. Reading the contributions he has left to fundamental science, one almost regrets that on it alone he had not centred his mental energies. The history of education would have suffered thereby, but the cause of sound philosophy have gained.

The critical judgment he always showed in historical research, penetrating into and classifying the facts that make the analytic groundwork of philosophy, was equalled, if not excelled, by the broad synthetic range of vision that enabled him to gather under principle and definition far outreaching fields of reality and theory. His intellect, naturally Aristotelian, was moulded on the same type by rigid discipline, yet not to the casting out of its Platonic richness.

Were we asked for illustration of this dual quality of the author's mind we would at once point to the opening essay of the second volume before us. Prepared originally for the summer session (1887) of the Concord School of Philosophy, and afterwards published apart (London: Kegan Paul, 1888), the essay on "*Aristotle and the Christian Church*," for grasp of historical data, for fulness of development, for philosophical interpretation, deserves the place of honor assigned it in the present volume. The theme was congenial to the author's taste and lines of study, for, as has just been said, his mind was cast in Aristotelian mould, and the work of his life had advanced by Aristotelian methods. The essay is a treasure-house of fact and interpretation. The influences of the Stagyrite in the early Church, in the East and the West, amongst the Arabs, in the Catholic universities—these are subjects opening out wide fields for historical investigation and portraiture. The spirit in which the schoolmen worked, the metaphysics, psychology and ethics of the Philosopher, present the material with which Azarias has interwoven a closely wrought tissue of the Christianized philosophy of Aristotle.

Besides this masterly essay we have one on the nature and synthetic principle of philosophy and another on the symbolism of the Cosmos. These two combined afford an admirable illustration of the author's synthetic power, intensified, as it was, by Catholic faith and life. A paper on some psychological aspects of education makes, from an analysis of the human intellect a plea, against the over-crowded college course and for a more judicious adaptation of an elective system of studies. The closing essay exhibits the sociological principles and teachings involved in the Encyclical of Leo XIII. on the conditions of labor.

Lastly, Brother Azarias was a man of letters in the finest meaning of

that term, a poet in feeling, (though he wrought but seldom in verse), in imaginative power, in instinct for the beautiful, in delicately artistic sense. Neither search for the dry bones of history, nor the dissecting processes of criticism, nor much dwelling in the colder heights of metaphysics dimmed or weakened or benumbed his literary strength. On the contrary, he bore with him into the past a light of soul that illumined all that he saw, a resurrecting power that gave life to what seemed dead, while over the skeleton forms of ontology he laid the flesh and blood of their human-sidedness, and the graceful vesture that made the abstract to stand out in the vivid reality and beauty of the concrete. Who with a mind for the deeper true and a sense for the beautiful has wandered into that garden of choicest fruits and rarest flowers, "Phases of Thought and Criticism," and has not returned again and again to linger over its many charms? *Le style c'est homme*. Never was the aphorism more truly verified than in that work of Azarias. Those who knew him best feel how here, in more than one way, the author's life-blood went out into printers' ink, and how he who saw so clearly into the depths of thinking into the meaning and value of the ideal in literature, into above all the spiritual sense of masterpieces like the *Divina Comedia* and the *In Memoriam*, wrought into the pages of that book the tissue of his inmost mental life—a life so delicately in touch with what is deepest, and highest, and purest in literature because its own spiritual sense had been cultured by long study and assimilation of what is truest and most beautiful in the world of letters.

Another apt example of the author's artistic sense and power might be drawn from the third volume of the present collection of essays, especially from the first paper on Literature, its nature and influence, from the third on the Sonnets and Plays of Shakespeare, and the fourth on the Culture of the Spiritual Sense. But we are running beyond our limits. For the rest, this portion of the series, being miscellaneous in character, contains, besides the essays just mentioned, four others on Religion in Education, our Catholic School System, the Outlook of our Colleges, Church and State, subjects which, falling for the most part directly within the author's professional work, gave an eminently practical outlet for his speculative powers.

In conclusion it should be noted that the entire collection of reprints would have been enhanced in value had the time and place of original publication (or delivery as lecture, when such was the case) been designated. It is worth the reader's while to know, for instance, that this essay was written in the author's younger literary life, and that embodies the thought of riper years. The place, review or magazine, is repeatedly mentioned, but not so the date. Moreover, it had been well to have signified the fact that the elaborate essay on the Culture of the Spiritual Sense appears substantially in *Phases of Thought and Criticisms*. These are trifling lacunæ which can be filled out in a future edition.—F. P. S.

ABBÉ DE BROGLIE—RELIGION ET CRITIQUE—ŒUVRE POSTHUME. Recueilli Par M. l'Abbé C. Piat. Paris: Lecoffre, Rue Bonaparte, 90. 1896. Pp. lx., 360.

ABBÉ C. PIAT, PROF. A L'INSTITUT CATH. DE PARIS—L'APOLOGETIQUE DE L'ABBÉ DE BROGLIE. Paris: Lecoffre. Pp. 83.

The Abbé de Broglie was one of those broad-minded, large-souled men of whom the Church in France has ever been prolific. By heredity, by education, by environment, by qualities of mind and heart, by Christian faith and charity, by priestly endowment, he was fitted to stand forth

in the present generation as one of the most prudent and valiant champions of Christianity against the advance of infidelity. A defender of the faith, he was more. Not content with passive resistance, he led the attack into the camp of the foe, combating on alien soil with the enemies' own weapons, weapons he had learned to wield as skilfully as though he had been drilled in their use from boyhood. The son of Duke Victor de Broglie and Mde. d'Haussonville, the germs which the blood of Mde. de Staël and Protestantism had left in his veins gave to his temperament that critical leaven which he used so well in defence of Catholicism. Educated first by Doudan, the famous critic of Saint Beuve and afterwards in the polytechnic school of Paris, the large intercourse in which his life was spent with men foreign to his own faith enabled him to appreciate their thoughts and feelings and to take the point of view from which they regarded his position. But above all it was the qualities—natural and infused—of mind and heart that made him the apologist he was and merited for him a place of honor beside the Frayssinous, the Lacordaires, the Ravignans, the Gratrys, the Dupanlous and the Frappels of yesterday.

Foremost among his works are "*Le Postivisme et la Science Experimentale*," "*L'Histoire des Religions*," and "*Le Present et l'Avenir du Catholicisme en France*."

Readers acquainted with these books will be glad to know that he has left a posthumous work which probably more completely than his earlier publications reflects his thought and character, and manifests the plan of campaign he pursued in his apologetic activity. The Abbé de Broglie was first and last a man of the times, in the sense that he understood and sympathized with the great movements, intellectual, social, religious, of humanity. Sensitive to all that makes for and against the higher interest of human souls, he was quick to discover and put to use methods of help and encouragement best adapted to the peculiar needs of the hour and his surroundings. Like that other eminent apologist, the Abbé Duilhé de Saint Projet, with whose spirit his own was so closely akin, he felt the need of modifying former apologetical methods so as to bring them closer to present habits of thought and feeling. Fully admitting the inner worth of the long-tried weapons of defence, he realized that they had become in large measure inefficient, because inapplicable to circumstances. The traditional philosophy of the schools in its bearing on apologetics had lost none of its essential strength, but its fundamental concepts and principles were not admitted by its adversaries, and it spoke in formulæ unintelligible to the outer world. Therefore must it be interpreted and translated in terms understood of those whose minds would be won to the truth. Hence his insistence in following the age in its thirst for the concrete. Religion, he saw, must be viewed primarily from the side of historic facts. The apologist must prove that the admission of certain facts—facts that can only be gainsaid by annihilating all historic certainty—implies the admission of "the transcendency of Christianity"—the fact, namely, that Christianity is a unique power in the world's history—unique especially when compared with other forms of belief and cult—a power inexplicable as an historic fact save in the hypothesis that it has come from God; that consequently God exists as Creator and Revealer. "*La thèse centrale de l'apologetique se ramène donc de nos jours à la transcendence du Christianisme*" (p. xvii.).

It suffices not, however, to establish the transcendent character and the divinity of the Christian religion, though this, of course, is the vital point. That religion must be defended against the manifold

and widespread objections brought to bear on it in the name of science and philosophy. The apologist must have at his command the ascertained facts and principles of physical science, and correlating them with the teachings of Christian faith show that between the two orders of truth there is not, as *à priori* there could not be, any real conflict. So, too, in the domain of philosophy. Alive to the wholesale destructiveness of modern positivism, he realized the necessity of a return to Thomistic philosophy, but to that philosophy, not changed, indeed, as to its essential content, but adjusted, as we have said, to present-day requirements. Philosophy, therefore, as history and science, must rise from the unmistakable data of inner and outer experience, from the facts of common sense, and holding ever to the controlling power of those facts, build up by patient abstraction and induction the principles that involve assent to the existence of God and of the supernatural order.

On these lines is laid this posthumous work of Dr. Broglie. Having wrought out by elaborate analysis a definition of religion in general and of the true religion in particular (Bk. I.), he develops the historical proofs for the "transcendancy" and divinity of Christianity (Bk. II.), and sets forth at considerable length the relations between religion and science (Bk. III), and between religion and philosophy (Bk. IV.). There would be little advantage in going farther into the detail of the author's argument, even were there space here at command to do so. Synopses and excerpts would be but threads rather mutilating than manifesting the closely-woven tissue of the thought. In its substance the historico-critical defence of Christianity is, of course, not new. The merit of the work at hand lies in its presenting the argument in bolder outline and fresher color. What the Abbé Piat has said of de Broglie's general apologetical work is especially verified in this his last legacy: "Il est peu d'hommes en notre siècle de chercheurs, qui aient émis, dans l'ordre des-questions religieuses et morales, un si grand nombre d'idées a la fois neuves et saines" (p. viii.).

The editor introduces the volume with a luminous picture of the author's life-work and methods. In the brochure mentioned in the heading above the preface has been published apart and enlarged by some twenty pages, wherein the personality of the author is reflected in colors which glow at once with the deep mental and religious life of the original and the genuine admiration and friendship of the artist for his illustrious friend. The secret of de Broglie's greatness is here unveiled. It lay in a heart, childlike and keenly sympathetic by nature, uplifted and inflamed by a divine charity—*vere magnus quia magnam habuit caritatem*: in a mind whose native soundness and acumen, docile to higher influences, recognized the conformity with itself of the *rationabile obsequium* of faith and submitted humbly, unswervingly, irrevocably to its teachings: La charité fut le mobile unique auquel obéit l'Abbé de Broglie dans tous ses écrits: et son idée directrice au milieu des questions de nature un peu troublante qu'il agissait sans cesse, ce fut sa foi aussi ferme qu'éclairée" (p. 68).

In conclusion, we warmly recommend this work to all whose privilege it is to explain the fundamental arguments for the Christian religion, and to those whose duty it is to be ready at all times to render a reason for the hope that is in them. To both it will be a treasure house of fact and proof and illustration which the long experience of de Broglie had found aptest for present service.—F. P. S.

THE CHURCH AND MODERN SOCIETY. Lectures and Addresses. By *Most Rev. John Ireland*, Archbishop of St. Paul. Chicago and New York: D. H. McBride & Co. 1896. Pp. ix., 413.

The friends and admirers of Archbishop Ireland will be pleased to know that he has given in this volume a unity and permanent form to his lectures delivered at various places and on different occasions, both at home and abroad. The public utterances of the eminent prelate cover a wide range of subjects, but, as is well known to every one familiar with recent history, they all focus on the central idea conveyed by the title of the volume at hand. The Church in relation to civil society as such, to the present age, to liberal education, to charity, to the cause of temperance—these are the constituent notes of the idea itself. The mission of Catholics in America, the philosophy of human progress, the meaning of true patriotism and of American citizenship, the State and the parish school, the vital question of social purity and other subjects of cognate character, suggest attributes equally intrinsic to or emanant from the same idea. The views of Archbishop Ireland on these lines of thought are more or less familiar to all close observers of contemporary events. There are, of course, to be found those who dissent from some of these views, or rather, perhaps, from what they regard as undue emphasis to a certain policy therein exhibited. None, however, will refuse the measure of praise due to the strong, earnestly striven for convictions, and the intense zeal for the manifesting of the Church's attitude towards all that makes for the preservation and advance of American society.

The special value of this collection of addresses is that it presents a complete picture of the speaker, the man and the prelate. Whatever view one may take of his policy, it is certain that the Archbishop of St. Paul has had and has a large influence in moulding public opinion, both within and without the Catholic Church. It is well, therefore, that the world of to-day and the historian of to-morrow should be able to discern the principles and theories that guide his activity and lie back of his social power. The present volume will furnish the desired data and criteria.

Usually the printed page is but a weak expression of the spoken word. This is not the case with Archbishop Ireland's lectures. The mute type seems to echo much of the vigorous eloquence, the passion and pathos with which the orator is wont to inspire his discourses and move his auditors.

The lectures have been "printed in the hope that they may be of some help in showing the attitude of the Church towards certain of the great issues of the day, and, perhaps, in stimulating among Catholics a more active interest in the various questions with which the Church and society are equally concerned" (p. ix.). In this dual hope the author, we believe, will not be disappointed. In favor of a realization of the latter—"the stimulating a more active interest" in social-religious questions—it may not be amiss to profit by the outlook sketched by Mr. F. H. Giddings, professor of sociology at Columbia University. Writing in the "*Political Science Quarterly*," for December, he says: Only to the faint-hearted and to the short-sighted should there be any need to say that a determined effort to restore that faith [in the true aristocracy of intellect and conscience] is to be the most momentous sociological phenomenon of the next fifty years. The initiative may be taken by the Roman Catholic Church. Accepting democracy as the inevitable form of the state within the constitution, the Roman Catholic Church fully and deliberately intends to make itself again what once

it was—the ruling aristocracy of the state behind the constitution. If this course becomes more and more obvious, the forces of Protestantism will again be aroused to intense activity. The principles of liberty and of individual responsibility will again be opposed to the principle of authority, and will again fascinate the minds of rationalistic men. In all probability, therefore, the destiny of democracy is to be controlled either by religious authority or by a much more earnest and thoughtful type of Protestant liberalism than that which prevails to-day. In a struggle between these forces men of all ranks and conditions, the rich and the poor, the learned and the unlearned, will give their allegiance to worthy leaders. It should be needless to add that such a struggle, if it comes, will be a contest of ideas.” Whether Prof. Giddings reads aright the signs of the times or not need not be here discussed, but if, as he thinks, such “a contest of ideas” is pending, it is most important that both sides should have clear conceptions as to the real teaching of the Church concerning her attitude towards the American form of government. Books like this of Archbishop Ireland will be helpful in this direction.—F. P. S.

LUTHER'S "SAINTLY" LIFE AND "SAINTLY" DEATH (Luther's "Heiliger" Leben und "Heiliger" Tod). *J. A. Kleis*. Maintz: Kirchheim, 1896.

This volume, the work of a missionary priest in Norway, has attracted considerable attention. It must not be placed in a line with Janssen's "History of the German People," or Pastor's "History of the Popes." Its primary object is controversial, not historical. The author, unfortunately now deceased, undertook by the offensive-defensive method to uphold the honor and reliability of Catholic historical science, which had been assailed by Prof. Nielsen, of Copenhagen. Nielsen was unfortunate not only in the cause he championed, but also in the opponent he brought into the lists. For F. Kleis was not only a scholar well versed in the voluminous literature, Catholic and Protestant, that deals with Luther's life, but was a disputant skilful in the art of literary fencing. His arms are sharp and pointed, and no exposed point in the enemy's armor escapes his sure and rapid eye. To prove his charges, Nielsen had appealed to Catholic historical treatment of the founder of his sect, and ventilated in terms far from measured his disgust at the picture they had drawn of the "saintly" Luther. Kleis, while refuting the Danish professor, takes occasion to illustrate Luther's "holy" life by an anthology from the "Reformer's" writings. We should not recommend the "holy" man's strong and odorous flowers for parlor use. Perhaps the most interesting part of the work deals with Luther's death. Kleis, by a minute, keen and careful analysis of the principal versions of the occurrence by the ex-monk's friends, proves that these are far from harmonious as to the details of his death. On the principle *qui s'excuse s'accuse*, they lead us to the conclusion that something happened in connection with Luther's decease that needed defence. The self-contradictory and mutually contradictory accounts of Justus Jonas, Coelius, Aurifaber and the Count of Mansfeld must awaken the suspicions of every open-minded reader. What was it that they sought to conceal? From the first, Coelius tells us, wicked rumors circulated regarding the "holy" man's death, and we come upon traces of these here and there in contemporaneous writers. But the Catholic controvertist, Cochlaeus, in 1548, only three years after Luther's death, brings us a report said by him to come from a Catholic eye-witness of the scene. Dr. Paulus, of Munich, thinks that the author of this narrative

was Joh. Landan, apothecary, at Eisleben. His arguments are not without cogency. From this account it appears that Luther was found dead in his bed, and that all attempts made to resuscitate him failed. Coelius' remark that "Luther was not yet dead twenty-four hours and already people say that he was found dead in bed" seems to confirm the story of the Catholic eye-witness. Kleis also discusses and seems to view with favor the report that Luther hanged himself. This report, which, when championed by Dr. Majunke, the author of "*Geschichtslügen*," caused much controversy, is based on a document first referred to by Bazius about 1592-3, purporting to be the statement of one of Luther's servants, who had subsequently returned to the Church. The document was first published by the Franciscan Sedulius in 1606, but does not contain the name of the witness, Majunke and Kleis identifying him with Ambrosius Rudtfeldt, who was certainly present at Luther's death. But Kleis gives no reasons for his identification, and Dr. Paulus calls the statement an "anonymous" document. At all events, Paulus, in the "*Historical Year-Book of the Görres Society*," rejects the story as not satisfactorily proved. We learn that this distinguished scholar is preparing for Herder a work on the personal history of the "Reformers," which lay somewhat outside of the scope of Janssen's works. —C. G. H.

HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN GERMANY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. Vol. III. *Dr. Heinrich Brück*. Maintz: Kirchheim, 1896.

The author of the present work is well known in the United States from the translation of his "*History of the Church*," which has been published in this country and has met with a cordial reception. The present work supplies a real need. It is often more difficult to find a connected narrative of events comparatively recent than of earlier ages, which bear a far less important relation to the present. The volume lying before us gives us a narrative of the revival of church life in Germany, which followed the revolutionary movement of 1848. The blessings conferred by that movement on the Catholic Church in Germany are undeniable. The liberties granted to the German people were shared to some extent at least by the Church, and the fetters of State control, which had hindered all real activity and progress, were broken, at least in part. Luckily the fortunes of the German Church were, during this period (1848-70), guided by a galaxy of loyal, devoted and able bishops, that struggled without fear and reproach for the reconquest of the rights of the Church, men like Cardinal von Geissel, von Reisach and von Rauscher, Bishops Blune, Weiss and von Ketteler, and the venerable nonagenarian Archbishop von Vicari, of Freiburg in Baden. Manfully they fought for their righteous cause, not without suffering at times the bitterest persecution, short of personal violence. The Papacy also worked might and main to secure for the Catholics of Austria and Germany their guaranteed rights and liberties. But of what avail are earnestness and diplomatic ability when the modern State unblushingly tears into shreds concordats and conventions sealed and sworn to but a few months before? The reader will find in Brück's book a doleful tale of baseness and perfidy that makes him wonder how the German governments could retain even the slightest remnant of respect among, we shall not say Catholics, but honest Protestants. In pleasant contrast with the unblushing faithlessness of the ruling powers, especially in the Catholic countries, Baden, Bavaria, Austria, is the picture of the unfolding of active Catholic life in Germany. The establishment of

associations for the support of Catholic interests, religious, literary, journalistic, artistic, social, is a visible proof that Christian Rome, like its imperial predecessor, derives new strength from struggles and losses. Among the most interesting facts set forth by Dr. Brück is the bitter hostility of Bismarck to everything Catholic long before the era of the Kultur Kampf. As early as 1854, when Bismarck was still Prussia's delegate at the German Diet in Frankfort, he went out of his way to prevent the settlement of the troubles then existing between the grand-ducal government of Baden and the venerable Archbishop von Vicari at Freiburg. About the same time he played the part of firebrand in Nassau. Altogether, the story of the bigotry and faithlessness of German statesmen, Catholic and Protestants, is far from edifying. The quiet, reflecting reader asks himself, "Is it possible that men of learning and education can be so ignorant, so impracticable and so purblind, when are they inspired by hate and malice?"

The book under review is a valuable compilation of mostly authoritative documents telling its story. It is to be regretted that the author does not possess or certainly does not use the gift of historical portraiture. The characterization of Bismarck, the only attempt of the kind in the book, is lifeless. What grand subjects for portraiture von Ketteler and von Vicari would have been! We should also desire to hear Brück's explanation of the fact why the legislatures of States like Baden, Bavaria and Austria, States overwhelmingly Catholic, should be so bitterly and persistently hostile to the Church and the Bishops.—C. G. H.

PRÆLECTIONES DOGMATICÆ QUAS IN COLLEGIO DITTON—HALL HABEBAT *Christianus. Pesch, S. J.* Tom. iv., pp. xiii., 350, pr. \$1.90. Tom. vi., pp. xviii., 428. Price, \$2.20. Friburgi, St. Louis, Mo.: Herder. 1896.

INSTITUTIONES THEOLOGICÆ IN USUM SCHOLARUM AUCTORE. By *G. Bern. Tepe, S. J.* In quatuor vol., pr., 24 francs. Index generalis separatim. Price, ½ franc. Parisiis: P. Lethielleux, 10 Rue Cassette. 1896.

It is not with theology as with some departments of physical science, that the latest books are the best. The classic life of dogmatic theology went out with the seventeenth century, with the age of giants like Suarez and Vasquez, Lessius, Ripalda, de Lugo, Petavius, Gonet, Goudin, Alvarez, the Salmanticenses and the other like *virī famosi a seculo*; and though the subsequent century added some honored names to the roll, such as Billuart, Gotti, Berti, Tournely and the Wirceburgenses, our own age has for the most part been living on the gathered stores of the greater past. One may stand before the two dozen folios left us by St. Thomas of Aquin, or the score and a half noble tomes of Suarez and dream dreams of the greatness of soul, the profound penetration of intellect, the soarings of genius, the unflagging industry of these builders at the temple of wisdom; yet the noise and flurry of real life soon dispel the vision and bring home the stern reality that the days of the folio are vanished, and the synopsis and primer hold the field. Let us then by all means have good compendia, made by hands that themselves have delved in the buried treasures of more favored times, and let us have reliable guide-books to point the busy traveller to sources whence he may draw and fill out the sketches caught in brief sojourning in the vast domain of theology. The many and constantly increasing demands on the student's course in our ecclesiastical institutions make it urgent that the text-books should present in shape as compact as may comport with clearness the contents of their respective subjects.

Though, therefore, it is not true, as we have said, that the latest theological books are the best, the growing experience on the part of professors as to what is needed in the line of institutes of theology to fit in with present-day requirements gives a presumption in favor of works like those before us. They are the latest of their kind, and certainly amongst the very best. Intended primarily if not exclusively for class purposes, they are admirably adapted to such use. Of the three opening volumes of Fr. Pesch's *Prælectiones* we have spoken with commendation in former numbers of this REVIEW. The fourth volume, dealing with the Incarnation and cognate subjects, and the sixth, treating of the Sacraments in general and the first three in particular, have just been published. As in the preceding, so in these latter tracts, the author shows that mastery of the matter which permits him to select what is most essential for grounding the student in the science of dogma, while the skill of the experienced teacher is apparent throughout in the orderly arrangement of detail, the simplicity and clearness of propositions and the logical marshalling and exposition of proof.

Three more volumes are still required to complete the course. The seventh will carry on the theology of the last four Sacraments. The fifth, treating of Grace, will follow next. The eighth and last will explain the virtues, sin and "de-novissimis." The work, when finished, will fill about thirty-two hundred royal octavo pages. From this it is evident that it may be called a compendium only in a sense relative to the vast range of dogmatic science. For the rest, its amplitude presupposes a three years' course of philosophy and four years given to theology.

Fr. Tepe's "Institutes of Theology" has also but recently fallen from the press. Like the *Prælectiones* of Fr. Pesch, this work is meant for the class hall, for which use it has proved its appositeness, its contents having been for a number of years in the hands of the author's pupils, the Jesuit scholastics of the English province. Comprised within about twenty-eight hundred octavo pages, it too can be called a compendium only in the relative sense before indicated. Sufficiently extended to take in the essential as well as integral parts of theology, the degree of development given to its subjects adapts the work to the average seminary curriculum. Of its special merits in this line we shall speak in a future number of the REVIEW.—F. P. S.

HISTORIA EXERCITIURUM SPIRITUALIUM—S. P. IGNATII DE LOYOLA. Collecta et Concinnata a P. Ign. Diertins, S. J. Nova Editio. Friburgi. St. Louis, Mo.: Herder. Pp. 323. Price, \$1.20.

In taking Jesuitism in its literal meaning, apart from the opprobrious accretion which bigotry has fastened to it, we ask for the principles on which is based that wonderful system of ideas and practical methods concentered, so to speak, in the Society of Jesus, we have but to point to the Book of Exercises. In that compendium of spiritual wisdom are summarized the truths which, expressing as they do the fundamental relations, natural and supernatural, existing between man and his Maker, embody the profoundest, most universal and sincerest doctrine of life, truths on which Ignatius of Loyola, co-operating with divine grace, moulded his own mind and heart and entire spiritual activity, on which, moreover, were formed those giants of wisdom and apostolic virtue, the early Jesuits, and on which the constitution was framed and the Society organized, and grew to be the power it has been in the

Church and the world at large during the past three hundred years. Whatever, therefore, will contribute to a fuller understanding of a philosophy which has in practice so uncontrovertibly verified its theory should have an interest not confined to the Society which it directly animates and governs. No small literature contributing to this end has grown up around the Book of the Exercises wherein that philosophy is formulated—a literature, however, mainly explanatory and illustrative of the doctrine of the spiritual life as set forth in the Exercises. For a history of the work itself and its use and spread during the early life of the Society the interested student has had to draw upon the large *Lives of St. Ignatius* by Maffei, Bartoli and Orlandino. In 1700 the Belgian Jesuit, Fr. Diertins, published at Rome his "*Historia Exercitiorum Spiritualium*," covering the history of the Exercises during the lifetime of St. Ignatius. Death prevented the author carrying the narrative farther. The first edition and a second, published in 1732, are long out of print. The present edition contains, besides the matter of the two former, several documents from the Bollandists pertinent to the early history of the Exercises. The work is intended as fundamental to a Manresan series of books which the Society of Jesus intends publishing.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- DEMON POSSESSION AND ALLIED THEMES, being an instructive study of phenomena of our own times. By *Rev. John L. Nevins, D. D.* Chicago, New York, Toronto: Heming H. Revell Company. 1896. Price, \$1.50.
- ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NICENE THEOLOGY. By *Hugh M. Scott, D. D.*, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Chicago Theological Seminary. Chicago: Theol. Sem. Press. 1896. Pp. 390.
- LIFE AND LETTERS OF FATHER JOHN MORRIS, S. J. (1826-1893). By *Father J. H. Pollen, S. J.* London: Burns and Oates, Limited. Received from Benziger Brothers.
- PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY. by *Dr. Paul Carus*. Revised edition. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1896. Pp. 242. Price, \$1.00.
- SCIENCE AND THE CHURCH. By *Rev. J. A. Zahm, Ph.D., C.S.C.* Chicago: D. H. McBride & Co. 1896. Pp. 299. Price, \$1.50.
- NATURE OF AN UNIVERSE OF LIFE. By *Leonidas Spratt*. Jacksonville, Fla.: Vance Printing Co. 1896. Pp. xii., 210.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE Most Reverend Delegate Apostolic, in a letter which we hastened to make known to the public as soon as received, has decided that (adversely to the opinion expressed on page 890 of our last volume) permission to retain a nominal membership in the three societies recently condemned must, *in each individual case*, be sought from the Apostolic Delegation. We are sincerely grateful to His Grace for having enlightened us on a point concerning which there had been a wide divergence of opinion, and request our readers to note the correction.

* * *

We deem it opportune to reiterate that the editors of this REVIEW do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions expressed in its columns by their contributors, who are at liberty to exercise their ingenuity within that wide debatable region into which the infallible authority of the Church has refused to enter. No other restraints are placed upon our esteemed writers than those imposed by orthodox faith and sincere charity. In thus defining our policy we but repeat the words written by our revered editor-in-chief when he assumed the supreme direction of the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW:

“Contributors will be allowed all proper freedom in the expression of their thoughts outside the domain of defined doctrines, the REVIEW not holding itself responsible for the individual opinions of its contributors.” (July, 1890.)

* * *

Our readers have, no doubt, been pained to learn that one of the ablest and most faithful of our staff of contributors, ARTHUR F. MARSHALL, B. A., has departed this life after long and excruciating sufferings, borne with the heroic Christian fortitude which had sustained him throughout a life of utter self-renunciation. His papers, especially upon the subject of the Anglican schism, were models both in form and matter; and he possessed, in an eminent degree, the art of enforcing his arguments with an inimitable wit, at times pungent, but always charitable. *May he rest in peace!*

